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 This dissertation examines the transformation of the World Bank’s agenda for 
private sector participation in urban water and sanitation utilities in developing 
countries between 1990-2010.  I analyze agenda change at the Bank at the level of 
international policy and through a case study of Uruguay.  The case study of Uruguay 
examines a successful domestic and transnational activist campaign to reform that 
country’s constitution to prohibit private sector involvement in the provision of water 
and sanitation services.   
 I find that a pro-privatization agenda institutionalized in the Bank during the 
1990s as a result of convergent interests between donor states, the Bank, and 
transnational corporations was destabilized by a dynamic interplay of external and 
internal forces in the 2000s.  Transnational activist networks, client states, and 
transnational corporations in retreat comprised the new configuration of external 
actors constraining the Bank in the 2000s.  Tensions internal to the Bank, between its 
roles as a financial institution and a knowledge producer, and in relation to its 
neoliberal ideological orientation, have militated against sustained learning as the 
Bank has confronted the failure of its agenda.  I show the Bank to be only a partial 
 
 
learner, unable to resolve contradictions between its espoused development goals, 
profit-making imperative, and ideology.  
 Transnational activists’ impact on the Bank occurred primarily through 
country-level campaigns, not through direct engagement or donor pressure, the main 
routes through which civil society activists have engaged with the Bank in the past.  
The case study of Uruguay illustrates the contradiction between ideology and “bottom 
line” pragmatism within the Bank, as well as the challenges facing activists seeking to 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
  
 For the last two decades the World Bank has promoted market-oriented 
reforms in the infrastructure sectors of developing countries, including urban water 
supply and sanitation (WSS).1  This dissertation seeks to explain how the Bank’s 
agenda for introducing private sector participation (PSP) in water and sanitation 
changed between 1990-2010, and what accounted for that change.  I focus particular 
attention on the role of transnational activist networks (TANs), acting in support of 
domestic campaigns, in transforming the Bank’s agenda.  I find that a pro-
privatization agenda institutionalized in the 1990s as a result of convergent interests 
between donor states, the Bank, and transnational corporations (TNCs) was 
destabilized in the 2000s by a dynamic interplay of forces internal and external to the 
Bank, including opposition from TANs.  
 Infrastructure services, especially WSS, have historically been provided by 
the state because of a combination of natural monopoly characteristics (economies of 
scale associated with pipe networks) and the public- or merit-good attributes of the 
service.2  The World Bank has pushed for private sector participation in WSS, rather 
than full or partial privatization, in recognition of these characteristics.  PSP in water 
and sanitation has been part of the Bank’s larger neoliberal development agenda, an 
extension of the principles and policies underlying the so-called “Washington 
                                           
1 Other multilateral and international organizations have been equally strong promoters of market-
oriented reforms in infrastructure sectors.  These include the International Monetary Fund, regional 
and bilateral development finance institutions, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, and associations of water private water operators. 
2 WSS are not pure public goods in that they are neither non-excludable or non-rival.  However, WSS 
has merit good characteristics because of positive health externalities associated with the provision of 
potable water and basic sanitation, and negative externalities which may result from adverse behavior 
by individual producers or consumers (such as contamination or pollution).   
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Consensus” of the 1990s.3  The Bank’s embrace of PSP reflected both sector-specific 
failures in Bank lending policies during previous decades, as well as the larger 
ideological framework of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) which guided the 
IFIs’ approach to development lending during this period.  It was fueled by 
transnational corporations’ drive to penetrate developing country markets, and the 
demonstration effect of PSP in countries which had privatized some or all of the 
sector, such as Chile, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and France.  The Bank 
promoted PSP in the belief that private investors would inject desperately needed 
investment capital and bring sound management into deteriorating, inefficient, and 
often corruptly-run urban water utilities in developing countries.  
 The 1992 “Dublin Statement” which emerged from the International 
Conference on Water and the Environment and was reaffirmed at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development , was a turning point in affirming 
water as an economic good as well as a social or merit good.  The “new public 
management” school of thought, an intellectual relative of public choice and new 
institutional economics, provided theoretical and ideological support for advocates of  
PSP.  The 1994 World Development Report and the Bank’s 1995 flagship 
publication, Bureaucrats in Business, drew on these conceptual frameworks, and 
memorialized the full tilt toward PSP for public services.  After world leaders adopted 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, the Bank touted PSP as the best 
                                           
3 The “Washington Consensus” was a term coined by John Williamson in 1989 with respect to 
prescriptions for reviving growth in Latin America.  It referred to a policy mix which prescribed the 
main elements of structural adjustment and stabilization policies, such as trade and financial 
liberalization, reordering public expenditure priorities, privatization, deregulation, tax reform, and 
protecting property rights.  See: Williamson, J. 2002. Did the Washington Consensus Fail?  
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics. 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488 (November 27, 2010). 
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hope for reaching the target in water and sanitation: halving the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation by 2015.  
 The 1990s were the heyday of PSP, a period during which the Bank fostered 
the growth of TNCs providing infrastructure services. But this period proved short-
lived: total global private sector investment in WSS peaked in 1997 at $9.97 billion 
and has declined since, averaging one-third of that for the period 2005-2008, and as 
low as 15 percent of this total in other years since 2001.4  Hopes placed in the private 
sector as a source for mobilizing finance were dashed, and a sizeable proportion of 
high-profile PSP projects collapsed.  Between 1991 and 2009, 64 Bank projects 
representing over one-third of total investment in WSS projects with PSP ($20.8 
billion out of $60.5 billion) were classified by the Bank as either cancelled or in 
distress.5  This 34 percent cancellation and distress rate compares to six percent of 
PSP projects in energy, three percent in telecommunications, and eight percent in the 
transportation sector.6   
 A variety of factors have contributed to the sharp decline and reconfiguration 
of water-related PSP over the last ten to twelve years: financial crises, transnational 
activist mobilization against privatization, domestic political opposition, TNCs’ 
reassessment of risk, and Bank miscalculations about PSP and the WSS sector.  
Transnational activism and country-based campaigns against water privatization 
surged during the first five years of the 21st century across continents and in countries 
                                           
4 The World Bank Group, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, Sector Data Snapshots, 
Water and Sewerage.  http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreSector.aspx?sectorID=4 (March 
30,2010) 
5 The World Bank Group, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), November 2010. 
Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, “Sector Data Snapshots-Water and Sewerage.”   
http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreSector.aspx?sectorID=4  (November 21, 2010) 
6 The World Bank Group, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, November 2010.  
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at all levels of development.  In early 2004, Public Citizen, the leading U.S.-based 
NGO active in transnational networks against water privatization, chronicled 
resistance to privatization efforts in 31 countries around the world.  Among the 
highest-profile campaigns were those in Argentina, Bolivia, Ghana, India, the 
Philippines, South Africa, and Uruguay—the case I analyze in this dissertation.   
The Bank’s agenda for PSP was perforce altered by these external 
developments as well as by internal reassessment and evaluation. The period 2003-
04, centered on the third World Water Forum, represented a turning point in the 
Bank’s public posture towards PSP.  The Bank admitted that privatization’s virtues 
had been oversold, declared itself an agnostic on whether infrastructure should be in 
public or private hands, and unveiled a “second generation” of infrastructure reforms 
to address a range of acknowledged problems in the Bank’s first generation of PSP 
policies.  But the Bank’s subsequent ambivalence toward implementing this second 
generation of reforms, its reactions to a changed external environment, and continued 
conflicts within the Bank’s internal organizational culture, have rendered agenda 
change an erratic, complex and often contradictory process.  
 The anti-privatization or “water justice” movement has also had to respond to 
a changed external environment: the retreat of major TNCs from developing country 
markets, the corresponding loss of a “framing” target, and the decline in PSP projects 
financed by the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral aid agencies.  
These are the trajectories and processes I examine in this dissertation. 
 




This dissertation seeks to answer two questions: 
(1) How has the World Bank’s agenda for PSP in WSS changed over the last decade? 
(2) What accounts for transformation in that agenda?  In particular, what role have 
transnational activist networks  played in this transformation?  
 I look at these questions at the international level of policymaking and 
agenda-setting in the World Bank, at the level of transnational activist networking, 
and through the nexus of international and domestic politics in my case study of 
Uruguay.  The case study of Uruguay examines a successful domestic and 
transnational activist campaign to reform that country’s constitution to prohibit 
private-sector involvement in the provision of WSS services.  I analyze the campaign, 
the linkages between TANs and the domestic coalition, and the World Bank’s role in 
the WSS sector before and after the constitutional reform in 2004. 
 To answer the first question I draw on the synthetic theoretical approach of 
Weaver (2007, 2008) and Miller-Adams (1999), who hold that agenda change in the 
World Bank is best understood through a lens that combines international relations 
theory and sociological organization theory.  International relations theory helps to 
explain external influences on the Bank, while sociological organization theory 
informs an understanding of the Bank’s internal culture, norms, bureaucracy, and 
incentive structures.  I present two schematic representations (or descriptive models) 
to account, respectively, for external and internal influences on change in the Bank’s 
agenda from the 1990s to the 2000s.7  The external model examines the influence of 
four actors in the context of changes in the global political economy: client states, 
                                           
7 These schematic representations are presented in Figures 1 through 4.  For simplicity’s sake, I refer to 




donor states, TNCs, and TANs, and identifies the direction and degree of their 
influence on the Bank.  The internal model identifies three components of the Bank’s 
internal organizational culture which are central to explaining agenda change in PSP 
in tandem with the external actors and variables I identify.  These are the Bank’s role 
qua (development) bank, its recognized role as an authoritative knowledge producer, 
and its dominant ideology of neoliberalism. 
 
1.2. External Influences on the Bank  
 
I argue that neoliberal governments in key donor states, interest by public 
service TNCs in expanding markets, and pressure on client states to reform each 
contributed to the realization of the Bank’s agenda in WSS during the 1990s.  Donor 
states, especially the United States, were key external actors exerting pressure on the 
Bank to incorporate private sector development (PSD) into its program and project 
lending.  As Miller-Adams notes, the PSD/PSP agenda was readily institutionalized 
because this external pressure was aligned with the Bank’s internal culture and 
ideology.  Poor client countries, plagued by debt and fiscal crises in the 1980s, were 
not in a position to resist Bank and IMF policies prescribing austerity and pro-market 
reforms.  Changes in the global political economy favoring market liberalization (e.g., 
capital mobility and liquidity) enabled multilateral financial institutions to press for 
WSS sector reforms with client countries through loan conditionalities, and facilitated 
water TNCs’ interest and investment in developing country markets.  Middle-income 
client countries, such as Argentina, supported PSP in the belief that it would 
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contribute to fiscal stabilization, improve efficiency, and increase investment, growth, 
and access for residential users.  
But by the turn of the 21st century, many transition and middle-income 
developing countries which had abandoned protectionism and import-substituting 
industrialization became disillusioned with the unrealized promises of liberalization 
and market reforms.  A number of these countries were afflicted by destabilizing 
currency and financial crises and had increasingly vocal publics who felt deceived by 
infrastructure privatizations.  Privatization policies became associated with higher 
utility rates, higher profits for foreign companies, and corruption.  “Reform fatigue” 
had set in, and public support for policies promoting PSP reversed course.  In Chapter 
Four I describe the influence of four actors on the Bank in the changed external 
environment of the 2000s, with transnational activist networks the new addition to the 
prior coterie of donor states, client states, and TNCs.  Changes in the global political 
economy strongly conditioned the interests and behavior of these four actors and their 
relationships to Bank WSS policy outcomes stands in sharp contrast to the vectors of 
influence a decade earlier.  At the same time, changes in interests and behavior, 
especially for the TANs and the Bank’s client borrowers, reflect a reaction to 
misguided or failed Bank and IFI policies for PSP in the 1990s.  As noted above, 
TNCs’ interest in developing country markets declined dramatically in the first few 
years of the new century.  This seriously constrained the Bank’s PSP agenda, and was 
met with redoubled efforts by the Bank to incentivize the private sector to invest, with 
little effect.  Client countries also now constrained the Bank’s agenda: faced with 
disaffected voters and popular resistance to market reforms, they reduced demand for 
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loans with PSP and/or pushed backed against loans with such conditionality.  The 
major donor countries with neoliberal governments continued to support and push 
PSP lending, but their influence mattered less in the face of the other actors’ 
withdrawal from, or rejection of, that agenda. 
TANs were the new external force constraining the Bank in the 2000s.  I 
argue that their impact on the Bank was almost entirely indirect yet no less (and 
perhaps more) effective than it would have been under direct engagement strategies.  
TANs’ effects on the Bank were mediated through support provided to country-level 
campaigns, which impacted governments (client countries) and water TNCs.  The 
case study of Uruguay that I present is a preeminent example of pressure exerted on 
the Bank through a vigorous and broad-based country campaign with TAN support.  
It had the added punch of directly proscribing any PSP lending after the constitutional 
reform passed.  The campaign, in turn, had a strong demonstration effect on 
subsequent strategizing by TANs and other domestic anti-privatization coalitions, 
which had an object lesson in the effectiveness of constitutional engineering.  
Secondarily, TANs wielded influence via negative publicity generated at 
international events and networking venues such as the World Water Forum and 
World Social Forum.  The impact of “water justice” TANs on the Bank thus did not 
occur through the usual channels of NGO or civil society organization (CSO) 
influence typically recounted in the literature (see Chapter Two).  These have 
involved insider-outsider alliances (pairing internal advocates who can move agendas 
from within the Bank with external activists) and/or campaigns to pressure donor 
countries.  I argue that the former could not occur given the nature of the issue area: 
8 
 
PSP is an integral component of the Bank’s neoliberal toolkit.  For the same reasons, 
donor-oriented strategies also played only a small role.  As I discuss in Chapter Five, 
direct engagement with the Bank has been minimal in contrast to country-level 
campaigns, and largely ineffectual.  The uneven willingness to engage with the Bank 
reflected schisms among NGOs and a misalignment in priorities between the Bank 
and NGOs, even among project-oriented NGOs (such as the U.K.-based WaterAid) 
which were less adamant in their opposition to all forms of PSP. 
  
1.3. Internal Influences on the Bank  
 
 In Chapter Four I put forward a descriptive model of the interactions between 
three components of the Bank’s internal organizational culture that I hold have been 
central to understanding agenda change around WSS policies, in dynamic interaction 
with external influences.  As I noted above, these are the Bank’s acclaimed role as a 
“knowledge bank” or knowledge producer; its role as a profit-making financial 
institution, and its neoliberal ideological orientation.  I argue that conflicts among 
these elements and different functional or structural imperatives (e.g., a culture which 
rewards rapid loan approval and disbursement) have rendered the Bank’s agenda for 
PSP in water contradictory and often at odds with the knowledge produced by experts 
inside the Bank.  A prominent illustration of one such unresolved contradiction is the 
conflict between the Bank’s interest in churning loans and the “patient loan capital” 
needed for developing institutional capacity in developing countries—something the 
Bank repeatedly acknowledges is an essential precondition for effective regulation of 
both public and private service providers.   
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 Analogously, I find that knowledge production and the Bank’s still-dominant 
neoliberal ideology are in continual tension around the PSP agenda in WSS.  I closely 
analyze a number of high-profile Bank research publications on PSP in WSS and 
consistently find incongruities between their internal content and their précis or 
executive summaries.  Close readings of these studies reveal that most or all of the 
advantages the Bank ascribes to PSP over public provision disappear; further, PSP’s 
effects on the poor are typically undocumented, or in several instances, acknowledged 
to be negative.  I argue that conflicts within the Bank’s organizational culture and 
among its competing roles have militated against sustained learning with respect to 
PSP in WSS.  Rather, I find the Bank to be a partial learner, at best, caught in an 
identity crisis.   
 My case study of Uruguay confirms this internal model.  Loan documents to 
the WSS sector reveal that the imposition of PSP loan conditions prior to the 
constitutional reform stemmed more from ideological conviction than from analysis 
of the public utility’s deficiencies. Conversely, the Bank had no problem in 
continuing its lending to the public sector after the passage of the constitutional 
reform, and even admitted that the new center-left government was more committed 




 I employed a case study approach to examine (1) the process of agenda 
transformation in WSS at the Bank at the level of international policymaking and (2) 
to analyze the constitutional reform campaign in Uruguay and its effects on the Bank 
10 
 
and the “water justice” movement.  Each of these two cases has intrinsic and 
instrumental characteristics.8  There is intrinsic value to understanding agenda 
transformation inside the world’s largest development finance institution and one of 
the largest international organizations.  At the same time, the specific case of private 
sector participation in water has instrumental value for understanding other instances 
of agenda transformation inside the Bank.    
 The Uruguay case study has intrinsic value because it was a unique example 
of a successful water activist campaign centered around a strategy of constitutional 
engineering.  The particularities of Uruguay as a small, educated, upper middle-
income developing country favored social and political mobilization, rendering it an 
atypical or “extreme” case.  In this respect it is a weak test for generalizing the effects 
of activist mobilization on agenda change in the Bank.  But as an extreme case, it is a 
strong test of what we can learn about the behavior and influence of TANs and 
activist domestic coalitions under optimal conditions for political mobilization, and 
through a successful campaign which had a strong demonstration effect on the water 
justice movement. The Uruguay case has instrumental value for understanding the 
challenges facing water justice activists after a successful campaign.  It is likewise a 
strong test of the Bank’s ex post reaction to a blanket prohibition on PSP in a country 
where it had been pushing this strategy through loan conditionalities. 
                                           
8 An intrinsic case study is motivated by a primary interest in exploring the uniqueness of the case 
itself, rather than to extend theory or generalize across cases.  In instrumental case study research, the 
case facilitates understanding of something other than the case itself, by providing insight into 
particular issues, facilitating generalizations, or building theory.  See Intrinsic and Instrumental Case 
Studies. 2009. In Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. http://proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/form?qurl+http%3A%2F%2Fwww.credoreference.com/entry/sagecsr/. 
(March 4, 2011) 
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   I used a methodology of triangulation to conduct my research through (1) 
close reading of primary and archival documents, (2) semi-structured and open-ended 
interviews, and (3) non-participant observation at closed and open meetings and 
events.  For my research on the World Bank I utilized a broad array of official 
publications and records including scholarly research reports often co-published with 
academic presses, project loan and country assessment documents, reports published 
by the independent evaluation arm of the Bank, transcripts of meetings and 
conferences, and other primary digital media sources.  Taken together as a repository 
of information these sources articulate the policies, standard operating procedures, 
and external and internal justifications for Bank programs and positions. When 
reading these documents I paid close attention to backgrounded and foregrounded 
information, such as divergences between internal content and content highlighted in 
executive summaries and précis.  Certain types of documents, for example, 
“Implementation and Completion Reports” for project loans, are often mainly 
targeted at an internal audience and can subtly reveal the Bank’s assessment of its 
own shortcomings, and/or interesting information about why the project failed to 
achieve expected outcomes.  I interviewed World Bank officials and officials at other 
development finance institutions to supplement and cross-check information, test out 
ideas and interpretations, and map relationships among the key actors.  I also had 
access to reliable third-party notes of interviews conducted with former World Bank 
officials now in academia.  I used water-related meetings and conferences which had 
international participation as venues for engaging in informal conversations with a 
variety of actors.  
12 
 
 My research on transnational activist networks and domestic activist 
coalitions similarly relied on primary and secondary publications, pamphlets, 
information provided on internet websites, semi-structured and open-ended 
interviews, and informal conversations at international and local meetings and events.  
My relationships with activists in the U.S. water justice movement provided me with 
contacts in transnational water justice networks and entrée to Uruguayan water 
activists in the domestic coalition, the National Commission for the Defense of Water 
and Life (CNDAV). This afforded me direct access to key players and “inside” 
information while conducting my field research in Uruguay.  I conducted interviews 
with a variety of actors in Uruguay, including government officials in the water sector 
and with direct experience working with or for the multilateral development banks. 
 
1.5. Findings  
 
1. Strongly institutionalized agendas that evolve as a result of convergent interests 
between the Bank and its most powerful donor members can be destabilized in short 
order by a dynamic interplay of external and internal force. 
As I have discussed above, the PSD agenda in WSS was institutionalized in the 1990s 
as a result of convergence between the Bank’s internal culture (neoliberal ideology) 
and external pressures (donor preferences).  That agenda was challenged and derailed 
by a different constellation of external actors a decade later (or in the case of TNCs, 
actors whose preferences had changed).   It was also undercut by knowledge 
production inside the Bank (piecemeal, rather than sustained, internal learning) which 
had to come to terms with the high rate of PSP project failures. This case validates 
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Weaver’s theoretical framework and emphasis on the dynamic and mutually 
reinforcing influence of external and internal factors on agenda change.  
 
2.  The Bank’s learning process in this case has been only partial and attenuated. 
 The Bank learned discrete lessons from failures in PSP contracts and concessions, as 
I discuss in Chapters Three, Four and Six.  Such lessons included, for example, the 
need for connection subsidies for the poor, a shift to “sustainable cost recovery” from 
the ideal of “full cost recovery,” and above all, the necessity for regulatory 
institutions. But it cannot translate a substantial part of this learning into practice 
because of conflicts within its organizational culture, as I noted above.  The limits of 
pro-privatization ideology have been exposed by knowledge production, and 
knowledge production (i.e., institution-building) has been trumped by profit-making.  
But profit-making can also trump ideology, as is evidenced by the Uruguay case.  It is 
not clear to what extent the tension between the Bank’s loan disbursement and 
approval cultures can be reconciled with the “patient capital” needed for institution-
building.  
 
3.  The case of agenda change in PSP validates the claim that the Bank engages in 
“paradigm maintenance.” 9  As I have discussed, the tension between ideology and 
knowledge production is reflected time and again in close analysis of Bank 
publications.  In my Uruguay case study, contradictions also surfaced in Bank 
                                           
9 Robert Wade coined the phrase the ‘art of paradigm maintenance’ to characterize the Bank’s distorted 
account of the developmental success of the “East Asian miracle” economies over last two decades of 
the twentieth century.  He and other scholars criticized the Bank for over-emphasizing the role of free 
markets in the rapid growth trajectory of these countries, while downplaying or ignoring the critical 
role of interventionist states in promoting that growth. Wade 1996;see also Wade 2002.   
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rhetoric about the importance of stakeholder participation and accountability, versus 
its admission (buried in a loan document) that it timed a PSP loan around an election 
cycle to favor a sympathetic neoliberal administration.   It also acknowledged that 
contract bids and renegotiations were executed in non-transparent fashion, and 
without public knowledge.  
 
4.  Strengths and Weaknesses of “Water Justice” TANs:  My analysis of the water 
justice “movement” in Chapters Five and Six reveals both strengths and weaknesses 
of TANs relative to their espoused goals of ensuring that everyone has access to water 
as human right and to satisfy basic needs.10  One of the strengths of TANs has been 
their horizontal and democratic engagement with domestic campaigns. Transnational 
activists have defined their roles in terms of supporting domestic movements, and 
several cross-cutting networks (La Red VIDA and Reclaiming Public Water) pride 
themselves in their flat and consensus-driven organizational structures. Questions of 
legitimacy and representativeness are generally not present in the water justice 
movement. 11  Some might argue that this stems from the horizontal nature of many 
of these links, but in certain country campaigns, TANs have played an essential 
enabling role—for example, in Ghana.  In almost all cases, TANs have had som
in providing financial support to campaigns.
e role 
   
                                          
 Conversely, as I discuss with respect to the domestic coalition in Uruguay and 
the Reclaiming Public Water network, the focus on attaining an ideal-type of 
democratic participation has diverted organizational energy away from the 
 
10 There may be less consensus around defining “basic needs.” 




fundamental issues of improving access and services for the poor. TANs have 
generally not made this a priority.  In a mirror-image to the Bank, some water justice 
TANs have also been limited by an anti-privatization ideology.  The focus has been 
on opposition, instead of problem-solving.  Parts of the movement have tried to come 
to terms with this to some degree in the last several years, by reorienting towards an 
articulation of alternatives to PSP.  This is a positive transformation, though at times 
acceptable alternatives are narrowed to a degree that suggests continued ideological 
rigidities; the “search for the perfect may be enemy of the good.”  
 
5. The Uruguay case study exemplifies several of the points enumerated above.  In 
addition, the success of the constitutional reform campaign revealed a danger for the 
domestic coalition: the seduction of international celebrity status.  Participation in 
international events appears to have come at the expense of the more prosaic task of 
operationalizing the goals of the constitutional reform and improving WSS delivery 
in the interior of Uruguay.  In the post-reform period, the domestic coalition has been 
caught up in a debate over whether participation in a multistakeholder advisory body 
on water (created by the government to fulfill one of the requirements of the 
constitutional reform) would compromise its values as an organization committed to 
“democracy from below.”  At the same time, the coalition admits that its own 
grassroots base has withered.  
 




Chapter Two reviews the literatures addressed in the dissertation. It covers a 
sample of the literature on transnational activist networks and looks at the literature 
on TANs and water privatization.  It then discusses the literature pertaining to the 
theory and practice of agenda change at the Bank, including the relationship of client 
states and civil society actors to the Bank, and the Bank’s internal organizational 
culture.  I follow with a discussion of the major works in the extensive political 
economy literature on private sector participation in urban WSS.  
Chapter Three is the first part of a two-chapter analysis of agenda change at 
the Bank. It presents a critical chronology of change in the World Bank’s knowledge 
production and policies from 1990-2010, the two decades over which there has been a 
notable shift in the Bank’s agenda for PSP.  It explores the global political and 
economic environment which conditioned the Bank’s embrace of PSP policies as well 
as the intellectual foundations articulated in several key Bank research reports.  It 
periodizes and analyzes the Bank’s reluctant retreat and two phases of subsequent 
policy revisionism during the 2000s.  It does so, in part, through close reading of 
several flagship Bank research publications on PSP in water, which expose the 
contradictions between expert learning and ideology.  The first phase of revisionism 
(circa 2003-04) embodies the Bank’s second generation of thinking about 
infrastructure reform.  The most recent phase (circa 2009) captures the Bank in a 
fundamental contradiction and what I describe in Chapter Four as a “partial learner’s 
identity crisis.”    
 Chapter Four presents the theoretical and empirical foundations for the 
descriptive models I develop of internal and external influences on agenda change in 
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the Bank.  I analyze and weight the role of external actors and forces that have 
influenced this change, and do the same for the internal elements of the Bank’s 
organizational culture that I identified above.  I conclude by discussing how the 
external and internal have plausibly interacted to condition this change. 
 Chapter Five provides an overview of the growth of country-based campaigns 
and TANs during the first half of the 2000s, followed by a discussion of the 
characteristics of campaigns, the major campaign actors among TANs and NGOs, 
and the role of IFIs and TNCs as key campaign targets.  It discusses the frames that 
activists have exploited, created, and deployed to engender collective action.  It then 
looks at the reorientation of the anti-privatization movement in the second half of this 
decade to a focus on alternatives, specifically “reclaiming public water” through 
public-public partnerships (PUPs).  I discuss the engagement of TANs’ and CSOs’ 
with the World Bank, including splits in the “movement” over this strategy.  The 
chapter concludes by analyzing the impacts TANs and CSOs have had on the Bank’s 
agenda for PSP in WSS, mediated by their effects on client states and TNCs.  
 Chapter Six presents my case study of Uruguay.  As discussed above, my case 
research relied on primary and secondary publications; semi-structured and open-
ended interviews with activists, academics and government officials; and non-
participant observation at meetings, political rallies, and other events.  The chapter is 
divided into three parts.  Part One (sections 6.2 through 6.4) discusses the precipitants 
of the constitutional reform campaign, its development and protagonists, and the 
trajectory of the campaign up to the October 2004 victory.  It looks at the 
underpinnings of the constitutional reform strategy in Uruguayans’ increasingly 
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frequent deployment of direct democracy mechanisms to engineer social change.  It 
discusses the coalescence of a cross-section of CSOs into the formation of the 
domestic coalition, CNDAV, and analyzes the characteristics of the coalition, 
transnational support, and the strategic development of the campaign between 2002 
and 2004.  Part Two (section 6.5) returns to the discussion of neoliberal policies in 
WSS provision between 1992-2004, closely analyzing key World Bank and IDB loan 
documents, including structural adjustment loans made during the severe economic 
downturn of 2002-2003.  Part Three (sections 6.6 and 6.7) examines developments in 
the post-constitutional reform period between 2005 and 2009.  It looks at fissures on 
the left, first between CNDAV and the new Frente Amplio government, and then 
within CNDAV over how to realize the social goals in the constitutional reform, and 
whether to do so by “participation from above or below.”  The penultimate section 
looks at the reactions of the World Bank and IDB to operating in the new WSS sector 
environment where PSP is now prohibited.  I conclude by looking at the unresolved 
tensions between CNDAV’s goals as a domestic actor and its celebrity status in the 
international water justice movement. 
 Chapter Seven concludes by suggesting several policy implications of my 
findings, and potential directions for future research.  Among these are the necessity 
for the Bank to squarely confront the conflict between its profit-making imperative 
and the longer-term framework needed to build regulatory capacity, if it hopes to 
promote truly “pro-poor regulation,” and that both reflexive pro- and anti-
privatization ideologies can divert attention away from the challenge of getting water 
and sanitation to the poor.
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This chapter provides an overview of the literatures related to World Bank 
agenda change, privatization of water and sanitation services, and transnational 
activist networks’ engagement with the Bank.  I indicate areas in which my 
dissertation may make particular contributions to these literatures.  Apropos and in 
general, no literature that I am aware of has attempted to account for the totality of 
external and internal influences that have transformed the World Bank’s agenda for 
privatizing WSS over the last two decades (1990-2010).  While there has been a 
developing literature in the last five-plus years which looks at TAN mobilization 
against WSS privatization, that literature does not focus on TANs’ influence on the 
Bank, including the failure of direct engagement strategies.  There is little, if any, 
literature which looks critically at the transformation of WSS anti-privatization TANs 
over the last decade, in partial reaction to the loss of a framing target in TNCs.  In 
addition, no literature has undertaken a detailed analysis of the constitutional reform 
campaign in Uruguay, focusing on the interactions between domestic coalitions and 
international TANs, along with impacts on the post-reform relationship between the 
Bank and the Uruguayan WSS sector. 
The first section of this chapter discusses the literature pertaining to the theory 
and practice of agenda change at the Bank, including the relationship of client states 
and civil society actors to the Bank, and the Bank’s internal organizational culture 
(knowledge production, ideology, and the Bank’s role as a financial institution).  The 
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second section looks at the small literature on transnational activism against water 
privatization.  The third section discusses some of the major works in the extensive 
political economy literature on private sector participation in urban WSS, as a 
prologue to the critical discussion in Chapter Three of Bank-produced literature in 
this area.    
 
2.1.  Transforming World Bank Agendas: Theory and Practice 
  
 Michelle Miller-Adams and Catherine Weaver examine how agendas are 
institutionalized and transformed inside the World Bank.12  They each deploy a 
synthetic theoretical approach combining international relations theory and 
sociological organization theory to explain and test agenda change at the Bank over 
the last two decades, examining several new policy areas of policy.  I use this 
theoretical approach to develop a descriptive model of agenda change in urban WSS 
which I develop in Chapter Four.  Miller-Adams and Weaver posit that international 
relations theory helps to explain external influences on the Bank, while sociological 
organization theory informs an understanding of the Bank’s internal culture, norms, 
bureaucracy, and incentive structures.  International relations theory, including 
rationalist-derived principal-agent models, contributes to an understanding of the 
Bank as a powerful organization influenced especially by the interests of its member 
states, including major donor and client states.  Principal-agent theory helps to 
explain how the Bank gains autonomy from principals (not just member states but 
                                           
12 Miller-Adams, Michelle 1999. The World Bank: New Agendas in a Changing World. London and 
New York: Routledge; Weaver, Catherine. 2008. Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of 
Reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Weaver,Catherine. 2007. “The World’s Bank and 
the Bank’s World,” Global Governance 13: 497-500.   
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also non-state actors which monitor the Bank, such as NGOs), through control over 
asymmetric information and the excessive cost to principals of monitoring slippage.13  
However, as a powerful, quasi-autonomous actor, the Bank’s behavior cannot be 
reduced to the interests of its principals, but is as much a function of its own internal 
culture.  Its bureaucratic politics, ideologies, norms, routines, rules, and incentive 
structures shape staff members’ expectations and interactive behavior.  Sociological 
organization theory and constructivist theory help to “unpack the black box” of 
agents’ preferences, rather than assuming them.  As Weaver states: “Culture informs 
staff members’ logic of appropriateness and consequence, letting them know how to 
respond to new tasks or challenges, which formal policies ‘really matter,’ what 
behavior will get rewarded or sanctioned in hiring and promotion processes, and what 
ideas regarding organizational policy and practice may be more readily received.” 14   
Miller-Adams stresses that we need to look at the “task environment” of the Bank to 
understand how agendas are incorporated in practice: its customers (developing 
countries), suppliers (international financial markets), regulators and monitors 
(NGOs, the Bank’s Board, and the development community), and its competitors 
(bilateral aid agencies, regional MDBs).  The Bank seeks to buffer itself from 
disturbances through growth and cooptation.  Although in theory the Bank operates 
under an apolitical norm embodied in its Articles of Agreement, Miller-Adams calls 
this as an ‘organizational myth.’  (I discuss the Bank’s role as a knowledge producer 
below). Change in the Bank’s agenda or policies should thus be viewed as an 
outcome of the interplay of external and internal pressures and influences.  
                                           
13 Weaver 2007. 
14 Weaver 2007, 497-500.   
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 Miller-Adams applied this approach to a comparative analysis of the three 
new agendas adopted by the Bank in the 1990s, albeit with different degrees of 
institutionalization: participation, governance, and private sector development (PSD).  
She argues that the PSD agenda was most thoroughly incorporated because of a 
congruence of external pressure with internal Bank culture.15  In contrast, agendas 
that are not congruent with the Bank’s own culture, such as the agenda to increase 
stakeholder and civil society participation, at a minimum require strong insider-
outsider alliances to move forward.  The governance agenda emanated from external 
criticism and the Bank’s internal recognition that SAPs for developing countries and 
“shock therapy” prescriptions for former Communist bloc countries were not leading 
to the desired results.  In the former, budget deficits were slashed without spurring 
economic growth; in the transition countries, rapid privatization exposed corruption, 
unaccountable public institutions, and the “wrong” incentive structures for politicians, 
bureaucrats and business leaders.16  But both Miller-Adams and Weaver point to 
contradictions in the Bank’s organizational culture which made it very difficult to 
internalize and mainstream the governance agenda, except by defining it narrowly 
and as a complement (via the “new institutional economics” and “new public 
management” theories)  to the Bank’s neoliberal reform agenda.17  The very nature of 
governance projects—their long-term time horizons, smaller loan size, need for more 
intensive monitoring, challenges in measuring impacts, cross-sectoral scope, and 
                                           
15 Although the U.S. brought pressure to bear on the Bank to more rapidly incorporate private sector 
participation into its policies by linking it to an increase in capital for the International Finance 
Corporation, the Bank was already predisposed towards adoption of the PSD agenda as a matter of 
ideological preference. 
16 Weaver 2008. 
17 I discuss “New Public Management” below. 
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potential for fractious negotiations with resistant client countries—clashes with the 
Bank’s “disbursement imperative” and “approval culture.”18 
 This dissertation intersects with each of these three agendas.  While Miller-
Adams emphasizes the congruence and easy adoption of the PSD agenda by the 
Bank, I show how that newly-institutionalized agenda unraveled a decade later in an 
important arena promoted by the Bank—urban WSS.  Weaver’s insights into the 
internal contradictions exposed by the governance agenda are very applicable to the 
case of PSP in water.  On the one hand, the type of governance advocated by the 
Bank in this area, regulation and contract rights preponderantly focused on private 
investors’ needs, fits squarely within the “new public management” paradigm 
complementing the neoliberal paradigm.  On the other hand, the well-
functioning,“pro-poor” regulatory institutions needed for both public and private 
service providers require “patient project capital” that runs headlong against the 
Bank’s lending culture.  Finally, the Bank’s rhetorical commitment to participation 
has been belied by little effort to compel transparency in contract negotiations 
between investors and governments, or to require pro-poor participation (as a kind of 
“social conditionality”) in its past lending for PSP.  
 
The Bank’s Internal Organizational Culture  
  
 In Chapter Four I discuss three dimensions of the Bank’s organizational 
culture that account for change, and resistance to change, in the agenda for PSP in 
                                           
18 The “disbursement imperative” refers to the incentives Bank staff face to move loans out the door 
expeditiously, in line with the Bank’s role as a bank.  The “approval culture” similarly refers to getting 
proposed projects approved within the shortest time-frame, which incentivizes Bank staff to prefer 
“blueprint” or “cookie-cutter” projects with easily measured inputs and outputs to complex projects, 
such as those for institutional development.    
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water and sanitation: (1) the Bank in its role as a major financial institution, (2) the 
Bank as a preeminent producer of knowledge in the development field, and (3) the 
Bank’s ideological orientation.   
    
 (1)  The Bank qua “bank” 
 
 
 The World Bank is a mammoth for-profit institution whose fundamental 
raison d’être is to lend money.  Cumulative lending and commitments for the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International 
Development Association (IDA) stood at close to US$750 billion at fiscal year (FY) 
2010.19  New IBRD loans and IDA credits totaled $60 billion in FY 2010.  Weaver 
notes that middle-income countries are the Bank’s bread and butter.  In borrowing 
from the IBRD (the “hard loan” window) they underwrite the Bank’s primary source 
of financial autonomy and sustainability, and help fund the activities of the IDA, the 
concessional or “soft loan” window.  Marshall points out that the financial 
independence of the Bank’s operations that involve lending, asset management, and 
borrowing on the capital markets give it a flexibility and leeway that other 
development institutions lack.20  Conversely, the financial discipline it imposes on 
borrowers as a lender generates corresponding rigidities.  For example, this discipline 
made it difficult for the Bank to address the over-indebtedness of poor countries until 
it was “nudged” to do by global citizens’ movements, such as Jubilee 2000, along 
                                           
19  The IBRD is known as the “hard loan” window of the World Bank Group, providing loans to 
creditworthy borrowers at slightly below market interest rates.  The IDA, which is the “soft loan,” or 
concessional window of the Bank, provides interest-free credits and grants to the world’s poorest and 
non-creditworthy countries.  Loan maturities are longer, with repayment periods stretched over 20-40 
years.  The largest donors to the most recent IDA replenishment (IDA15) were the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Italy and Spain. 
20 Marshall, Katherine. 2008. The World Bank: From Reconstruction to Development to Equity. 
London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis.   
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with the ensuing pressure from the Group of Eight governments.  As referenced in the 
preceding section, the “disbursement imperative” and “approval culture” drives staff 
behavior in the construction, implementation, and evaluation of Bank programs.21 
These incentivize Bank staff to favor large bankable projects with quick turnaround in 
project design and Board approval.  To expedite project approval, staff favor projects 
with easily quantifiable inputs and outputs, which creates a bias towards development 
activities that can produce certain kinds of results, steering staff away from activities 
that may not produce immediately tangible results.  Weaver notes that ideology and 
this quantitative bias can affect information gathered and considered during project 
appraisal and design, while time-consuming, complex social and political risk 
assessments are often bypassed.  Kapur notes that the pressure to lend is a constant 
within the Bank: “staff are terrified of losing their substantial benefits and (for many) 
their visa status… and the charge of being an obstructionist can be a convenient cover 
for the removal by a chief executive of senior managers who have dared voice 
dissent."22  
 As I discuss in the section below on the relationship between client states and 
the Bank, another factor affecting the Bank’s behavior in general, and vis-à-vis 
agenda setting, has been increased competition from private capital markets, which 
has resulted in a significant decline in demand from the Bank’s middle-income 
borrowers.  Brazil, China and Russia, for example, have turned increasingly towards 
private lenders, where commercial interest rates have declined, and borrowers can 
avoid the numerous conditions attached to Bank loans.  Weaver notes that the Bank 
                                           
21 Weaver 2007. 
22 Kapur, Devesh. 2002. “The Changing Anatomy of Governance of The World Bank.” In Reinventing 
the World Bank, ed. Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
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has responded by seeking reforms to become more “client-focused,” and is less 
willing to cede to demands by donor states and NGOs that might alienate middle-
income clients.  
 
 (2)  The Bank as a “Knowledge Bank”  
 
 I discuss the Bank’s role as a knowledge producer in Chapter Four.  In 1996 
World Bank President James Wolfensohn announced that the Bank should become a 
“knowledge bank,” focused as much on disbursing knowledge assets to poor and 
developing countries as on providing economic support for development projects.23  
Research is an essential input to Bank operations and lending, and is used in the 
Bank’s advisory services, including policy dialogue with governments, analytical 
reports (in Bank jargon, “economic and sector work”), and technical assistance.24  
The Bank is the largest development research entity: its Development Economics 
group (DEC) is in charge of 80 percent of the Bank’s research expenditures and the 
production of the annual World Development Indicators and World Development 
Report.  DEC is important because it also serves as the main source of research for 
other MDBs and bilateral aid agencies.25  Neoclassical economists make up the vast 
majority of research social scientists and senior management within the Bank, a trend 
reinforced during the 1980s following on debt crises in developing countries, the 
                                           
23 Cohen, Don and Bruno Laporte. March 2004. “ The Evolution of the Knowledge Bank.”  KM 
(Knowledge Management) Magazine. Reprinted on the World Bank’s website. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/EvolutionoftheKnowledgeBank.pdf ( December 18, 
2010) 
24 Dethier, Jean-Jacques. 2007. “Producing Knowledge for Development: Research at the World 
Bank.” Global Governance 13: 469-478. 
25 Broad, Robin. August 2006. “ Research, Knowledge, and the Art of ‘Paradigm Maintenance’: The 




neoliberal Reagan and Thatcher administrations and the turn to macroeconomic 
policy reforms and structural adjustment lending.   
  Pincus notes that part of the Bank’s reinvention as a “knowledge bank” was in 
response to competition from private capital markets, which lowered its comparative 
advantage as a financial institution.  It also reflected Joseph Stiglitz’s tenure as chief 
economist at the Bank; Stiglitz emphasized that development success was predicated 
on closing the knowledge gap between rich and poor countries, and on building 
institutions conducive to the spread of knowledge.  But Pincus underscores that the 
Bank has treated knowledge as a neutral, quantifiable commodity, leaving 
unaddressed the questions of “whose knowledge” and what legitimately constitutes 
knowledge.26  In other words, the Bank ignores politically uncomfortable issues of 
access to information, and the power relations that underlie the social construction of 
knowledge.  A 2006 evaluation of Bank research chaired by Princeton economist 
Angus Deaton and conducted by a team of noted mainstream economists, lauded the 
Bank for “having done a creditable job of delivering on the many, potentially 
inconsistent, demands made of [Bank researchers],” and praised the Bank for 
producing a good deal of high quality work.27  But the evaluation garnered publicity 
because it also made some notably critical claims about the impartiality and quality of 
the Bank’s work.  The evaluators found that in some cases, strong policy positions 
were not supported by evidence and that the Bank “proselytized selected new work in 
                                           
26 Pincus, Jonathan R. 2002. “State Simplification and Institution Building in a World Bank-Financed 
Project.” In Reinventing the World Bank, ed. Jonathan Pincus and Jeffrey Winters. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press. 
27 Deaton, Angus, et al. 2006, 80-81. An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998 – 2005. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-
1109362238001/726454-1164121166494/RESEARCH-EVALUATION-2006-Main-Report.pdf  
(December 18, 2010). 
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major policy speeches and publications without appropriate caveats on its 
reliability.”28  The panel noted a failure in the checks and balances that should 
separate advocacy and research.29  
 
 (3)  Ideology and Paradigm Maintenance 
 
 Robert Wade famously coined the phrase the ‘art of paradigm maintenance’ to 
characterize the Bank’s distorted account of the developmental success of the “East 
Asian miracle” countries in the last several decades of the twentieth century.  He and 
other scholars criticized the Bank for over-emphasizing the role of free markets in the 
rapid growth trajectory of these countries, while downplaying or ignoring the critical 
role of interventionist states in promoting that growth.30  Weaver describes “paradigm 
maintenance” as “the careful vetting and censorship of prominent Bank publications 
and public statements by key officials.”31  Broad levels the same accusation at the 
DEC.  Following numerous interviews with Bank staff, she concludes that it has 
played a critical role in the legitimization of the neoliberal free-market paradigm over 
the last quarter-century, disseminating less than objective research.  She identifies 
several interrelated processes and mechanisms through which the DEC performs its 
paradigm-maintenance role, and privileges individuals whose work conforms to a 
neoliberal ideology.  These include incentives which increase an individual's chances 
to be hired, to advance one's career, to be published, to be promoted by the Bank's 
external affairs department, and, in general, to be assessed positively.  She describes 
                                           
28 Deaton et al. 2006, 38. 
29 Dethier 2007, 475. 
30 Wade, Robert Hunter. 1996. “Japan, the World Bank, and the Art Of Paradigm Maintenance: The 
East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective,” New Left Review, 217: 3-36. 
31 Weaver 2007. 
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these incentives and rewards as unstated and tantamount to “soft law.”  They are 
reinforced through selective enforcement of rules, discouragement of dissonant 
discourse, and even the manipulation of data to fit the paradigm.  With respect to the 
latter charge, Broad notes that “there is evidence that the Bank crafts, and even 
manipulates, the executive summaries and press releases of reports so that they 
reinforce the neoliberal paradigm,” even when at odds with the text of the report.32  I 
found exactly this discrepancy upon close reading of several key Bank reports on PSP 
in infrastructure service provision (see Chapters Three and Four).  
 Stein (2008) and Wade (2002) cite the interests of the U.S. and other major 
shareholders as an important driver of the Bank’s tenacious adherence to neoliberal 
policy prescriptions.  Wade argues that the U.S. has maintained hegemony in the 
Bank by pushing a “strategy of enlargement of the world’s free community of market 
democracies” behind the scenes, in a manner that “maintains the appearance of acting 
according to the rules decided by the collective of member governments.”33  He 
examines two cases which illustrate how the U.S. Treasury applied strong pressure to 
ensure that a pro-market reform message was not diluted: first by applying pressure to 
fire the heterodox chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, and then by undercutting the 
author of the 2000 World Development Report (WDR) on poverty, Ravi Kanbur.  
Kanbur’s emphasis on factors other than growth for poverty reduction, and the 
questions he raised about the sufficiency of, and even causal link between, neoliberal 
policies and poverty reduction, branded him as an outlier with respect to accepted 
orthodoxies.  Under pressure to de-emphasize distributional and other non-growth 
                                           
32 Broad 2006, 410. 
33 Wade 2002, 202. 
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considerations in the WDR, Kanbur resigned.  Just as Broad does, Wade notes that 
the final 2000 WDR contained many inconsistencies within the text, while the stand-
alone summaries, press releases, and chapter introductions and conclusions were 
“scrubbed” to convey the dominant pro-growth message of the U.S. and mainstream 
Bank staff.   Pincus and winters similarly argue that the U.S. has continually 
supported the Bank in large part because it is highly centralized and ideologically 
predictable.34   
 
External Influences on the Bank 
 
 (1)  The Relationship of Donor and Client States to the Bank  
 
As I discuss in Chapter Four, the Bank is a powerful international 
organization influenced by external actors, especially by the interests of its member 
states, including both dominant donor and client states.  Five developed country 
donor states comprise the major shareholders of the Bank and collectively wield 
37.38 percent of the voting power of the Bank’s Executive Directors (EDs).35  The 
largest shareholder member states have their own EDs; smaller shareholders group 
together and are represented by an elected ED.  The United States is the most 
powerful donor state in the Bank, controlling 16.4 percent of the votes on the IBRD 
board and 13.4 percent of the votes on the IDA Board.  Donor states can directly 
influence policy change at the Bank through the threat of withholding triennial 
                                           
34 Pincus and Winters 2002. 
35 As of November 2010 the five largest shareholders in the IBRD, by voting power of the EDs, were 
the United States (16.40 percent), Japan (7.87 percent), Germany (4.49 percent), France (4.31 percent) 
and the United Kingdom (4.31 percent).  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-
1215524804501/IBRDEDsVotingTable.pdf  (December 18, 2010). 
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replenishments for the concessional IDA (Miller-Adams; Weaver; Fox and Brown).  
The U.S. has been most influential in wielding its “power of the purse,” and NGOs 
have used Congress (which authorizes contributions to the IFIs and approves IDA 
replenishments) as a lever to push the Executive Branch to exert policy influence over 
the Bank (see discussion in the next section on NGOs).  Marshall cites widespread 
criticism of the “democracy deficit” in the Bank’s voting system, which weights 
donors’ votes in relation to their share of contributions and disempowers poor client 
countries.  Marshall, whose primer on the Bank is generally sympathetic, states: 
“Rarely spoken but fundamental to the debate [about the ‘Imperial Bank’] is concern 
that IDA’s ability to raise funds stems in significant part from a voting system that 
ensures that the interests of the financiers are decisive in cases of controversy.”36   
 At the macro-level, the ability of client/borrower countries to influence Bank 
agendas and negotiate loan terms will be determined to a large degree by the 
structural constraints imposed on them as a function of their degree of aid-
dependence.  David Williams argues that the norm of sovereignty in some of the 
world’s poorest countries (quasi-states) is being trumped by the IFIs, which not only 
finance the continued functioning of many governments, but also stand as gatekeepers 
for other aid flows to these countries.37   The IDA lends to countries not considered 
creditworthy for loans from the IBRD.38  Almost all African countries rely on IDA 
funding.  Countries without an agreement with the IMF and World Bank are unlikely 
                                           
36 Marshall 2008, 141. 
37Williams, David. 2000. “Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-states and the International Financial 
Institutions.” Review of International Studies. 26: 567.  
38 Eligibility for IDA support depends on a country’s relative poverty, defined as GNI per capita below 
an established threshold, which is updated annually (in fiscal year 2011, US$1,165).  As of 2011, 79 
countries were eligible for IDA interest-free loans (known as credits), representing 2.5 billion people.  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~me
nuPK:83991~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html  (February 19, 2011)   
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to receive other bilateral aid flows.  Wood argues that conditionality in loan 
agreements tends to skew government accountability away from the electorate and 
towards donors, signaling a lack of ownership on the part of the borrower.39  Despite 
the “partnership” rhetoric adopted by the Bank in the last two decades stressing the 
importance of client country ownership, Pincus and Winters describe this as the “taxi-
cab approach . . . in which the country is in the driver’s seat, but no one is going 
anywhere until the Bank climbs in back, gives the destination, and pays the fare.”40 
Nevertheless, Weaver suggests that there are several reasons to see the 
dependent relationship of client countries on the Bank in reverse—especially for 
middle-income countries.  One form of power available to the Bank’s largest client 
states is the threat of loan default.  In the early 1990s the possibility of default by 
countries such as Brazil, India, and Indonesia would have put between 11 to 14 
percent of the Bank’s portfolio in a nonaccrual status and led to its first annual loss.  
A second form of influence available to large borrowing countries is an understanding 
that the Bank thrives according to the volume of loans it makes, giving these 
countries a source of leverage in negotiating loan conditions.  Even with conditions in 
place, larger clients may choose not to comply, realizing that there are economic and 
political pressures on Bank staff not to abandon projects mid-stream.  A third 
important source of influence available to creditworthy client states (albeit perhaps 
dampened by the global financial crisis of 2008) has been the pressure on the Bank 
from increased competition from private capital markets, as discussed above.   Some 
middle-income countries, such as China, have themselves become lenders and 
                                           
39 Wood, Angela. 2004. “Conditionality: Past, Present, and Future.” Quoted in Money Talks: How Aid 
Conditions Continue to Drive Utility Privatization in Poor Countries. London, U.K: Action Aid. 
40  Pincus and Winters 2002, 14. 
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competitors to the Bank (e.g., in Africa).  Critics from the right (e.g., the 2000 
Meltzer Commission report) have argued that the Bank crowds out private investment 
in middle-income countries and should better focus its resources, including increasing 
grants, on the poorest countries.  Defenders of continued Bank lending to middle-
income countries argue, inter alia, that these countries account for roughly two-thirds 
of the world’s population living under two dollars a day, and are big enough to create 
systemic risk in global capital markets.  De Ferranti accuses critics on the right of 
failing to appreciate that the Bank enables and complements the private sector by 
improving the climate for private sector investment.41  
 
 (2)  The Relationship of Transnational WSS Corporations to the Bank 
 
  Writing before the decline in TNCs’ investment during the 2000s, Finger and 
Allouche argued that the World Bank fostered the growth of “public service” 
(infrastructure services) TNCs in the 1990s through its privatization policies.42  These 
policies were undergirded by an “instrumentalist logic” linking water scarcity to the 
necessity for full-cost pricing and the elimination of subsidies, putatively to induce 
conservation and promote efficiency.  Finger and Allouche maintained that the Bank 
de facto promoted a process of concentration and cartelization in the sector.  The 
direct relationship between the IFIs and TNCs is not well explored in the literature, 
likely because these interactions take place behind closed doors.43   Sklair, Helleiner, 
                                           
41 de Ferranti, David. 2005. “The World Bank and the Middle-Income Countries.” Center for Global 
Development. http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/9957  (December 29, 2010). 
42 Finger, Matthias and Jeremy Allouche. 2002. Water Privatization: Transnational Corporations and 
the Re-regulation of the Water Industry. London: Spon Press. 
43 I am here excluding the IFC and the Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency (MIGA) since 
their raison d’etre is to work directly with the private sector.  
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and Martinelli note that firms and TNCs clearly engage in political activities to 
influence the decisions of intergovernmental and multilateral organizations.  Lobina 
and Hall see the Bank’s WSS agenda as having directly followed, to a good degree, 
the signals and needs of water service TNCs.   In contrast, I argue that changes in the 
Bank’s agenda have been conditioned by an array of external actors—including client 
states, TANs, and TNCs, as well as by factors internal to the Bank’s organizational 
culture.  
  
 (3) The Role of NGOs and TANs in Influencing Agenda Change at the Bank 
 
An extensive literature has evolved on transnational civil society, TANs, 
international NGOs, and transnational social movements which has contributed to 
understanding how non-state actors influence international policymaking and help to 
create forms of global governance.  It is now widely accepted in the international 
relations literature that transnational social actors can shape international outcomes by 
inter alia:  
• Identifying problematic consequences of globalization that might otherwise be 
ignored and placing these on the international agenda.44  
• Building transnational alliances, and mobilizing information strategically to help 
create new issues and categories; and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage 
over much more powerful organizations and governments.45  
                                           
44 Brown, L. David, Sanjeev Khagram, Mark H. Moore, and Peter Frumkin. 2000. “Globalization, 
NGOs, and Multisectoral Relations.” In Governance in a Globalizing World, edited by Joseph S. Nye 
and John D. Donahue. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; O’Brien, Robert, Anne Marie 
Goetz, Jan Aart Scholte, and Marc Williams. 2000. Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral 
Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; 
Price, Richard. July 2003. “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.” World 
Politics. 55: 579-606. 
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• Exploiting political opportunities, creating collective identities, and providing 
resources to domestic movements in formation. 46 
• Articulating new values, ideas, and norms that may become institutionalized in 
international practice and governance.47  
 Much of the literature discusses the importance of political opportunity 
structures, resource mobilization, and framing processes to the success of TANs.48  
Among the critical determinants of TAN influence and success are: target 
characteristics (e.g., states, transnational corporations, and intergovernmental 
organizations), changes in the domestic and/or international POS, issue 
characteristics, and network characteristics (e.g., moral authority, expertise, and the 
network’s claim to representativeness and legitimacy).  With respect to issue 
characteristics, Keck and Sikkink find that TANs have organized most effectively 
around issues that involve bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially 
concerning equality of opportunity, and where there is a “short and clear causal chain 
assigning responsibility.”49  Fox and Brown, and Nelson suggest that it has been 
difficult to sustain activist mobilization around IMF stabilization policies and World 
                                                                                                                        
45 Keck and Sikkink 1998. 
46 Tarrow 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002. 
47 Brown, Khagram, et al. 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Price 2003. 
48 See McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald.1996. Guidry (2004: 617) describes the “political 
process/political opportunity structure” as changes in the “larger political relationships of elites, 
masses, and states” which provide openings for movements to emerge. Tarrow (1998:19) describes 
political opportunities as consistent, but not permanent, dimensions of the political struggle that 
encourage people to engage in contentious politics. Changes in both opportunities and constraints 
provide openings for resource-poor actors.  Framing “shapes grievances into broader and more 
resonant claims” (Snow and Benford 1988, quoted in Tarrow 1998:21).  Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 
(2002:12) define framing as “the strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings 
of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action…Frames define the 
issues at stake and the strategies for action.”  
49 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 27. 
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Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs) because of the complexity of the issues 
involved.    
 The most successful campaigns directed at the Bank have involved discrete 
projects or discrete policies.50  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s NGOs mounted a 
series of campaigns to focus public attention on the damaging environmental and 
social consequences of large Bank projects.  Examples include campaigns against 
deforestation and displacement of indigenous peoples in Brazil, forced resettlement of 
thousands of villagers in the wake of the construction of the Narmada Dam in India, 
and the proposed resettlement of large populations to more sparsely-inhabited islands 
in the Indonesian archipelago.51  Moore and Sklar studied NGO influence on the 
Bank’s water resources policy in the context of a specific campaign in the early 1990s 
which involved direct NGO consultations with the Bank.  However, concerns about 
WSS privatization did not figure prominently in the NGOs’ campaign at that time, 
and unlike the focus of many anti-water privatization TANs today, the campaign’s 
explicit strategy was to gain influence through direct engagement with the Bank (i.e., 
through an insider-outsider strategy).  U.S. NGOs successfully pressured Congress to 
require changes in the MDBs’ environmental policies, but most of the Bank’s client 
members resisted extension of Bank-Government dialogue to NGOs until the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  While that Bank came to see value in civil society 
participation as an element contributing to successful project outcomes, it was equally 
                                           
50 Fox and Brown 1998. 
51 Miller-Adams 1999; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002; Fox and Brown 1998. 
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good at co-opting NGO criticism by paying more attention to already-codified 
policies and by involving NGOs at earlier stages of the project cycle.52  
  While NGOs have exerted influence over MDBs’ discrete policies and 
projects, various scholars have noted that campaigns have been less successful in 
challenging paradigmatic issues such as structural adjustment policies.  In 1995 Paul 
Nelson described NGO efforts targeted against SAPs as “a remarkably unsuccessful 
decade-long campaign to challenge the legitimacy of the Bank’s adjustment 
program.”53  Several reasons were cited for the Bank’s intransigence in engaging this 
issue area.54  SAPs, by definition, embody the heart of the Bank’s neoliberal 
development paradigm, and are therefore an issue area where insider allies would be 
hard to come by (in line with the previous discussion on the Bank’s organizational 
culture and ideology).55  However, and probably in at least partial reaction to the 
adverse publicity generated against the Bank and the IMF by the “Fifty Years is 
Enough Campaign,” the Bank’s President Wolfensohn agreed to a tripartite 
multistakeholder initiative in 1995-96 known as the “Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative” (SAPRI).56  But the Bank withdrew from SAPRI in 
2001; Peet ascribes this to institutional inertia and external interests (such as the U.S. 
Treasury) that severely limited the ability of SAPRI to influence Bank policies.  Bond 
                                           
52 Miller-Adams 1999, 74-78 
53 Nelson 1995, 22. 
54 Fox and Brown 1998; Nelson 1995, 1996 and 1999; Travis 2000. 
55 The Bank had also believed it had dislodged the critique of SAPs by redesigning them to include a 
social safety net component, such as social investment funds and poverty-alleviation programs (Fox 
and Brown 1998; Nelson 2002). 
56 The Bank described SAPRI as “aiming to improve understanding about the impacts of adjustment 
policies as well as about how the participation of local, broad-based CSOs could improve 
policymaking.” (Travis 2000).  Seven developing and transition countries participated in  SAPRI; the 
international NGO secretariat claimed that the SAPRI network encompassed at least several hundred 
CSOs and grassroots organizations. (Peet 2009; Travis 2000).    
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likens SAPRI to other multistakeholder processes, such as the World Commission on 
Dams and the Extractive Industries Review in which “well-meaning civil society 
advocates went inside the Bank.”57  In each case, the Bank distanced itself from or 
disavowed the final policy recommendations that were put forward.    
 The literature on the relationship of TANs and NGOs to the Bank traces two 
main routes of influence on the Bank’s agenda: via donor member countries and 
through insider-outsider alliances with reformist-oriented Bank staff.  Using the 
language of principal-agent theory, Weaver maintains that the “police patrol” and 
“fire alarm” functions taken on by NGOs and CSOs help to reduce slippage between 
donors’ interests and the Bank’s, fulfilling a monitoring and whistle-blowing role that 
states lack the capacity to take on.  Although Weaver acknowledges that NGOs have 
also “called states to account for the apparent errant behavior of the Bank,” I think 
this conceptualization lends itself, more than is warranted, to a presumption of allied 
interests between donor states and NGOs.58  That alignment of interests has not been 
prevalent in the case of PSP in water and sanitation.  
 NGOs exert influence on the Bank’s agenda through pressure on donor 
member countries’ legislative or executive branches, typically either through the 
“power of the purse” (appropriations for the IFIs) or through “voice and vote” 
exercised by donors’ Executive Directors to the Bank’s Board of Directors.59  Keck 
and Sikkink, Weaver, Miller-Adams, Fox and Brown, Udall, and popular NGO 
                                           
57 Bond 2007, 484-485. 
58 Weaver 2007, 502. 
59 U.S. legislation contains numerous “voice and vote” directives to the U.S. Executive Directors (U.S. 
EDs) of the World Bank. Examples  include the 1989 “Pelosi Amendment” requiring the U.S. EDs to 
abstain from votes on projects that would have significant environmental impacts, and the “Frank 




literature (e.g., that of the U.K.-based Bretton Woods Project) discuss various NGO 
campaigns that exerted pressure on the Bank to reform through legislative strategies 
that targeted regular donor contributions to the IDA.  NGOs have used the three-year 
replenishment cycle for the IDA as a “political opportunity structure” to leverage 
policy change at the Bank: successes include opposition to the Narmada Dam in 
India, pressuring the Bank to adopt an information disclosure policy, and to institute 
an “Inspection Panel.”  Fox and Brown observe that “most major Bank policy reforms 
were directly associated with the need to respond to donor government debates over 
IDA contributions.”60  Covey points out that one of the major NGO campaigns 
against IDA replenishment (IDA 10) generated and exposed splits between northern 
and southern NGOs and networks, with southern NGOs favoring a more moderate 
position—full replenishment funding, but with conditions.61  Keck and Sikkink 
discuss how environmental advocacy networks have levered legislative and Executive 
branch strategies to pressure the Bank to suspend loans and institute new operational 
directives on “safeguards” policies.  Pressure on the Bank was also used to create a 
boomerang effect, with the Bank applying pressure on borrower countries.  
 Fox and Brown and contributors, Miller-Adams, Khagram, and Vetterlein 
stress the importance of insider-outsider alliances to agenda change.  External critics 
can tip the balance for internal Bank dissidents, empowering them within the 
institution.  Miller-Adams ascribes the incorporation of the “participation agenda” in 
the Bank to synergies between internal and external advocates. Vetterlein shows how 
the incorporation of social development policies depended on internal advocates’ 
                                           
60 Fox and Brown 1998, 7. 
61 Covey 1998. 
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strategic use of external pressure.  Fox and Brown trace a longer and more 
complicated route through which civil society typically exerts influence on the Bank, 
involving both donor country pressure as well as insider-outsider alliances. They 
argue that the outcomes of interactions between the World Bank and civil societies 
are mediated by government economic policymakers in donor and borrowing 
countries.  Northern country NGOs and activists pressure donor countries and their 
respective EDs to the Bank, who support internal Bank reformers, who in turn lend 
support to reformers in borrowing country governments—who engage in supportive 
interactions with Southern NGOs.  
 This dissertation makes a contribution by presenting a case where the 
influence of TANs and activist coalitions on the Bank did not occur through the 
typical causal routes identified in the literature above.  In addition, and related to the 
absence of these causal routes, the issue area I study, private provision of WSS, 
involves a central component of SAPs and fundamental tenet of the Bank’s ideology.  
Neither pressure on donor states, monitoring on their behalf, or insider-outsider 
alliances with Bank staff were influential in transforming the Bank’s agenda for PSP 
in water.  To the contrary, I maintain that activists opposing water privatization and 
the Bank’s PSP agenda found little common ground with powerful donor states in 
opposing the Bank’s PSP agenda, as I discuss in Chapters Four and Five.  TANs’ 
influence on Bank agenda change was instead mediated through client countries, 





2.2. Transnational Activist Networking Against Water Privatization 
 
 There is a small scholarly literature which focuses specifically on TANs and 
civil society organizations opposing WSS privatization.   The provenance of some of 
this literature is with activist researchers or participant-observers, as I note below.  
Paul Nelson looks at activist mobilization against water privatization through a 
human rights frame, arguing that these claims are part of a broader trend towards 
rights-based advocacy in many social justice movements worldwide.  He 
acknowledges, however, that water rights claims have typically been bound together 
with other themes. These include nationalism and opposition to foreign investment at 
the local level, and at the international level, a mix of hostility towards TNCs, the 
IFIs, and the promotion of water as a global public good.  Nelson cites public protest 
or litigation as the reason behind the abandonment or modification of privatization 
schemes by governments and corporations, with consequent re-evaluation of PSP by 
the World Bank.62   I show activism to be a partial, but incomplete, explanation of the 
reasons for government and corporate withdrawal from PSP, and the Bank’s “re-
evaluation” to be erratic, at best.  Nelson suggests, but does not elaborate, that 
framing by many TANs went beyond human rights-based themes to incorporate 
themes that challenged neoliberalism.  I maintain that human rights-based frames 
were constructed and posed as opposing dyads: pro-rights and anti-commodification.  
Nelson also notes that national and international advocacy efforts have been dynamic 
and mutually-supportive but loosely linked.  I am in essential agreement on this point, 
though there are several networks (La Red VIDA, and the Reclaiming Public Water 
                                           
62 Nelson 2009. 
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Network) which have fostered stronger domestic-international links.  Nelson has 
written critically in the past on the legitimacy and accountability of international 
TANs which claim to advocate for affected populations and CSOs in the South, but 
he is silent on this point with respect to the water justice movement.63   I maintain 
that this has not been an issue in water justice networks, not only because of the 
generally “looser” relationship of  TANs to country campaigns, but also because of a 
conscious effort on the part of water justice TANs to include southern voices and 
representation. 
 Conca discusses how the norms, rules, and practices underlying “water 





                                          
64  The anti-privatization movement availed itself of the 
opportunity structure offered by global multi-issue conferences and events (such as 
the World Social Forums) to strengthen networks and forge common frames arou
water as a human right, against its commodification by corporate investors, and 
against liberalization in the context of trade in services.  Hall, Lobina, and de la 
Motte, academic researchers for the leading public sector trade union federation 
opposing water privatization (Public Services International, PSI), see opposition to 
water privatization as rooted fundamentally in concerns over equity and economic 
issues.  This is not surprising given their base of support in trade unions.  They stre
that resistance to privatization has always originated at the local or national level, 
never prompted or coordinated by international campaigns.  However, this implies 
that the “organisation of the opposition does not mirror the structure of the policy 
 
63 Nelson 1995, 1999, and 2002. 
64 Conca 2005, Chapter 7. 
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makers it is engaging,” as has happened with other “solidarity campaigns” such as 








 policy at the 
global level.  I critically examine the RPW network in Chapter Five. 
                                          
65  They note that only in a few instances (e.g., Brazil) has the 
resistance to privatization and the articulation of coherent alternatives been closely 
integrated with political parties and the broader political system.   My case stu
Uruguay provides another example of a link to political parties, albeit of less 
importance to the
diverse CSOs.    
 Philipp Terhorst discusses the rise of the “Reclaiming Public Water” (RPW
network as an outgrowth of the alter-globalization movement and an initiative to 
change water sector policy through “globalization from below.”66  He argues that 
transnational networking, collaboration, and social learning among social movem
actors, NGOs, trade unions, and water sector professionals have created a “new 
dynamic protagonism for the efficiency and equity benefits of public water and 
sanitation.”  This protagonism, however, continues to depend on two other strategic 
approaches by the water justice movement: recognition of the “human right to w
as a public good,” and the continuation of defensive strategies at the local and 
national levels to defeat privatizations.  Terhorst maintains that the RPW network 
creates a transnational social space “to imagine different paths of development for 
urban water systems,” and creates a globalized discourse to challenge
 
65 Hall, David, E. Lobina, and R.de la Motte. June 2005. “Public Resistance to Privatisation in Water 
and Energy.” Development in Practice. 15 (Nos. 3&4):298. 
66 Terhorst was affiliated with the European NGOs Corporate Europe Observatory and the 
Transnational Institute as he was working on his dissertation on constructing democratically-controlled 
alternatives to PSP in Peru and Bolivia. 
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 In addition to the above, anti-privatization campaigns in water and sanitation 
have been referenced in the context of a larger literature on privatization in different 
regions and countries; for example, Ruiters and McDonald on southern Africa, and 
Spronk on Bolivia and Latin America.  NGOs active in the anti-privatization and 
water justice movements have produced many publications for popular consumption 
describing local campaigns and international support for them (e.g., Corporate Europe 
Observatory/Transnational Institute, Council of Canadians, Food and Water 
Watch/Public Citizen, and the World Development Movement). 
   
2.3.  The Political Economy of Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure 
 
 There is a vast literature on the privatization of state-owned enterprises which 
was spawned by the push by IFIs and neoliberal governments for reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s.  Full-fledged privatization involves the direct sale of public assets 
to the private sector.  “Private provision” is a catch-all term that captures an array of 
institutional arrangements which have been advocated by proponents of private sector 
participation in urban water and sanitation.  These may include contracting-out of 
specific operations, leasing, and long-term concessions to private operators (see 
Appendix for a typology of PSP contracts following OECD, 2009).  Since the full or 
even partial transfer of asset ownership in urban WSS has, to my knowledge, never 
been prescribed as a policy condition of a World Bank loan, I do not review that 
larger literature here.67  However, I briefly reprise some of the key findings in a 
                                           
67 Chile, England, and Wales are rare examples of countries which fully privatized urban WSS in the 
1980s and 1990s.  As I note in Chapter Three, the privatization of the WSS sector in England and 




recent volume published under the auspices of Columbia University’s Initiative for 
Policy Dialogue (IPD), Privatization: Successes and Failures.  The IPD volume is 
illuminating specifically because it contains  contributions by several experts who 
worked for many years on infrastructure privatization at the World Bank. 68  I then 
look at the intellectual foundations for the World Bank’s embrace of PSP in the 1980s 
and 1990s and the Bank’s role as a leading producer of knowledge on PSP in water 
and sanitation.  I follow this with a discussion of some of the scholarly and expert 
literature produced outside the Bank, focusing on issues such as the role of water 
TNCs, regulation, finance, and the merits of public versus private provision.  
 Former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz writes in the foreword to 
the IPD volume that privatization failures arose in natural monopolies, such as 
infrastructure utilities, when they were privatized before regulatory and antitrust 
systems were put into place.69  According to Stiglitz, some state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) have been deservedly criticized for inefficiencies and corruption, but 
privatization has been pushed by the IFIs even when SOEs  have been markedly more 
efficient than private sector companies (e.g., the state-run steel company in South 
Korea).  Stiglitz observes that one of the driving reasons for privatization has been 
“simple-minded ideology;” another motivation has been the lure of quick gains for 
special interests.70  The theoretical case for privatization is strongest in areas where 
market failures and information asymmetries are limited, and these are the sectors in 
which abuses can be most easily controlled.   
                                           
68 Roland, Gerard. ed. 2008. Privatization: Successes and Failures. New York: Columbia University 
Press.   
69 Stiglitz, Joseph. 2008. Foreword. In Privatization: Successes and Failures, ed. Gerard Roland. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
70 Stiglitz 2008, xi. 
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 In comparing private and public management, Stiglitz notes that private firms’ 
higher average profits do not necessarily signify greater efficiency: many public firms 
in developing countries have faced tighter investment and budget constraints resulting 
from IMF policy conditions, and under-performance may reflect under-investment.  
Platz and Schroeder also argue that the constriction of “fiscal space” (room in a 
government’s budget to increase public spending) can exert significant pressure on 
the use of aid inflows, including expansion of basic services.71  In Latin America, 
fiscal consolidation led to a sharp decline in funding for infrastructure services. 
Moreover, many public firms are entrusted with distributional objectives (e.g., access 
to clean water for all) and cross-subsidies may not be enough to offset losses from 
serving low-income individuals.72  Privatized firms may have the same principal-
agent problems as SOEs because their incentives for maximizing profits are not 
aligned with governmental or societal goals.  Even when governments impose service 
or investment requirements in concession contracts, private firms may seek to 
circumvent these.  Just as there have been government failures, there are market 
failures when market and social incentives differ markedly.  Stiglitiz further 
maintains that arbitration procedures for investor-state disputes under bilateral 
investment treaties constitute an additional argument against privatization: the 
proceedings and rulings fall short of judicial standards expected in modern 
democracies, there is no appellate process, and no clear system of determining 
precedents.   
                                           
71 Platz, Daniel and Frank Schroeder. September 2007. Moving Beyond the Privatization Debate: 
Different Approaches to Financing Water and Electricity in Developing Countries, Occasional Paper 
34/2007. New York: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
72 Stiglitz 2008, xiv-xv. 
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 Roland notes that the empirical evidence for the superiority of privatized firms 
is often not convincing because it suffers from selection bias.  Privatized firms that 
are selected for comparison with non-privatized firms may have better performance 
because their SOE antecedents were more profitable or had the highest potential for 
profitability.73   In Chapter Three I review one of the Bank’s showcase econometric 
studies comparing PSP in urban water utilities with SOEs; its lead author specifically 
touts its superiority over all previous studies because it overcomes this 
methodological bias.74  Nevertheless, as I show through a close reading of this study, 
the performance superiority of utilities with PSP rests almost entirely on labor force 
reductions (see Table 1).  
 John Nellis, another contributor to the IPD volume who worked at the Bank 
for 16 years managing privatization assistance to client countries, writes that the 
evidence on privatization in Africa is scant at best, and that infrastructure 
privatization (with the largest share of SOEs) has lagged the most.  The evidence that 
does exist is mixed, but positive effects are observed only when privatization is 
associated with enhanced competition and better quality of regulation.  There is also 
evidence of rent-seeking, regulatory capture, reduction in affordability of public 
services, and job loss—which feeds resentment and increases governments’ 
reluctance to pursue further privatization reforms. Nellis stresses that this does not 
imply that the counterfactual, the absence of privatization, would have delivered 
                                           
73 In addition, Roland notes that governments have frequently kept sizeable residual stakes in 
privatized firms, so that many privatized firms have, in effect, mixed ownership. Roland 2008, 11. 
74 K. Gassner, A. Popov, and N. Pushak. 2009. Does Private Sector Participation Improve 
Performance in Electricity and Water Distribution? Trends and Policy Options, No. 6. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.  Gassner’s study 
includes a very large sample of comparator SOEs, which mploys a dual estimation strategy involving a 
second “difference-in-differences” estimation procedure, and which uses “nearest neighbor matching” 
to find the best comparator sub-samples from the full sample.  
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better results.  But even more than other regions, weaknesses in institutions will 
attenuate or eliminate expected gains from privatization. 
 Antonio Estache and Lourdes Trujillo write about the experience of 
privatization in Latin America: each has particular expertise in infrastructure 
privatization, and Estache worked for the Bank for 25 years advising governments on 
public sector reform.  In contrast to Africa, infrastructure privatization has been a 
prominent feature of privatizations in Latin America, precipitated by extreme fiscal 
strain and the expectation of fiscal payoffs.  In terms of regions, Latin America was 
the highest recipient of private participation in infrastructure between 1984-2004.75  
Concerns about politically sensitive distributional issues such as access to WSS, 
electricity, and transport meant that assets were generally leased rather than sold, or 
contracts took the form of concessions (as in water supply and sanitation, where the 
private operator is responsible for operations, maintenance, investment in asset 
replacement, and network expansion).  Positive effects of privatization in Latin 
America generally included investment inflows, increased profitability, and increased 
productivity which resulted in improved quality in goods and services.76   But these 
effects have been tempered, sometimes severely, by the “really ugly facts” associated 
with privatization.77  The reasons political support for privatization disappeared in 
Latin America include the following: 
 (1) Privatization rarely put an end to subsidies or the need for government investment 
in the sectors concerned. The concern for affordability of public services was “so 
                                           
75 Estache 2006.  
76 Estache, Antonio and Lourdes Trujillo. 2008. “Privatization in Latin America: The Good, the Ugly, 
and the Unfair.” In Privatization: Successes and Failures, ed. Gerard Roland. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 154-156. 
77 Estache and Trujillo 2008, 156. 
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clearly at the top of politicians’ priorities that subsidies for both operating 
expenditures and capital expenditures” lasted longer or crawled back over time.78   
(2) Privatization has generated large rents for new owners, but these have not been 
shared with the general public due to regulatory failure, including regulatory capture; 
Estache and Trujillo cite the well-known case of water privatization in Cochabamba, 
Bolivia (see Chapter Five).  Estache (2006) notes that while initial tariff rebalancing 
in infrastructure services was good from an efficiency standpoint, the efficiency gains 
were “quite regressive,” and achieved at the cost of an increase in the burden imposed 
on the lowest income groups.  Few countries organized tariff revisions to pass along 
gains to users.   
(3) Competitive bidding often has not existed.  Related to the absence of competition, 
TNCs were often able to renegotiate contracts after the initial privatization took place.  
In Latin America, roughly 50 percent of the concession contracts signed since the 
mid-1980s ended up being renegotiated.79    
 In terms of winners and losers, taxpayers and important user populations (the 
poor, rural, and suburban users) were hurt by PPI, while international banks 
benefited, regardless of whether the PPI relationship was “a happy or unhappy one.”  
Private operators had to rely on international banks for long-term financing for 
concession contracts, and these banks profited from transaction fees more than the 
lending activity itself—so actually benefited from contract renegotiations.  Private 
operators who were engaged in short-term management contracts and had few 
investment obligations continued to favor PPIs, while those with concession 
                                           
78 Estache 2006, 12. 
79 Estache 2006. 
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contracts, cooled to PPI.  In terms of sectors, telecommunications was “the clear 
winner of the PPI experience,” though it lagged energy and transport in numbers of 
projects.80 The clear loser was the WSS sector; its investment figures were very 
significantly lower than other infrastructure sectors, with only five percent of total 
investment commitments generated between 1984 and 2004.  As I note in Chapter 
Four, a top research economist in the Bank acknowledged to me  that WSS turned out 
not to be the most propitious candidate for PSP.  It is closer to a natural monopoly 
than other infrastructure sectors, and even less amenable to “unbundling” for 
purposes of introducing competition.  As I suggest, however, the fact that the Bank 
resisted this acknowledgement for well over a decade tells us something about the 
power of neoliberal ideology inside the Bank.  Estache concludes that the record for 
PPI has been quite mixed:  
While efficiency levels, quality and access rates have benefited from the 
reforms, these gains have been achieved at significantly higher fiscal costs and 
distributional costs than expected.  There are thus plausible reasons for 
tensions between governments, operators and users which may contribute to 
some of the divorces…. Public-private partnerships in infrastructure may meet 
sector specialists’ concerns with efficiency, but not the standards of 
macroeconomists’ concern with fiscal costs of the sector, and with interest 
groups committed to ensuring that interests of poor are met.81  
 
Roland summarizes the contributions to the IPD volume by concluding that 
privatization is uncontroversial in competitive environments, but becomes 
“increasingly complex in more monopolistic environments where good regulation is 
easier said than done…Calling for better regulation might be illusory because it 
would require a major institutional overhaul that is not in the cards in the immediate 
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future.”82 As I discuss in Chapters Three and Four, the Bank also finds itself in a 
conundrum with respect to supporting the development of institutions that it 
recognizes are essential to the efficient and equitable operation of either public or 
private utilities.  The time horizon needed for regulatory and institutional 
development conflicts with the Bank’s “disbursement imperative” and loan approval 
culture.  Roland’s pessimistic assessment, it must be said, bodes just as poorly for 
improving public utilities in developing countries.  
  
Intellectual Foundations of  Private Participation in Infrastructure 
 
 Several intellectual trends and policy initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s 
supported arguments advanced by proponents of water sector privatization, including 
the World Bank.  The 1992  “Dublin Statement,” which emerged from International 
Conference on Water and the Environment and was reaffirmed at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development was a turning point in affirming water 
as an economic good as well as a social/merit good.83  WSS are not pure public goods 
in that they are neither non-excludable or non-rival.  However, WSS has merit good 
characteristics because of positive health externalities associated with the provision of 
potable water and basic sanitation, and negative externalities which may result from 
adverse behavior by individual producers or consumers (such as contamination or 
pollution).  Moreover, economies of scale associated with pipe networks make water 
provision a true natural monopoly, and asymmetries of information between 
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providers and users also argue for strong regulation in the sector.84   The World Bank 
promoted vertical “unbundling” in the WSS sector as a means of getting around the 
objection of monopoly power.  Unbundling would entail a separation between water 
production (e.g., bulk water treatment), more amenable to competition within the 
market, versus water carriage and distribution, which because of inherent 
monopolistic characteristics, would be subject to competition for the market—i.e., 
competitive contract bidding.  Nickson and Franceys note that the IFIs arrived at a 
consensus for reforms in the urban water sector after the two 1992 conferences, as 
evidenced by policy statements by the Bank in 1993 and the OECD in 1994 (I 
analyze several foundational Bank documents from the early 1990s in Chapter 
Three).  Two principles were at core of the IFIs’ and OECD’s “consensus:” an 
institutional principle which argued for subsidiarity in water management (devolving 
water management to the lowest appropriate level and involving users, planners, and 
policy makers), and an instrument principle, which held that water should be 
recognized as an economic good and water utilities should be treated as commercial 
enterprises.  The strong variant of the “instrument principle” suggested that water 
should be charged not just on a cost-recovery basis, but also according to its long-run 
marginal cost of supply to cover new investment as well as operating and 
maintenance costs. This would imply steep tariff increases in many situations. 
   The “New Public Management” (NPM) school of thought, an intellectual 
relative of public choice and new institutional economics, provided theoretical and 
ideological support for advocates of privatization.  Nickson and Franceys characterize 
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NPM as guiding the second generation of reforms in the Bank, following the first 
generation of SAPs.  SAPs reduced fiscal deficits but failed to improve economic 
performance for many of  the countries which undertook reforms.  NPM holds that 
government’s best role is to protect property rights, ensure competition, and regulate 
firms to protect consumers from market failure.  Other than these functions, it should 
get out of the business of delivering services directly.85  NPM proffers several 
rationales for privatizing basic services such as WSS, especially in cash-strapped 
developing countries with failing public utilities.  Privatization would free up scarce 
budget resources for governments to spend on poverty alleviation and development 
initiatives while providing access to capital from the private sector for infrastructure 
needs.  It should improve efficiency and performance, and help to make reforms 
irreversible, removing them from future political agendas.86  Principles drawn from 
the new institutional economics (NIE) included the use of market and quasi-market 
mechanisms to stimulate competition between service providers, making public 
services demand-driven through customer orientation and “citizen charters,” and 
changing employment contracts from career tenured positions to limited-term 
contracts with performance-based remuneration.87  As I discuss in Chapters Three 
and Four, and as noted in the research cited in the previous section, there is limited or
no empirical evidence that NPM and NIE theories were validated through the Bank
reform program for PSP.   
 
’s 




85 Kessler 2004. 
86 Kessler 2004, 1-2.   
87 Nickson and Franceys  2003, 7-10.    
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World Bank Literature on PSP in Infrastructure and WSS 
 
 The Bank is arguably the leading producer of research on private sector 
participation in infrastructure, including the WSS sector.  Research is conducted and 
published by numerous networks and groups within the Bank, often with the financial 
support of various donor-financed trust funds.  The Water Sector Board, currently 
located under the Sustainable Development Network, publishes a Discussion Papers, 
Working Notes, and a Practitioner Notes series. 88  Discussion Papers are peer-
reviewed and present expertise and good practices developed by the Bank’s 
professional staff.  Various papers have addressed, inter alia, finance, regulation, risk 
mitigation, and experience with sector reforms.  Working Notes are described as 
“work-in-progress” documents intended to elicit discussion on topical issues from 
peer professionals, while Practitioner Notes are synopses of larger World Bank 
documents, reporting key findings.  The multi-donor trust funds, such as the Bank-
Netherlands Water Partnership Program (now the Water Partnership Program) and the 
Water and Sanitation Program, have helped to underwrite many of the Water Sector 
Board’s publications.  
 The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), a multidonor 
technical assistance facility whose goal is to catalyze private sector investment and 
management in infrastructure, underwrites significant research on PSP. 89   In 2009, 
                                           
88 Sector Boards develop sector strategies and often work across networks and departments within the 
Bank. 
89 PPIAF is a multi-donor technical assistance facility financed by 17 multilateral and bilateral donors.  
It was was created in 1999 with support from Japan and the United Kingdom to catalyze “increased 
private sector participation in emerging markets…by support[ing] the creation of a sound enabling 
environment for private service provision.” It is is governed by a Program Council composed of its 
donors. An independent technical advisory panel reviews PPIAF activities and provides strategic 
advice to the Program Council.  http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/page/about-us  (January 23, 2011).  
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under its flagship publication series, “Trends and Policy Options,” PPIAF published 
two of the largest studies the Bank has conducted to date on PSP in water and 
sanitation.  Those studies, Philippe Marin’s case study-based review, Public-Private 
Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities, and Katharina Gassner’s econometric study, 
Does Private Sector Participation Improve Performance in Electricity and Water 
Distribution?, are critically assessed in the next chapter.  I show that a close, interior 
reading of these two reports undercuts their “headliner” synopses trumpeting the 
Bank’s claims for the continued superiority of PSP in urban water provision.  I 
critically assess another flagship publication on infrastructure reform, Reforming 
Infrastructure, a 2004 report which encapsulated the “second generation” of Bank 
thinking about PSP.90  The Development Economics group in the Bank sponsored 
and published the research for Reforming Infrastructure.  As I discuss in the next 
chapter, Reforming Infrastructure reflected a revisionist turn by the Bank, but o
that continues to reflect the Bank’s ambivalence towards impartiality in choosing 
between public and private o
ne 
ptions. 







90 Kessides 2004. 
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Chapter 3:  From Panacea Back to Problem, 1990-2010 
 
  
 This chapter presents a critical chronology of change in the World Bank’s 
knowledge production and policies from 1990-2010, the two decades over which 
there has been a notable shift in the Bank’s agenda for PSP.   It is the first part of a 
two-chapter analysis of agenda change at the Bank.  In Chapter Four I put forth a 
model of change rooted in a synthetic theoretical approach which combines 
international relations and sociological organization theory to account for external 
and internal influences on the Bank’s agenda.  Chapter Four draws on the critical 
exposition presented in this chapter, supplemented by additional analysis and 
information gleaned in interviews with Bank staff and water experts.      
 The first section of this chapter examines the decade of the 1990s, the heyday 
of PSP policies and programs at the Bank.  It explores the global political and 
economic environment which conditioned the Bank’s embrace of PSP policies as well 
as the intellectual foundations articulated in several key Bank research reports.  The 
second section is divided into three parts, periodizing the Bank’s reluctant retreat and 
two phases of subsequent policy revisionism. The first phase (circa 2003-04), 
discussed , embodies the Bank’s second generation of thinking about infrastructure 
reform.  The most recent phase (circa 2009) captures the Bank in a fundamental 
contradiction and what I describe in Chapter Four as a “partial learner’s identity 
crisis.”   Despite its professed agnosticism between public and private operation of 
urban WSS utilities, the Bank continues to advocate for PSP on a tenuous thread 
while turning back to the oft-maligned public sector with the expectation that it fulfill 






3.1.  PSP as Panacea: The 1990s, a Decade Free of Doubt 
 
 
 The 1990s proved to be the heyday of private sector participation in the WSS 
sector for the Bank.  After the “lost decade” of the 1980s saw a multitude of 
developing and socialist economies thrust into crippling levels of debt and depression, 
the 1990s witnessed a turn to market liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.  
Structural adjustment and stabilization policies prescribed by the IFIs in the 1980s 
and 1990s pushed debtor countries towards openness, fiscal austerity, and monetary 
restraint, a brew of policies which came to be known as the “Washington 
Consensus.”91  The lackluster performance of import-substituting industrialization 
and the successful model of developmentalist export-led growth in East Asia92 also 
spurred Southeast Asian and Latin American countries to follow suit and open their 
economies to international trade and investment.93     
 The Bank’s full-on embrace of PSP in the water and sanitation sector in the 
1990s reflected both sector-specific failures in Bank lending policies during previous 
decades, as well as the larger ideological framework of SAPs which guided the IFIs’ 
                                           
91 The “Washington Consensus” was a term coined by John Williamson in 1989 with respect to 
prescriptions for reviving growth in Latin America.  It referred to a policy mix which subsumed the 
main elements of SAPs and stabilization policies, including trade and financial liberalization, 
reordering public expenditure priorities, privatization, tax reform, and protecting property rights.  See 
Williamson, J. 2002. Did the Washington Consensus Fail?  Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics). http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=488 
(November 27, 2010). 
92 As numerous scholars have argued, and as even the World Bank was forced to acknowledge in the 
mid-1990s, the “East Asian miracle” was not fueled by export-led growth alone, but as much by a 
“developmental state” which deployed industrial policies and selective incentives, inter alia, and was 
characterized by a “seamless web of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed interests.” Meredith Woo-
Cumings, ed. 1999. The Developmental State. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. See also 
Wade 1992.  
93 Frieden, Jeffry. 2006. Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. New York: 
W.W.Norton and Company, 392-434.   
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approach to development lending during this period.   An internal Bank evaluation of 
the Bank’s experience in the WSS sector from 1967-89, known as the Buky Report, 
after its lead author-- criticized project lending in WSS along almost all dimensions 
of expected outcomes.94  It identified shortcomings in low coverage rates, low tariffs 
(encouraging wasteful water use and inadequate cost recovery), underinvestment, 
deteriorating infrastructure, overstaffing, inefficient management, and 
unresponsiveness to the needs of poor.95 Beyond the internal acknowledgement of 
failures in the WSS sector and the global impetus towards market liberalization, the 
push for PSP was accelerated by the promotion of “Washington Consensus” policy 
prescriptions, the drive of water TNCs to internationalize, and the demonstration 
effect of PSP in countries which had privatized some or all of the sector, such as 
Chile, the U.K., New Zealand, and France.  A senior World Bank official in the 
Bank’s “Water Anchor,” Philippe Marin, points to the 1989 water privatization in 
England and Wales as central to convincing policy makers that private financing of 
urban water utilities could be viable: “This privatization was a momentous event for 
the industry worldwide, raising massive amounts of private money from international 
financial markets…many observers expected that such a promising new approach 
could be replicated on a large scale in the developing world, where a considerable 
amount of money was needed to fund the investment backlog.”96  Marin does not 
                                           
94 The World Bank . 1992(c). "Water Supply and Sanitation Projects: The Bank's Experience, 1967-
89," [The Buky Report]. OED Report No. 10789, World Bank, Washington, D.C.  Summary in: 
OED/IEG, Précis No. 29, June 1, 1992. 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/7e26d3f0c5cb
c7d7852567f5005d83b6?OpenDocument  (August 22, 2010). 
95 The World Bank. 1992(c);  Bakker, K. “Overview Paper: Recent Trends in PSP, Financing, and 
Regulation in the Water Sector.”April 28, 2009.  http://www.waterdialogues.org/downloads/new/TP-
Overview-28-April.doc (August 29, 2009). 
96. Marin 2009, 19. 
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comment on why “observers” had such high expectations of replicability, given the 
U.K.’s status as a highly-developed country with the institutional ability to ensure that 
a special regulatory agency (along with an innovative regulatory mechanism) 
accompanied privatization.  But as Jeffry Frieden points out, Chile’s continuation of 
market-friendly policies after the democratic election of a civilian government in 
1989 led other Latin American countries to look more favorably at the potential of 
economic integration and PSP.97  Enthusiasm for pursuing PSP in water also followed 
on the massive amounts of private investment in other infrastructure sectors, such as 
telecoms, electricity and transport.  
Richard Franceys, a British academic who has worked for the World Bank 
and the U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID), notes that the IFIs 
exerted leverage on client countries to pursue PSP through direct conditionalities in 
loans, as well as through IMF policies of fiscal restraint and austerity, which induced 
central governments to limit subsidies to water utilities.98  International market 
penetration by French transnational water companies Veolia (formerly Vivendi), 
Ondeo (formerly Suez),99 and SAUR, was facilitated by the Bank’s endorsement of 
the Francophone model of PSP for urban WSS in developing countries.100  Further 
sanction was given to the Bank’s promotion of commercializing water by the 1992 
                                           
97 Frieden 2006, 425. 
98 Nickson and Franceys 2003, 52-54.  
99 Veolia Environnement was founded in 1853 as Compagnie Générale des Eaux, which in 1998, 
became Vivendi. while Ondeo was Société Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux. SAUR is the Société 
d’Aménagement Urbain et Rural.  
100 Nickson and Franceys 2003, 53-54. The Francophone model is based on a contractual arrangement 
between the public sector and the private operator known as affermage, which is similar to a lease 
contract. Under affermage, the private operator is responsible for operation and maintenance of the 
water system, collecting tariffs, and paying a fee to the public sector for leasing the infrastructure 
assets.  Under a lease, this fee is fixed, while under affermage, it is proportional to the volume of water 




International Conference on Water and the Environment.  Principle Four of the 
Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, which was the outcome of 
that conference, affirmed water as an economic good, which should be managed as 
such to achieve environmental sustainability, and efficient and equitable use.  Finger 
and Allouche argue that this helped support the Bank’s conceptualization of water 
resources management, where “privatization becomes the [Bank’s] answer to 
environmental concerns.”101   
 PSP in water in the 1990s got its greatest impetus from the process of 
economic liberalization underway in Latin America.  Antonio Estache, Chief 
Economist for the Sustainable Development (formally Infrastructure) Vice Presidency 
of the World Bank for over 25 years, attributes Latin America’s embrace of private-
public partnerships in infrastructure in the late 1980s and 1990s to middle and upper-
class voters’ fatigue with the rationing of essential public services due to a long 
succession of fiscal crises.102  Sector reforms, including PPPIs, were seen as the way 
out of a downward spiral; 75 percent of Latin Americans supported privatization in 
1995.103  PPPIs were supposed to contribute to fiscal stabilization, increase 
investment and growth, improve efficiency, and  increase access and affordability for 
residential users.  The fiscal impact of reform was the main expected payoff, through 
income from the sale, lease or rental of assets, reductions in public sector operational 
and capital expenditures resulting from the transfer to private operators, and increased 
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tax and non-tax revenue.104  The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s took place in a 
global environment when the cost of funds was relatively low, yet private capital was 
still mostly attracted to infrastructure privatizations in telecommunications and 
energy in richer countries.  For the WSS sector, TNCs set their sights on large urban 
centers that offered the possibility of “cream-skimming.”   
The first water PPP of the period was a concession awarded in 1991 for the 
Argentine provincial utility of Corrientes, to a consortium led by newly-privatized 
British operator, Thames water.  Two years later, a concession was awarded for the 
Greater Buenos Aires region, with a commitment to invest over four billion dollars 
over the 30 year contract term—what Marin calls “an unprecedented amount for the 
water industry in a developing country…which generated considerable momentum” 
for further PPP investments.105  A series of PPP contracts for WSS utilities were 
executed between 1994-97 around the globe, in such countries as Malaysia, Senegal, 
the Philippines, Colombia, Bolivia, Hungary, and several more in Argentina.  The 
number of developing countries with water PPPs rose from four to thirty-eight 
between 1991 and 2000, and the population served by private operators rose from six 
to 93 million.  Latin America accounted for 45 percent of the population served by 
private operators, with Argentina by far the largest market, with over half the urban 
population served by private operators.106  Other regions lagged Latin America: 14 
million people were served by private water operators in Asia (Manila and Jakarta), 
16 million in sub-Saharan Africa, 13 million in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and 
7 million in the Middle East and North Africa.  Marin notes that between 1990 and 
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2000, contracts worth over $43 billion included some form of private participation, 
where that participation involved an investment commitment on the part of the private 
sector.107   
Figure 1 provides a schematic model of the external influences on the Bank’s 
full-throttle push for PSP in water and sanitation during the 1990s.  As described 
above, changes in the global political economy towards market liberalization and 
supporting policies enabled multilateral financial institutions to press for sector 
reforms with client countries through loan conditionalities and facilitated water 
TNCs’ interest and investment in developing country markets.  Donor states, 
especially the U.S., exerted pressure on the Bank to incorporate private sector 
development (PSD) into its policy work through helping countries develop regulatory 
and legal frameworks to support  privatization and PSP, as well as microenterprise 
and financial sector development.  Since the IBRD and IDA do not lend directly to 
private entities or engage in private sector transactions, the U.S. applied pressure on 
these sovereign lending arms of the World Bank Group by linking Congressional 
funding for a capital increase for the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
private sector loan “window” of the World Bank Group (WBG), to progress on 
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But as Michelle Miller-Adams points out, unlike the campaign to change the Bank’s 
approach to environmental issues, U.S. pressure for the PSD agenda involved only 
minimal effort to seek international consensus.  The push did not originate in 
response to societal demands, but as a matter of ideological preferences, which were 
unsurprisingly, consonant with those of the Bank.  However, the timing and details of 
the Bank’s incorporation of PSD were as much a function of the Bank’s own 
preferences and reflected other external pressures—not simply those from donor 
countries.  Specifically, competition with private capital flows had intensified in the 
1990s, threatening to diminish the influence of bilateral and multilateral financial 
institutions and spurring the Bank to be seen as a cost-effective institution promoting 
market-friendly policies.109  Since the Bank faced competition with private lenders 
for creditworthy middle-income client countries, it sought to create a niche for 
expertise in developing the institutional framework to support  PSD.  Organizational 
changes inside the Bank, including the establishment of a Vice President for Finance 
and Private Sector Development, gave PSD increased prominence during the 1990s, 
as did the new requirement that all Country Assistance Strategies (CAS’) address the 
status of the private sector.  Figure 1 thus shows that the enabling conditions for PSP 
in WSS in the 1990s were bi-directional between the Bank and the transnational 
private water sector.  Depending on the client state, and the inclination of the client 
borrower to implement sector reforms, the Bank either imposed and/or enabled PSP 
reforms.  The same dynamic infused bilateral development assistance, as indicated by 
the same pressures exerted by donor states on client borrowers. 
its 
                                           




 3.1.2. Knowledge Production Inside the Bank: the Analytical Foundations 
 for PSP in Infrastructure 
 
 Three Bank documents from early 1990s provide the intellectual rationale and 
policy framework for the Bank’s promotion of PSP in the water sector: the 
Operations Evaluation Department’s (OED) Buky Report (1992), the 1994 World 
Development Report, and a report  widely-cited as the capstone of the Bank’s critique 
of  public ownership and state-owned enterprises, Bureaucrats in Business (1995).  
The Buky Report, produced by the Bank’s independent evaluation arm, the OED 
(today known as the Independent Evaluation Group), provided the analytical 
backdrop for the switchover to PSP strategies in the sector.  Looking at 120 projects 
over more than two decades, the Report found that all of the projects increased the 
supply of potable water to urban populations and supported improved living standards 
for millions of urban  dwellers.  But these achievements were undercut by the Bank’s 
failure to meet a wide range of expected performance outcomes, including increasing 
WSS coverage for the poor—an outcome which fell far short of projections.  Major 
failings were identified in the Report in the following areas:110  
Financial Viability.  The governments of 42 borrower countries—more than three-
fourths of the project borrowers—did not comply with the covenants in loan 
agreements with the Bank concerning pricing and financial performance.  
Governments often did not provide transfers to  
water utilities on time in the agreed amounts, and many SOEs failed to pay their bills.  
The OED noted that:  “Financial problems arose most often from failure to improve 
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tariffs and charges that would cover operating and maintenance costs and contribute 
to new investment… [T]he Bank's promotion of economically efficient pricing 
conspicuously failed in many countries where large consumers are still 
subsidized…The Bank seems to have been hesitant and methodologically ill-prepared 
to promote tariffs and charges that reconciled economic efficiency, social equity, and 
financial criteria.”  Incremental revenues were found to be “well below the economic 
cost of service.”  Notably, 16 of the 30 projects that the OED found in compliance 
were in just four countries: Botswana, South Korea, Singapore, and Tunisia.  
Sectoral Policies and Water Resource Management. The Buky Report criticized the 
Bank for failing to document whether Bank staff properly identified communities' 
water and sanitation needs and the best responses to them.  The Bank’s sectoral 
strategies, dating from the 1960s, were not updated to address water resources 
management in an environmentally-sustainable manner, and which balances 
competing uses of water.  The OED implicitly criticized the project lending model, 
noting that “[T]he time span afforded by one project is generally too short for 
developing an enabling sectoral framework and building well-staffed, efficient 
utilities… Repeater projects have a better record of success.”   
Institution Building.  The Report noted that “Efforts to help strengthen water supply 
institutions through project lending succeeded rather rarely,” because the Bank did 
not use its influence, or make systematic recommendations to governments, to secure 
the autonomy and regulation of WSS authorities.  The lack of operational and 
financial autonomy also resulted in poor management, and the Bank here too failed to 
use its influence to retain qualified staff.   
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Water for the Poor.  The OED’s assessment of the Bank’s failure in this area appears 
quite damning: 
 Efforts to provide poor households with water and sanitation were constrained 
both by project design and by lack of resources.    
 The impact of projects on poverty was not well documented.  In many cases, 
project design did not provide adequately for the poor, owing to lack of 
sufficiently detailed data on the numbers and locations of poor households, and  
because of political pressure from influential groups to improve their own water 
and sanitation services.. 
 Of  89 projects analyzed, only two “demonstrably succeeded in improving 
conditions for poor households. Another 20 claimed success but offered no 
means of measuring it, and . another 15 failed.  Poverty issues were not 
addressed in 52 projects (40 percent of these were begun before the Bank's 
declaration of commitment to poverty relief). 
Environmental Protection.  Environmental impacts were not well documented, and 
negative environment impacts resulted from relative inattention to sewerage lending, 
weaknesses in sector institutions, and increased wastewater volumes which 
accompanied improvements in water supplies.  The 62 projects which increased  
water supply alone relied on existing sanitation systems, and “in none of the urban 
areas served were these systems capable of handling associated increases in 
wastewater volumes.”  
 Two years after the OED/Buky Report, the Bank devoted its 1994 World 
Development Report (WDR), Infrastructure for Development, to the subject of 
68 
 
improving the “effectiveness of investments and efficiency of service provision” in 
the infrastructure sector, defined as including public utilities, public works, and the 
transport sector.111    The Bank argued that although developing countries were 
investing $200 billion per year in new infrastructure, inefficiencies, waste, redundant 
staffing, and the absence of the right incentives for providers were contributing to 
chronic underperformance, likely to be further exacerbated with urban population 
growth.  Four strategies would be needed to change course: commercial management, 
competition, stakeholder involvement, and a transformation in the roles of 
governments and the private sector.   Henceforth, the dictum would be that 
infrastructure would need to be “managed like a business, not a bureaucracy,” and 
that “enabling measures for private entry and market provision should be adopted in 
the shortest possible time span to ward off opposition.”112   In natural monopoly 
sectors, competitive bidding and unbundling of potentially-competitive segments 
could indirectly introduce competition.  Governments would have a “continuing, if 
changed role,” and be responsible for creating policy and regulatory frameworks 
which safeguarded the interests of the poor, improved environmental conditions, and 
supported private involvement in the provision of infrastructure services.   Users and 
stakeholders “should be given a strong voice and responsibility…and be represented 
in the planning and regulation of infrastructure services.”   Yet elsewhere in the 
WDR, the Bank maintains that “Experience argues for keeping regulation to a 
                                           
111 World Bank 1994. World Development Report 1994. Infrastructure for Development. Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank and New York: Oxford University Press. 
112 World Bank 1994, 2 and 65.  
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minimum…and moves toward privatization and PSP need not wait for the formal 
creation of a comprehensive regulatory framework.”113    
 A year after the publication of Infrastructure for Development, the Bank 
published Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government 
Ownership, its coup de grace in touting the virtues of privatizing SOEs.114  A former 
department head of the NGO Water Aid, Belinda Calaguas, described this policy 
research paper as embodying the culmination of Bank ideology advancing 
privatization during the 1990s.  Bayliss and Fine characterized it as representing the 
“new privatization synthesis” for the Bank, rooted in a theoretical framework 
incorporating strands from the New Institutional Economics and New Political 
Economy.115  Bureaucrats in Business argues that “large and inefficient SOE sectors 
have high costs for developing economies, especially the poorest,” and that “reducing 
the role of bureaucrats in business can bring a country substantial economic gains.”116  
Despite more than a decade of divestiture supported by World Bank and other 
bilateral aid agencies and MDBs, the size of the SOE sector in 1995 had not changed 
substantially in 20 years.  The poorer the country, the larger the size of the sector. The 
Report argues that SOEs hinder economic growth, absorb a large amount of funds 
that could be better spent on basic social services, such as health and education, and 
capture a disproportionate share of credit, squeezing out private sector borrowing.  
Governments are forced to finance SOEs through transfers, domestic private savings, 
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World Bank Approach to Privatization and Public Sector Reform,” Journal of International 
Development. 10:7, 841-855. 
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or some mix thereof.  The larger the SOE sector’s overall deficit, the larger the fiscal 
and current account deficits.  In a familiar refrain, bureaucrats face perverse 
incentives and contradictory demands, while the private sector, sometimes even in 
monopoly markets, is more efficient.   
 Using internal Bank data and analysis, the  Report examined SOE reform 
efforts in a non-random sample of  12 low- and middle-income developing countries.  
Looking at financial performance, productivity, and the savings-investment deficit 
(the difference between the SOE sector’s surplus and investment), it found that only 
three countries were successful at reform.117  The successes, Chile, Mexico and South 
Korea, utilized five components of reform that facilitated or incorporated commercial 
principles: divestiture, competition, hard budgets, financial sector reform, and 
changes in the institutional relationship between SOEs and government.   The Report 
concluded that the political economy of successful SOE reform was predicated on 
three enabling conditions: (1) reforms must be politically desirable to leaders and 
constituencies (which can occur with regime change, coalition shifts, or an economic 
crisis); (2) they must be politically feasible: leaders must be able to overcome 
opposition, either by compensating losers or “compelling them to comply, despite 
their losses,” and; (3) they must be credible--to investors, as well as to losers who 
should be compensated, such as SOE workers.118   It is noteworthy that the Bank is at 
pains to state that “our data and analysis provide no support for the frequently voiced 
opinion that SOE reform is more likely in authoritarian regimes…nor is there any 
                                           
117 The 12 countries included nine “developing market” economies, and three transition economies: 
Chile, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Ghana, India, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, 
Senegal and Turkey.   
118 World Bank 1995, 31-32. 
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clear link between democracy and SOE reform.”119  Although denying any link 
between SOE reform and regime type, the Bank simultaneously points out that for 
reforms to meet the second and third conditions of  feasibility and credibility, the 
private sector must be confident that policy reversals will not occur: “whether a 
country has a more or less authoritarian form of government is therefore a strong 
indicator of feasibility.”120  At the same time, the Bank does not shy away from 
recommending strong measures that exert generalized pressure for reform, 
particularly for countries not ready to reform their SOEs.  In these cases, the Bank 
recommends macroeconomic reforms, including fiscal and monetary tightening, trade 
and domestic market liberalization, and other stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies—which do not directly threaten SOE supporters, but create constituencies 
which generate pressure for future SOE reform.  The Bank advocates compensating 
losers by eliminating obstacles to private job creation, and de-coupling SOE jobs 
from the benefits provided with those jobs, through such measures as creating a 
“commercial housing market or a public health care” system.  It offers these 
prescriptions breezily, with little acknowledgement that such major social policy 
initiatives are at odds with simultaneous recommendations for fiscal and monetary 
austerity, and often not achievable in developed countries, let alone developing ones.  
Further, the Bank expected that developing market economies would in principle, be 
better candidates for reform. Yet its Europe and Central Asia Department 
conveniently found that transition economies, such as the Czech Republic and 
Poland, were “among the more successful reformers… because politically charged 
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reforms may be easier to push through in the context of widespread, sweeping change 
than when they are part of a more routine incremental reform process.”121 
 Bayliss and Fine characterize Bureaucrats in Business as suffering from the 
“panacea syndrome:” the notion that privatization will itself generate or enhance the 
appropriate economic and political circumstances required for it to be successful.122  
They maintain that the Report presents limited evidence in support of the superior 
performance of the private sector, ignoring contrary evidence.  They point out that 
those countries which successfully reformed SOEs were middle income countries, 
had the most developed financial sectors, and already had strong state sectors before 
reform or divestiture took place.  In other words, the causal explanation could be 
precisely the opposite of that posited by the Bank—with a strong state sector and/or 
common conditions and policies enhancing the performance of the public, financial, 
and private sectors.  This implies that the difference between countries matter more 
than the ownership conditions within countries.  They further note that the 
telecommunications sector has by far and away dominated infrastructure 
privatizations in developed countries, by virtue of unique features which do not 
prevail in other sectors—a consideration which the Bank does not factor into their 
analysis or prescriptions.123 
 The Bank’s embrace of PSP during the 1990s, as well the private sector itself, 
also found an intellectual and institutional home in two international water 
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organizations established in 1996: the Global Water Partnership (GWP), and the 
World Water Council (WWC).  The WWC, set up as a policy think tank devoted to 
the study and analysis of global long-term water policy, reinforced the Bank’s 
emphasis on the critical role of the private sector and market mechanisms as the 
solution for the global water crisis.124   Under the WWC’s auspices, a comprehensive 
document known as the World Water Vision was unveiled at the Second World Water 
Forum in The Hague in 2000, to provide forward-looking recommendations on 
addressing the crisis. Among other  recommendations, the World Water Vision called 
for greatly-expanded private sector investment in water and full-cost pricing to 
promote efficiency and accountability.125  The GWP, whose organizational focus was 
on helping countries and water organizations apply IWRM in the field through 
technical assistance and capacity building, also envisioned a primary role for the 
private sector and full-cost pricing.126 
 The World Bank’s 1994 World Development Report and Bureaucrats in 
Business represented high-watermark documents memorializing the Bank’s full turn 
towards privatization and PSP for public services such as water and sanitation.  The 
1990s were the heyday of  those  policies, a period during which the Bank fostered 
the growth of TNCs providing infrastructure services.127   But this period was short-
lived.  Total global private sector investment in WSS peaked in 1997 at $9.97 billion 
and has declined since, averaging one-third of that for the period 2005-2008, and as 
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low as 15percent of this total in other years since 2001.128   The hopes placed in the 
private sector as a source for mobilizing finance did not materialize, and a sizeable 
proportion of high-profile PSP projects fell far short of expectations. The Bank’s 
hopes in the panacea of PSP were, ironically, deflated from opposing poles: 
transnational capital, and transnational activists opposing that capital.  The next 
section looks at the first pole-- how and why the “magical market” solution failed to 
materialize, and the Bank’s evolving reaction to this disappointment. 
 
3.2. No Magic in Markets: Retreat and Revisionism, 2001-2010 
 
 3.2.1.  The Road to Revisionism: 2001-2003 
 
 
 At the close of the first decade of the 21st century, the Bank’s hindsight 
assessment of the 1990s looked quite different than at the start of the decade:  Marin 
writes:  
When compared with other infrastructure sectors, private financing of urban 
water utilities was limited, representing  only 5.4 percent of the total 
investment commitments in private infrastructure between 1990 and 
2000…[five private water companies] represented 90 percent of the total 
investment commitments during 1991-97.  Furthermore, figures on investment 
commitments were for the total amounts to be invested over the duration of 
the contracts, and most of the commitments were for a few large projects, with 
those in Chile, Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Manila (the Philippines) 
representing nearly half the total amount.129 
 
  The Argentine financial crisis of 2001-2002 proved to be a turning point for 
PSP, and highlighted the exposure of foreign investors to currency and contractual 
                                           
128 The World Bank Group, Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, Sector Data Snapshots, 
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risk.  In 2002, the water TNC Suez wrote off  $500 million in losses in Argentina, 
which represented over eight percent of its international water business.   In 
December 2002, another flagship concession--Suez’s Maynilad subsidiary in the 
Philippines, announced that it was abandoning the concession and claiming $303 
million in compensation for sunk investments.  In a presentation to the World Bank in 
2002, the CEO of French water TNC SAUR told the Bank that it would require 
substantial grants and soft loans to meet required investment levels, and that growth 
in the water sector in the developing world would depend on soft funding and 
subsidies.130  In January 2003, Suez announced that it would withdraw from those 
investments in developing countries that did not offer a better risk-to-return ratio and 
enhanced cash generation.  CEO Gérard Mestrallet stated that Suez would reduce its 
exposure in developing countries by one-third, finance new investments only from 
cash flow and freeze financing in strong currencies, and with multilateral institutions, 
“perfect appropriate intervention procedures.”  If concession-granting authorities and 
parties failed to adhere to their commitments, it would “prepare to depart.”131   
 The withdrawal of water TNCs from developing countries coincided with (and 
was in part precipitated by), a backlash against pro-privatization policies, especially 
in Latin America.  Lora, Panizza, and Quispe-Agnoli cite Latinobarómetro public 
opinion polls showing that pro-market reforms were considered one of the causes of 
the economic crisis in Latin America in the late 1990s and early 2000s.132   In 1998 
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more than 50 percent of Latin Americans thought that privatization was beneficial for 
their country; that percentage had dropped to 31 percent in 2001 and to 25 percent  in 
2003.   By 2003 the percentage of people who supported a market economy had 
dropped to 18 percent from 77 percent in 1998.133 
 At the World Bank Water Week in March 2003, World Bank Director for 
Energy and Water Jamal Saghir acknowledged this new reality: capital flows to 
emerging markets had dropped by 40 percent from 1997-2001,  the number of 
strategic investors in WSS had dropped, and those investors were “reconsidering” 
their  portfolios in emerging markets.134 Saghir recounted a litany of risks faced by 
investors in the water sector:  
♦ currency risk (where debt is dollar-denominated, but earnings are in local 
currency); 
♦ Regulatory risk—the risk of the agreed framework not being implemented 
♦ Payment and performance risk (where governments fail to pay the amounts due) 
♦ Sub-sovereign risk—since investments are often made at the sub-sovereign 
level; and 
♦ Affordability risk—the risk that public investments and subsidies will be 
necessary to supplement the role played by private operators and consumers. 
Saghir then laid out a number of strategies for addressing these key risks which 
presaged the recommendations contained in the Camdessus Report, unveiled several 
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weeks later at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto.  These included combining 
public financing with private, targeting lending and guarantees at the sub-sovereign 
level, and increasing the use of risk mitigation instruments—such as partial risk 
guarantees, political risk insurance, and breach of contract coverage.  The workshop 
sessions offered at the 2003 Water Week reflected the less sanguine landscape and 
prognosis for PSP, with titles such as “Beyond the Public-Private Debate,” “Modes of 
Public Engagement,” “New Approaches to PSP” and “The Role of Strategic 
Communication in Water Reform.”  All of these appeared under the thematic 
umbrella: “Water Supply and Sanitation: Not One Size Fits All.”135 
 The challenges of the decline in private finance to the WSS sector were taken 
up at the Third World Water Forum  (3rd WWF) in Kyoto, Japan in March 2003 in 
The Report of the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, known as the 
Camdessus Report, after its Chairman and former IMF Managing Director Michel 
Camdessus.  The Panel was formed in 2001 as a joint initiative of the GWP, the 
WWC and 3rd  WWF to “address the ways and means of attracting new financial 
resources to the water field.”136   Conca notes that the Panel’s composition lent the 
Report heft: of the 20 panel members, not counting Chairman Camdessus, four were 
presidents of the regional multilateral development banks, two were vice-presidents 
of the World Bank, and two were senior executives from the water TNCs Suez and 
Thames Water.  Only two international NGOs were represented on the Panel 
(Transparency International and Water Aid).  The Report concluded that financial 
flows would have to at least double if the MDG goals for household water and 
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sanitation were to be reached by 2015.   It focused in particular on means to mitigate 
risk for the private sector including through a “reversal of the traditional financial 
architecture,” with more funds targeted to the sub-sovereign and local levels, 
including the development of local capital markets and instruments.  The Panel came 
up with a set of 87 recommendations on how to achieve these goals: the largest set of 
recommendations dealt with “adapting financial policies and instruments to the needs 
of the water sector.”  Among the chief the recommendations to the IFIs and export-
credit agencies were proposals to: 
♦ Enhance and extend political risk coverage for projects, and relax internal 
constraints on the  use of loan guarantees and insurance—keeping the specific 
needs of potential private operators in mind  
♦ Direct finance to the sub-sovereign level, by issuing local currency bonds to 
promote local capital markets, extending local loan tenors,  and encouraging the 
use of local pension funds.   
♦ Leverage the private sector, by encouraging banks and other lenders to develop 
and employ innovative financing techniques such as securitization or 
collateralization of loan-debt obligations 
♦ Create a new “Devaluation Liquidity Backstopping Facility” to address 
devaluations and consequent liquidity crises, which make it difficult or 
impossible for local water authorities and providers to service foreign debt in 
local currency.  The Facility would effectively guarantee foreign loans and 
finance the additional debt service incurred from devaluation.  The Facility 
would be paid for by a surcharge levied on end users.   
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 Eleven recommendations in the Report concerned PSP, and what is 
noteworthy about these recommendations was the new emphasis on combining 
public and private finance—with a now explicit acknowledgement that the former 
would be critical for mobilizing the latter.  The Report recommended that 
Governments create an enabling environment for PSP, that donors and governments 
be “open to financing water projects by combining public funds with private 
financing,” and that sub-sovereign entities “consider the option of retaining assets in 
public ownership, with continuing public responsibility for investment finance—
while operations are privately-managed.”137  The recommendations of the Panel with 
respect to PSP reflect the same double-speak that the Bank was also beginning to 
adopt during this period: on the one hand, a professed agnosticism as to choice of 
service provider ownership structure; on the other hand, tenacious in the continued 
push for private participation.  Hence, while one Panel recommendation stresses that 
the choice between different mixes of public, private and self-help options should be 
“pragmatic—eschewing ideology,” many more proposals recommend that ODA 
grants and technical assistance be steered towards helping public authorities build 
capacity for PPP contracts, tendering, and procurement.   At the same time, the 
Report made concessions to certain realities: while it argued that full cost recovery 
was the ideal long-term aim, it acknowledged that affordability issues and the need 
for subsidies argued for “sustainable cost recovery,” which allowed for wide 
variations in payment capacity.  One of the most controversial recommendations in 
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the Report was a call for the IFIs to resume lending in water storage schemes, i.e., 
dams.  
 The three sponsors of the Camdessus Report proudly reported that the Report 
“soon permeated the international community” in the months following the 3rd 
WWF, with follow-on initiatives by the World Bank Group, the G-8 summit, and the 
Asian Development Bank.138  In a July 2003 internal response to the Report the 
World Bank agreed to follow up on the Panel’s recommendations on increasing the 
use of risk mitigation instruments and sub-sovereign instruments, and to scale up 
technical assistance and lending at the country level.  At the same time, it 
characterized the Report as overly optimistic on the prospects of attracting 
significant increases in private sector financing, and took exception to the Panel’s 
recommendation to earmark funds for WSS at the global level.  In line with its own 
institutional structure, the Bank argued that the use of instruments and facilities 
should be anchored in a country-based framework.139 
 Most activist NGOs were, not surprisingly, critical of the Camdessus Report, 
which they argued reflected the influence and interests of water TNCs, and which 
failed to incorporate the views of civil society organizations.  Richard Jolly of the 
Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC), a U.N.-mandated 
organization which promotes provision of water to the world’s poor characterized the 
Report as “too much about big bucks, failing to emphasize a need for a change in 
priorities in the sector.”  U.S.-based Public Citizen noted that “civil society was 
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pleased to learn that the Report, which essentially lauds privatization coupled with 
public subsidies, was not incorporated into the final Forum statement.”140  The 
public sector union-backed Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)  
criticized the report for ignoring the risks to countries’ taxpayers and consumers in 
providing guarantees for private concessions, and for preferring top-down 
conditionalities to local political decisions on governance issues.  However, the large 
U.K.-based NGO WaterAid had a more nuanced reaction to the Report.  WaterAid
then-president Ravi Narayanan applauded the Report’s endorsement of the need for 
governments to have predictable revenue frameworks for WSS, and for central 
governments to provide support to municipalities to cope with increasing 
urbanization, with the attendant problems of unregistered dwellings and informal 
settlements.  With respect to ensuring predictable revenue streams, WaterAid (as 
discussed in Chapter Five on activist networks) broke ranks with other activi
on the issue of cost recovery: “No matter how revolting the idea of paying for a bas
service, the fact remains that failures in recovering costs for services in the past 
constitute one of the reasons why current services are so poor and paltry…there is 







                                          
141  Nevertheless, Narayanan stressed that tariffs 
had to be set through socially-negotiated frameworks, with open discourse on 
subsidy levels for the destitute—and that the Panel had work to do in elabo
concept of “sustainable cost recovery.”  WaterAid also warned that the push for 
decentralization was saddling sub-sovereigns with new responsibilities, without
commensurate resources or authority.  It recommended that the IFIs lift the cap o
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government staffing levels, which incapacitates local governments, and hamstrings 











tion enthusiasts at the World Bank--the main tool the wealthy nations 
ave to influence economic policies in the poor ones--wondering what went 
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 3.2.2.  The Second Generation of Infrastructure Reform: 2003-2006  
The period before and after the 3rd WWF represented a turning point in the 
Bank’s public posture towards PSP, with the Bank now declaring itself an agnostic on
whether infrastructure should be in public or private hands.  During the Forum, Ba
Vice-President for Sustainable Development Ian Johnson declared the Bank to be 
ideologically neutral, opposed to a “one-size fits all” approach.  A July 2003 Wa
Street Journal (WSJ) article titled “The World Bank as Privatization Agnostic” 
described the Ban
SJ wrote: 
What seemed like a no-brainer in the 1990s--that developing countries s
sell off money-losing state infrastructure to efficient private investors--no 
longer seems so obvious, especially when it comes to power and water 
utilities…Investors, who once seemed eager to risk their money on Brazilian 
power plants or African sewers are pulling back…Consumers, feeling 
deceived, increasingly associate privatization with higher rates for them an
higher profits for foreign companies and corrupt officials. Rate increases have
spurred violent demonstrations against a water concession in Bolivia and 





The article quoted Michael Klein, then Vice President for the Private Sector 
Development Department and Chief Economist at the IFC as saying: “there’s 
 




certainly a lot of soul-searching going on.”   The “soul-searching” was induced by
two opposite ends of the pole—the flight of transnational capital and the fight of 
transnational activists—as well as by internal learning at the Bank induced by th
high rate of project terminations and cancellations.  As discussed above, and as 











a sound overall policy and regulatory framework, address key operational 
performance issues, and foster the financial sustainability of the utility.  
 
 
                                          
erably less sanguine about the prospects for a significant private sector role  
The outcome of this soul-searching—the Bank’s response to this cognitiv
political crisis—was a second generation of research and policy on PSP.  At th
operational level, this was reflected in the April 2004 document Operational 
Guidance for World Bank Group Staff: Public and Private Sector Roles in Water 
Supply and Sanitation Services (Guidance Note).143   The 2004 Guidance Note was a 
follow-on to the Bank’s July 2003 Infrastructure Action Plan (IAP), which sought t
“revitalize” the Bank’s infrastructure business in response to the decline in private 
sector investment and the fifty percent decline in Bank lend
te made explicit the Bank’s revived willingness to: 
work with well-performing public utilities and those that put in place credib
programs to improve performance over time.  Such a program would esta
 
The Bank acknowledged that due to declining private interest in the sector most PPPs 
would need substantial levels of public funding.  It stressed, however, that “financing
inefficient utilities that lack a clear reform program will remain a thing of the past,”
and that fostering the financial viability of service providers would be paramount.  
 
143 World Bank and the Water Supply & Sanitation Sector Board, April 2004. Operational Guidance 
for World Bank Group Staff: Public and Private Sector Roles in Water Supply and Sanitation Services. 
Washington, D.C.:The World Bank.                                                                           
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While the Note conveys the internal and public message that the Bank is once aga
open to financing public utilities, it sets high bars for doing so.  It directs staff t
consider supporting government strategies in the sector only when a “realistic 
medium-term performance improvement plan” includes virtually the entire list of 
desired sector reforms: reductions in non-revenue water (NRW), bill collections, 
staffing levels, tariff levels and structure, subsidy levels and mechanisms, service to 
the poor, the recovery of operation and maintenance costs, as well as depreciation an
financing costs!  Less clear is whether the Bank intended to hold governments who 
involve private providers to the same expectations, or whether it had been applying 
this threshold of reform results to ongoing PPP projects.  With respect to improving
the performance of public sector providers the Bank makes clear that its preferred 
option is the public limited company, where the utility is run as a private busines








the nature and extent of public support should be evaluated on a case-by-
                                          
144  Expanding private provision of 
services is always to be encouraged, even when prices already fully reflect costs.  T
Guidance Note’s emphasis is directed at governments’ past failures, not at private 
providers’ failings.  Hence, it is governments which “may have to provide s
commitments to agreed contractual and regulatory frameworks,” including 
backstopping commitments to risk-sharing thorough loan and political risk 
guarantees, and taxpayer coverage of foreign exchange risk.  The Bank does at least 
caution that 
case basis.  
 
144 World Bank and the Water Supply & Sanitation Sector Board  2004, 7. The Netherlands 
exemplifies this type of public sector management model.  
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  Perhaps most revealing in the Note is a matrix of possible technical and 
institutional interventions by the Bank Group.  Notwithstanding the Note’s professed 
agnosticism between public and private provision, the matrix is principally organiz
around identifying which WSS sub-sectors retain appeal for the private sector, which 
hold little interest, and what government reforms and bank group instruments a
necessary to retain private sector involvement.  Not surprisingly, the private sec
portrayed as having low interest in rehabilitating or expanding drinking water 
distribution and access, but greater interest in bulk water supply and treatment 
facilities which are often financed under less risky “take-or-pay” agreements with 
governments.  Similarly, private sector interest in sewerage provision is confined to 
middle-income countries and wastewater treatment facilities, and is low with respect 
to on-site sanitation facilities.  The tasks laid out for governments are little short of 
daunting: getting tariffs right, correctly targeting subsidies to the poor, strengthe
the financial capacity and creditworthiness of municipalities, developing domestic
financial markets, committing to risk sharing, ensuring coherence in regulatory 
institutions, etc.  While the matrix incorporates several recommendations aligned 








mendations remain geared toward facilitating PSP and favoring the 
 
ank was 
                                          
creation of PPPs, including through an “effective communications strategy” by 
governments.145 
  Although the professed new credo of agnosticism seemed to be a bit less than
such in the Guidance Note to Bank staff, by June 2004 it was clear that the B
 
145 World Bank and the Water Supply & Sanitation Sector Board 2004, 18. 
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engaged in fundamentally rethinking its infrastructure privatization paradig
June 14, 2004 press conference led by three senior vice presidents from the 
Development Economics, Infrastructure, and Private Sector Development 
Departments, the Bank launched a new policy and research report co-published with
Oxford University Press: Reforming Infrastructure: Privatization, Regulation, and 
Competition (Reforming Infrastructure).   Francois Bourguignon, the Bank’s Chief 
Economist and Senior Vice President for Development Economics, opened the press 
conference and introduced the major themes of the report.  Bourguignon conceded 
that the experiences of the last two decades in infrastructure privatization reforms had
often been very controversial and the subject of intense debate.  On the one hand, h
defended the Bank’s policies in this area, reminding the audience that the pre-reform 
status quo was that of inefficient SOEs which underpriced services and could not 
attract financing to expand.  On the other hand, the Bank had learned some important 
lessons from its mistakes over the last two decades.  Again he repeated the mantra 
that there is “no universal reform model.”  The Bank had learned that regulation was
an absolute precondition for PSP in infrastructure, both to attract the private secto
and to garner sustainable public support.  And Bourguignon crucia






lly admitted that 
the dist  
Bank h
hat those reforms can be applied 
blindly as has been the case at some stages in the past. It is important to make 
sure that all the tools necessary to assessing the impact of reform are 
available, and that there is no doctrinal view that will overcome what these 
146
ributional impact of reforms had often been seen as negative, and that the
ad lacked the information necessary to assess this impact:  
It is an essential condition for success in the future that this weakness be 
corrected… It is certainly not the case t
tools may bring us as information.    
                                           
146 World Bank. June 14, 2004. Press Conference on Reforming Infrastructure, Press Conference 




 The author of Reforming Infrastructure, Ioannis Kessides, was the lead 
economist in the Development Economic Department’s Research Division.  The 
report covers the Bank’s experience in the electricity, telecommunications, 




been fueled by price increases, job 
reductions, and high profits of firms.    
 
The report identifies a sweep of mistaken assumptions and policy shortcomings that 
account for failed reform strategies. The major themes encompass:  
♦ Ownership Structure:  Kessides acknowledges that the structure of ownership is 
NOT the key variable explaining differences in performance outcomes; rather, it 
is the existence of strong institutions, which can take decades to evolve—as was 
the case in East Asia’s “miracle” economies: “And the fact that state ownership 
is flawed, does not mean that privatization is appropriate for all infrastructure 
activities and all countries.”   Before state ownership is supplanted by another 
institutional setup, it will be essential to assess the properties of the proposed 
alternative, the sector’s features, and the country’s economic, institutional, social 
and political characteristics.  
  
Privatization has been oversold and misunderstood… Just a few years a
privatization was heralded as an elixir that would rejuvenate lethargic, 
wasteful infrastructure industries and revitalize stagnating economies. But 
today, privatization is viewed differently and often critically.  Skepticism and 
outright hostility toward privatization is not limited to a few radical proteste
Opinion polls in several developing and transition economies, especially i
Latin America, reveal growing public dissatisfaction with privatization.   
Public discontent with privatization has 
147
                                                                                                                      
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20212636~menuPK:34476~
pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (June 16, 2004) 
147 Kessides 2004, 7-8. 
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♦ Competition: Kessides states that “most analysts now believe that network 
utilities should be unbundled” as they are no longer seen as exclusively natural 
monopolies and there is scope to introduce competition in a number of horizontal 
and vertical segments (e.g., unbundling electricity transmission and distributio
from generation).  However, he offers strong caveats to this view.  Industrialize
countries have themselves only recently introduced unbundling in traditiona
natural monopoly utilities, and this new model poses “significant risks” if not 
accompanied by structural and regulatory safeguards.  In many developing 








                                          
lack the very strong institutional capacity necessary for a “mixed system” o
competitive and monopoly providers.  
♦ Sectoral Characteristics:  In a frank admission that contrasts starkly with a 
decade of pro-PSP policies by Bank staff working in the water sector, Kesside
admits that the natural monopoly character of water supply is so strong that 
structural unbundling is rare, and there is far less scope for competition than 
other infrastructure sectors.  He states candidly: “The sector’s economic and 
technological characteristics disallow the possibility of an institutional magic 
bullet that would significantly increase efficiency.  Ultimately designing and 
sustaining effective water reforms depends on managing the political agenda.”
♦ Regulation: As noted above, the need for effective regulation as a precondition 
for private sector involvement is a key theme of the report. The discussion of 
regulation is particularly illustrative of internal contradictions in Bank rhetoric 
 
148 Kessides 2004, 220-222. 
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and policy.  When discussing the need for strengthening regulatory institutions,
the preponderant emphasis in Bank documents and pronouncements had been o
doing so for investors—e.g., clarifying property rights, assuring investors
sunk investments won’t be subject to regulatory “opportunism,” guaranteeing 
revenue streams, and ensuring that contracts will be enforced.  Kessides 
acknowledges that the interests of investors and consumers are often at odds a
that “creating regulatory institutions that render decisions legitimate to citiz













                                          
149  An effective regulatory regime is a key 
institutional precondition for privatization to achieve its public interest 
objectives, yet Kessides notes that none of the regulatory regimes tracked by the 
Bank had very strong or formal institutional structure in terms of commitment
enforcement, or consumer representation.  The best regulatory framew
Santiago, Chile—which “perhaps ironically, represented state ownership and 
operation.”150  Kessides admits that governments will often sidestep 
transparency, integrity and accountability in constructing regulatory procedures
because “their choices are influenced and constrained by external pressures
loan conditions.” And in a statement that is at odds with the oft-repeated Bank
screed that investors must be guaranteed regulatory certainty and stability, 
Kessides states that capture of regulatory agencies by private investors in the 
water sector has been a greater risk than expropriation.. He allows  that it took 
decades for the U.S. to reach a state of independence of regulatory agencies.  
 
149 Kessides 2004, 16. 
150 Kessides 2004, 252. 
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♦ Poverty Reduction and Equity: A major admission of the report is that PSP may
not only fail as a poverty reduction strategy, but that it may have exace
poverty and worsened distributional equity.  Though pubic service monopolies 
failed to achieve universal access, it is not clear that privatization and 
liberalization will automatically benefit poor households, since the public sect
subsidized tariffs, or specific customer or service segments.  Kessides states that 
it would be impossible to maintain significant cross-subsidies in tariffs under 







ity might come at the expense of 
orkers, customers, and other groups as a result of higher prices, reduced 
effects must  be considered, and this requires systematic household income, 
 





ple of the 
                                          
welfare effects beyond looking at firm profits and industry performance to
k at the effects on workers and households at different income levels:    
[But] increased efficiency and profitabil
w
levels and worsened terms of employment, and lower-quality services.  These 
expenditure, and employment surveys. 
In order for privatization to be sustainable, 
have to promote prices that balance efficiency and equity, and find new ways to
increase poor people’s access to services.  
♦ Transparency and Accountability:  Consumer involvement in water regulation
and procedural transparency are key to ensuring public acceptance of a PSP 
reform strategy.  But Kessides acknowledges this as a condition rarely met in 
developing and transition economies: “Indeed, limited public disclosure of ke
information and contract provisions is common, and advocated by multinationa
corporations to protect commercial secrets.”151  (He cites the exam
 






dapest Sewerage Company, where the MNC Vivendi and a German equity 
holder refused to make documents available to the City Council!) 
 Reforming Infrastructure represents a kind of mea culpa for the Bank on the 
shortcomings of privatization as well as the intellectual basis for a second generation 
of policy reforms.  It is at the same time a mottled mea culpa, flecked with 
reversions back to the Bank’s neoliberal belief in the superior performance of priva
operators—even as the report repeatedly delineates the ways in which that 
performance is contingent on a whole array of preconditions. This tension, which 
points to fundamental contradictions in Bank policies, was evident during the 
question and answer session following the press conference.  One questioner, for 
example, agreed with Mr. Kessides that getting institutional and regulatory reforms 
right often takes decades, yet Bank staff need to show measurable results by the end 
of the project cycle period.  Kessides replied that this anxiety was well placed, but h
elided a more detailed response except to say that this was good reason to hold off
assessing how successful a privatization project actually is!  When questions along 
the same lines surfaced later in the press conference, Kessides expounded that “I
agree that the policy preconditions that are so indispensable for effective privatization
to be implemented and the benefits to fully obtain, are rarely met.  So there is a 
dilemma here: should you delay the process?”  And the answer he proffered: “I th
that the judgment in many countries that it would be appropriate to proceed with 
privatization and restructuring even in the absence of institutional and regulatory 
safeguards…was the right one.”   In response to another question on the backlash









Chief  IFC Economist Michael Klein responded by pointing out that support for 
privatization in Latin America depended on how pollsters posed the question.  He 
said that the Latino Barometer poll which showed only 21 percent of Peruvians 
supporting privatization when the question was framed as “Do you like privatization
or not?” generated a much more favorable response when the questions were framed
as: “Would you appreciate privatization if regulation were well done, if investment 
came to improve [sic], if a transparent procurement process were used, if deci
were made by regulators in transparent ways?”  When the questions were thus posed
(lo and behold) two-thirds of the population in Peru said they would support 
privatization under those conditions.  Concludes Mr. Klein, quite ingenuously, “the 
question then is, how can a government put in place those conditions?”—as though 
this were a simple matter of choosing ice cream flavors.  Following on this remar
Vice President Bourguignon observed that the public’s reaction to privatization “is 







who are  
remely careful about in this 
respect, is to make sure that at the time the reform is launched, that there is an 





                                          
zation or financial liberalization. There is, very often, some ambiguity about
 the gainers and who are the losers.”  And then came his fanciful punch line:
What is really missing, or what we must be ext
announcement which is clearly made about who will be benefiting and who 
compensation that may be given to them? 152   
Laced a little more judiciously throughout the Kessides’ report than in previous Bank
documents is the exhortation that reform programs be properly communicated t
public in order to gain acceptance.  The Bank has frequently invoked the absence of
 
152 World Bank. June 14, 2004. Press Conference on Reforming Infrastructure. 
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an “effective communications strategy” to explain the public backlash against 
privatization in the WSS sector.  Consequently, one is left a bit incredulous seeing 
Bourguignon’s words above.  What self-interested politician would identify ex ante 
who the expected losers are from a proposed privatization reform?  And given 
many developed countries are not politically willin
that 







liberalization, how exactly are the poor or middle-income developing country 
borrowers of the World Bank expected to do so?   
  Other Bank answers to questioners during the press conference take on this 
same phantasmal quality of conflating reality on the ground with the illusory ideal of
how PSP should be practiced.   A questioner in the African Urban and Water Unit 
asks Mr. Kessides how increasingly decentralized responsibilities for urban WSS (a 
policy strongly pushed by the Bank for several reasons, including to impose fiscal 
restraints on central governments and weaken their budgetary authority) can be 
managed by local governments in the context of already extremely weak natio
government capacity.  How will governments know how to set tariffs or to nego
contracts?  Mr. Kessides responds again that this is indeed a problem—water 
provision is by its nature local or regional in character, yet the lower the tier of 
government, the less capacity to manage: “So the central regulatory authority
provide nonbinding, perhaps technical and other guidelines for regional authorities to 
follow.”  And shortly thereafter the Vice President for Infrastructure Nemat 
(Minouche) Shafik intercedes, asserting that “It’s an illusion for central governments 
when they decentralize in this way, that they’re getting these [service and financial]
obligations off their books… I think there’s no escaping from the fact the someb
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probably the central government… needs to provide support in terms of brokerin
and standardizing contracts… even the UK [when it privatized water] provided
central support to local governments, and often forced them to bundle contracts 
because they were too small.”  Perhaps the capstone of Bank double-speak, of 
veering from revisionism back to conventional thinking, comes at the end of the pres
conference, as Kessides positions himself between the pragmatism of Infrastructure 
Vice President Shafik, and the neoliberal cheerleading of Vice President for Private 
Sector Development Klein. On the one hand, Kessides acknowledges that the
significant fixed costs associated with regulation which would make decentralizing
these functions impossible, except perhaps in large countries with large and 
competent subsovereign jurisdictions.  On the other hand, Kessides agrees with a 
point made by Mr. Klein, which is that when it is not feasible to wait for effective 
regulatory institutions to be functioning—which by this point all have agreed is a 
long-term proposition—and in the face of very weak regulatory capacity, then “th







 it might be appropriate under those 
 
                                          
circumstances to let things go and not try to regulate, and I feel that we have not 
explored as much as we could that option.”153  
  Reforming Infrastructure does represent an important revisionist moment for 
the World Bank, incorporating self-reflection and self-criticism, and pointing to 
necessary policy changes in order to make infrastructure reform function as a poverty 
reduction strategy.  It was at the same time an attempt by the Bank to square a circle 
that it was fundamentally unable to square, because of competing interests within and
 
153  The World Bank. June 14, 2004. Press Conference on Reforming Infrastructure.  
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a core ideological belief system in the supremacy of the market.  With respect to 
former, task team leaders need to show project-specific results in a short-to-medium
term time frame, while the institutional prerequisites for WSS sector reform fall 
under a medium to long-term time horizon.   Moreover, institution building 
nearly as profitable to the Bank qua bank as building physical infrastructure, whether
a dam or a water treatment facility.  With respect to the Bank’s ideological 
orientation, as one senior official in the Water Anchor put it to me, the Bank’s push 
for PSP in the water sector “was just an expression of its larger neoliberal age
But this same official stressed that ideology could be and was in practice trumpe
the Bank’s pursuit of its bottom line: it was for this reason that the Bank was 
returning again to large and controversial infrastructure projects such as dams.  
Several senior Bank staff working in the WSS sector acknowledged to me that PSP
was not the driving force in determining whether or not the Bank would make a lo
in the sector—and that it would readily bend this principle to pragmatism (i.e., a












SS sector.  He also emphasized, even more so than he had done in 2004, the 
inheren
                                          
155  As I discuss in the next chapter, in an interview with 
Ioannis Kessides six years out from the publication of Reforming Infrastructure, Mr. 
Kessides reflects the continued ambivalence within the Bank about neoliberal ref
in the W
t obstacles to PSP in the water sector as compared to other infrastructure 
sectors. 
 
154 Interview 2. 
155 Interviews 1, 2, and 5. 
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The next significant moment in the debate over PSP for the Bank occurred
the Fourth World Water Forum (4th WWF) in Mexico City in March 2006.  C
20,000 participants from the private sectors, governments, and NGOs attende
six-day forum, whose main theme was “Local Actions for a Global Challeng
Although the challenges facing the PSP paradigm emerged in the 3rd WWF, 











 90 percent of the water to those households 
at have it….Even officials of the World Water Council, the organization that 
ns the forum and is heavily weighted toward multinational water companies, 
infrastructure for the 50 countries most in need and the twenty poorest 
 
president of the Council.”  
 
 of the 
t 
press release issued by 15 water activist NGOs after the close of the Forum accused 
                                          
ledged in the 4th WWF by the IFIs and the key promoters of the Forum. The 
ork Times/International Herald Tribune reported that: 
 
For more than a decade the idea that private companies would be able to bring 
water to the world’s poor has been a mantra of development polici
by international lending agencies and many governments. It has not 
happened….Instead, many people here want to return to relying on the lo
public utilities that still supply
th
ru
appear to be giving up on wholesale privatization. “Let’s finance 
megacities through a more intense donation policy” said Loïc Fauchon,
156
 
The article further noted that although the debate over privatization was driving the 
controversy inside and outside the forum, where activists held alternative anti-
privatization events and marches, activists still remained unconvinced that 
governments and the IFIs had given up on privatization.  (A fuller discussion
activists’ involvement in the 4th WWF is covered in the chapter on TANs).  A join
 




the WWC and the World Bank of being “determined to keep private sector 




ed by a 
ood and outlook inside the 4th WWF, in other 
words, 
                                          
,” and its effects on poor countries, which remained at the mercy of the 
IFIs.”157   
Despite this criticism from the anti-privatization TAN, events inside the 
Forum revealed a more complex picture of the IFIs’ attitude toward PSP, a 
continuation of the internal contradictions characterizing the previous three years.  
Speaking at an official session of the forum, Jamal Saghir made the somewhat 
astonishing remark that the last twenty years in WSS had been wasted in development 
efforts as a result of the focus on privatization.158  To avoid the same outcome over 
the next ten years, the focus must be on helping public utilities to function better-
since the vast majority of water services are, and will continue to be, provided by the
public sector.  This sober reassessment of PSP by its erstwhile cheerleaders was 
reinforced during the fourth day of the forum, which was devoted to one of the five 
framework themes, “Water and Sanitation for All.”  The day was characteriz
plethora of thematic sessions addressing the human right to water, the “public-private 
controversy in water and sanitation,” public policies for WSS services, and 
“turnaround” of public utilities.  The m
reflected the somber reappraisal by PSP cheerleaders and a reorientation 
towards the less sanguine new reality. 
 
157 “World Water Forum Fails, say civil society groups.” Mexico City, March 22, 2006.  Among the 
consortium of fifteen NGOs issuing the press statement were the Blue Planet Project, CEE Bankwatch, 
the Council of Canadians,Food and Water Watch, Red VIDA, the Transnational Institute, and the 
World Development Movement.  
158  John Butterworth and IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre for the Water Integrity 
Network (WIN),  “WIN at the 4th World Water Forum 2006,” 2006. : 
http://www.waterintegritynetwork.net/page/198 (August 6, 2010). 
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But neither were the activists wrong in doubting that the IFIs and private 
sector would so easily abandon privatization.  This was evidenced in a signature 
report unveiled at the 4th WWF, the Gurría Task Force’s findings on “Financing 
Water for All,” the official follow-up to the report of the Camdessus Panel.  The task
force, named for its chair and incoming Secretary-General of the OECD José Angel 
Gurría Treviño, was mandated to present a case-based report on progress
challenges ahead, focusing on new models for financing WSS at the local level, and 
on financing water for agriculture.  The Gurría report noted that despite 
recommendations to double WSS financing to developing countries from $15 billion 
in 2003, the water sector was experiencing static, decreasing, or marginal increases.
The task force faulted the recommendations of the Camdessus Panel for focusing too
narrowly on the supply side, without addressing the demand for finance.  It argued 
that the focus should be redirected at issues affecting the demand side, such as tarif
structures, regulation,  local capacity, and access to various finance options for loca
governments and service providers.  The task force saw its mandate as putting the 
local private sector and local civil society front and center in the quest to improve 
WSS for the poor.  It argued that financing new investments in WSS would only be 
possible if repayment was assured, and this was equally true in poor areas—where the 
cost of service provision would have to be balanced by revenues from user fees and 
taxpayer contributions.  In order to provide the poor and unserved with greater access,
the report broke ranks with orthodox economic thinking inside the Bank about tariff 
structuring, and called for “solidarity among customers, cities, and countries th
 









cross-subsidies and targeted subsidies.”159  But it also cautioned that cross-subsidies 
and pro-poor tariff structures needed to be socially and politically acceptable, 
“without making excessive demands, in order to avoid richer customers disconnecting 
from public services and resorting to their own private supply.”160  And the report did











                        
161 for operational or connection subsidies during the transition 
to full cost recovery.  Following up on one of the recommendations of  the 
Camdessus Panel, the Gurría report called for increasing the creditworthiness of loca
governments through greater us
te issuance of municipal bonds, backed by partial credit guarantees162 from 
IFIs or bilateral aid agencies.   
The message of the 4th WWF with respect to the privatization debate was, i
sum, a mixed one. The acknowledgment of the failure of the PSP model coexisted
with attempts to re-divert it more forcefully to the local, decentralized level.  The 
Forum’s Ministerial Declaration reaffirmed the “primary role of Governments in 
promoting” improved access to water and sanitation, “through improved governan
at all levels and appropriate enabling environments and regulatory frameworks.”  Thi
                   
159 Paul Van Hofwegen 2006. Task Force on Financing Water for All, Enhancing Access to Finance 
for Local Governments, Financing Water for Agriculture, Chaired by Angel Gurría.. 
160 Van Hofwegen 2006, 6. 
161 Partial risk guarantees cover debt service defaults on a loan, normally for a private sector project, 
when such defaults are caused by a government's failure to meet its obligations under project contracts 




162 Partial credit guarantees cover debt service defaults on a specified portion of a loan, normally for a 






intentionally ambiguous invocation could be read as either consigning the public 
sector to a supportive role for the private sector, or reaffirming its role as a pr
of services.  
 The Ministerial Declaration also failed to recognize the human right to water











                                          
163    The water activists’ network  accused the World Water Council 
and the International Federation of Private Water Operators, AquaFed, of trying to 
co-opt the “right to water,” one of the key demands of civil society groups opposing 
the commercialization of water.  Activist groups argued that the embrace of  “right to
water” rhetoric was a clever tactical move with little risks involved for TNCs,
even a potential marketing tool for expanding markets.164  Indeed,  the 4th WWF wa
the self-described “premiere” for AquaFed, which was created in 2005 to act as the 
voice and institutional representative of global private WSS operators.  In its 
introductory brochure distributed at the Forum, AquaFed claimed a membership of 
over 200 water service providers operating in 38 countries.165   It described its ra
d’être as filling a gap and responding to the demand for a international sectoral body
which could interact with the “global community of water stakeholders,” such as the 
IFIs, the U.N., the European Community, federations of local governments, and 
global NGOs.  AquaFed has close connections to the French water TNCs Suez and
Veolia; its president, Gerard Payen, is the former CEO and chairman of Suez’s wate
 
163 At one point during the negotiations over the final draft, ten governments appeared to support the 
right to water in the Declaration, including all of the left-leaning Latin American countries.  They were 
opposed by countries such as Mexico, the U.K., U.S., Netherlands and France. 
164 “World Water Forum Fails, say civil society groups.” Mexico City, March 22, 2006. 
165  “AquaFed: The International Federation of Private Water Operators,”  March 2006.                                                              
http://www.aquafed.org/pdf/Aquafed_Leaflet_2006-03.pdf  (August 5, 2010). 
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division, the Ondeo Group.  Noting that the private water industry lobbied throu
host of different organizations in the years prior to AquaFed’s formation, PSIRU 
pointed to two main motives for AquaFed’s establishment.  The first motive was to
counteract negative publicity: on the one hand, generated by anti-privatization 
activists, and on the other hand, by the perception that water TNCs failed to live up to 
the expectation of delivering investment finance to fulfill the PSP promise in poor 
countries.  Secondly, the water TNCs were looking for a collective lobbying vehicle 
specifically aimed at influencing Europ
gh a 
 
ean Union institutions.166   Although it did not 






e are very numerous private water operators all over the 
world. Until recently they were ignored by the global community.  AquaFed’s 
goal is to make them known and give them a better voice….The worldwide 
the significant contribution of private sector operators to public health and 
community.  
be quite 
                                          
c
eception from a variety of “water stakeholders,” noting that its members were 
with respect and without bias:  
This shows that…ideological confrontations are not unavoidable. As glob
practitioners the world over agree: there is no “best system,” merely a myriad 
of good systems that can learn from each other. [Our] members have clearly 
demonstrated that they have sought to dialogue, especially on the “right to 
access to water” (emphasis mine) and the role and needs of local 
governments… It becomes clearer now in the minds of many institution
players that ther
footprint of private sector operators is often overestimated.  At the same time 
sustainable development is greatly underestimated by the international 
167
 
The activists’ reaction to AquaFed’s rhetorical cooptation of the “right to water” (or 
their clever permutation of that phrase, inserting “access to,”) turned out to 
 
166 D. Hall and O. Hoedmann, March 2006. AquaFed: Another Pressure Group for Private Water. 
Report Commissioned by the European Federatioon of Public Service Unions. 
http://www.psiru.org/reports/2006-03-W-Aquafed.doc  (August 4, 2010)   
167 AquaFed March 2006. “A world Première for AquaFed and its Members.”                                                              
http://www.aquafed.org/pop_up_wwf4_02.html (December 20, 2010) 
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prescient.  As I argue in the section below, the formation of AquaFed was 
strum  
th









                                          
in ental in re-energizing the World Bank’s policy orientation towards PSP in the
years following the 4  WWF, up until the global financial crisis of 2008.   
 
 
In November 2006 the OECD hosted the Global Forum on Sustainable Development
in cooperation with the World Bank and Agence Française de Développement (AFD
The purpose of the Forum was to discuss how developing countries could wo
local private water companies to provide affordable safe water and basic sanitation,
and the role donors, the financial sector and international private water companies 
should play.  Invitees included government representatives from OECD and 
developing countries, major international water companies (e.g. Suez, Veolia, and 
Thames Water), and new private water operators from developing countries.  What is 
noteworthy about the OECD Forum is the striking convergence of messaging by 
Gerard Payen of AquaFed and Jamal Saghir of the World Bank.  Payen opened his 
presentation by again stressing the contribution of private operators, “with the supp
of public authorities,” to reaching the MDGs in drinking water in their operational 
areas.”168  He recounted the growth of local and developing country operators, and
claimed that  PSP was active across all contract types.  (However, a closer look at 
Payen’s PowerPoint slides reveal that new equity joint ventures and concessions wer
all in either upper-middle income developing countries or China.  The majorit
 
168 Payen/and AquaFed. November 29, 2006. “Water and Sanitation Services: Trends at the Global 
Level, A Private Perspective.”  PowerPoint presentation, OECD Global Forum for Sustainable 
Development. http://www.aquafed.org/pdf/2006-11-29_OECD-WorldBank_AquaFed-Payen_WSS-
globaltrends_Pc_2006-11-29.pdf  (August 7, 2010) 
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contracts, leases/affermage and management contracts, which require no investment 
from the private operator, were prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe and only in 
two less-developed African countries.)  He quoted the UNDP’s 2006 Human 
Development Report as stating that public-private polemics are detrimental to the 
poor; at the same time, he acknowledged that operators and donors needed to n
focusing on “sustainable cost recovery,” rather than full cost recovery.  Sustainable 
cost recovery recognizes that there may always be an affordability gap for the poor 
that has to be met through subsidies, but of the right type (e.g., connection vs. 
consumption subsidies).  Private operators had become scapegoats, Payen
and everyone needed to recognize that “operators are not bankers.”  PSP required a 
“partnership spirit,” which meant that public authorities had to hew to their cor
political responsibilities of providing an enabling framework, even with 




ents and regardless of whether utility operators were 
s 
PPs; a 
shift to the principle of limited cost recovery;  and the need to depoliticize tariffs and 
                                          
public or private.  At the same time, Payen dismissed as a myth the notion of  
“independent regulators,” arguing that periodic renegotiations with private operator
are “normal and necessary.”169 
 Jamal Saghir’s presentation on behalf of the World Bank echoed, sometimes 
verbatim, the same themes as AquaFed’s.170   He underscored the importance of a 
partnership between the public and private sectors; “smart risk allocation” between 
private investors, governments, and end-users; the need for public support of P
 
169 Payen/AquaFed, November 29, 2006. “Water and Sanitation Services: Trends at the Global Level, 
A Private Perspective.”   
170 Saghir. November 29-30, 2006. “Public-Private Partnerships in Water Supply and Sanitation – 
Recent Trends and New Opportunities,” PowerPoint Presentation, OECD Global Forum for 
Sustainable Development.     http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/61/37723389.pdf. (August 7, 2010) 
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employ “smart subsidies.”  New forms of private participation were now avail







ective partnering and increased  mobilization of private resources 
ill we be able to make a “dent” in the growth and poverty reduction agenda.  
ic 





ference to PPPs needing to be mainstreamed as 
                                          
d the issue yet again: it was now time, as headlined by Slide 27 of his 
oint presentation, to “Rebuild and Adapt the PPP/PPIModel:”  
“We need to rebuild and adapt the PPP model of the 90s on the basis of the
lessons and experiences of the recent years and the immediate needs: [Th
Public sector role as enabler (policy maker and regulator) and in some cases 
provider cannot be substituted (sic).. [The] Private sector is still a key player 
to provide the large amounts of capital and management needed to sustain 
infrastructure development and economic growth.  We believe that only 
through eff
w
PPPs need to be mainstreamed as an important policy tool to provide publ
PPPs.”171 
 The professed agnosticism between public and private provision that had 
permeated World Bank policy documents for the preceding three years had thus tilted
again back toward the private sector.  Desultory prognoses were pushed aside, buoyed 
by renascent hope in the “new” private sector actors from developing countries, and 
the promises of decentralization.  Moreover, despite years of evidence to the contrary, 
Saghir continued to maintain that the private sector will be a key player to “prov
large amounts of capital.”  The new messaging was reprised again by Saghir at Water 
Week 2007, the Bank’s biennial water confabulation.  Saghir gave virtually the 
identical slide presentation that he did at the OECD’s Global Forum, but the credo in
Slide 27 was toned down and more equivocally expressed.  The private sector now 
“could contribute in (sic) making a dent” in poverty reduction, rather than being the 
sine qua non of that outcome.  The re
 
171 Saghir.  November 29-30, 2006, Slide 27. 
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a ortant policy tool was also eliminated, as was the reassurance that  “the Wo
Bank/IFC stand[s] ready to assist.”   
 PSIRU interprets this reversion in 2007 as a confirmation that the World 
Bank’s policies in WSS are driven by two imperatives: the objectives and strategies 
of TNCs, and neoliberal ideology.






 at an  
us 
r 
172   As I lay out in my schematic model of the 
multiple external and internal influences on Bank behavior, this is an incomple
underspecified explanation for the Bank’s embrace of PSP, but it contains a partial 
truth.  Jamal Saghir, in particular, appears repeatedly to have seized upon any 
optimistic projections for expanded investment put forth by the private sector, and 
one may clearly infer from their synchronized OECD presentations that Saghir and 
Payen/AquaFed were in close contact.  But Saghir himself represents a particular 
in the World Bank: he joined the Bank in 1990 as a private sector development (PSD
specialist and worked his way up to Director of the Energy, Transport and Water 
Department (ETW) through numerous positions related to PSD.  Just prior to Wa
Week 2007 Saghir was promoted to Director of ETW in the Sustainable Development
Vice Presidency; prior to this, he had been Director of Energy and Water in the 
Private Sector Development and Infrastructure Vice Presidency.  An executive
international water association expressed his frustration to me over Saghir’s tenacio
ideological preference for promoting PSP in the WSS sector in the face of the 
predominance of public utilities, including many well-performing ones, and at the 
expense of focusing on improvements in their operation (see discussion under Wate
                                           
172 PSIRU March 2009.   
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Week 2009 below).173  In short, notwithstanding the regrets he expressed at the 4th
WWF at the Bank’s prolonged attachment to PSP, Saghir has continually revealed
himself to be a PSP fundam
 
 








 this chapter, operations staff are guided as much by pragmatism and their 
unctional imperatives (getting loans and projects continually out the door) as by 
deological proclivities.    
 The question of the extent to which the Bank has been driven by the agenda of
private capital became moot by late 2008 as the global financial meltdown once 
again threatened the Bank’s PSP agenda.  In one of the keynote addresses at the 
Bank’s Water Week 2009 Carlos Braga,  Bank Director of the Economic Policy and 
Debt Department, warned that the crisis would make PPPs quite vulnerable as the 
public sector cut infrastructure spending in the context of fiscal adjustment and
private sector confronted liquidity constraints.174  To the extent the Bank had 
counted on bolstering private finance with local public debt, it now faced an 
environment where corporate and public bond issues were falling dramatically in 
emerging markets, let alone developing countries.  In addition to scaling up lending 
to address the crisis and extending loan repayment terms, the Bank’s policy r
was otherwise consistent with the role it had laid out for itself since the 3rd WWF.  
To address the financial risks common to municipal water projects it would 
customize “financial solutions” for client borrowers using credit enhancement 
                                           
173 Conversation with an executive in an international water association, February 17, 2009.  
Washington, D.C.    
174 Braga. February 17, 2009. “The Financial Crisis and its Implications for Infrastructure 
Investments.”  World Bank Water Week, Washington, D.C. : 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWAT/Resources/4602122-1213366294492/5106220-
1234469721549/0.2_Infrastructure_Crisis.pdf  (September 3, 2010). 
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risk mitigation tools, through instruments such as partial credit and risk guarantees 
and currency and interest rate swaps.175  In her Water Week presentation, the 
Director of the Banking and Debt Management Department of the World Bank 
Treasury  pointedly marketed the Bank’s funding cost advantages to clients over 
their cost of borrowing in bond markets.  The Bank today was not the traditional one-







advisory services customized to the needs and risks of each client.176  This was the 
new World Bank qua bank—marketing itself to maximize its comparative advantage
in global capital markets.   
 Water Week 2009 was an opportunity for the Bank to unveil, side-by-side, the 
two largest studies it had to date conducted on the performance of  PSP and PPPs i
urban water and sanitation.  A full afternoon on the first day  was devoted to 
panels on these studies, new trends for PPPs, and a “debate about the future.”177  
Water Week agenda noted that the “early termination of several high-profile PPP 
contracts in recent years has cast doubts on the viability of this approach for 
developing countries;” these studies would anchor the debate in “solid objective 
data…to assess the actual performance of PPP projects.”178  The first of the reports 
was a case study-based assessment of the performance of 65 large water PPP proje
over the 15 year period 1992-2007.  It was authored by Philippe Marin, senio
                                           
175 Grandolini. February 17, 2009. “Customized Financial Solutions, Water Week.”  PowerPoint 
Presentation.  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWAT/Resources/4602122-
1213366294492/5106220-1234469721549/0.3_Customized_Financial_Products.pdf  (September 3, 
2010) 
176 Grandolini. February 17, 2009.    
177 P. Marin and M. Fall. February 17, 2009. “Public Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities in 
Developing Countries: Review of the last 15 years of experience and Debate About the Future.”    
178 Water Week 2009. Tackling Global Water Challenges.  : 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTWAT/0,,contentMDK:21966422~men
uPK:5207704~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:4602123,00.html (June 23, 2009) 
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and sanitation specialist in the Bank’s Water Anchor and Coordinator of Water W
2009.  A staffperson in an NGO active in the anti-privatization movement quoted 
Marin as telling her that the Bank put out this report because it “was tired of 










                                          
179  Marin’s study examined PPP projects in ci
p tions of  25,000 or greater where projects were in place for at least five yea
(three in the case of management contracts).  By population served, the sample 
covered in the study represented close to 80 percent of the water PPP projects that 
were awarded before 2003 and had been active for at least three years. 
  The second study consisted of a sophisticated econometric analysis using
panel data covering the entire population of utilities with PSP from the early 1990s
2004 (301 utilities, all with at least three years of post-PSP experience).  The study
was funded by the Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF
under the lead authorship of Katharina Gassner, senior economist in the Bank’s 
Finance, Economics and Urban Development group (FEU). 180 To control for the 
counterfactual, how public utilities would have performed in the absence of PSP,  
Gassner included a large sample of 926 comparator SOEs operating in the same 
sectors and countries or regions.  The analysis employed a dual estimation strategy to 
combine explanatory power. The first estimation strategy used a larger but potentially
biased data set which included all available SOEs as comparators, while the second 
strategy used a smaller set of SOEs and a “difference-in-differences” estimation 
 
179 Reported to me in confidence by an NGO based on an interview with a high-level Bank specialist in 
water and sanitation, May 2009. 
180 Gassner, K., A. Popov, A., and N. Pushak. 2009. Does private sector participation improve 
performance in electricity and water distribution? Trends and Policy Options, No. 6. Washington, 
D.C.: The World Bank and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.  
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procedure to choose the best subsample of SOE comparators from full pan
This technique provided for more rigorous estimation and differentiated by contract 
type, but at the cost of fewer observatio
el sample.  
ns and results. Gassner described her study to 
 
y of service, operational 
ented in Table 1.   
Most st
as surpassing all previous statistical studies on PSP because of its treatment of the 
counterfactual and its use of this dual estimation strategy.  However, she 
acknowledges that the study does not assess the economy-wide welfare effects of PSP
and cannot identify its beneficiaries.   
 Marin and Gassner’s studies both confirmed what the Bank had been forced to 
acknowledge since 2004: PSP had brought no increase in investment by the private 
sector despite the employment attrition documented.  Each study instead focused on 
five broad performance indicators: access to water, qualit
efficiency (a composite indicator), tariff levels and investment.   A comparison of the 
results of these studies across the key performance indicators is pres
riking, as discussed below, the only robust results for the superiority of PSP 
from a reduction in staffing by private operators.  
Philippe Marin opened the Water Week session where he presented his repo
e following remarks, keyed to his Pow
derive 
 rt 
with th erPoint presentation: 
. 
There is little enthusiasm now for PSP.  But, there’s little objective 
were awarded in developing countries since 1990…contractual targets for 
private operation is better.  This study is the requisite step to move beyond the 
 
After huge initial expectations in the 1990s, the pendulum has swung back
performance data in the published literature even though more than 250 PPPs 
these PPPs were not met in most cases…The goal is not to discuss whether 
debate over public versus private.    
Marin went on to cite an impressive list of contract cancellations, concessions in 
crisis, and countries reverting to public management at the end of a PPP contract.  
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Among the high-profile terminations were Bolivia (Cochabamba, La Paz-El Alto),
Argentina (Tucuman, Buenos Aires, and Santa Fe), and several countries in sub-
Saharan Africa (Mali, Chad, Tanzania).  Concessions in crisis included Manila (west 
zone) and Jakarta, and countries reverting to public management at the end of a PPP 
contract included Venezuela, Trinidad, Turkey, Guinea, Uganda and Jordan.  But 
after enumerating these failures Marin continued by stating that “84 percent of PPP 
projects awarded for water utilities since 1991 are still active, with only nine perce
terminated early.”  Citing to this percentage is a sleight of hand on Marin’s part




largest PPP projects and 
the type most promoted by the Bank (concessions). Fifty percent of the PPP projects 
in sub-Saharan Africa failed.  Second, Marin does not review the performance of 
contracts awarded since 2003: these newer contracts covered 90 million, or 56 
percent, of the 160 million people served by PPP contracts at year-end 2007.  The
majority of the cancelled or crisis-ridden projects were in developing countries m




DG ls for water—not in transition countries or 
hina, which represent the lion’s share of contracts awarded since 2003.  Third, 
Marin notes that of the 65 countries that embarked on water PPPs in the last two 
decades, 24 (37 percent) had reverted to public management or terminated early 








PPP Performance Indicators and Results: Marin versus Gassner Studies 
 






Connections and Residential 




Mixed. Overall performance 
of concessions mixed, many 
failed to invest the amount of 
private funding originally 
committed, and failed to meet 
contractual targets for 
coverage.  Better performers 
were where private financing 
was complemented by public 
funding. Leases-affermage 
“usually performed more 
satisfactorily.”  The two cases 
mentioned are Senegal and 
Côte d’Ivoire. However, Marin 
points out that Côte d’Ivoire 
has a long history with the 
affermage model, dating back 
to a 1960 contract with the 
French TNC SAUR.  
Connections: 12 percent 
increase in average number of  
residential connections in post-
PSP period; 54 percent 
increase in residential 
connections per worker.  
 
Residential coverage: Either 
decreases significantly or 
shows no significant changes 
across all types of PSP.  “This 
result is somewhat 
surprising…suggests that data 
quality may be poor.” 
Evidence inconclusive. 
QUALITY OF SERVICE 
 




Mixed. Colombia and some 
cases in West Africa improved, 
but “not  everywhere.” Manila 
(western zone) failed to 
improve service continuity. 
Inconclusive overall. Panel 
regressions on the full sample 
show average increases of 41 
percent in daily water service.  
But this is not confirmed by 
difference-in-differences 
estimation with matching, 
possibly because of 
insufficient data. 
OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY    
-Water Distribution Losses  
 
Mixed. Improved in West 
Africa, Brazil, Colombia, 
Morocco, Eastern Manila 
(Philippines). But, NRW 
remained very high-- more 
than 50 percent, in numerous 
cases. 
 
Evidence inconclusive overall.  
Panel regression shows 
reduction of 23 percent for all 
types of PSP, but this is not 
confirmed by difference-in-
differences estimation, 
possibly hampered by lack of 
data. 
-Bill Collection Some improvement, but 
mainly in management 
contracts.  
 
No improvement in bill 
collection rate over and above 
state-owned utilities—either in 






PPP Performance Indicators and Results: Marin versus Gassner Studies 
 
Performance Indicator Results: Marin (65 case Results: Gassner 
studies) (econometric) 
-Labor Productivity  
 
(No. of staff per 1000 
customers) 
Strong evidence that 
improvements in productivity 
achieved through staffing 
reductions and increases in the 
customer base.  Significant 
layoffs, ranging from 20-65 
percent of the initial labor 
force. 
Across all contract types, 
strong attrition in 
employment—ranging from 20 
percent for concessions to 34 
percent for partial divestitures. 
 
Water sold per worker and 
connections per worker 
increase for all contract types. 
OVERALL EFFICIENCY 
 
(Combination of three 
indicators above--Access, 
Quality of Service and 
Operational Efficiency)  
Concessionaires: Unclear. 
Lease-Affermage: operating 
efficiency in some cases. 
Management contracts: water 
loss reduction and improved 
bill collection in many cases. 
 
TARIFF LEVELS Cites Gassner, no increase.  No increase. 
INVESTMENT  No increase. No increase, despite the 
employment attrition 
documented. 
SANITATION  No significant effect of PSP on 
connections and output in the 
sanitation sector—under either 
methodology.  Only effect is 
through decrease in 
employment:  37 percent 
increase in connections per 
worker and 19 percent increase 
in residential coverage; also in 
wastewater treated per worker.  
But not confirmed in matching 






 Marin’s 208 page report, Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water 
Utilities in Developing Countries is in fact replete with examples of internal 
inconsistencies, juxtaposing broad  positive assertions about PPPs with narrative 
detail and conclusions that undercut these assertions.  Comparing the narrative 
treatment of the performance indicators listed in Table 1 to the ultimate conclusions 
about each indicator is illustrative.  Beginning first with the contribution of PPPs to 
increased access, measured by connections to piped water and/or residential 
coverage,181 Marin  claims that 24 million people were connected to water supply 
networks since 1990 through 36 large PPP projects.  Thirty of these projects were 
concessions, and the remaining six, lease-affermage.  Yet a striking number of these 
projects collapsed or faced dire problems (Argentina, Bolivia, west Manila); did not 
meet targets for private investment in expansion (almost all); or relied on public 
financing or grants to finance what expansion did occur (all except for Côte d’Ivoire, 
in which a subsidiary of the French water multinational SAUR was established over 
fifty years ago).   Argentina was the first country in Latin America to embrace PSP in 
large-scale water operations in the early 1990s across several major cities.  Yet Marin 
admitted that only “moderate progress of seven percentage points” had been achieved 
by 2004 in expanding coverage for both water and sewerage.  Moreover, the largest 
concession in Greater Buenos Aires failed to make progress after 1998—well before 
the country’s economic crisis erupted.  In Cordoba, Argentina; Guayaquil, Ecuador; 
                                           
181 Marin here measures access using connections to piped water, but notes that the Joint Monitoring 
Program, which tracks progress toward the MDGs, uses a criterion of “improved access,” referring to 
access via a household connection or through a standpipe within 200 meters of the household. 
Computing residential coverage for piped water is also challenging, as it hinges on the reliability of 
household data in each country, as well as resale of water to neighbors, and illegal connecitons.   
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and Cartagena, Colombia, the good performance of PPP concessions was directly 
attributed to public investment.182   In the second largest Latin American concession 
in Guayaquil, Marin credits the expansion of water access in urban areas to cross-
subsidies (a telephone tax transfer mechanism) which had been introduced by the 
government in the 1980s.  In Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Marin states that “private 
operators have clearly performed better than public utilities in expanding access 
through household connections.”183  But the caveats which follow this statement 
virtually negate this confident assertion.  Half of the gains in SSA were made in just 
one country, Côte d’Ivoire, which has had private sector involvement through a 
French MNC subsidiary since 1960.   Further, when access is measured using the 
“improved access” criterion of the Joint Monitoring Group for the MDGs, which 
considers more basic and common forms of water access such as community 
fountains and standpipes, there is no difference in the performance of public and 
private operators. The same holds true for an index tracking whether or not countries 
were meeting the MDGs for water.  Moreover, Marin acknowledges that subsidized 
connection programs played a major role in both Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, two of 
the Bank’s favorite PPP countries in Africa—but that “significant rates of 
disconnection [in those countries] suggest that household connections are not 
necessarily the most suitable service option for the poorest families.” Marin thus 
concludes the discussion by remarking: “Overall, there is no evidence that PPP 
projects are more efficient than publicly managed utilities for expanding access.” 184    
                                           
182 Marin 2009, 45-65.  
183 Marin 2009, 45-65.  
184 Marin 2009, 61-65.  
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 Gassner’s study shows a 12 percent increase in the average number of 
residential connections in the post-PSP period, but finds that residential coverage 
actually decreases or shows no significant change across all types of PSP.  She 
describes this result as “surprising” and suggests that the data quality may be too poor 
for a meaningful result.  But she provides no further explanation, including why poor 
data quality does not similarly compromise the other results she presents.185  
 With respect to the second performance indicator in Table 1, “quality of 
service” (measured by continuity and hours of water service provided), Marin 
presents case-specific evidence that private operators helped to ease water rationing 
in Colombia and several countries in West Africa.  But he acknowledges that few 
data are available on other regions and countries, and there are counter-examples of 
deterioration in water service provision under private operators, notably in the 
Western zone concession of Manila and in Antalya, Turkey.  Further, Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia and Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso succeeded in greatly improving 
continuity of service under public operators.  Gassner similarly finds the evidence 
inconclusive overall. 
 Marin and Gassner both cite operational efficiency as the area in which PPPs 
have made their greatest and most consistent contribution. Operational efficiency is 
defined as an aggregation of three performance indicators: water distribution losses 
(non-revenue water, NRW),186  the bill collection rate, and labor productivity 
(number of personnel per 1000 utility customers).  But looking at each indicator in 
                                           
185 Gassner, Popov and Pushak 2009, 44. 
186 The NRW ratio is measured as the difference between the volume of water produced and billed to 
customers divided by water produced.  It captures the efficiency of the distribution network (physical 
losses) and commercial management (commercial losses due to metering and billing problems).  
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turn, it is only for labor productivity that this claim is validated in each study.  
Looking first at NRW, a performance indicator that the Bank prioritizes for 
improvement in all of its urban WSS lending—Marin’s findings are quite equivo
Across all types of contracts, private operators succeeded in reducing water losses i
Western Africa, Brazil, Colombia, Morocco and  Eastern Manila, but no notab








                                          
187  In fourteen management contracts reviewed in the stud
only five showed slight improvement in NRW.188   Gassner again finds the 
inconclusive, with an average increase of 41 percent in daily water service shown in 
the panel regressions on the full sample, but not confirmed in the difference-in-
difference estimations.189  With respect to the second indicator, bill collection, 
Gassner finds unequivocally that there is no improvement in the bill collection rate 
over and above state-owned utilities under either estimation procedure.  Marin finds 
improvement only in management contracts.   
 The real driver of improvement in operational efficiency for PSP is an 
increase in labor productivity through labor shedding.  Marin’s study finds evidence 
of significant layoffs, ranging from 20-65 percent of the initial utility labor force. 
Gassner finds strong attrition in employment across all PSP contract types, ranging 
from 20 percent for concessions to 34 percent for partial divestitures.  A close reading 
of each study shows that almost all of the claims for the superiority of PSP can be 
reduced to this consistent result.  All other performance indicators show mixed or 
inconclusive results, or no difference between public and private operators.  
 
187 Marin 2009, 4.  
188 Marin 2009, 87 and World Bank Water Week 2009. 
189 Gassner, Popov, and Pushak 2009, 45. 
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 Of particular note, Marin admitted at Water Week 2009 that while 
improvements in utilities’ operational efficiency positively impact creditworthiness 
and financial viability, “these are not directly perceived by customers.”  In theory, 
efficiency gains should be passed on to customers in the form of better service and 
lower tariffs.  With respect to tariffs, the potential impact of PSP depends on at least 
two factors which move in opposite directions: how far the initial tariff level is from 
the cost-recovery level, and the extent of efficiency gains that can be made by private 
operators.190  Marin reports that for most of the cases in his study, tariffs rose over 
time, but he could not ascertain the underlying reasons or whether those increases 
were justified.  Gassner’s study found no significant changes in average residential 
tariff levels after the introduction of PSP or between public and private operators.191   
Gassner points out that especially in view of the “young” regulatory environments in 
developing countries, the possibility exists that private operators are reaping 
efficiency gains through increased profits, rather than passing these along to 
consumers in the form of lower tariffs.  
 The Marin and Gassner studies simultaneously illustrate both change and 
resistance to change in the World Bank’s position on PSP in water.  Each presents 
findings which reverse, scale back, or significantly qualify earlier Bank claims on the 
benefits expected to redound from PSP.  But having done so, the studies’ executive 
summaries revert back to positive generalizations at odds with data and analysis 
contained in the selfsame reports, and simultaneously shift responsibilities and 
                                           
190 As Marin points out, tariffs are also determined by local factors such as raw water availability and 
legal and administrative frameworks which may differ between public and private operators.  
191 Marin 2009, 5-6 and Gassner, K., Popov, A., and Pushak2009, 45. 
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expectations from the private sector to governments.192   Take the key issue of 
poverty reduction.  Marin frankly acknowledges that results have been 
“disappointing” and show little evidence that sizable improvements occurred for the 
poor: “The automatic trickle-down to various groups that was assumed does not 
happen by itself,” and social considerations need to be explicitly incorporated into 
PPP reforms. 193  A senior economist in the Bank pointed out that the Bank 
recognizes the reality of subsidies for the poor today whereas this was completely off 
the table fifteen years ago.194  This is a far cry from the expectations of the 1990s 
where a key raison d’être for PSP articulated by the Bank qua development bank was 
its direct contribution to poverty reduction.  Now, as Marin stated bluntly at Water 
Week 2009, “governments and IFIs must recognize the explicit cost of social goals as 
well as affordability issues and put in place the necessary instruments instead of 
trying to pass the problem to a private partner.”  Private operators are viewed merely 
as agents whose behavior is “dictated” by the design of the project.  There is no 
acknowledgment that contract design is rarely “dictated” by governments; rather, as 
Bank and expert literature affirm, contract negotiations have more frequently 
reflected principal-agent asymmetries and the unequal bargaining power of corporate 
actors in relation to developing country governments inexperienced in negotiating 
long-term infrastructure service contracts.  A senior economist in the Bank 
                                           
192 Gassner claims that she only draws conclusions from robust results which are confirmed by both 
estimation techniques, yet the Executive Summary of her study she highlights several results that do 
not meet this criterion. Marin likewise presents conclusions in his report’s summary, albeit phrased 
with soft qualifiers, that contradict results presented in the body of the report. He states, for example, 
that “Despite limitations related to data accessibility and reliability, and the ambiguity of indicators, 
the analysis of the four dimensions of performance (access, quality of service, operational efficiency, 
and tariff levels) suggests that the overall performance of water PPP projects has been generally quite 
satisfactory.”    
193 Marin 2009, 134 and Water Week presentation, February 2009. 
194 Interview 4. 
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acknowledged to me that the Gassner study, the most definitive and rigorous to date, 
could not show whether the poor benefited from PSP.  Further, PSP was so dependent 
on the right regulatory and institutional infrastructure that it was only likely to work, 
at best, in middle-income countries.195   
 Governments, viewed with a new lens from the 2010 perch of the Bank, are 
now the parties responsible for ensuring that efficiency gains are passed on to 
customers, that benefits are equitably distributed and that negative impacts are 
“addressed through well-designed and well-funded mitigation measures.”196  On top 
of all this, and most critical of all, governments must now pony up the public 
financing needed to make the new hybrid models of PSP, such as leases and 
affermage, operational to replace the failed concession model previously promoted by 
the Bank.  The view from the perch in 2010 is indeed a quite different vista than the 
Bank gazed upon in 1994-95 at the time of publication of the WDR and Bureaucrats 
in Business.  The prescribed ratio of government versus private sector roles in 
expanding WSS to the poor have been effectively reversed, with the lion’s share of 
responsibility, as financier, watchdog, regulator and redistributor, falling squarely 
back on the shoulders of the public sector in developing countries.     
 
                                           
195 Interview 4.  The interviewee spoke of  performance benchmarking over a 3-5 year period as an 
option for poor countries.   
196 Marin, 2009, p.134-135. 
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4.1. Theorizing Change at the World Bank  
          
 In this chapter I present two schematic models to account for the change in the 
Bank’s agenda for PSP in urban WSS that I described in Chapter Three.197  These 
models derive from a synthetic theoretical approach to explaining Bank practices and 
outcomes.  They combine international relations (IR) theory to help explain external 
influences on the Bank and sociological organization theory to inform an 
understanding of the Bank’s internal culture, norms, bureaucracy, and incentive 
structures.   I draw here in particular on the work of two political scientists and 
scholars of the Bank, Michelle Miller-Adams and Catherine Weaver.198  IR theory, 
including rationalist-derived principal-agent models, contributes to an understanding 
of the Bank as a powerful international organization  influenced by external actors, 
especially by the interests of its member states, including both dominant donor and 
client states.199  The United States is the most powerful donor state, and has 
historically been most influential in wielding its “power of the purse,” particularly 
with respect to funding for the concessional IDA arm, which requires triennial 
                                           
197 As I note in the introductory chapter, I refer here to “models” in the descriptive, not causal, sense.   
198 Miller-Adams 1999 and Weaver 2007, 493–512. 
199 The 187 member countries of the Bank are represented by the Board of Governors. The Board of 
Governors meets only annually, and delegates day-to-day governance and oversight functions to 25 
Executive Directors (EDs). The largest shareholder member states have their own EDs; smaller 
shareholders group together and are represented by an elected ED. Five developed country donor states 
comprise the major shareholders of the Bank and collectively wield 37.38 percent of the voting power 
of the Bank’s Executive Directors.  As of November 2010, the five largest shareholders in the IBRD, 
by voting power of the EDs, were the United States (16.40 percent), Japan (7.87 percent), Germany 
(4.49 percent), France (4.31 percent) and the United Kingdom (4.31 percent). 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-
1215524804501/IBRDEDsVotingTable.pdf  (December 18, 2010). 
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replenishments.  However, as a potent quasi-autonomous actor, the Bank’s behavior 
and change cannot be understood as simply derivative of the interests of its member 
states.  Rather, the Bank is pushed and pulled by external and internal tensions: the 
complex politics of its external environment versus the bureaucratic politics and 
cultural dynamics of its internal environment.  Principal-agent theory helps to explain 
how the Bank gains autonomy from principals (in Weaver’s view, not just member 
states but also NGOs) through control over asymmetric information and the excessive 
cost to principals of monitoring slippage.200 
 But IR and principal-agent theory cannot account for the complex 
bureaucratic culture of the Bank which plays a critical role in shaping policies and 
practices.  Sociological organization theory and constructivist theory help to “unpack 
the black box” of agents’ preferences, rather than assuming them—as IR theory 
would.  The Bank’s internal culture encompasses the ideologies, norms, routines, 
rules, and incentive structures that shape staff members’ expectations and interactive 
behavior.  As Weaver puts it:201   
 
Culture informs staff members’ logic of appropriateness and consequence, 
letting them know how to respond to new tasks or challenges, which formal 
policies “really matter,” what behavior will get rewarded or sanctioned in 
hiring and promotion processes, and what ideas regarding organizational 
policy and practice may be more readily received. Culture in this sense is 
intrinsic to our understanding of strategic behavior…Bureaucratic actors, 
taking cues from culture to figure out what constitutes “rational” behavior, 
will adopt appropriate language, methodological tools, and other framing 
                                           
200 Weaver 2007, 495-497. Weaver argues that NGOs play the role of “fire alarms” and 
“whistleblowers” for donor states, thus helping to reduce “slippage” between donors’ agendas and 
interests and the Bank’s. But this presumes that NGOs’ interests are aligned with those of donor states, 
a presumption which may hold in some cases, but certainly not all. To the contrary, I maintain that 
activists against water privatization and the Bank’s PSP agenda found little common ground with 
powerful donor states in opposing the Bank’s PSP agenda.   
201 Weaver 2007, 497-500.   
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techniques to promote their ideas and gain voice and resources within the 
institution. 
 
As I discuss in this chapter and as is later illustrated in Figure 3,  I hold that there are 
three key components of the Bank’s internal organizational culture which explain 
agenda change in PSP in tandem with the external actors and variables I identify.  
Key among the internal elements are the Bank’s function as a development bank, its 
recognized role as a knowledge producer, and its dominant ideology of neoliberalism. 
 The World Bank is first and foremost a for-profit institution and a bank; as a 
development bank, it lends money to low and middle-income governments for 
investment projects and policy reforms.202  The IBRD lends at slightly-below market 
rates to sovereign governments or for projects guaranteed by sovereigns, while the 
IDA makes loans to the poorest countries on concessional, or low-cost terms.  The 
IBRD is financed primarily by selling bonds to private investors in international 
capital markets, backed by the pledges of its member governments.  As the NGO 
watchdog and activist organization the Bank Information Center (BIC) points out:203 
With capital backing of nearly US$200 billion from its member governments, 
the IBRD is able to raise significant funds on international capital markets at 
preferred "AAA" credit rates….[it enjoys] a preferred creditor status with its 
borrower shareholders, in effect, putting the IBRD first in line for debt 
repayment. …Conservative financial and lending policies and practices instill 
a high degree of investor confidence in IBRD securities. These policies and 
                                           
202 The Bank has a wide array of loan products; investment project loans and development policy loans 
are the two main types. Investment project lending typically supports public works and infrastructure, 
while “development policy” or “structural adjustment” lending is for economic, institutional or other 
policy reforms, and predicated on the borrower’s compliance with pre-agreed conditions. 
203 Data are based on the Bank’s 2008 annual report.  
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practices also instill a high degree of discipline in the IBRD's relations to its 
borrowers.204 
 
The IBRD has never written off a loan.  Its consistent profitability has helped the 
Bank grow as an organization and fund the activities of the IDA.  Nevertheless, the 
Bank has faced increased competition from private capital markets over the last 
decade which has reduced demand from middle-income countries such as China, 
Russia and Brazil—the Bank’s “bread and butter” clients.  This has increased these 
countries’ borrowing leverage over the Bank, and their increased power is also 
evidenced by recent increases in the voting shares of China, India and Brazil. 
 The Bank’s role qua bank is reflected in and reinforced by its internal 
operational environment and the pressures of what are commonly termed its 
“disbursement imperative” and “loan approval culture.”  As Miller-Adams, Weaver 
and other Bank scholars and observers note, Bank staff are rewarded for packaging 
large bankable projects with quick turnaround in project design and Board approval.  
Blueprint, or “one-size-fits-all” projects have been preferred for this reason—though 
the Bank is often at pains to state that is moving away from this model.  Weaver 
further notes that the time pressures associated with streamlined approval and 
disbursement often translate into a bias in favor of  technical inputs and outputs which 
can be quantitatively measured and against complex social and political risk 
assessment.205  This also tends to steer Bank staff away from activities that may not 
                                           
204 In 2008 the IBRD raised US$19 billion at medium to long-term maturities.  Strict limits are set on 
loan concentration in individual countries, and the IBRD freezes loan approvals and disbursements if a 
country fails to pay obligations on time. Bank Information Center, The World Bank (IBRD and IDA).  
http://www.bicusa.org/en/Institution.Lending.5.aspx. (December 5, 2010) 
205 Weaver 2007, 505-512.   
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produce immediately tangible results, a point I emphasize with respect to the critical 
importance of governance and institutions for well-functioning utilities.  Weaver 
maintains that the Bank’s operational culture in lending has historically suffered from 
an absence of effective monitoring and evaluation: “this path dependency of internal 
bureaucratic norms and routines has hampered processes of organizational learning 
and adaptation.”206  An interview I had with a senior Bank WSS specialist confirmed 
that the Bank is in need of more independent project monitoring and evaluation.  That 
specialist shared the example of an African country which had received a “highly 
successful” rating in the Implementation and Completion Report for a rural water 
supply project.  Yet this specialist knew from first-hand experience that almost half of 
the pumps for that project were either non-working or sitting unopened in the 
country’s capital.   As I argue in Section 4.3 below, the Bank is in fact caught in 
multiple conflicts between its role as a profit-making bank and its roles as a 
knowledge producer and promoter of market-oriented values. 
 In 1996 World Bank President James Wolfensohn announced that the Bank 
should become a “knowledge bank, as focused on disbursing the knowledge assets 
poor and developing countries needed as it was about providing economic support for 
development projects.”207  Research is an essential input to Bank operations and 
lending and used in the Bank’s advisory services, including policy dialogue with 
governments, analytical reports (in Bank jargon, “economic and sector work”) and 
                                           
206 Weaver 2007, 505-512.   
207 Cohen and Laporte. March 2004. “The Evolution of the Knowledge Bank.”  KM (Knowledge 
Management) Magazine. Reprinted on the World Bank’s website.  : 




technical assistance.208  The Development Economics Vice Presidency (DEC) is in 
charge of 80 percent of the Bank’s research expenditures and the production of the 
annual World Development Indicators and World Development Report.  The Bank is 
the largest development research body, and DEC is important because it also serves 
as the main source of research for other MDBs and bilateral aid agencies.209  
Although the Bank views itself  as technocratic and apolitical in its research 
orientation and output, this characterization has been widely challenged.  A 2006 
evaluation of Bank research chaired by Princeton economist Angus Deaton and 
conducted by a team of mainstream economists lauded the Bank for “having done a 
creditable job of delivering on the many, potentially inconsistent, demands made of 
[Bank researchers]” and noted that “much of what we read was of very high 
quality.”210  But the evaluation also made some notably critical claims with respect to 
the impartiality and quality of the Bank’s work.  The evaluators found that:  
A small fraction of prominent Bank research is technically flawed and in some 
cases strong policy positions have been supported by such (non) evidence. 
The panel fully appreciates the need to take positions before all of the 
evidence is in, and recognizes that the Bank must often aggressively defend its 
own policies…[T]he panel believes that, in some cases, the Bank proselytized 
selected new work in major policy speeches and publications, without 
appropriate caveats on its reliability…New research methods have sometimes 
found their way into country assistance and country policy without adequate 
evaluation.211    
                                           
208 Dethier 2007, 469-478. 
209 Broad. November 2006. “Research, Knowledge and the Art of ‘Paradigm Maintenance:’ The World 
Bank's Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC).” (Abridged version). Bretton Woods Project, 
Update 53.       http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=546206#fn002 (December 5, 2010). 
210 Quoted in Bretton Woods Project. January 31, 2007. “Knowledge Bank-rupted: Evaluation Says 
Key World Bank Research Not Remotely Reliable.” Update 54.  : 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-549070 ( December 5, 2010).  
211 Deaton, Angus, et. al. September 2006. An Evaluation of World Bank Research, 1998 – 2005. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-
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 Miller-Adams calls the characterization of the Bank as “apolitical” an 
organizational myth, and traces it to the early decades of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions’ (BWIs) history, enabling the BWIs to lend to both aligned and 
nonaligned countries. The Bank is a diverse institution, comprising staff from an 
array of countries and disciplinary backgrounds.  However, as former senior staff 
member Moises Naim stated, “economic reasoning is respected, while ‘soft’ 
sociological type analysis is belittled.”212  Neoclassical economists make up the vast 
majority of research social scientists and senior management within the Bank, a trend 
reinforced during the 1980s following on debt crises in developing countries, the 
neoliberal Reagan and Thatcher administrations and the turn to macroeconomic 
policy reforms and structural adjustment lending.  Weaver states that “the ideological 
hegemony of the neoliberal economics perspective is reinforced by what Robert 
Wade calls the ‘art of paradigm maintenance’—the careful vetting and censorship of 
prominent Bank publications and public statements by key officials.”213  Professor 
Robin Broad levels the same accusation at the DEC: she maintains that it has played a 
critical role in the legitimization of the neoliberal free-market paradigm over the last 
quarter-century, disseminating “less than objective research.”214  In particular, she 
identifies six interrelated processes and mechanisms through which DEC performs its 
paradigm-maintenance role by privileging individuals whose work conforms to a 
neoliberal ideology.  These include: 
 
                                           
212 Quoted in Weaver 2007, 505-507.   
213 Weaver 2007, 505-507.   
214 Broad 2006. 
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incentives which increase an individual's chances to be hired, to advance one's 
career, to be published, to be promoted by the Bank's external affairs 
department, and, in general, to be assessed positively. And, they also include 
selective enforcement of rules, discouragement of dissonant discourse, and 
even the manipulation of data to fit the paradigm…this incentive or reward 
system is typically unstated, may even negate the formal or stated procedures 
and, as such, functions as "soft" law.215 
 
 
 I have outlined here the theoretical and empirical foundations for the models I 
present in the next two sections explaining agenda change in the Bank.  In Section 4.2 
I analyze and weight the role of external actors and forces which have influenced this 
change.  In Section 4.3  I do the same for the internal elements of the Bank’s 
organizational culture that I identified above.  I conclude by discussing how the 
external and internal have plausibly interacted to condition this change. 
 
4.2.  External Influences: Donors, Clients, TANs and TNCs 
 
 
 In Figure 1 of Chapter Three, I presented a diagrammatic model of actors and 
elements facilitating and enabling the Bank’s pursuit of PSP in water and sanitation 
during the 1990s.  I discussed how the global political economy, neoliberal 
governments in key donor states, interest by public service TNCs in expanding 
markets, and pressure on client states to reform, each contributed to the realization of 
the Bank’s agenda.  Figure 2 of this chapter illustrates the effects of external 
influences on Bank change from 2000-2010.   Transnational advocacy networks are 
the key addition to the external actors previously identified in Figure 1; their role is 
discussed briefly in this chapter, and in detail in Chapter Five.  Changes in the global 
political economy strongly conditioned the interests and behavior of the four actors in 
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this descriptive model, and their relationships to Bank WSS policy outcomes stands 
in sharp contrast to the vectors of influence a decade earlier (see Figure 1).  At the 
same time, changes in interests and behavior, especially for the TANs and the Bank’s 
client borrowers, reflect a reaction to failed or misguided Bank and IFI policies for 
PSP in the 1990s.  
 As Jeffry Frieden writes, “By the turn of the new [21st] century, the path to 
growth seemed to run inevitably through globalization, yet this path was littered with 
disappointments.  Scores of countries in the developing and Communist worlds had 
turned away from protectionism and planning and toward the market, yet few of them 
had realized substantial improvements in living standards.”216  The reasons for this 
are manifold and debated, and include bad policies, insufficient  implementation of 
(putatively) good policy reforms, exogenous shocks, and a fundamental mismatch 
between liberalized financial markets and national monetary policy autonomy, which 
generated repeated and destabilizing financial crises.  The last two decades have 
witnessed wave after wave of currency and banking crises afflicting middle-income 
and transition countries, including Mexico, East and Southeast Asia, Russia, Brazil, 
Turkey, and Argentina.217  These pressures are illustrated in Figure 2 as constraints 
imposed by the global political economy on client states’ continued pursuit of PSP.  
Public support for policies promoting privatization and PSP similarly reversed course. 
Writing in 2002 Birdsall and Nellis noted that “the number of firms undergoing 
                                           
216 Frieden 2006, 437.   
217 A central conundrum for states wrought by global financial integration was captured by Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Robert Mundell in his “impossibility theorem,”also known as the “unholy 
trinity.” It posits that countries can only have two of three things in an open international economy: 
capital mobility, a stable exchange rate, and monetary independence. The countries experiencing 
financial crises during the 1990s and 2000s often found themselves caught between trying to prop up 
their currencies to stabilize exchange rates and satisfy debtors, and weakening their currencies to 
promote export-led growth and accumulate foreign reserves.  
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ownership change now well exceeds 100,000; and the total value of assets transferred 
has been very large.”218  But by the late 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st 
century, “reform fatigue” had set in.  Birdsall and Nellis point to “evidence of 
political chicanery and corruption in Russia and Malaysia, fiscal mismanagement in 
Brazil, escalating prices in Argentina, and lost jobs in a great many countries” as 
factors that contributed to sullying the reputation of liberalization, even among 
proponents of reforms during those decades.219  In a much cited 2003 article, the Wall 
Street Journal wrote that consumers felt deceived by privatizations, associating them 
with higher utility rates and higher profits for foreign companies and corrupt officials: 
this was responsible for the “crisis of faith for that apostle of privatization, the World 
Bank.”220    
 
The Impact of Market Forces on Agenda Change 
 
 Financial crises, political opposition to privatization, and some fundamental 
miscalculations about the nature of the WSS sector—both by the Bank and private 
investors, led to a sharp decline and reconfiguration of PSP in WSS throughout the 
first decade of the 21st century.  Sixty-four projects representing an impressive 34 
percent of total investment in PPPs between 1991-2009 ($20.8 billion out of $60.5 
billion) were classified by the Bank as either cancelled or in distress.221  This 34 
percent cancellation and distress rate compares to six percent of PPP projects in 
                                           
218 Birdsall and Nellis. May 2002. “Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impacts of 
Privatization. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 6.  at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=999986 
219 Birdsall and Nellis 2002, 1. 
220 Phillips, M. July 21, 2003. Wall Street Journal. 
221 World Bank, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, November 2010.  
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energy, three percent in telecommunications, and eight percent in the transportation 
sector.222  The Latin American and Caribbean region accounted for 45 percent of 
investment in distressed and cancelled projects, while the East Asia and Pacific 
region accounted for 44 percent.  In contrast to the total  
number of PPP projects, which increased over the last ten years (especially greenfield 
projects), actual funding mobilized through these projects has not recovered to the 
levels disbursed between 1993 and 2000.  By region, East Asia and the Pacific and 
Latin America saw dramatic declines in the 2000s, South Asia showed incrementally 
small increases, and Sub-Saharan Africa remained virtually devoid of investment.223  
Since 2006, the number of contracts awarded annually dropped sharply to pre-1999 
levels, and the new awards were concentrated in only a few countries, with China 
taking the largest share.  Financing for PSP in China relies primarily on local and 
expatriate funding.224   
 With the exception of China and a very few other countries, these statistics 
illustrate what happened to the Bank’s promise of PSP as a tool for development and 
for reaching the MDGs in water, if not sanitation.  The TNCs in which the Bank had 
placed its faith in the 1990s beat a quick retreat when economic and political 
headwinds made investments in most developing countries look untenably risky.  In 
my interview with water finance expert Aldo Baietti at the World Bank, Baietti cited 
currency risk as a key factor driving TNCs from the sector.  He pointed to Maynilad, 
the private concession in the western zone of Manila, which went bankrupt as a result 
                                           
222 World Bank, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, November 2010.  
223 World Bank, Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, November 2010. 
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131 
 
of foreign-denominated debt. 225  Another former Bank official who worked on WSS 
in the Africa region noted that after the TNCs “got burned” in Argentina they became 
much more careful in assessing risk, and were especially risk-averse in Africa: “water 
systems can only be funded in local currency, it works better that way. The most 
stable place to invest right now is in China and India.”226   Baietti said that the private 
sector did not like the suite of risk mitigation instruments the MDBs began to offer 
following on the recommendations of the Camdessus and Gurría reports; in particular, 
they were not happy with the tenors of  loan guarantees.  
  Figure 2 illustrates the opposing forces at work between the Bank and 
transnational WSS companies from 2000-2010: the decline in TNCs’ interest in 
developing country markets, which constrained Bank PSP policies, was met with 
redoubled efforts by the Bank to enable PSP policies.  But these strategies have not 
worked.  A faculty member of an Ivy League university who specializes in 
infrastructure commented to an NGO “that big companies pulled out of the water 
sector because it was not a high-return investment…it’s too expensive to run utilities, 
especially in poor countries.” 227  He noted that almost all of the infrastructure 
investment was in telecommunications or transport in middle-income countries; i.e., 
in investments perceived as safer than water: “the Bank’s focus is on Africa, but 
there’s no evidence of infrastructure improvements there.  Private companies would 
rather pull out their fingernails than invest in Africa.”  Another academic water expert 
who was contracted by the World Bank to explore re-engagement with public utilities 
                                           
225 Interview 3.   
226 Interview notes shared by an NGO based on an interview with a former high-level water specialist 
at the World Bank, October 2008. 
227 Interview notes shared by an NGO based on an interview with a former high-level  water specialist 
at the World Bank, September 2008. 
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also underscored that the politics and economics of the WSS sector render it 
essentially unprofitable for the private sector: “costs are too high to manage without 
raising tariffs, which people oppose…most utilities are in such disarray that it’s a bad 
investment.”228  He further implied that decentralization policies advocated by the 
Bank would be ineffectual or counterproductive, since “utilities are run at the 
municipal level, which usually doesn’t have the power to tax or give subsidies that 
would allow for investment in the utility to avoid raising tariffs.”  
 In  2001 the market for PSP was dominated by five TNCs (Suez, Veolia, 
SAUR, Agbar Water and RWE) which controlled 71 percent of the market: by 2010 
their market share had dropped to 32 percent.229   In 1999, 84 percent of private WSS 
companies covered by Pinsent Masons annual Water Yearbook were in OECD 
countries; by 2010 this figure had dropped to 45 percent.  While Philippe Marin and 
former Bank officials like to cite the rise of small regional operators as a trend which 
has counteracted the decline of  TNC investment,  the scope and scale of that 
investment (with the exception of China in some years), nowhere approaches the 
actual investments of TNCs in the 1990s, nor expectations for their continued 
investment over the past decade.  Moreover, there has been a precipitous decline in 
investment over the last few years in countries with national private operators, such as 
the Philippines and Malaysia.230   
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China and Singapore have been the major new entrants in the market for outward 
investment, but that investment is directed only at the Middle East, which including 
North Africa, is the only region to evidence an upward trend in investment since 
2005.  
 The conclusion to be drawn here is that both the Bank and the private sector 
seriously  misunderstood and/or turned a blind eye to the political economy of the 
WSS sector.  Although it was always implicitly recognized that by dint of being a 
natural monopoly the water sector was less amenable to “unbundling,” there was little 
serious analysis in the 1990s of the political and institutional dimensions of 
privatization, alongside of a failure to appreciate the market risks involved in a 
globalized economy.  Hence, six years after authoring Reforming Infrastructure, 
Ioannis Kessides acknowledged that the “water sector was the wrong sector for 
PSP.”231  The failure of analysis, at least up until 2003 or so, derived from an internal 
culture in the Bank where ideology and knowledge production were mutually 
reinforcing, as discussed later in this chapter. 
The Influence of Client Countries on Agenda Change 
 
 The reaction against the wave of neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
generated not only popular resistance, expressed through local and transnational 
activism, but also resistance and push-back from the Bank’s borrowing clients.  
Governments which had embraced market reforms, as Lora et. al. point out, now: 
                                           
231 Interview with Ioannis Kessides, July 15, 2010.  Kessides noted that technological change in the 
telecommunications and transport sectors greatly facilitated the introduction of competititon; in 
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…increasingly tended to blame free-market policies for low economic growth 
and high unemployment.  Not only has public opinion become opposed to 
further promarket reforms, but fatigue is also affecting the views of 
policymakers, the opinions of international organizations, and the 
prescriptions of top international economic advisers.”232 
 
Estache (2006) contextualized the dilemma for political leaders, noting that the 
assessment of the fiscal impact of PPPIs was a “hotly debated topic” among 
policymakers.  Specifically, the macroeconomic reforms required in the wake of 
financial crises were constraining “fiscal space” for developing countries, and had the 
effect of rationing the infrastructure sectors.  While the short-run payoffs from PSP 
were significant in terms of public savings, the long-run story was more nuanced and 
“at the core of the current debate:” 
The concern for affordability of public services is currently so clearly at the 
top of the politicians’ priorities that subsidies for both operating and capital 
expenditures tend to last longer or crawl back over time… Even where 
reforms included major tariff rebalancing and initial subsidy cuts to increase 
sector autonomy in a fiscally sound environment, the public sector eventually 
returned to the subsidization of the sector.233  
 
For utilities in particular, Estache adds, this implies that additional revenue from taxes 
introduced by governments to recapture some of the efficiency gains of private 
operators were not enough to offset additional requirements for subsidies.  As I note 
with respect to Uruguay, Estache acknowledges that in some countries privatization is 
not the right fiscal choice either in the short- or long-term, owing to the significant 
contribution of SOEs to government revenues.  
 The backlash against privatization policies in WSS in Latin America found 
expression in national campaigns and the regional transnational advocacy network, 
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Red VIDA, discussed in Chapter 5.  It also translated into ballot-box victories for left-
wing governments: cumulatively, as of 2008, eleven of eighteen major countries in 
Latin America were headed by left-of-center presidents.  These countries accounted 
for 65 percent of the 350 million people who live in the region.234  Beginning in 
2003, leftist candidates won in countries where water projects with PSP had met with 
popular opposition, leading in many cases to early terminations, cancellations and 
withdrawals.  These countries included Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, 
and Uruguay.  Political scientist Susan Stokes makes the point that several center-left 
governments in Latin America were not against open markets and globalization so 
much as they were responsive to pressures to expand spending and “upsize” the state 
once again to address social issues and priorities.235   
 Figure 2 illustrates the changed relationship between the Bank and client 
states in the past decade compared to the 1990s (see Figure 1).  Opposition to 
privatization coupled with increased sources of credit for certain middle-income 
client countries (e.g., China, India, and Brazil)236 constrained the Bank in pushing 
PSP policies, as it increased its willingness to soften PSP conditionalities or eliminate 
them entirely.  The Uruguay case study illustrates the Bank’s willingness to not only 
continue lending after PSP in WSS was constitutionally prohibited, but to increase its 
lending to the country.  The Bank also had to acknowledge that first-generation, 
“orthodox” PSP prescriptions could no longer be required of borrowers.  In Uganda, 
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236 A former senior water advisor at the Bank, and one of the architects of PSP policies, stated that 
China, India and Brazil didn’t find the Bank to be “relevant to them anymore. They can access more 
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former senior World Bank water official, February 2009.  
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for example, a “poster child” country that the Bank has invoked for successful reform 
of the public sector utility, the Managing Director of the Uganda National Water and 
Sewer Corporation commented on a panel at Water Week 2009:237 
 
We endeavored to involve the private sector, but it didn’t work…Large 
private operators were looking for millions in return.  We’ve had to look at 
internal finance…indexing tariffs to energy and inflation and subsidizing 
connections.  [But] tariffs won’t get us to full cost recovery. Sixty percent 
must come from outside. 
 
Confirming this drop-off on the demand and supply side, a consultant to the World 
Bank told me she knew of only two (non-IFC) Bank loans for PSP in the last two 
years, and that “private sector involvement in management, lease, and affermage 
contracts is definitely low in World Bank supported projects.” 238 
 
Transnational Activist Networks’ Influence on Bank Agenda Change 
 
 The influence of TANs on Bank agenda change in WSS is touched on here 
and discussed more fully in Chapter 5.  As Figure 2 illustrates, TANs’ effects on the 
Bank were mediated through country-level campaigns (strong constraining effect), 
TNCs (strong constraining effect), donor states (weak constraining effect), and in 
direct engagement with the Bank, albeit with only a weak constraining effect, if any.  
These effects are not surprising, insofar as TANs have expended their greatest energy 
building alliances and providing support to country-level campaigns.  These in turn 
have targeted TNCs’ investments and, in most instances, the state. Vicky Cann, who 
was the lead water campaign organizer for the U.K.’s World Development Movement 
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(WDM) and an international spokesperson for anti-privatization TANs, told me that 
“none of the shifts [in bilateral and multilateral development finance institution (DFI) 
policies] that have happened would have happened without movements on the 
ground—in Argentina, Bolivia, Jakarta, Manila, Tanzania, Delhi, South Africa or 
Ghana.”239  Direct engagement with the Bank has been minimal in contrast to 
country-level campaigns, and largely ineffectual; the willingness to engage reflected 
schisms among NGOs.  In some instances, TANs were successful in constraining 
bilateral DFI assistance conditioned on PSP.  WDM’s campaign, which targeted the 
U.K.’s Department for International Development (DFID), was one such success.  
Cann told me that it succeeded in getting DFID to agree to curtail all WSS technical 
assistance for PSP and any conditionality linked to its bilateral aid.240  On the other 
hand, she also said that while DFID de-linked its own aid from PSP conditionality “it 
was happy to continue to work with other MDBs such as the World Bank and IMF in 
promoting PSP.”   
 TANs did not focus a great deal of energy on pressuring the Bank via donor 
states, likely because they did not see this as yielding a good return on investment of 
resources.  Northern donor countries either favored private sector development 
policies in the Bank, corresponding to their own domestic political preferences (e.g., 
the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.), and/or were home to some of the biggest water 
TNCs (e.g., France and Germany).  However, TANs did campaign to pressure donor 
countries to withdraw contributions to the Bank’s pro-privatization advisory facility, 
PPIAF.  The WDM submitted testimony to Parliament in which it argued that “PPIAF 
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plays a significant part in eliminating the choice of poor country governments to 
decide their own development path…by collaborating with conditions imposed by 
international financial institutions, failing to consult on all possible reform options for 
the sector, and undertaking pro-privatisation consensus-building work,” including 
public relations campaigns.241  The WDM stressed that the DFID created PPIAF 
jointly with the World Bank in 1999, had been by far its largest contributor to date, 
and argued for a termination of public monies to support PPIAF’s agenda.  A 
corollary campaign launched by an alliance of European water activists succeeded in 
getting Norway to withdraw its funding for the Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF) in 2007.242  But this was largely symbolic, as Norway’s 
contributions to PPIAF from 1999-2006 totaled only $2.5 million compared to the 
U.K.’s contribution of $63 million during the same period.    
 
Donor States’ Influence on World Bank Agenda Change in WSS 
 
 As suggested in the preceding section on TANs, the public record does not 
indicate that the Bank’s largest donors, in toto or individually, exerted strong pressure 
to either expand or constrict the Bank’s PSP policies.  These were in any case, 
forcibly in retreat by the middle of the decade.  Activists would claim that until the 
last few years, donors were largely on board (literally and figuratively) with the 
                                           
241 Memorandum submitted by the World Development Movement to the U.K.'s House of Commons, 
International Development Committee, Select Committee Inquiry on Water and Sanitation. October 
2006. Published April 17, 2007.  : 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmintdev/126/126we01.htm  (January 
3, 2011). 
242 The NGOs included the Corporate Europe Observatory, the U.K.-based World Development 
Movement, the Norwegian Association of International Water Studies (FIVAS), Friends of the Earth 
International, and the Transnational Institute.  
http://archive.corporateeurope.org/pdfs/ppiafsummary14052007.pdf  (December 3, 2010) 
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Bank’s PSP agenda.  For example, European activists note that the European Union’s: 
243 
[d]eeply entrenched neoliberal view on water was evident in the launch of its 
 
e  
In addition to the campaign to pressure donors to withdraw contributions from 
PPIAF, it is plausible to infer that other campaigns, such as Red VIDA’s campaign 
against Suez (supported by Danielle Mitterand of France Liberté ), at least made 
certain donor states more sensitive to their voting positions in the Bank, especially as 
prospects for private investment continued to dwindle.  Figure 2 therefore indicates, 
albeit somewhat speculatively, that donor states’ influence in aggregate
water facility in 2003, which clearly stated its intention to expand the role of 
private sector involvement in water, and specifically to help EU private sector
water companies expand into developing countries.  EU Water commissioner, 
Louis Michel, backed up these ideological convictions with considerable cash, 
investing one million Euros per year into the Public Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF) as well as setting up its European equivalent, th




 over the 
decade likely ran in both directions: weakly enabling and constraining the Bank—
depending on the particular donor state and year.  The more important point is that 
donor states were less influential actors in changing the Bank’s agenda than were 
client states, TNCs, and TANs.  
 An interesting twist during this decade involved the U.S. under the Bush 
administration.  The U.S. is the most powerful donor state to the Bank, controlling 
16.4 percent of the votes on the IBRD board, and 13.4 percent of the votes on the 
International Development Association (IDA) Board.  Donor states can directly 
influence policy change at the Bank through the threat of withholding replenishments 
                                           
243 Buxton, Nick. September 24, 2010. “Is the Water Privatisation Tide Finally Turning?” 
http://www.waterjustice.org/?mi=1&res_id=284 (January 7, 2011). 
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for the IDA, which is the concessional-loan window of the Bank;  contributions to 
IDA’s replenishment must be approved by Congress.  As Weaver points out, this 
"power of the purse" has been effectively used by environmental NGOs through 
legislative strategies over the past three decades to push for significant changes.244  
Not surprisingly, conservative governments, including the U.S. under the Bush 
Administration, used replenishments to push for private sector development.  But 
contradictions could surface, as occurred during negotiations for the thirteenth IDA 
replenishment in 2001.  Funding for the replenishment was held up past the 
December 2001 deadline due to a dispute between the U.S. and its European 
counterparts.  The dispute centered on a condition the U.S. attached to the funding 
that would mandate that at least 50 percent of IDA disbursements be in the form of 
grants rather than loans, and surprisingly, over the role of the private sector in Bank 
projects for essential services, such as health care, education, and WSS.245  Although 
some NGOs were suspicious of the Bush Administration’s ultimate intent, the grants 
proposal was welcomed by a coalition of other U.S. NGOs, including several that had 
pushed for de-linking essential services from PSP.  In a joint statement, Friends of the 
Earth, the AFL-CIO, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and RESULTS, an 
NGO focused on “international economic justice,” urged Congress to require the 
Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Director to the World Bank to 
promote the 50 percent grants target along with the de-linking of PSP to funding for 
                                           
244 One example of this is the 1989 Pelosi Amendment that directly led to the establishment of 
environmental impact assessment and safeguard measures in Bank lending operations. Weaver 2007. 
245 Weaver 2007. 
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essential services.246  However, European countries ultimately prevailed, and donors 
agreed in July 2002 that 18 to 21 percent of aid during IDA 13 should be in the form 
of grants.  Moreover, a Congressional Research Service analyst who followed this 
debate closely noted that in contrast to earlier Bush Administration statements, the 
final IDA 13 Agreement made no mention of health, education, and WSS as priority 
areas for grant funding.247  Further, the U.S. threw its full support to private sector 
development in the fourteenth IDA replenishment in June 2005.  It exhorted the IDA 
to work more closely with the IFC to promote private sector growth in developing 
countries, and to take other steps designed to encourage private sector 
development.248   
 
4.3.  Internal Influences: Knowledge Production, Neoliberal Ideology and the 
Bank qua Bank 
 
 
Knowledge Production versus Neoliberal Ideology  
 
 In Chapter 3  I traced the trajectory of the Bank’s knowledge production over 
the last decade.  Outputs included the 2004 Operational Guidance to staff, major 
policy research papers on PSP such as Reforming Infrastructure, and what the Bank 
acclaimed as milestone studies by Marin and Gassner.  Marin is situated in the 
Bank’s “Water Anchor,” a specialized unit of water experts which provides expertise 
                                           
246 Conversation with Rick Rowden, RESULTS, December 2001. See also: Bretton Woods Project, 
March 25, 2002. Taken for granted? US Proposals to Reform the World Bank’s IDA. Update 27. 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-16169  (November 21, 2010).  Other NGOs, such as the U.S.-
based Globalization Challenge Initiative, were suspicious of the potential link between the grants plan 
and PSP in essential services. But Deputy Assistant  Secretary of Treasury Bill Schuerch maintained 
that the USG’s proposal for using grants to provide essential services did not include private sector 
activities or private provisioning of services.    
247 Sanford. September 2004.  
248 Sanford. May 3, 2005, 3–4. 
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to country and regional directors and TTLs; helps formulate, implement, and 
coordinate the Bank’s water sector strategy; monitors and evaluates the Bank’s water 
portfolio; is responsible for global advocacy and partnerships; and works with other 
Bank networks and DEC to create and disseminate knowledge.249   There are about 
150 urban WSS specialists within the Water Anchor, most dispersed among 
countries around the world.  As a senior WSS specialist in the Water Anchor told me, 
the Anchor is a “laboratory where ideas evolve, where we learn by doing.  Buenos 
Aires [the failed water concession] was a big learning experience. There were other 
high-profile cases which imploded.”250  On the other hand, another WSS specialist in 
the Water Anchor admitted that “dissemination and coordination of WSS policy in 
the Bank was hard, because staff are scattered all over the world and there is no real 
central direction”251   As I discuss below in the section on the “World Bank as a 
Bank,” the learning that does occur within the Bank is often trumped by, or competes 
with, other functional imperatives.  In particular are the incentives for staff to 
“churn” loans, regardless of whether or not the loans incorporate recommendations 
from Bank researchers, or take into account prior experiential learning.  
 I would argue for distinguishing between knowledge production alone and the 
conjoint production and application of knowledge, or what might be viewed as 
sustained learning—the systematic application over time of acquired knowledge.  As 
Figure 3 illustrates, conflicts within the Bank’s organizational culture and between its 
functional roles (i.e., knowledge production versus acting like a bank) have militated 
                                           
249 The Water Anchor is a unit within the Energy, Transport and Water Department of the Sustainable 
Development Vice Presidency of the World Bank Group. 
250 Interview 2. 
251 Interview notes provided by an NGO based on an interview with a senior World Bank water 
official, May 2009. 
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against sustained learning with respect to PSP in WSS.  It is much easier to pinpoint 
changes in “thinking” about PSP within the Bank than it is to point to how this 
thinking (or iterative re-thinking) has led to systematic changes in Bank practice.  
Changes in Bank practice have certainly occurred, such as the decline in IBRD and 
IDA lending for WSS that includes PSP conditionality, the recognition that subsidies 
must be a component of water provision to the poor, and the recognition that full-cost 
recovery (FCR) is far more ideal than it is achievable.  The decline in loans with PSP 
conditionality is arguably more a function of external influences than internal factors, 
as I described in Section 4.2.  But the conflicts between ideology, knowledge 
production, and preeminently, the Bank’s role qua bank, have rendered its policies 
and agenda contradictory and often at odds with the direction suggested by “lessons 
learned.”  Key among these lessons has been the importance of putting in place 
institutions and mechanisms to govern and regulate any public service provider, 
whether publicly or privately operated.  
 The top two brackets of Figure 3 illustrate the push and pull between 
knowledge production and the still-dominant neoliberal ideology of the Bank: on the 
one hand mutually-reinforcing, on the other hand conflictual.  Research outputs, such 
as the studies by Marin, Gassner, and Kessides, put forth conclusions that acutely 
narrowed the advantages that could be ascribed to PSP and sharply delimited its 
applicability.  Yet each study, especially Marin’s and Gassner’s, clung in the end to  
arguing for the superiority of  PSP on the slender thread of improved private sector 
efficiency obtained almost exclusively through labor shedding.  Many other examples 
of new knowledge production can be cited that would have been, or would be 
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expected, to change Bank policies and practice in a systematic fashion..  For example, 
the Independent Evaluation Group’s 2010 evaluation of World Bank support to WSS 
between 1997-2007 critiqued two linchpins of Bank PSP policies: full-cost recovery 
and decentralization.252   The IEG’s report criticized the Bank for failing to broaden 
access to sanitation and to tackle cost recovery: “cost recovery in Bank-supported 
projects has rarely been successful: only 15 percent of projects that attempted cost 
recovery achieved their goal.”253   
On decentralization, a strategy favored by the Bank to promote PSP, the IEG found 
that: 
[o]nly 50% of projects that aimed to strengthen local capacity and two-fifths 
supporting institutional reform were successful… budgets and authority didn’t 
match responsibility.  Positive outcomes usually associated with 
decentralization, such as increased accountability, ownership, empowerment 
and social cohesion, were achieved in a minority of cases…well-maintained 









                                           
252 Independent Evaluation Group/World Bank  2010.  
253 Independent Evaluation Group/World Bank 2010, vii. 
254 The World Bank distinguishes between several types of “decentralization,” including political, 
administrative, fiscal and market concepts. The Bank has strongly linked coordinated decentralization 
to PSP in WSS, arguing that “Water was treated primarily as a social good under the centralized, 
supply-drive approach…. Its positive health and environment externalities seemed to justify the view 
of both government and communities that free water was a fundamental right of the people… In 
theory, decentralized water services should improve governments’ ability to treat water as an economic 
good and assess user charges that will create incentives for efficient water use as well as finance 
improved service delivery.”  World Bank Group, Decentralization and Subnational Regional 
Economics. “Service Delivery. Decentralized Water Services: Irrigation and Water Supply and 









World Bank management has an opportunity to respond to IEG evaluations, and in 
this case, it devoted the bulk of its response to defending its approach to cost 
recovery: 
Evidence shows that achieving full cost recovery in water services delivery is 
an ultimate goal, which although desirable economically is difficult and rarely 
achieved in practice.  Underpricing of water supply services is widespread, 
even in upper-middle-income countries and high-income countries…estimates 
show that 39 percent of water utilities have average tariffs that are set too low 
to cover basic operation and maintenance (O&M) costs... [a] further 30 
percent have tariffs that are set below the level required to make any 
contribution toward the recovery of capital costs. Even in high-income 
countries, only 50 percent of water utilities charge tariffs high enough to cover 
O&M costs and partial capital recovery.255 
 
The Bank continued this argument by stressing that some degree of general subsidy is 
the norm: even in high income countries political constituencies make raising tariffs 
unlikely, and in Bank client countries, low tariffs (below full cost-recovery levels) 
ensure that water services are kept affordable. It concluded by stating that the [World 
Bank] “is proactively looking at who will pay for uncovered costs.”  
 This is a very different posture and emphasis than that adopted by the Bank in 
prior years; for one, rarely has the Bank highlighted how far OECD countries are 
themselves from the goal of full cost recovery.256  This defensive response by the 
Bank to the IEG is noteworthy not only because it constitutes something of a role 
reversal (one would more readily expect the IEG to critique the Bank for unrealistic 
assumptions about FCR when serving the poor), but equally because it captures a 
                                           
255 Independent Evaluation Group/World Bank Group 2010, xiv. 
256 An presentation by the OECD on “Financing and Pricing Water” during the Bank’s Water Week 
2009 noted that “there was a wide discrepancy in the relative proportion of tariff, taxes or 
transfers…we were surprised by the diversity of water financing among OECD countries, especially 
financing through taxes.” Peter Börkey, Environment Directorate, OECD, February 18, 2009. 
“Financing and Pricing Water: An OECD Perspective.” World Bank Water Week, Washington, D.C. 
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fundamental contradiction that the Bank has been unable or unwilling to resolve.  
Setting tariffs at a level that allows for FCR has always been considered necessary as 
a dependable source of revenue for attracting private finance and operators.  As 
World Bank water finance expert Aldo Baietti wrote in 2005, achieving long-term 
financial sustainability for water utilities in developing countries should entail (a) 
lessening the dependence on governmental subsidy transfers, (b) increasing reliance 
on user tariffs as the main source of internally generated financing, and (c) gaining 
financial independence to source external private financing based on the enterprise’s 
own creditworthiness.257   But several years later the Bank was admitting that it 
would have to look elsewhere—that “elsewhere” being the only other two sources of 
finance for utilities, taxes or donor transfers.  This push and pull between learning and 
the doctrine of market supremacy was evident in an interview I conducted with 
Baietti in June 2009.  Baietti noted several ways in which the Bank had changed 
course in its WSS projects:258 
Planning and feasibility assessment for Bank projects are very different than 
ten years ago. Donors and the MDBs were incentivized to go into big projects, 
with inefficiencies built in from the outset.  For example, the Bank preferred 
bulk treatment projects over financing distribution networks.  Now the 
emphasis is on demand-based approaches to planning—we do market 
surveys…We overestimated the poor’s “willingness to pay” (WTP)  for water 
based on the assumption that they bought all their water from expensive 
tanker trucks.  But this was wrong…they use different sources for different 
needs. 
 
Estimates of the poor’s WTP undergirded the Bank’s belief that tariffs could be raised 
over time to approach FCR levels.  Baietti’s comments reflected both a criticism of 
the Bank’s penchant for safe, profitable projects (bulk treatment facilities) that were 
                                           
257 Baietti and Curiel. October 2005.  
258 Interview with Aldo Baietti, June 30, 2009.  
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“supply-side” driven, as I interpreted this—by the Bank’s interests, and internal 
learning about differentiated water usage and expenditure among the poor (one 
wonders why it took the Bank so long to identify these patterns).   
 At the same time, Baietti held firm to the belief that “public utilities could not 
be successful unless they had the same governance structure as the private sector.”  
This could be accomplished through corporatization, statutory codification of 
performance standards, and an expansion of the stakeholder base to include private 
bankers, consumers, and bondholders.  The superiority of private sector operation 
stemmed from the profit-making incentive: performance failures were penalized 
through loss of shareholders’ equity.  When I asked Baietti if in reality shareholders 
always did shoulder the burden of a failure in private operators’ performance—citing 
allegations and perceptions that often the public ended up footing the bill, Baietti 
responded that this “all had to do with putting together a good contract.  In the 
contracts I’ve put together, shareholders do pay in foregone profits.”259  
 I subsequently raised Baietti’s points in an interview I conducted with 
internationally recognized water expert Peter Gleick, President of the Pacific Institute 
for Studies in Development, Environment and Security.260  Gleick had the following 
reactions to Baietti’s comments on the incentives that ostensibly drive the private 
sector to outperform the public sector: 
                                           
259 Interview with Aldo Baietti, June 30, 2009. 
260 Interview with Dr. Peter Gleick, Pacific Institute, Oakland, California, July 6, 2009. Gleick was 
elected an Academician of the International Water Academy in Oslo, Norway in 1999; elected to the 
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., in 2006; and is the author of numerous scientific 
papers and books, including  the biennial water report “The World’s Water,” and  “Bottled and Sold: 
The Story Behind Our Obsession with Bottled Water.” For a full biography, see: 
http://www.pacinst.org/about_us/staff_board/gleick/  (December 17, 2010). 
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There are two key issues here.  No one disputes that private operators can be 
shown to be better.  But there are other measures for which they can’t be 
shown to be better: protecting certain aspects of the public good.  There’s 
historical evidence that the public sector can be equally good. There are 
examples of public utilities equally good as private ones; the best public and 
private utilities are in the developed world.  The reasons both types fail has to 
do with governance and community involvement. 
 
With respect to Baietti’s argument that sanctions against performance failure are 
inherent in well-written private contacts, Gleick responded: 
There’s theory versus reality. The World Bank has a model of the private 
sector that doesn’t exist, it’s a moving target.  The Bank has shifted from pro-
private to agnostic because reality has been shown to be more complicated. 
They had to confront reality…The success of certain private water efforts are 
not necessarily an indicator of the success of the private model. Any 
successful water agency will have the following characteristics: availability of 
capital, expertise of the workforce, oversight of public agencies, and clarity of 
contracts…Contracts are a good example of the problem with privatization.  
There’s no standard language, every contract is individually-negotiated.  We 
need private suppliers to agree to a standard contract specifying how prices 
get adjusted. And you need governments to accept guidelines [for contract 
negotiations]. 
 
Gleick agreed with Baietti’s point that shareholders will put pressure on a company to 
succeed, “but in order to provide the service they do, private providers have to take 
more money out of the system—they have to charge more. Other factors you have to 
consider are ecosystem protection, water quality maintenance, and the public good.  
Both public and private operators require strong government oversight.”  Gleick 
noted that there had been a sea change in the debate because of some very public 
failures of PSP.   
The debate has moved from ideology toward a more practical approach; there 
are rarely cases of purely public or purely private.  Having said this, you’re 
more likely to get a better outcome on the public side.  It’s plausible to design 




 At the end of my interview with Aldo Baietti, he commented that the “social 
agenda was problematic—issues of governance, regulatory frameworks, ensuring 
investments from the outset, and determining WTP.”261   Indeed, there is a good 
degree of theoretical and rhetorical convergence between Gleick’s and the Bank’s 
emphases on governance, performance incentives, and accountability.  The difference 
lies in the Bank’s almost reflexive reversion back to the private sector as the sine qua 
non for improvement in utility performance—all evidence about the critical enabling 
role of institutions and accountability mechanisms notwithstanding.  This was 
reinforced yet again in my July 2010 interview with Ioannis Kessides (author of 
Reforming Infrastructure, 2004), and Lead Economist in the Bank’s Development 
Research Group in the DEC.262  Six years out from his publication, Kessides stated to 
me that there were “significant differences across countries as to whether PSP can 
work.  Public operators can be as good as private, but that totally depends on 
institutions.”  He used the example of Sweden versus his native Greece, where he 
characterized public services as rife with corruption.  He agreed with my assessment 
that the main result of Marin’s and Gassner’s studies showed that most of the positive 
outcomes from PSP were in terms of operational efficiency which derive from 
rationalizing labor, and that it was not possible to identify the beneficiaries of this 
increased efficiency—in particular, whether the poor benefited.  Yet he seemed to 
downplay the emphasis in his 2004 report on the need for better data on equity and 
distributional impacts, and did or could not confirm whether the Bank had improved 
its capacity in this area.  Kessides did strenuously argue, however, that in countries 
                                           
261 Interview with Aldo Baietti, June 30, 2009 
262 Interview with Ioannis Kessides, July 15, 2010.  
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with corruption or undeveloped institutions, PSP will always be preferable to the 
public sector because the public sector will not serve the interests of the poor.  
Finally, I asked Kessides to what extent the policy advice contained in research 
publications were incorporated into Bank loan packages by country and regional 
directors and task team leaders (TTLs), and influenced changes in Bank practice.263  
Kessides laughed somewhat ruefully at this question, and without saying so bluntly, 
implied that  this was at the discretion of country directors and TTLs.  This provides a 
segue into the next section, which discusses the critical role of the Bank qua “bank” 
in determining how knowledge production and ideology have conflicted with the 
“disbursement imperative” and approval culture which condition Bank staff’s 
behavior and the composition of lending. 
 
The World Bank as a Bank 
 
 
 Several former and current senior Bank officials have confirmed in interviews 
that the Bank’s WSS strategy is driven by regional and country directors.264  A 
professor at an Ivy League university who previously worked extensively on water 
resource issues inside the Bank and was a country director for a large middle-income 
client country stated that there was “no real Bank strategy on water—it’s country 
driven.”  Power accrues to country or regional directors because they are the single 
                                           
263 Each World Bank project is handled by a “Task Manager” or “Task Team Leader” (TTL) who has 
overall responsibility for a project from inception to completion, including monitoring, procurement, 
and consultant selection.  TTLs are selected from Bank professional staff based on experience and 
professional training, and may sometimes change over the course of the project cycle (typically seven 
years).  TTLs have a large role in determining the quality and extent of stakeholder participation in a 
project and are the point of contact for civil society engagement. WaterAid, March 2005. World Bank 
Primer for WaterAid Staff and Partner Organizations, author’s personal copy. 
264 Interview 2, and interview notes shared by an NGO based on interviews with several former senior 
World Bank water advisors and specialists, conducted between September 2008 and February 2009. 
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person in charge of a country or region: they manage across World Bank “network” 
or thematic areas by apportioning country budgets to network projects.  As discussed 
previously, country directors and TTLs have an array of strong incentives to “move” 
projects, including individual professional rewards as well as the accumulation of 
more organizational resources.  Another professor at an Ivy League university who 
has consulted to the Bank on infrastructure issues and WSS corroborated this view: 
“Even people who are in sectors, like water experts, have more loyalty to their 
country offices than their departments because they’ll get promoted that 
way…Country officers are loan officers; they just want to get projects out the door.  
They’re promoted on the quantity of projects.”   
 The bottom half of Figure 3 illustrates the structural conflicts between the 
“Bank qua bank” and knowledge production and ideology.  A key example of the 
conflict between lessons learned and the desire to “move” project loans is the 
necessity of well-designed and functioning governance and regulatory infrastructure 
for utilities.  But institution building is a complex, medium-to-long term process, and 
results are often not readily measurable.  This is at odds with the short-term project 
cycle in the Bank and the incentives which support it.  Yet as all the Bank literature 
reviewed in Chapter 3 shows, getting WSS services to the poor depends exactly on 
“getting institutions right.”265  By the same token—and somewhat paradoxically, the 
Bank’s role qua bank can also trump ideological proclivities.  As I demonstrate in the 
case study of Uruguay in Chapter Six, the Bank actually increased its lending to 
                                           
265 Professor Karen Bakker, Director of the Program on Water Governance at the University of British 
Columbia, has written that governance failure is at the heart of the challenge to deliver urban water 
supply to poor households, regardless of whether the monopolistic provider is public or private.  
Bakker, K. and Koy, M. 2008. “Governance Failure:Rethinking the Institutional Dimensions of Urban 
Water Supply to Poor Households.” World Development, 36(10), 1891-1915. 
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Uruguay after that country passed its 2004 constitutional reform which outright 
prohibited PSP in WSS.  Admittedly, Uruguay is not a poor country characterized by 
a “basket case” public utility riddled with severe inefficiencies, poor service, and 
corruption.  But it had been a country that the World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank had very much expected to increase its private sector involvement 
in water utilities following on numerous prior loan conditions seeking this outcome.  
A senior analyst in the Water Anchor confirmed that ideology would take a back seat 
to lending volumes if necessary: “In the 1990s the infrastructure sector was a sunset 
sector; the private sector was ascendant.  Lending volumes require us to get back into 
infrastructure.  We’ve never walked away from a country because of PSP.”266    
 
4.4.  A Partial Learner in an “Identity Crisis” 
 
 Catherine Weaver argues that Bank’s external political and ideational 
environment “is not a competing variable with its internal culture and bureaucratic 
politics…[there is a] dynamic interaction between the two over time…Borders 
between the internal and external environments are fluid, malleable, and 
intersubjective, hard to disaggregate.”267  This chapter has revealed this to be the case 
with respect to agenda change in PSP.  The Bank has produced research that reflected 
experiential learning and that has overturned at least one previous generation of 
thinking about PSP.  Experiential learning occurred because of a combination of 
external and internal influences impossible to segregate or to which specific weights 
can be assigned.  The flight of  WSS service TNCs forced the Bank back to the 
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drawing board to consider alternative sources of investment finance, which pulled it 
back into the domain of  public finance.  Transnational activist networks, as I discuss 
in the next chapter, put the Bank in an uncomfortable global spotlight, forced the 
Bank to recalibrate the weights assigned to water as a public versus economic good, 
empowered both civil society and client states which were disaffected with PSP, and 
compelled the Bank to reevaluate PSP’s effects on poverty reduction (as did water 
experts).  Client states which had suffered politically from the uptick in loans with 
PSP conditionality, reduced their demand for such loans.   
 But the Bank has shown itself ultimately to be only a partial learner caught in 
an identity crisis.  Conflicting functional roles and structural asymmetries (e.g., 
between experts and  TTLs/country directors) have militated against sustained 
learning.  Tensions between knowledge production and ideology have not been 
resolved, as reflected in the top half of Figure 3.  Despite the intellectual recognition 
that both private sector and public sector utilities’ performance is dependent on well-
functioning enabling institutions, the Bank continues to revert to ideological 
recalcitrance in favoring the private sector.  It refuses to genuinely embrace the 
agnosticism that it has rhetorically professed for the last six years.  However, under 
the right circumstances (e.g., a middle-income client country that won’t leave egg on 
the Bank’s face in poor evaluation  results), Bank staff will readily assume the role of 
the consummate, pragmatic loan officer--looking out for its institution’s bottom line.    
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Chapter 5:  Transnational Activism Against WSS 
Privatization, 2000-2010 
 
Street protesters have it exactly right when they argue 
that the economic policies imposed on developing 
nations by the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank have hammered the poor.... “structural 
adjustment programs”-- a chilly bureaucratic 
euphemism if ever there was one--attract foreign 
investment and stimulate the business climate (and the 
local elites).  But the programs also drive up the cost of 
living, rip holes in already tattered safety nets, and help 
kill small farms and businesses....The IMF and the 
World Bank admit the problem while insisting that their 
policies will boost living standards over the long term. 
But people in the Global South have lost patience with 
such talk.   
 
-- Time Magazine 268 
 
The message we bring is that resistance is possible, that victory is 
possible.  Our work has given democracy new substance in our 
country…We are about to win our first victory against the neoliberal 
model. 
 
-- Oscar Olivera, one of the principal leaders of La Coordinadora para 
la Defensa del Agua y Vida (The [Coalition] for the Defense of Water 
and Life), Cochabamba, Bolivia.269  
 
5.1.  Introduction 
 
 A number of factors converged at the turn of the twenty-first century to create 
a fertile environment for transnational collective action against water privatization.  
The most important enabling condition was the burgeoning “anti- or alter-
globalization movement.”270  As Frieden writes: 
                                           
268 Pooley, Eric. April 24, 2000. “The IMF: Dr. Death?.” Time Magazine 155 (16). 
269 Linda Farthing and Ben Kohl. March-April 2001 “Bolivia’s New Wave of Protest,” NACLA Report 
on the Americas, 34(5). 
270 Geoffrey Pleyers writes that the neologism  “alter-globalization” emerged in late 2001 to counter 




Very public challenges to global capitalism emerged in the last years of the 
century.  In protests from Seattle to Prague, Washington and Genoa, millions 
of activists targeted the [World Trade Organization] WTO, the World Bank, 
the IMF, the Group of Seven industrial countries, and other international 
economic organizations at the types of meetings that had previously attracted 
no attention.  As the WTO’s [1999] ministerial meeting and the Seattle 
protests wound down, antiglobalization author and activist Naomi Klein wrote 
that they reflected a “face-off…between two radically different visions of 
globalization.  One had had a monopoly for the last 10 years.  The other just 
had its coming-out party.”271 
 
The “Battle of Seattle” in 1999 was hardly the beginning of transnational 
activism against the IFIs or international organizations focused on trade and 
investment liberalization, but it signified a coalescence of critical oppositional mass.  
Several key NGOs which had been active fighting the IFIs’ structural adjustment 
policies (SAPs), the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and trade 
liberalization negotiations under the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and its successor, the WTO, migrated to--or added to their portfolio a new 
issue area: privatization of “essential services,” including WSS.  Transnational 
activism against the privatization of urban WSS utilities burgeoned over the first five 
years of the 21st century, surfacing across continents in countries at different levels of 
economic and political development.  There are five background conditions I would 
identify in the global environment and political economy which made the issue of 
water privatization ripe for strategic social construction by activists and activist 
leaders, or “norm entrepreneurs:”    
                                                                                                                        
‘another globalization’ and the importance of constructing alternatives.” Pleyers 2010. Alter-
Globalization: Becoming Actors in a Global Age . Cambridge and Oxford, U.K.:Polity Books.  Phillip 
Terhorst, an activist-intellectual who recently completed a Ph.D. on efforts to construct public 
alternatives to water privatization in Latin America traces the origin of the term to the 2002 World 
Social Forum’s Charter of Principles. Terhorst 2008, 103-114.”   
271 Frieden 2006, 459.   
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 The alarming depletion of the world’s freshwater reserves and the 
concomitant threats to public health, political stability, and the environment 
 The IFIs’ extension of  PSP in the 1990s to infrastructure services 
 Accelerated investment by water TNCs in developing countries 
 The inclusion of the services sector in trade and investment negotiations in 
the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in the Free 
Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and in bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements (FTAs); and allegations that bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) undercut state sovereignty by privileging the interests of private 
investors; and 
 The gradual accretion of political space for stakeholder participation in IFI 
projects and programs, including  the 1999 introduction of the requirement 
for stakeholder participation in the formulation of  Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs).272   
 This conflux of conditions both constituted and helped activists create a 
“political opportunity structure” to combat water utility privatizations.273  Conca 
notes that the political opportunity structure for mobilization was enhanced by the 
“availability of a series of events at which anti-privatization activists have been able 
to come together, exchange ideas, and forge tighter links,”274 including the World 
Social Forums and alternative events and venues at the World Water Forums.  In 
                                           
272 PRSPs detailed the steps to be taken by low-income countries receiving concessional loans and debt 
relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries’ Initiative. 
273 Khagram, Riker and  Sikkink, eds.2002.  The editors describe political opportunity structures as 
“consistent dimensions of the political environment which provide incentives for, or constraints on, 
people undertaking collective action…[they] provide resources for leverage and spaces for access.” 
274 Conca 2005. 
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addition to exploiting and creating opportunity structures, I argue that transnational 
activist networks and anti-privatization campaigns around WSS grew and gained 
traction for several additional reasons, which I discuss further in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.  
These are: 
 The characteristics of the issue area.  Water is both a tactile and symbolic 
issue with clear cross-cultural and cross-class resonance. 
 The ability to frame the debate in multiple ways that invoked both rights-
based norms and norms and ideas to counter the ideology of neoliberalism.  In 
Section 5.3  I discuss four rights-based frames that TANs have used in 
campaigns and two frames that challenge precepts of neoliberalism.   
 The characteristics of  the target actors, in particular, the declared 
commitment of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral aid 
donors to poverty reduction.   
 
A Note on Nomenclature 
 
 Of the various typologies of transnational collective action propounded by 
scholars of social movement organizations,275  Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink’s (KRS) 
definition of “transnational advocacy networks” (TANs) best approximates the fluid 
contours of cross-national coalitions and campaigns that have characterized activism 
against privatization of urban water and sanitation utilities.  KRS define TANs as:  
 
sets of actors linked across country boundaries, bound together by shared 
values, dense exchanges of information and services, and common discourses.  
The essence of network activity is the exchange and use of information. 
                                           
275 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 1998..  
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Networks do not involve either sustained coordination of tactics, as with 
coalitions, or mobilizing large numbers of people in the kind of activity we 
associate with social movements.276  
 
TANs constitute the “most informal configuration of non-state actors” among the 
three configurations of collective action-oriented organizations that KRS describe—
the others being “transnational coalitions” and “transnational social movements,” and 
represent the most common expression of collective action.277   The international 
NGOs and networks listed in Table 2 and discussed in Section 5.2 can generally be 
described as TANs.  However, the lines between TANs and transnational coalitions or 
campaigns are often blurry.278  For the sake of narrative simplicity I will often use the 
colloquial phrase “anti-privatization movement” or “water justice movement” in this 
chapter. 279  In doing so, I refer to the broadest patterns of activity and mobilization 
by TANs and national or local coalitions and campaigns, without implying the tig
coherence ascribed to the term “movement” by TANs scholars.  
ht 
                                           
276 Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002,.7. 
277 KRS and other TANs scholars argue that transnational coalitions involve a greater level of tactical 
and strategic coordination to publicly influence social change than is typically present in TANs.  These 
shared tactics and strategies are transnational campaigns, which may blend institutional and non-
institutional tactics.  Transnational social movements are the most difficult form of transnational 
organization to create and sustain across space and time, requiring joint mobilization and the capacity 
to generate sustained social mobilization in at least three countries.  Given the high threshold of 
coordination and temporal sustainability involved, true transnational social movements are rare. 
278 For example, the National Coalition Against Privatization of Water in Ghana worked very closely 
on tactics and strategies, albeit not in all decisions taken, with transnational networks supporting and 
engaged in their campaign.  The idea behind the formation of the Interamerican Network in Defense of 
Water, La Red VIDA, was to form a transnational regional coalition where member countries can be 
mobilized and coordinated in support of country-level campaigns.  
279 The “water justice movement” has been described as “global citizen movements and critical non-
governmental organizations”mobilized around  “conflicts within and between countries and non-state 
actors (corporations, citizen movements) over water control, and “the underlying and critical struggle 
for hegemony between the competing definitions of water as either a fundamental human right or a 
commodity to be bought and sold.”  Davidson-Harden, Naidoo, and Harden. November 2007. “The 
Geopolitics of the Water Justice Movement.” Peace Conflict & Development. Issue 11.  
http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/PCD%20Issue%2011_Article_Water%20Justice%20Movem
ent_Davidson%20Naidoo%20Harden.pdf  (January 2, 2011) 
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 Section 5.2 of this chapter provides an overview of the growth of country-
based campaigns and TANs during the first half of the 2010s, followed by a 
discussion of the characteristics of campaigns, the major campaign actors among 
TANs and NGOs, and the IFIs and TNCs as key campaign targets.  Section 5.3 
discusses the frames that activists have exploited, created, and deployed to engender 
collective action.  Section 5.4 discusses the reorientation of the anti-privatization 
movement in the second half of this decade to a focus on alternatives, specifically 
“reclaiming public water” through public-public partnerships (PUPs) and other forms 
of service provision which strengthen community involvement and democratic 
participation.  Section 5.5 discusses TANs’ and CSOs’ engagement with the World 
Bank, including splits in the “movement” over this strategy.  It concludes by 
analyzing the impacts TANs and CSOs have had on the Bank’s agenda for PSP in 
WSS, mediated by their effects on client states and TNCs.  
 




 Transnational activism and country-based campaigns against water 
privatization surged during  the first five years of the 21st century.   An array of 
coalitions, campaigns, and networks began forming to challenge the perceived 
“commodification” by TNCs and the IFIs of water resources and WSS service 
delivery.  The widely publicized  “shot across the bow” which thrust the issue into the 
international spotlight occurred in 2000 in Cochabamba, Bolivia when widespread 
popular protests spilled out onto the streets.   The Bolivian Government’s decision in 
1999 to lease the Cochabamba water system to Aguas del Tunari, a multinational 
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consortium of private investors which included a subsidiary of Bechtel Corporation, 
turned into what came to be known as the Water War, la guerra del agua.280   Aguas 
del Tunari was the sole bidder at auction and after closed-door negotiations was 
granted a 40 year concession to operate the water and sewer system.  Within weeks of 
taking control of the municipal water system, the consortium raised rates by an 
average of 50 percent or more.  Unable to pay their water bills, citizens’ groups, 
including labor unions, neighborhood associations, peasant farmers, retirees, and 
water cooperatives, joined forces in a broad coalition known as the Coordinating 
[Coalition] for the Defense of Water and Life (La Coordinadora para la Defensa del 
Agua y Vida).  After a general strike and widespread protests in early 2000 which 
spread beyond Cochabamba’s border, in April 2000 a student protester was shot dead 
by a Bolivian Army captain, and a “state of siege” declared by the Government.  By 
April 10, 2000, after six deaths, scores of injuries, and forced detentions of protesters 
by the military and police, the Government agreed to La Coordinadora’s demand for 
the withdrawal of Aguas del Tunari.  It promised the repeal of water privatization 
legislation and the return of the water system to the coalition and former municipal 
authority’s control.281    
 The victory was at the time both real and pyrrhic: Aguas del Tunari, Bechtel, 
and the other co-investors filed a complaint in 2002 with the World Bank’s 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) seeking 
restitution of $50 million from the Government of Bolivia.  Jim Shultz, Executive 
                                           
280 Public Broadcasting System, Frontline- World. “Timeline: Cochabamba Water Revolt.” 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html (August 13, 2003). 
281Public Broadcasting System, Frontline- World, 4 
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Director of  the Democracy Center in Cochabamba and the only ongoing source of 
reporting to foreign audiences as the water revolt was underway, writes: 
 
Very few people anywhere had ever heard of ICSID before Bechtel launched 
its Cochabamba case, and almost all of those who had were corporate lawyers.  
No ICSID case had ever faced a major challenge by citizens’ groups…The 
Coordinadora and its international allies, including the Democracy Center, 
launched a campaign based on a clear strategy—in a legal forum handpicked 
by Bechtel, the key to winning was not to beat the company legally but to 
undermine its willingness to wage the fight…Google reports more than 
127,000 Web pages linking Bechtel to the Cochabamba revolt, including 
stories by scores of major news organizations and by activist groups across 
every continent.  Journalists and citizens who had never heard of Bechtel 
before knew the name first for its association with the water revolt and the 
company’s attempt to squeeze $50 million from some of South America’s 
most impoverished families.282   
 
 
Water revolt leaders formally requested legal status to join the ICSID case, with the 
legal backing of the environmental group Earth Justice and bolstered by an 
“international citizens’ petition” endorsed by more than 300 CSOs from 43 countries.  
In January 2006, Bechtel and its co-investors capitulated, signing a formal agreement 
in which they abandoned their $50 million claim for a token payment of two 
bolivianos (thirty cents).  Shultz quotes Bolivia’s lead negotiator in the case as stating 
that Bechtel’s CEO “told his lawyers that the case wasn’t worth the damage to the 
company’s reputation.”283  The Cochabamba case had a global demonstration 
effect, empowering collective action across continents and inspiring a succession of 
anti-privatization mobilizations.  It showed that even in the poorest country in South 
America, multi-class, cross-sectoral coalitions could prevail against a militarized state 
                                           
282 Shultz, Jim. 2008. “The Cochabamba Water Revolt and Its Aftermath,” pp. 9-42. In Shultz, J. and 
Draper, Melissa C., eds. 2008. Dignity and Defiance: Stories from Bolivia’s Challenge to 
Globalization. Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press. 
283 Shultz 2008, 32.  
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and the considerable financial prowess of the private consortium.  In Bolivia, the 
protests over water united urban “Cochabambinos” with highlands campesinos, and 
sparked parallel protests across the country for land reform, better teachers’ salaries, 
and economic fairness for small-scale coca growers.284  Ultimately, as Shultz states, it 
“ignited a chain of events that provoked historic political and social change,” leading 
to the current left-wing administration of Evo Morales.  But as I  discuss in section 
5.4,  the Cochabamba case also came to represent—in the eyes of many of the 
Coordinadora’s activists and supporters, winning the battle against corporate 
profiteers and their government cronies, but losing the war to transform the 
remunicipalized utility, SEMAPA.  
 The many campaigns against water privatization which followed in the wake 
of Cochabamba crossed every continent and were chronicled regularly by leading 
anti-privatization NGOs such as Nader-backed Public Citizen’s “Water for All” 
program.285  As of early 2004 Water for All was reporting on efforts to privatize 
utilities and resistance to these efforts in 31 countries around the world: twelve 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, ten countries in Africa, four countries 
in Asia and the Pacific, and four countries in Europe and North America, including 
the United States.286  These campaigns were chronicled by Water for All several 
times per year between 2002-2005 in the publication “Defend the Global 
                                           
284 Farthing and Kohl, 8. 
285 Public Citizen’s Water for All program described itself as “campaigning to protect universal access 
to clean and affordable drinking water by keeping it in public hands.” The program lasted until early 
2005, at which time its staff left to form a new NGO, Food and Water Watch (FWW).  More detail is 
provided in the section describing TANs. 
286 Public Citizen, Critical Mass Energy and Enviroment Program (CMEP), Water for All. “Reports 
from Around the World.” : http://www.citizen.org/cmep/Water/cmep_Water/reports/  (April 7, 2004). 
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Commons.”287  Following are brief descriptions of some of the highest profile 
campaigns which took place during the first part of this decade: 
 
 In South Africa, the installation of pre-paid meters between 2000 and 2002 in 
several municipalities was blamed for a rash of cholera outbreaks as the poor 
resorted to using untreated water sources.288  The Anti-Privatization Forum 
(APF), which grouped dozens of neighborhood associations, organized against 
the South African government’s policy of full cost recovery for water utilities 
that had been recommended by the World Bank.  According to a  Le Monde 
article in February 2004, the French TNC Suez Lyonaisse des Eaux (now Suez 
Ondeo), which had won the Greater Johannesburg contract, is “paying for the 
anger of the poor” who cannot pay their water bills and are in revolt.  Faced 
with rebellion, the Government started a free minimum service.289   In July 
2006, a group of  activists from Phiri, Soweto (the “Phiri Five”) filed suit 
against the government in the Johannesburg High Court arguing that the use of 
prepaid water meters was unconstitutional.  The Court ruled in their favor in 
April 2008, but that decision was overturned on appeal in October 2009.290 
 
 Starting in the mid-1990s, Argentina saw a wave of protests against 
privatization after the government privatized the water utilities in Buenos Aires, 
Tucuman, Sante Fe and Cordoba.  In the small province of  Tucuman, 
consumers organized a payment boycott which by 1998 had pressured the 
French concessionaire Compagnie Generales des Eaux to seek withdrawal from 
its contract.291  In a 2002-2003 case involving the French TNC Suez, a coalition 
of consumers’ associations, environmentalists, and citizens’ groups in Santa Fe, 
Argentina, formed “The Provincial Assembly for the Right to Water” to agitate 
for the rescission of a 30 year concession signed with the Suez subsidiary, 
Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe.  The coalition held a non-binding referendum 
on their proposal to rescind the contract in September/October 2002, using 
7000 volunteers at 1000 polling stations in 15 cities of the province.  Over 
255,000 votes were cast in favor of the proposal.292   In Buenos Aires, where a 
thirty-year water concession had been granted to a Vivendi-Suez consortium, 
                                           
287 The publications continued for another four years under the new Food and Water Watch NGO, but 
with less frequency.  FWW has de-emphasized its international focus since 2008, with fewer staff 
devoted to this area of the water program. 
288 Public Citizen, “Pre-Paid Meters Punish the Poor,” Defend the Global Commons, Volume 1(2): 7. 
289 Quoted in World Bank Press Review. February 25, 2004. 
290 Barlow, Naidoo and Karunananthan. May 27, 2010. “Three World Water Wins, Soweto Activists 
Take Prepaid Water Meters to Court.”  Yes! Magazine online. : 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/water-solutions/3-world-water-wins  (November 6, 2010) 
291 Public Citizen. February 2002  “The Social Protest for Water in Tucuman.” Defend the Global 
Commons, 1(1): 9.  
292 Public Citizen. January 2003.  “Plebiscite in Santa Fe, Argentina Demands Exit of Suez,” Defend 
the Global Commons,  2(1): 1-2.  
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Aguas Argentinas, in 1993, a coalition of unions and citizens’ groups waged a 
campaign to protest high connection fees and water rates which had risen over 
177 percent since the concession began.293  In the wake of the Argentine 
financial crisis of 2001-2002, the concession defaulted on over $700 million 
worth of loans to IFIs.  
  
 In the Philippines, the Water for the People Network formed to challenge the 
1997 privatization of Manila’s Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, 
at the time, the largest water privatization in the world.  The concessionaire for 
the Western zone of the city, Maynilad, raised rates by 253 percent over the 
course of five years.294  Civil society groups criticized the non-democratic and 
non-transparent bidding process; the rate hikes, which were tied to an automatic 
exchange rate adjustment mechanism; the unmet promises of network 
expansion to the urban poor; and weak regulatory and oversight practices.295 
 
 In Ghana, the World Bank and IMF had been promoting PSP in the urban water 
sector since the 1990s through such means as “triggers” in the 2000 Country 
Assistance Strategy which would double the amount of loans Ghana would be 
eligible for if it undertook PSP; Bank and IMF poverty reduction loans which 
included conditions to concession or lease urban water systems to private sector 
operators; and conditions requiring plans to implement full cost recovery with 
automatic tariff adjustments.296  Ghana’s National Coalition Against the 
Privatization of Water (NCAP of Water) was formed during the National 
Forum on Water Privatization in Accra in May 2001.  A number of key 
international NGOs and CSOs assisted NCAP in its campaign, including 
through constituting an international “fact-finding mission” (IFFM)  to 
investigate the likely impacts of the proposed Bank and IMF water sector 
reforms.  The IFFM was composed of a 14 member international CSO 
delegation led by British M.P. Jenny Tonge, and  issued a 100- page report  in 
August 2002.  In 2003-2004 the World Bank backed off of its push for a ten-
year lease contract and convinced the Government of Ghana to agree to a five-
year management contract, to be financed by a $103 million IDA grant instead 
                                           
293 Canadian Broadcating Company News., March 31, 2004. “Argentina: A Grand Experiment in 
Water Privatization that Failed.”   http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/deadinthewater/argentina2.html (November 
2004).  See also Hall, Lobina, and de la Motte.  June 2005. “Public Resistance to Privatisation in Water 
and Energy.” Development in Practice,15(3 and 4): 286-301.  
294 Ibon Foundation, Inc.. “Consumers Form Group Against Water Privatization,” IBON Features, 
online news report, Vol. X: No. 1, Manila, Philippines.  : http://www.ibon.org/news/if/04/04.htm 
(March 22, 2004).  
295 Grusky, Sara.  March 2003, 4.  
296 World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  April 1, 2002. “Review of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) Approach: Early Experience with Interim PRSPs and Full PRSPs,” 43-44.  
These conditions were cited in a submission by the Ghanaian NGO the  Integrated Social Development 
Center and Southern Links in testimony before the International Select Committee on the World Bank, 
October 24, 2002.  The full cost recovery conditions were included in an IMF three-year loan 
arrangement for Ghana under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. See: Government of Ghana 
Letter of Intent, Ghana—Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV Consultations.” Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 56-57.   
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of the originally-contemplated loan.297  The management contract included 
several clauses requested by NCAP, such as 50,000 new water connections for 
the poor and a review of tariffs by the Public Utilities Regulatory 
Commission.298 
 
 In Uruguay, the case study I present in Chapter 6, a broad-based “red-green” 
coalition of trade unionists, environmentalists, consumer groups, and 
neighborhood associations launched a successful three-year campaign for a 
constitutional amendment making PSP in WSS utilities illegal.  The campaign 
garnered international support and had a strong demonstration effect on 
subsequent anti-privatization campaigns, including a constitutional reform 
campaign in Colombia.     
 
Other activist campaigns in developing countries which originated during the first 
half of the decade included those in India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Peru, Sri Lanka, and 
Tanzania.299  Opposition to water privatization was by no means confined to 
developing countries: rejection of proposals to introduce PSP or terminations of 
existing privatizations have occurred in both transition and developed countries 
including Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, the United States and New 
Zealand.300  In the United States, opposition led to termination of a privatization 
initiative in Atlanta, voided a privatization contract in Stockton, California, and 
stalled another initiative in New Orleans.301 
Characteristics of  Campaigns and Campaign Actors 
 
                                           
297 World Bank.  Urban Water Project: Ghana. Project Approval Date: July 27, 2004.  
:http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P056256&theSitePK=40941&piPK=6429
0415&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=64282134&Type=Overview . (December 22, 2010).  
298 Timeyin Uwejamomere,WaterAid. 2007, updated in 2009. “Ghana:Civil Society Organisation 
Involvement in Urban Water Sector Reform.”  
http://www.wateraid.org/documents/ghana_case_study.pdf  (January 19, 2010) 
299 Public Citizen, Critical Mass Energy and Enviroment Program (CMEP), Water for All. “Reports 
from Around the World.”  
300 Hall, Lobina, and de la Motte 2005, 289-292.   
301 Conca 2005, 239.  Pacific Institute for Environment and Development. October 27, 2003. “Stockton 
Water Privatization Ruling a 'Victory' for Democracy.”   
http://www.pacinst.org/topics/water_and_sustainability/water_privatization/stockton/  (December 23, 
2010).                  
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 The majority of campaigns against water privatization appear to have been 
initiated by local or national organizations.  PSIRU claims that [no local or national 
campaign]  
 
was prompted by international agencies or originated as part of international 
campaigns.  Many opposition campaigns have received little or no 
international assistance, including some of the most successful ones, such as 
the water campaigns in Lodz (Poland), Tucuman (Argentina), and Nkonkobe 
(South Africa)….None of the [international organisations active on these 
issues] has a centralised structure capable of ‘commanding’ local participation 
in a global campaign.  The campaigns have not even been ‘coordinated’ by 
international confederations, as has happened with the union campaigns 
against mining companies; lobbying of multinational company shareholder 
meetings, for example, has been almost completely absent in the water and 
energy sectors. 302                                          
 
 However, from my experience studying campaigns and TANs over the last 
eight years and from interviews with TAN activists, it is equally the case that many 
national campaigns would have never reached the scope, scale, or impact they had 
without support from transnational NGOs, CSOs, or networks.  In Ghana, for 
example, the support and advocacy of the international NGOs in the transnational 
network was vital for publicizing the anti-privatization campaign and leveraging 
power against the IFIs and the Government of Ghana.  The TAN in support of the 
NCAP of Water brought important resources to the campaign and pressured the IFIs 
and bilateral donors through actions in CSOs’ respective home countries.303  In the 
United Kingdom, Christian Aid, Oxfam-U.K., the World Development Movement, 
and Southern Links played a strong advocacy role for the NCAP campaign through 
                                           
302 Hall, Lobina, and de la Motte 2005, 293-298. 
303 Travis, Karen. April 2004. “Transnational Activist Networking Against Privatization of Water and 
Sanitation Utilities in Developing Countries, with Case Studies of Ghana and Uruguay.” Unpublished 
paper. University of Maryland, College, Park. 
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pressure on the Department for International Development (DFID), the U.K.’s 
bilateral development aid agency, which has been a source of significant donor aid to 
its former African colony.  In the U.S., Public Citizen’s Water for All program acted 
as an advocate/liaison with World Bank project managers and Country Directors, and 
provided financial support to the leadership of NCAP to attend international 
conferences.304  To some degree, the TAN helped to create the “boomerang” effect 
conceptualized by Keck and Sikkink.305   At the same time, there has been no single 
TAN or northern NGO that has functioned as the hub of international campaigns.  
Conca writes that a “noteworthy difference between the anti-dam and anti-
privatization campaigns is the absence in the latter case of a focal point akin to the 
role played by the International Rivers Network…Instead, several movement groups 
and nongovernmental organizations have become important nodes in a broader and 
more diffuse network.”306  
 Table 2 presents an overview of many of the key CSOs and global and 
regional networks which have been active in transnational campaigns against water 
privatization, and/or which have advocated for “water justice” in developing 
countries during the last decade.  The inventory of organizations is not intended to be 
exhaustive, nor will I undertake an analysis of these organizations and networks here, 
though I reference many of  them throughout this chapter.  The table captures the 
major activist players between 2000-2010, grouping CSOs and networks according to 
                                           
304 Interview with Sara Grusky, Public Citizen-Water for All campaign, Washington, D.C., February 
18, 2004. 
305 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12-13.  The “boomerang pattern” refers to a situation where local NGOs’ 
access to their government and avenues of potential redress is blocked (due to no or low level of 
democratic institutions). TANs and/or foreign NGOs exert leverage over donor/Northern states and/or 
intergovernmental organizations to gain access to and/or  influence over, the closed state.  
306 Conca 2005, 244.  
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their geographic bases and scope, and provides a short description of the organization 
and activities related to WSS.   I also include “networks of networks” such as the 
World Social Forum gatherings, which have functioned as critical social and political 
spaces for the development of anti-privatization water networks, and a description of 
a multistakeholder initiative organized to explore issues around PSP, The Water 
Dialogues.   
The first category in the table, “International Membership-Based CSOs,” 
includes three of the most prominent advocacy federations which have worked on 
WSS issues: Consumers International, Friends of the Earth-International, and Public 
Services International.  Each represents different constituencies which at times have 
worked together in country-specific campaigns.  Though Consumers International 
tends to represent more middle-class constituencies, consumers groups in Latin 
America, for example, have formed multisectoral coalitions both to oppose PSP and 
to promote increased access and equity in WSS services.  These federations are 
member-based and significantly member-financed, and local and national affiliates 
have typically pursued campaign involvement autonomously.  Of these three 
federations, PSI and its research affiliate, PSIRU, have been continuously involved in 
anti-privatization activities throughout the decade and have had Board representation 
on networks such as “Reclaiming Public Water” (discussed in Section 5.4) and The 
Water Dialogues.   
 The next organization listed in the table is La Red VIDA, a regional network 
of CSOs in the Americas which has been particularly visible and active in 
international networks and conferences, and in supporting country-level campaigns.  
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There is an analogous network in Africa, the Africa Water Network, which was 
launched at the 2007 WSF in Nairobi, Kenya by activists representing organizations 
from across Africa.  However, it has so far not turned into a cohesive entity able to 
either support country-level campaigns or wield influence regionally or 
internationally. 
   The next category of groups presented in Table 2 is northern NGOs and 
CSOs headquartered in the U.S, Canada, the U.K., and Europe.  In whole or in part, 
though in different ways, these NGOs have prioritized forging links to national and 
local CSOs in developing countries.  During the first half of the decade, Public 
Citizen was the U.S. NGO most engaged in transnational networking against PSP 
through its International Water Working Group and Water for All campaign.  Its 
successor, Food and Water Watch (FWW), has become more focused on U.S. 
campaigns during the last several years, but has continued to espouse a strong anti-
privatization platform in international forums, and has been active in networks 
fighting for formal recognition of the rights to water and sanitation in the U.N.   The 
Council of Canadians, whose national chairperson, Maude Barlow, is an 
internationally recognized author and indefatigable spokesperson for the anti-
privatization and right to water movements, has been one of the most active 
organizations in international networks over the last decade.   Among European 
NGOs, the U.K.’s World Development Movement (WDM) waged a successful 
campaign against the Department for International Development, which agreed to 
eliminate PSP conditionality in its bilateral aid and technical assistance.  The 
European think-tank NGOs Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transnational 
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Institute (CEO/TNI) have coordinated the “water justice” campaign and the 
“Reclaiming Public Water” network, promoting public-public partnerships and 
advocating for alternative models of participatory control of WSS services.   FWW, 
the Council of Canadians, CEO/TNI, La Red VIDA, and WDM (to 2008) represent 
and group NGOs and CSOs that have taken a consistently “hard line” against PSP 
throughout the decade.   
WaterAid, in contrast, is both a service delivery and advocacy NGO, and one 
of the largest international NGOs working on improving access to water, hygiene, and 
sanitation in 26 of the world’s poorest countries. WaterAid works with, and helps to 
fund, local partners’ projects, as well as works to influence policy at all levels.  The 
Freshwater Action Network (FAN), a separate entity under WaterAid, aims to create 
capacity and voice among local CSOs across the WSS sector to advocate and lobby 
policymakers.  WaterAid receives funding from the U.K.’s water industry, including 
through employee fundraising campaigns, and from the U.K.’s Department of 
International Development.  Nevertheless, its positions on PSP have been skeptical 
and critical, and it would be unfair to allege, as have some NGOs from the “hard line” 
anti-privatization networks, that WaterAid’s positions align with its corporate 
funders.  As I note later in this chapter, WaterAid’s more pragmatic position about the 
role of the local private sector in developing countries no doubt emanates from its 
work on the ground and with small-scale providers.  
 The second-to-last entry in Table 2 consists of the World Social Forums 
(WSFs), which have taken place almost annually over the last decade.307  The WSFs 
                                           
307 In several  recent years, the WSFs have been structured as polycentric gatherings across continents, 
rather than conferences in a single city.  
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have been important venues for network-building, information exchange, and for 
generating momentum and esprit de corps. hey have functioned as a “political 
opportunity structure” for the anti-privatization movement. 
 The last entry in Table 2 describes a multistakeholder initiative known as The 
Water Dialogues (TWD), which lasted from 2002-2009 and grew out of the highly-
polarized debate over PSP during the first half of the decade.  TWD consisted of a 
series of national-level multistakeholder dialogues and research processes in five 
countries: Brazil, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa and Uganda, with an 
International Working Group providing an oversight and coordinating function.  The 
national dialogues examined whether and how the private sector could contribute to 
the delivery of affordable and sustainable WSS services, and varied by country along 
several dimensions: consensus versus confrontational styles, themes chosen for 
emphasis, and capacity for undertaking evidence-based primary research.308  
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss TWD in any detail, I offer a 
few observations here.  I interviewed the International Coordinator of TWD in 
London, and she emphasized that the dialogues were really focused on the national 
level and that the lessons learned from the stakeholder processes could be synthesized 
only up to a point, given the different country experiences.309  In the Philippines, for 
example, she stated that “the process was contentious and it was difficult to get to a 
point of dialogue—the private water concessionaires (Manila Water and Maynilad) 
                                           
308 For example, the dynamics of the Philippines and South African groups were characterized as 
confrontational, though this did not necessarily preclude moving towards some shared understandings.  
Almost all of the national groups focused to some extent on the themes of finance and regulation, but 
some chose additional emphases such as the role of small scale providers (Uganda).  See: Bakker, 
Karen and Martin, Kate Elaine. November 2009.  The Water Dialogues:An International Summary 
Report. London, U.K. http://www.waterdialogues.org/summary.htm  ( December 21, 2010)  
309 Interview with Kate Elaine Martin, International Coordinator of The Water Dialogues, London, 
U.K. March 10. 2009. 
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dropped out of the process.”  The South Africa dialogue was also a “confrontational” 
process, with issues of commercialization at the fore of contentious discussions 
between activists and water TNCs.  With financial help from the government and the 
World Bank, the Brazil national dialogue was able to conduct longitudinal analysis of 
54 PSP contracts across the country, using household surveys and secondary data 
obtained from private companies and government agencies.310  Brazil was therefore 
able to devote substantially greater resources to looking at the question of PSP’s 
impact on tariffs and the ability of the WSS sector to attract finance. 
 Professor Karen Bakker, who authored several analytical papers for TWD, 
characterized the situation at the end of the process as having changed significantly 
from the outset: 
 The role of the private sector in providing water supply services in 
developing countries has “evolved” significantly...Some participants in the 
international debate now offer a more nuanced understanding of the broad 
range of private actors – both formal and informal, profit and not-for-profit – 
participating in the water supply sector.  The issue of the relative merits of the 
public and private sector as water service providers has been joined (and to 
some extent supplanted) by other issues, including financing and 
311regulation.  
 




                                          
Although The Water Dialogues largely gravitated towards issues and 
approaches around which consensus or relative agreement could be reached
they have not yet resolved key issues facing the sector. These participa
might argue that the question of whether or not to engage in PSP (and 
commercialisation) is still central, and requires active debate on the most 
 
310 Bakker and Martin. November 2009.    
311 Bakker, Karen. April 2009.  “Overview Paper: Recent Trends in PSP, Financing, and Regulation in 
the Water Sector.”   
 http://www.waterdialogues.org/downloads/new/TP-Overview-28-April.doc  (August 29, 2009) 
312 Bakker and Martin Kate. November 2009, 37. 
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merica), the IBON Foundation in the Philippines, and Fundación Solon in Bolivia.     
 
ampaign Targets: The IFIs, Neoliberal States, and TNCs
 
Nevertheless, all of the national dialogues were able to reach some areas of consen
and clarify the nature of existing conflicts.  This was considered the main “les
” at the international level and for future multistakeholder initiatives.  
In concluding this discussion I would note that there have been a pletho
other NGOs and CSOs that have provided support to campaigns against water 
privatization. These include faith-based organizations and NGOs working on 
range of development issues and/or focused on the IFIs.313  Foundations and 
intergovernmental organizations, such as numerous U.N. agencies, have supporte
the work of both anti-privatization CSOs and NGOs working on “water justice” 
issues.  Notable examples include the Heinrich Böll Foundation (Germany and North 
A





                                          
 Many activists were drawn to the WSS anti-privatization movement as an 
extension of their opposition to a “neoliberal project of globalization from above
In my 2003 interview with Carol Welch, Director of International Programs for 
Friends of the Earth- U.S., she stated that the “trade and IFIs campaigns were dr
the water campaign…the corporates campaign targeting specific multinational 
corporations was also taking off.”315  Vicki Cann of the U.K.-based NGO WDM, tol
 
313 Examples include Action Aid, Christian Aid, the Bretton Woods Project,  the Uruguay-based anti-
poverty network Social Watch, and Third World Network. 
314 Quoted in Terhorst 2008, 104. 
315 Interview with Carol Welch, Friends of the Earth-U.S., Washington, D.C., December 8, 2003. 
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me that WDM “came into water [in 2004-2005] because of its campaign around the 











orld countries to abandon their public water delivery systems and contract 
with the water giants in order to be eligible for debt relief.  
                                          
316  Correspondingly, the primary targets of campaigns have be
the IFIs, transnational water service companies, and neoliberal states viewed as 
complicit in agreeing to donor conditionalities, and/or viewed as rent-seeking or 
ineffectual in PSP contract negotiations with TNCs.  Activist literature from the early 
2000s is replete with accusations of a collusive relationship between the World
and the TNC “water lords,” as well as condemnation of the illegitimacy of aid 
conditions requiring PSP.  I quote below from several sources to give a flavor of
rhetoric and substance.  Maude Barlow, National Chairperson of the Council of 
Canadians and the high priestess of the anti-privatization movement, summarized in 
The Nation in September 2002 the argument she and co-author Tony Clark
st-selling “bible” against the privatization of water, Blue Gold:317 
A handful of transnational corporations, backed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, are aggressively taking over the managem
public water services in countries around the world, dramatically raising the 
price of water to local residents and profiting especially from the Third 
World’s desperate search for solutions to its water crisis…There are ten m
corporate players now delivering freshwater services for profit…They are 
aided by the World Bank and IMF, which are increasingly f
W
 
316 Interview with Vicki Cann, World Development Movement, London, United Kingdom, March 10, 
2009. 
317 Barlow, Maude and Tony Clark. September 2, 2002. “Who Owns Water?” The Nation. 
http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20020902&s=barlow  (February 25, 2003).  Barlow has 
been called the “Ralph Nader of Canada.” She is the co-author, with Tony Clarke of Canada’s Polaris 
Institute, of Blue Gold: The Battle Against Corporate Theft of the World’s Water, published in 17 
countries and 47 languages around the world.  She chairs the board of Washington-based Food and 
Water Watch, is an executive member of the San Francisco–based International Forum on 
Globalization, and is the recipient of the  2005 Right Livelihood Award (known as the “Alternative 
Nobel”). In 2008-2009, she served as Senior Advisor on Water to the 63rd President of the United 





Public Citizen’s Water for All campaign literature emphasized the relationship 
between the B
 




ompanies by requiring cash-
rapped and indebted governments around the world to privatize their water 
 
port 







and other economic policies…a fully independent review of the use of 
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especially those who identified with the “water justice” movement, commonly 
                                          
e:318 
The World Bank shuns the growing criticism from thousands of civil society
organizations around the world. These organizations claim that the 
institution’s policies of privatization, de-regulation, trade liberalization
fiscal austerity are having drastic impacts on employment, small farmer’s 
livelihoods, the environment, funding for schools, health care, water, 
sanitation, labor rights and much more.  While the grievances of civil society 
organizations are studiously ignored, World Bank “partnerships” with major 
corporations remain more than cozy…The World Bank and the IMF provide 
new business opportunities for the global water c
st
systems as a condition for loans and debt relief. 
The multi-country based advocacy NGO Action Aid International published a re
in 2004 entitled “Money Talks: How Aid Condi
ations in Poor Countries,” arguing that: 
The conditions that donors attach to their aid programmes go far beyond any 
legitimate measures to ensure that aid money is used efficiently for its stated 
purposes. Indeed, they go to the heart of the public policy-making process i
the countries concerned. Utility privatisation is a prime example of this trend, 
and is particularly worrying given its relevance to poverty reduction.  In a 
large number of low-income countries, donors are pressuring governments
sell off and sub-contract services in water and electricity to private companie
They do so despite the lack of evidence that this increases access for poor 
people, accountability to consumers or cost-effectiveness…There shoul
an end to the tying of IFI loans and bilateral aid to the privatisation of utilit
economic policy conditionality by IFIs and bilateral donors is overdue.31
As I discuss in Section 5.3 below, and as the quote above illustrates, activists—
 
318 Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. September 2002, 1-5. 
319 Action Aid International. April 2004. “Money Talks: How Aid Conditions Continue to Drive Utility 




deployed frames castigating the neoliberal economic model in arguing against WSS 
privatization.   
 In 2002, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), a 
project of the Center for Public Integrity, conducted a year-long investigation on the 
effects of “The Water Barons,” the largest WSS TNCs, on various communities 
around the world.320  The ICIJ introduced its series of reports by noting that: 
The explosive growth of three private water utility companies in the last 10 
years raises fears that mankind may be losing control of its most vital resource 
to a handful of monopolistic corporations. In Europe and North America, 
analysts predict that within the next 15 years these companies will control 65 
percent to 75 percent of what are now public waterworks. The companies 
have worked closely with the World Bank and other international financial 
institutions to gain a foothold on every continent. They aggressively lobby for 
legislation and trade laws to force cities to privatize their water and set the 
agenda for debate on solutions to the world's increasing water scarcity. 
 
In hindsight, the ICIJ was highly mistaken in quoting analysts’ predictions that 
private companies would come to control a majority of publicly-owned utilities in the 
ensuing decade and a half.  Even as the ICIJ was investigating, TNCs’ investments in 
the WSS sector were trending downward in developing countries and the companies’ 
interest was clearly on the wane.  Alarms about TNCs raised by other activist NGOs 
such as the Council of Canadians and Public Citizen, proved equally inflated, and 
account to a large extent for the reorientation of the movement in the middle of the 
decade.  That reorientation moved campaigns away from heavily targeting TNCs 
towards seeking formal recognition of water as a human right in the United Nations, 
and towards the articulation of public-sector and community-based alternatives, as I 
discuss in Section 5.4.  
                                           
320 The Center for Public Integrity. February 3, 2003. “The Water Barons.” Online. :    




5.3.  Framing Collective Action against Water Privatization 
 
 Campaigns against water privatization have attracted a broad spectrum of civil 
society organizations, including anti-poverty and development CSOs, environmental 
groups, trade unions, anti- and alter-globalization activists, faith-based organizations, 
and public health groups.  Social activist entrepreneurs in TANs have used multiple 
frames for engendering collective action—frames which draw on existing and 
emergent international norms.  KRS define framing as “the strategic efforts by groups 
of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action… Frames define the issues at stake and the 
strategies for action.”321   Tarrow notes that frames are not ideas, but ways of 
packaging and presenting them.  Framing is critical to social movement formation.  
The ability to fashion common frames among heterogeneous groups is facilitated by 
invoking existing international norms, seeking to enforce them, and engaging in 
construction of new norms.322    By framing their arguments in multiple ways which 
invoke both rights-based norms and ideas which challenge the dominant neoliberal 
model, water privatization activists extended the issue’s reach and facilitated broad-
based coalition building.     
 
Water as a Cross-Cutting Issue  
 
                                           
321 Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002,12. 
322 KRS distinguish between international norms, which they define as shared expectations held by a 
critical mass of states and intergovernmental organizations in the international arena, and transnational 
norms or collective beliefs, which are shared beliefs held by TANs, transnational coalitions, and social  
movements. Groups must work to develop these shared, collective beliefs. 
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 Part of the success of TANs in mobilizing against water privatization can be 
attributed to the nature of the issue area itself. Water has inherent characteristics that 
have made it an ideal organizing issue.  It is a necessity for life and health, and is 
considered a public or merit good; these characteristics resonate across classes, 
sectors, and cultures.  Keck and Sikkink note that among the issue characteristics 
most conducive to TANs are “issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, 
especially where there is a clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility, and 
issues involving legal equality of opportunity.”323   As they have been framed by 
activists, the issues raised by water utility privatizations satisfy both of these 
conditions.  
 
Frames Invoking International Norms 
 
1. Access to Potable Water and Basic Sanitation is a Fundamental Human Right.  
All of the TANs working against water privatization have invoked the 
international norm of access to water and sanitation as a basic human right.  After 
a decade of invoking this norm in campaigns, TANs and NGOs scored a major 
victory in July 2010 when the U.N. General Assembly declared access to clean 
water and sanitation a human right.324   Prior to this victory, TANs drew on norms 
and principles embodied in the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, the U.N. 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and reports of the U.N. 
Development Program and UNESCO.  TANs have linked basic human rights to 
                                           
323 Keck and Sikkink 1998, 27. 
324 U.N. News Centre, July 28, 2010. “General Assembly Declares Access to Clean Water and 
Sanitation is a Human Right.” The Council of Canadians and Food and Water Watch are NGOs which 
have been particularly mobilized around formalizing the right to WSS in U.N. legal instruments.  
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the norm of poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs, subscribed to 
by all the world’s governments and the leading development institutions.  
2. Water is a Public Good and an Essential Service.  Even though water supply and 
sanitation are not pure public goods, they have widely-recognized public and 
merit goods characteristics.  U.N. agencies and documents frequently refer to 
WSS services as public goods.  The positive externalities associated with 
universal and affordable access to WSS are readily appreciated, making this a 
frame which has had cross-cutting appeal, like the human rights frame. TANs 
have counterpoised the concepts of “rights” and “essential” to that of water as a 
commodity: water is essential to satisfying basic needs and if left to the market 
will be underprovided and lead to human deprivation.  This has been a frame 
conducive to mobilization in that it pits the norms of equity and basic needs 
against profiteering. 
3. Stakeholder Participation And Government Accountability Make For Good 
Development Policy.  Multilateral development agencies and intergovernmental 
organizations have promoted the norm of stakeholder participation in poverty 
reduction strategies.  In essence, this is a norm of democratic participation: the 
norm is a composite of principles of transparency (in decision-making and 
governance); accountability (of states to citizens); and voice (to the poor in policy 
formation).  Activists in water TANs have exploited what they see as a 
contradiction between rhetoric and practice with respect to this norm in the IFIs.  
They have pointed to World Bank and IMF conditionalities in loan agreements 
which required governments to move towards full-cost recovery in water utilities, 
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including measures to assure investors’ profitability through automatic tariff or 
exchange-rate adjustment mechanisms.  Activists have claimed that these 
conditions are almost always applied in secret negotiations between states and the 
IFIs; that bids and contracts for PSP are non-transparent; and that mandated 
participation under the PRSP process has been little more than a cosmetic 
exercise.  
4. Environmental Justice.  This might be characterized as more of an emergent 
international norm, or a “transnational norm.”  This frame is a composite of social 
and environmental sustainability, linking human rights and equity to protection of 
the environment.  It has been invoked most often by Latin American TANs under 
the terminological rubric of “socio-ambiental,” reflecting a “social ecology” 
orientation.  Frames identify the poor as those who bear the heaviest burden of  
environmental degradation and pollution, including contaminated water supplies 
and lack of sewerage.  Activists have linked weak regulation in the WSS sector to 
weak environmental regulation generally, and linked privatization in WSS to 
corporate and state malfeasance against the natural environment.  Campaigns 
against bottled water incorporate this composite frame, arguing that the global 
bottled water industry depletes water reserves and aquifers in poor communities 
(e.g, the campaign against Coca-Cola in Kerala, India).    
 
Frames Critical of Neoliberalism  
  
 In addition to the international norms and rights-based frames discussed 
above, many of the activists in the anti-privatization and water justice campaigns 
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adapted or created frames that drew on critiques of neoliberalism and previous or 
coextensive struggles against SAPs.  These frames develop and elaborate what KRS 
call “transnational norms,” or collective beliefs.  As I noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, many activists who became involved in anti- privatization networks around 
WSS formerly worked on, or continued to work concurrently on, a range of issue 
areas targeting the IFIs and SAPs.  Two particular frames which have been deployed 
exploited the perceived threat to democratic and local control from corporations and 
unaccountable, unelected, global institutions.   
 Privatization Of WSS Threatens States’ Sovereignty.  This frame is related to 
the frames discussed above (water as an essential service under the stewardship of the 
state), but it contains a separate component that recasts the privatization debate in 
terms of neoliberal policy prescriptions.  TANs have used this frame to argue that 
water and sanitation are so strategically important in social and political terms that 
they cannot be allowed outside of the ambit of the state.  Further, it is chimerical of 
the IFIs to argue that weak states have the institutions and capacity necessary to 
adequately regulate and oversee the private sector.  This frame, along with the norm 
of water as a public good and essential service, has also been used by public sector 
unions (especially in Latin America) to argue for their relevance and unique role in 
the WSS sector.  
 Global Trade And Investment Rules Undermine States’ Sovereignty.  This 
frame runs parallel to the frame above, positing that the extension of trade and 
investment rules to the services sector threatens states’ sovereignty.  Framing by 
reference to trade liberalization enabled WSS activists to gain leverage by linking 
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conceptually and on the ground to activists with campaigns around free trade 
agreements in the first part of the decade (e.g., Oxfam International, Public Citizen, 
and other NGOs and coalitions which opposed the FTAA and the Central American 
Free Trade Agreement).  This frame also subsumes opposition to bilateral investment 
treaties, an increased focus of water justice activists during the second part of the 
decade.325  Activists have used this frame to publicize the risk of arbitral tribunals 
awarding onerous sums to TNCs which have filed claims under ICSID alleging 
impairment or expropriation of their investments under their host-home country BIT.  
In July 2006 an ICSID tribunal awarded a U.S. company, Azurix, which had a WSS 
concession in Buenos Aires, $165 million in damages against Argentina, finding that 
Argentina violated certain provisions of the U.S.-Argentina BIT.326   In July 2010, an 
ICSID tribunal ruled in favor of a consortium including Suez, Aguas de Barcelona, 
and Vivendi against Argentina in a case involving another Buenos Aires WSS 
concession, deferring for the time, the determination of the award amount.327  
 The use of multiple frames which referenced international norms and 
collective beliefs increased the ability of anti-water privatization TANs to exploit 
contradictions in the publicly-expressed goals of opposition targets such as the IFIs.  
                                           
325 Numerous activist NGOs and CSOs in the water justice movement, including from Bolivia and 
Uruguay, submitted testimony for the public hearing on July 29, 2010 as part of  the U.S. 
Government’s review of the 2004 Model BIT.     
326 The tribunal found tha Argentina failed to accord “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection 
and security” to Azurix’s investment, and that it took arbitrary measures that impaired Azurix’s use 
and enjoyment of its investment. See: Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
Arb/01/12), Annulment Proceeding, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, Sept. 1, 2009.  : 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8f820ce2-1547-463b-8177-8c6ba1be49bc ( December 
27, 2010).    
327 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. July 30, 2010. “In the proceedings 
between Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.(Claimants) 
and The Argentine Republic (Respondent) 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19.  
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisiononLiability.pdf  (December 28, 2010) 
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Casting PSP in water as an element in a larger neoliberal agenda of trade and 
investment liberalization helped activists forge multi-issue coalitions and broaden the 
base of campaign supporters. 
  
5.4.  A Shift in the Movement’s Orientation, 2005-2010 
 
A Turning Point Around the Fourth World Water Forum 
 
 In an interview I conducted with Sara Grusky of FWW in November 2005, 
she described the international “movement’s” activities heading into the 4th WWF as 
focused in several directions.  La Red VIDA, the Latin American water network, 
would attempt to combine the success of the referendum/plebiscite model from the 
Uruguayan victory with a continued campaign against the TNC Suez.  Bolivian, 
Brazilian. and Uruguayan activists wanted to build a global campaign calling for 
water to be taken out of the WTO and bilateral investment treaties by promoting 
constitutional initiatives or national laws which restrict water in international trade 
agreements.  An increased focus would be on improving systems of public water.  As 
I discussed in Chapter 3, the 4th WWF represented a turning point for the IFIs’ PSP 
agenda: there was explicit, if reluctant, acknowledgement that the tide had turned 
away from private sector interest in WSS utilities in developing countries.  The IFIs 
were not giving up the ghost on PSP, but the mood and outlook were certainly more 
somber than they had been in the previous 15 years.  In parallel, the TANs and 
campaigns around water privatization recognized that they had reached a new 
juncture, with weakened opposition in the IFIs and TNCs.  To quote CEO/TNI’s 




The Fourth World Water Forum in Mexico City (March 16-22) showed that 
the international debate about water and sanitation is at a crossroads.  After 
the unashamed promotion of privatisation at the previous editions of the 
WWFs (the Hague in 2000 and Kyoto in 2003), the Mexico City conference 
indicated a growing recognition of the widespread failures of private sector 
water management and the need to prioritise improved public water 
supply…the failure of privatisation in numerous cities over the last years and 
the gradual departure of Suez and other water multinationals from developing 
countries forced the World Water Council to adopt a very careful discourse 
during the 4th WWF.328 
 
 
 I attended the 4th WWF and the main alternative forum organized by a broad-
based international network of activists, the International Forum in the Defense of 
Water (IFDW).329  The influence of the anti-privatization movement could be seen 
inside the official WWF in the smorgasbord of panels which addressed the human 
right to water, the debates over PSP, and revitalizing public utilities.  TANs and 
CSOs were split over participation in the 4th WWF, with the Mexican host coalition, 
COMDA, refusing to enter.   Ten governments reportedly advocated for inclusion of 
the “right to water” in the WWF’s final Ministerial Declaration, but were thwarted in 
this goal by opposition from Mexico, the United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands 
and the United States, among other countries. (Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela and 
Uruguay tabled a “complementary Declaration” which included strong reference to 
the right to water.)  Despite this setback, international media reporting reflected and 
reinforced the goals and struggles of the “water justice movement.”  The Associated 
Press (AP) and the New York Times led off their articles covering the 4th WWF by 
                                           
328  Hoedeman, Olivier and  NamiYamamoto.  May 2006. “The Tide Turns, but Pro-Privatisation 
Currents Remain Strong.” CEO/TNI Water Justice Project.  
http://www.waterjustice.org/?mi=16&res_id=134  (October 2006)  
329 The IFDW was hosted by the Mexican coalition COMDA (Coalicíon de Organizaciones Mexicanas 
por el Derecho al Agua) in Mexico City between March 17 and 19, 2006. 
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describing the failure of private companies to bring water to the poor.  The AP’s 
opening paragraph began: “Governments, not private companies, should take the lead 
in improving public access to safe drinking water, representatives of 148 countries 
said Wednesday at the end of a forum on improving global water supplies.”330  
  The IFDW’s organizing slogan was: “Water is a right, not a commodity—no 
to privatization.”  Anti-privatization TANs and a broad spectrum of Mexican CSOs 
took up this theme in a show of strength during the opening day of the 4th WWF as 
20-30,000 people took to the streets in Mexico City, protesting not only privatization, 
but dams, Coca-Cola and its bottled water empire, and other local issues in Mexico 
related to water scarcity and environmental degradation.  The IFDW reported that 
close to 1000 participants from 50 countries attended its three-day forum, which 
covered four main themes and drew 45 speakers.  The themes comprised the human 
right to water; privatization, public management, and social control; the environment, 
sustainability and ecology; and democratic management, equality, justice and social 
participation.  The two themes addressing public and democratic management and 
social participation reflected a new emphasis on articulating alternatives, discussed in 
the next section.  The Declaration which was adopted at the close of the IFDW 
encapsulated this under the banner “The Right to Water is Possible: Participatory 
Public Management.”  The European NGOs Corporate Europe Observatory and 
Transnational Institute commented: “The IFDW showed that the water justice 
                                           




movements are moving far beyond opposition to privatization.”331  However, I argue 
in the next section that the “far beyond” is less concrete than it is aspirational.    
 
From Anti- to Pro-: Articulating Alternative Models 
 
  
 Marcela Olivera, water activist and sister of Oscar Olivera, one of the 
internationally-known leaders of La Coordinadora in Cochabamba, took the podium 
at Washington, D.C.’s first “Water Justice Film Festival” after the premiere of the 
movie Thirst on April 27, 2004.332  Thirst was produced by San Francisco activist 
film-makers Alan Snitow and Deborah Kaufman, and documented resistance to water 
privatization in Bolivia, India, Stockton (California), and at the third World Water 
Forum (2003) in Kyoto, Japan.  Olivera’s message to the audience, who had just 
witnessed images of bravery and resistance in Cochabamba on the screen was this: do 
not romanticize the victory in Cochabamba, because there is no victory until we solve 
the real problem of getting water to the people. “We’ve won the battle but not the 
war.  The real challenge confronting us is only now beginning.”   
 Writing about resistance to privatization in 2005, PSIRU researchers 
acknowledged that opposition campaigns have often not articulated specific 
alternative policies: “the information costs of doing so are very high, and most 
campaigns do not aspire to detailed restructuring and management of utilities.”333  
Terhorst noted that while “organic intellectuals” in the anti-privatization movement 
initially “avoided detailed articulation of alternatives in favour of normative 
                                           
331 Hoedeman Yamamoto May 2006.  
332 Thirst had its broadcast premiere on PBS’ “P.O.V.” documentary series on July 13, 2004.  I 
attended the premiere at the Water Justice Film Festival, which was co-sponsored by Public Citizen, 
the Earth Day Network, and The George Washington University.  
333 Hall, Lobina, and de la Motte. June 2005, 295. 
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statements on the right to water and the democratisation of the governance of water,” 
a qualitative shift occurred in the debates during the 2004 and 2005 World Social 
Forums. He quotes one activist as saying: “we are winning the privatization debate, 
but what now?”334  At the 2004 WSF in Mumbai a working group was established to 
explore collaboration on alternatives to privatization, subsequently coordinated by the 
Amsterdam-based NGOs, CEO/TNI.  “After twelve months of difficult though 
reasonably effective transnational collaboration,” writes Terhorst, a new loose 
network of social movement organizations, trade unionists, academics and some 
utility managers published a volume entitled “Reclaiming Public Water” in January 
2005.  The volume is divided into three sections with 22 case studies.335   In 
November 2005, the “Reclaiming Public Water” (RPW) network was officially 
launched in Madrid and made its public debut at a symposium it sponsored at a pre-
event of the IFDW on the day prior to the opening of the 4th WWF.   I attended this 
“Public Water for All” symposium, which drew an audience I estimate at between 
100-150 people.  Many of the panelists were affiliated with the RPW network and 
contributors to the volume.336  The symposium unveiled the concept of public-public 
                                           
334 Terhorst 2008, 105. 
335 Transnational Institute (TNI) and Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO). January 2005. Reclaiming 
Public Water: Achievements, Struggles, and Visions from Around the World.  Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands: TNI and CEO. The first section includes examples of successful public utilities in the 
North, as well as examples from the South such as the uniformly-cited model of participatory 
governance in Porto Alegre, Brazil and a successful municipal water cooperative in Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia.  The second section includes cases described as “works in progress,” such as efforts to 
restructure previously weak public sector utilities (Recife, Brazil; Caracas, Venezuela) and introduce 
participatory decisionmaking into re-municipalized utilities (Cochabamba).  The third section covers 
“campaigns in progress and at different stages of formulating new policies,” and includes cases 
deemed successful in fighting privatization (Uruguay) as well as ongoing struggles (Indonesia, 
Philippines, South Africa).  
336 Symposium organizers included TNI/CEO, COMDA (Coalicion de Organizacíones Mexicanas por 
el Derecho al Agua, the Mexican host coalition for the alternative IFDW), Friends of the Earth-




partnerships (PUPs) “which seek to pair well-performing public utilities with those 
that are performing less well to share expertise on a not-for-profit basis in order to 
improve the standard of the lesser performing utility.”337    
 The cases presented in the RPW volume and at the symposium presentations 
in Mexico City focused preponderantly on social and political processes rather than 
the operational or technical “nuts and bolts” of public water provision.  Cochabamba 
serves as an object lesson in this regard.  Writing about that city’s water situation and 
public utility (SEMAPA) in 2009, the Democracy Center’s Jim Shultz continued to 
echo the challenge that Marcela Olivera threw out to fellow activists five years 
earlier:338 
Water activists in Cochabamba focus on how to build “social control” of 
SEMAPA…Social control of a public company is clearly important, but 
looking at process issues without looking at operational issues-such as the 
leak problem and SEMAPA’s finances—has left the operational issues a 
mess…when the company has tried to undertake practical solutions, water 
activists have sometimes made it more difficult.  For example, when 
SEMAPA was pushed by the IDB to increase rates (unchanged in six years) 
just to account for inflation, activists attached the proposal bitterly.  But if 
costs are increasing and rates aren’t keeping pace, how is the company 
supposed to keep up with the demand for expansion?   Wading into the details 
of running a water company isn’t romantic, but it is essential. 
 
Terhorst, in contrast, continued to blame the IFIs for the impaired viability of 
alternative models of socially-controlled WSS delivery:339 
 
                                           
337 Public Services International. March 17, 2006.  “PSI at the World Water Forum: Public-Public 
Partnerships are Slowly Attracting High Level Attention.”  : http://www.world-
psi.org/TemplateEn.cfm?Section=Utilities&CONTENTID=11508&TEMPLATE=/ContentManageme
nt/ContentDisplay.cfm  (April 10, 2006). 
338 Shultz 2008.  Shultz notes that SEMAPA has been losing 55 percent of the water in its pipes to 
leaks and illegal hookups, and that it suffers from mismanagement and the lack of a solid financial plan 
despite a steady infusion of funds from the Japanese government and the Interamerican Development 
Bank.    
339 Terhorst  2008, 111. 
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Cochabamba, however, is an example of how the lack of political support by 
development agencies and the local political elite can endanger social reform 
processes.  The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has offered 
SEMAPA a loan, but with conditions that hamper the transformation of the 
utility and, in fact, endanger popular support by delaying visible 
improvements in water delivery. 
 
However, as Karen Bakker points out, the inability to so far realize the community 
ownership and social control model for Cochabamba proposed by La Coordinadora 
is rooted in much greater complexity.  She points to the disjuncture between a vision 
of social control that originated in small rural irrigation cooperatives and community-
run water supply systems in peri-urban Cochabamba and other parts of Bolivia, and 
the very different structure of parallel public networks that have supplied water to 
well-off residents of the city.  Advocates for community-control models may be 
unwittingly strengthening class-based fragmentation and segmentation of water 
supply delivery systems.  Bakker notes that the concept of community is frequently 
ambiguous, and while community/consumer participation can improve accountability 
and transparency, it rarely addresses issues of financing, access, and operational 
management.340   In the case of Cochabamba, moreover, a former organizer with 
FWW and the Latin American water justice network, La Red VIDA, told me that 
members of ASICA-SUR, an association of cooperatives in Bolivia, did not want to 
advertise the fact that they were receiving financing from the IDB and Japan’s 
development agency.341  This parallels a situation I describe in my case study of 
Uruguay in Chapter 6.  There, the anti-privatization coalition CNDAV has remained 
mum over continued and increased MDB financing for its public utility after it won 
                                           
340 Bakker 2008, 236-252.  Bakker is an Associate Professor in the Department of Geography, and 
Director of the Program on Water Governance at the University of British Columbia, Canada. 
341 Interview with Jeff Conant, San Francisco, California. July 7, 2009. 
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its successful constitutional reform campaign to prohibit any form of PSP in WSS 
delivery. 
 The RPW is by its own description a diverse and loose-knit network without 
formal membership.  Opinions within the network vary on issues ranging from the 
importance of recognizing the “right to water,” to whether or not the public sector is 
inherently good or desirable, to the meaning or usefulness of the concept of the 
“commons.”342  Sophisticated activists in the movement have recognized that 
winning the battles and the war requires not just the articulation of a vision of 
democratically-governed utilities, but engaging with the technical details of running a 
water utility.  Vicki Cann, lead water campaigner for the World Development 
Movement’s water campaign, told me that while the WDM campaign could claim 
numerous successes: 
 
We were self-critical of the campaign we launched because we weren’t 
specific enough early on about viable alternatives to privatization, such as in 
Tamil Nadu (India), Brazil, and Phnom Penh (Cambodia, a corporatized 
public utility)…In 2005 we had a big row with DFID and Hilary Benn (then 
Secretary of State for International Development) who told us that he was sick 
of criticisms and wanted to see proactive suggestions… We worked closely 
with Water Aid on [publicizing these alternatives].343    
 
 
 Although impossible to measure, it is fair to say that the RPW network and 
the shift in some TANs’ orientation to a focus on public and alternative models has 
had an effect on renewed emphasis on public sector WSS provision in the 
international arena. One of the outgrowths of the 4th WWF was the initiation of the 
                                           
342 Conant, Jeff.  March 2010. “Water Justice, Like Water, Travels in Networks: Notes On Reclaiming 
Public Water.” http://www.waterjustice.org/?mi=1&res_id=277  (November 21, 2010) 
343 Interview with Vicki Cann, World Development Movement, London, United Kingdom, March 10, 
2009.   
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“Global Water Operators’ Partnership Alliance” (GWOPA) by the U.N. Secretary 
General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation.  GWOPA was established to 
promote  “water operators’ partnerships” (WOPs) to help countries reach the water 
and sanitation targets of the MDGs.  The objective of GWOPA’s capacity building 
activities is to develop the skills of water operators by helping them share knowledge 
through “twinning,” analogous to the concept behind PUPs.344   GWOPA has also 
established a financing and advisory facility to implement performance improvement 
plans to facilitate large scale sector investments.  The Reclaiming Public Water 
Network has a seat on the International Steering Committee of GWOPA, as do 
several trade union leaders, public utility managing directors, public utility 
associations, and a Ghanaian water activist and member of the African Water 
Network.345  Nevertheless, the RPW network has criticized the GWOPA for allowing 
the regional MDBs and private sector members to steer the organization towards 
private WOPs or corporatized, commercially-oriented public water companies.346 
 Just before the 5th WWF in Istanbul, Turkey in March 2009, PSIRU and 
researchers affiliated with RPW published a report on PUPs in water, with short 
descriptions of close to 20 examples and an annex listing 137 PUPs in 70 
countries.347  The report is an important activist contribution to the debate about 
revitalizing weak public utilities, but beyond very cursory descriptions, it does not 
analyze what effect these PUPs have had on “turning around” weak public utilities or 
                                           
344 U.N.Habitat, GWOPA. “What We Do.” http://www.gwopa.org/about-us/gwopa/what-gwopa-
does.html  (December 29, 2010). 
345   U.N. Habitat,GWOPA. “List of Steering Committee Members.”  http://www.gwopa.org/about-
us/gwopa/steering-committee-members.html  (December 29, 2010) 
346 Conant.  March 2010.  
347 Hall, Lobina, et al.. March 2009. “Public-Public Partnerships (PUPs) in Water.”  :                              
http://www.psiru.org/reports/2009-03-W-PUPS.doc#_Toc223775017  (November 21, 2010) 
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the sustainability of the partnerships.  A senior water analyst at the World Bank wh
interviewed and who served as the WSS civil society liaison for a number of years, 
praised PSIRU’s research in general, but was skeptical that weak public utilities in
South could derive much benefit from PUPs.  This Bank analyst did not believ
these voluntaristic arrangements would provide the kind of serious technical 
assistance that these utilities needed, and argued that performance-based or not-for-




o be addressed.  
                                          
348  Whether or 
not PUPs can be scaled-up is an issue that needs t
 In a recent development, the RPW network applauded (and WDM claims, 
directly influenced) the European Commission’s decision to earmark 40 million 
Euros to support not-for-profit partnerships to develop capacity in the water and 
sanitation sector in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.349  PSIRU has created a 
website for the EC to help find partners, form partnerships and provide advice and 
information.  RPW cautions, though, that “members must remain vigilant and 
intercede in the financing agenda” to ensure that partnership funding doesn’t go “to 
management contracts and other forms of semi-privatization.”350 
 The preceding discussion illustrates both the influence and limitations of the 
RPW network and water justice TANs to date.  While the diversity of the network’s 
members helps to account for the difficulty in achieving common positions, the 
equivocal and critical stances taken on positive developments could lead to the 
perception that too often “the perfect is the enemy of the good.”  The preoccupation 
 
348 Interview 2. 
349  PSIRU, University of Greenwich. “ACP-EU Water Partnerships.”  : http://www.acp-eu-
waterpartnerships.org/ (December 30, 2010). 
350 Conant. March 2010. 
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with ideal-types of community participation seems to far exceed the expenditure of 
organizational resources devoted to the technical and operational challenges of 
improving service delivery to the poor. The stated opposition to any form of private 
sector involvement also betrays inconsistencies in the movement’s rhetoric and 
practice: several of the oft-cited examples of either well-run public utilities (e.g., 
Phnom Penh) or utilities with participatory management (Porto Alegre, Brazil) 
incorporate either commercial principles into management or use private sector 
outsourcing for specific activities.  In other words, they do not fit a purist ideal-type. 
 However, the RPW and anti-privatization TANs do not comprise the totality 
of the movement, and other NGOs and networks such as WaterAid and FAN have 
taken a more nuanced and pragmatic view of, for example, small-scale private 
providers (particularly in rural areas, where both organizations are active) and 
corporatized public utilities.  As I discuss in the next and final section, splits in the 
“water movement” emerged with respect to these kinds of issues, including cost 
recovery, and were particularly evident in efforts to engage the World Bank directly 
on the PSP agenda.    
 
5.5. The Influence of the Water Justice Movement on the Bank’s PSP Agenda 
 
 Figure 4 illustrates the influence of TANs and CSOs on the Bank’s agenda for 
PSP in urban WSS.  As I have discussed throughout this chapter, there have been 
mutually-reinforcing interactions between water justice/anti-privatization TANs and 
the broader alter-globalization movement, as well as between TANs and domestic 
CSO coalitions which have been the main drivers of country-level campaigns.  Figure 
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4  illustrates the strong reciprocity in these relationships and interactions, including 
through political space created at international venues such as the World Social 
Forums and World Water Forums.   
 As I argued in parallel in Chapter 4, the activist-driven vectors of change 
originated first and foremost in country-level campaigns. As the WDM’s water 
campaign coordinator Vicky Cann told me, “none of the shifts that have happened [at 
DFID and the IFIs] would have happened without movements on the ground.”  The 
importance of the country level to the Bank is also evident in the many 
pronouncements the Bank has made, often in hindsight, about how a good public 
relations campaign might have altered the failed course of PSP in various countries.  
At Water Week 2009 Philippe Marin stated: “The Manila concessions generated a lot 
of negative publicity. A vigorous campaign on the benefits of concessions might have 
helped.”  Similarly, at a workshop on communications strategies to promote PSP held 
by the Bank in May 2002, one invited speaker, journalist Rupert Wright, used the 
Ghanaian case as an example of a country that needed a public relations strategy to 
counter public opposition.  In Tanzania, a consultant to DFID, Adam Smith 
International, received £273,000 of U.K. aid money to run a public relations 
campaign promoting the country's privatization program, which included the 






The campaign used a national comedian in a series of television advertisements, and  
produced pop songs and videos.351  These are all countries where TANs mobilized to 
assist local campaigns.  The Bank has always emphasized that client governments 
need “the PPP process to be accompanied by an effective communication strategy,” 
and even published a 75 page toolkit for task team leaders and client governments 
titled Public Communication Programs for Privatization Projects.352    
 TANs’ leverage vis-à-vis country campaigns occurred at times through the 
“boomerang” effect--lobbying donor governments and Bank Executive Directors, and 
intermediation with Bank staff.  But as I discussed in Chapter 4, this was not a 
primary strategy deployed by the WSS TANs, with the exception of the campaign to 
reduce donor contributions to PPIAF.  That campaign was only minimally effective in 
material terms, insofar as activists were unable to pressure major donors, like the 
U.K., to reduce funding.  However, it did succeed in publicizing the role of PPIAF in 
the Bank.    
 TANs’ influence on change in Bank’s agenda has therefore been mediated 
primarily through the effects of country campaigns.  As I discuss next, direct 
engagement with the Bank by some TANs and NGOs has been largely unsuccessful, 
and has reflected divisions in the movement between “hard-line” anti-privatization 
activists and development/advocacy CSOs.  Unlike other NGO campaigns directed at 
                                           
351 Memorandum submitted by the World Development Movement to the U.K.'s House of Commons, 
International Development Committee, Select Committee Inquiry on Water and Sanitation. October 
2006. Published April 17, 2007.  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmintdev/126/126we01.htm  (January 
3, 2011).  The privatization program was supported by the World Bank; Biwater, a British TNC, had 
won the water contract in Dar es Salaam, which was later terminated. 
352 World Bank External Affairs Department, Development Communications Unit. 2002. “Public 
Communication Programs for Privatization Projects.” (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank).  See also 
“Operational Guidance for World Bank Group Staff,” April 2004, 18. 
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the Bank, there were no significant insider-outsider alliances that pushed for agenda 
change in PSP policies inside the Bank.  This is very likely due to the nature of the 
issue area.  In contrast to  issue areas such as environmental protection, protection of 
indigenous populations, or involuntary resettlement policies, private sector 
participation goes to the heart of the Bank’s governing paradigm.  Just as with 
campaigns against the Bank’s structural adjustment policies (of which 
PSP/privatization is of course a component part), insider-outsider alliances did not 
materialize, given the fundamental issues raised, and the presumed limits of 
heterodoxy that Bank management would tolerate among Bank staff.353    
 
The Failure of Direct Engagement between the Bank and CSOs  
 
 
 There have been at least three attempts by CSOs over the last decade to 
formally engage the World Bank in a discussion of WSS issues related to PSP, urban 
WSS, and/or greater participation of CSOs in influencing Bank policies and projects.  
The first attempt was led by Washington-based CSOs in 2003 and focused on how to 
involve participation by southern CSOs in the anti-privatization movements, 
especially in Latin America.  Bank officials halted that dialogue due to weak buy-in 
from senior staff.354  The second attempt was led by London-based CSOs, hosted by 
WaterAid, which extended invitations to a variety of TANs and NGOs, including 
                                           
353 For a fuller discussion see Karen Travis, May 2000. “Transnational Mobilization Against Structural 
Adjustment Policies: A Case Study of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative and its 
Associated Civil Society Network.” Paper presented at a conference on Democracy in the Age of CNN, 
University of Padua, Padua, Italy, May 25-27, 2000. 
354 Calaguas, Belinda. April 8, 2006. “Why have Bank-CSO Dialogues on Water Faltered?”  Bretton 
Woods Project, Update 50.   http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=531787  (May 6, 2009)  
See also Bretton Woods Project. February 2, 2005. “Cautious Dialogue as Conflict over Water 




Public Citizen’s Water for All campaign, to join in the kick-off of the dialogue in 
London in November 2004.355   However, most of the CSOs focused on anti-
privatization campaigns (particularly in North and Latin America) boycotted the 
London meeting.356 At the time, I was en route to Uruguay to conduct research, and 
was asked by Public Citizen to confirm that a leader of the CNDAV coalition in 
Uruguay had seen the joint letter that Public Citizen had drafted along with other 
North and Latin American activist CSOs declining WaterAid’s invitation.357  The 
draft letter, addressed to WaterAid’s Director Ravi Narayanan and Jamal Saghir at the 
Bank, dismissed past CSO-Bank undertakings:  
 
Unfortunately, the history of World Bank consultative and review processes 
on issues of concern to civil society- the World Commission on Dams, the 
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative, and the Extractive 
Industries Review (processes that were much larger and more developed than 
this proposed dialogue) makes us skeptical that this dialogue will seriously 
engage with the important issues that concern our constituencies.358  
 
 
The letter went on to criticize the proposed dialogue on the grounds that it focused 
disproportionately on northern NGOs and took place in a northern venue; the agenda 
failed to address key constituency concerns, such as cost recovery, PSP, and legal and 
institutional reforms; and no high-level follow-up mechanisms were included as part 
of the proposed dialogue.  In contrast, WaterAid’s then advocacy-director, Belinda 
                                           
355 Personal communication with Sara Grusky, Water for All campaign, Washington, D.C., October 
2004. 
356 Personal communications with Sara Grusky, Water for All campaign.  The letter was signed by 
Public Citizen, the Council of Canadians, and member campaigns affiliated with Red VIDA, among 
other groups.  See also: Calaguas, Belinda. April 8, 2006. “Why have Bank-CSO Dialogues on Water 
Faltered?”  Bretton Woods Project, Update 50. 
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=531787 (May 6, 2009) 
357 Alberto Villareal was a key leader in CNDAV and in REDES (Friends of the Earth-Uruguay).  He 
added his name to the letter declining the invitation. 
358  Personal copy of draft letter provided by Sara Grusky, Water for All campaign.  
201 
 
Calaguas, characterized the second attempt at engagement as initially successful in 
drawing social movement and service delivery CSOs from Africa, Asia, and Central 
America and in reaching an agreement on a program of joint research.  Calaguas 
noted that the agenda this time did not focus exclusively on privatization, but 
included commitments from the Bank to make project information more accessible 
and to begin a dialogue on cost recovery. Calaguas believes the Bank was more 
committed to the second round of dialogues because it wanted to mitigate risks 
associated with its intention to treble its investments in WSS, including in public 
utilities and the domestic private sectors.  Calaguas’ view, which I cannot 
corroborate, is that the Bank believed the involvement of development and service 
NGOs such as WaterAid “could ensure that there was accountability from the public 
utilities and the government officials responsible for them.”359   
 The follow-up Bank-CSO work program on cost recovery further exposed the 
rift between WaterAid and NGOs such as Consumers International, and what 
Calaguas called the “anti-privatization social movements.”  I was privy to an email 
exchange between the Water for All campaign and Belinda Calaguas that illustrated 
the fault lines in this debate.  WaterAid had drawn up terms of reference (TOR) for 
the cost recovery research which would test the following hypothesis: 
“Consumer/citizen participation improves the design and effectiveness of cost 
recovery.” It proposed that the case studies be carried out in a number of countries 
where a range of institutional arrangements for public participation in water tariff 
                                           
359 Calaguas, Belinda. April 8, 2006. “Why have Bank-CSO Dialogues on Water Faltered?”  Bretton 
Woods Project, Update 50. http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=531787  (May 6, 2009) 
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decision-making were in existence.360  Maj Fiil and Sara Grusky of Water for All 
wrote Calaguas questioning the proposed hypothesis for focusing on the link between 
participation and increasing revenue. They argued that this ignored the link between 
participation and “accountability to citizens, improvement of the utility’s 
performance… and the ability to pay, and equity of service delivered for the fee 
which is charged…the real issue is not cost recovery but expanding access.”  As I 
note in the footnote, the TOR were originally phrased to make this link more explicit.  
Nevertheless, this exchange underscores the very real splits among TANs, which 
can’t be solely attributed to the difference between development NGOs, such as 
WaterAid, and the “anti-privatization/social activist” TANs.  WaterAid and FAN 
have also engaged in advocacy and activism, and WaterAid has certainly questioned 
the pro-PSP agenda of the Bank and IFIs in its research, lobbying, and advocacy 
work.361  But at a deeper level, the differences may in fact reflect the experience 
WaterAid has had on the ground in its work on WSS service provision.  For example, 
WaterAid has recognized that small-scale private providers have been virtually the 
only “game in town” in rural and often also in peri-urban WSS provision.  It has also 
taken the position organizationally, as I noted in Chapter 3, that some level of cost 
                                           
360 Letter to WSS CSOs attached to an email to Public Citizen from Belinda Calaguas, dated 
September 30, 2005. This email also inclued the attachment  “Terms of Reference: WaterAid 
Discussion Paper on Cost Recovery,” dated July 29, 2005. In the July terms of reference, the cost 
recovery hypothesis was framed more broadly and skeptically: “test the working hypothesis regarding 
whether and how cost recovery policy can be an instrument for achieving universal services, 
particularly, ensuring sustainable service to the urban poor… In case of the opposite impact, cost 
recovery leading to exclusion from services—identify the factors that explain why this happens.” 
361 See for example WaterAid and Tearfund, 2003.  “New Rules, New Roles: Does PSP Benefit the 
Poor? Synthesis Report.” 
http://tilz.tearfund.org/webdocs/Website/Campaigning/Policy%20and%20research/newrulesnewroles.p
df  (November 29, 2009).    
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recovery is needed to ensure utilities’ operational viability, fully recognizing, 
however, that this does not obviate the need for subsidizing the poor.   
 The third dialogue activity between CSOs and the Bank was spearheaded by 
FAN in February 2007 and involved two components: an initiative to generate 
funding requests to finance policy dialogue and operational collaboration on water 
issues at the country level, and a scoping study on how to promote more systematic 
dialogue.  These initiatives generated 38 proposals for dialogue activities, but only 
two came from the World Bank, and those two originated in the Water Anchor: none 
were proposed by task team leaders (TTLs) actually managing WSS projects.362  The 
Bank noted that “Unfortunately, because of a lack of available funding and support 
from Bank Task Team Leaders, none of these proposals ended up being funded.”363 
The consultants hired by FAN to research and evaluate the scoping study process, 
Brendan Martin and Sue Cavill of the U.K.-based NGO Public World, noted that the 
main stumbling blocks seemed to be either insufficient capacity or commitment by 
either the Bank or CSOs.  Of particular interest, Martin and Cavill identified:  
 
an unexpected mismatch between the concerns of CSOs and Bank officials at 
the country level. The dialogue activities proposed by CSOs at the country 
level did not tend to focus on policy issues such as consumer accountability, 
tariff structures, the role of small scale providers, and corruption.  Yet for 
Bank task teams normally operating in several countries in parallel, those are 
the subjects in which they tend to hope CSOs might have some comparative 
advantage.364   
 
                                           
362 Martin, Brendan and Cavill, Sue. January 2008. “FAN-World Bank Scoping Study about 
Developing Dialogue between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations about Urban Water 
and Sanitation Services: Commentary about the Scoping Experience and its Lessons.” London, U.K.: 
Public World. 
363 The World Bank 2009. World Bank-Civil Society Engagement: Review of Fiscal Years 2007-2009. 
Washington, D.C.:International Bank for Reconstrucition and Devleopment, 9-11. 




Martin and Cavill went on to reiterate that whatever the cause of the failure of this 
dialogue, the perception that “few World Bank staff outside of the Water Anchor 
have engaged with the process is real and justified.”  Relations between the Bank and 
CSOs were in the main mediated by consultants.  
 Although the Bank clearly acknowledged the failure of this dialogue activity, 
its description of engagement with CSOs on the issue of WSS between 2007 and 
2009 is put forward in a much more positive light:  
 
The World Bank’s Water Unit has intensified its engagement over the last 
three years with a variety of policy advocacy CSOs on the issues of access, 
rights, and ownership of urban water and sanitation programs. Of particular 
concern to CSOs have been the issues of water privatization, cost-recovery 
approaches, and lack of water services for low income populations in Bank-
financed water and sanitation projects. For its part, the Bank has welcomed 
this dialogue because it clearly shares with civil society the goal of extending 
universal coverage to the poor in developing countries. Within this context, 
the Bank has undertaken important meetings and joint research projects with 
leading NGOs, trade unions, and research centers during this period…The key 
CSO interlocutor to emerge during this period was Freshwater Action 
Network (FAN).365 
 
 In contrast, a senior water specialist in the Water Anchor at the Bank 
confirmed to me in a March 2009 interview that very few staff resources at the Bank 
have been devoted to engaging CSOs on WSS:366 
 
It’s really just me.  Lots of expressions of interest by CSOs, but it’s been hard 
to match this to Bank staff; staff say that they already have a dialogue [at the 
country level].  The amount of time World Bank staff spends on these 
dialogues has been countable in days, not weeks.  The intangible output is 
bigger than the tangible output. 
 
 
                                           
365 The World Bank 2009. World Bank-Civil Society Engagement: Review of Fiscal Years 2007-2009, 
9-11. 
366 Interview 2. 
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I asked the liaison what the Bank had learned from CSO input, and vice versa.  The 
response was that there were differences in CSOs’ orientation that made this hard to 
evaluate: “some CSOs like Consumers International have a middle class constituency 
and were more interested in tariff-related issues and informal water consumer groups. 
Others, like FAN, were focused on service to the poor.”  In response to my question 
about whether anti-privatization protests had affected Bank policies, the liaison 
responded: 
  
It’s still a polarized debate. There are tensions between anti-privatization 
activists and those interested in delivering water. Advocacy is cheaper than 
building toilets…Activists have been spinning their wheels.  There are 
protests against PSP, then things realign and move forward…Yes, activism 
has influenced the Bank.  It’s made it more risk-averse, and probably made 
projects better.  The protests sped up a process that might have occurred 
anyway.  The underlying thoughts about what made service delivery work 
have been around for a long time….PSP in water is just one expression of a 
neoliberal agenda. 
 
I interpret these remarks as an acknowledgement that the activists focused the Bank’s 
attention on deficiencies in PSP projects that were already surfacing, related to the 
absence of necessary institutional infrastructure and questionable impacts on the poor.  
The liaison has a background in public utilities and also acknowledged that the Bank 
had done too little analytical work on public utilities, especially the replicability of 
successful ones.  But the liaison also pointed to “charismatic leaders” as a factor in 
the success of some public utilities (Uganda is often cited), and wondered aloud if the 
RPW network knew “that Suez was a consultant to the [public utility] in Phnom 
Penh.”  The liaison summed up by saying that “the final answer to the PSP challenge 
would be to bring countries back to the global level inside the Bank,” implying that a 
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Bank-wide policy would be needed if the goal was to create a uniform and consistent 
policy inside the Bank.    
 
Activists’ Views of their Influence on the PSP Agenda 
 
 I  have asked several activists whether they felt their campaigns or 
organizations had effected agenda change at the Bank.  As I noted earlier, WDM’s 
Vicki Cann stressed that this certainly occurred through country level campaigns, and 
most activists would agree that campaigns have been in part responsible for a shift in 
the Bank’s approach to PSP.  But many are equally reluctant to state that any change 
has occurred, especially among the hard-line anti-privatization activists.  A former 
campaign organizer for FWW and committed international activist expressed it this 
way to me: “Even if the IFIs have ‘reformed,’ it’s still the population of the countries 
that have paid the price—and continue to pay the price, for SAPs.  This explains the 
continued rhetoric and attitudes against the Bank.”367   I encountered a similar 
dualism when I interviewed PSIRU’s two lead researchers, David Hall and Emanuele 
Lobina.  Lobina voiced the view that “Overall, CSOs have not been instrumental in 
changing the Bank’s attitude towards PSP.  The rhetoric changes at big events, but the 
actions are still the same—there’s a striking coherence from 2000-2009.”  In contrast, 
David Hall stated: “I’m surprised by how much impact we’ve had.  We made a huge 
difference at the global level.  CSOs have opened up space, particularly through 
                                           
367 Interview with Jeff Conant, July 7, 2009, San Francisco, California.  
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campaigns at the country level.”368  Belinda Calaguas attributed change in the Bank 
to several factors.  She told me: 
 
CSOs’ protest actions created policy space.  But the private sector also said 
that PSP would not work.  There were rifts within the Bank.  Some in the 
Bank [the civil society unit] said to others, you have to hear the activists out.  






 Each of the views expressed above contains a piece of truth about how 
activism ultimately influenced the Bank.  Lobina’s view captures the continued 
tension within the Bank between ideology and pragmatism/realism that I discussed in 
Chapter 4.  Calaguas identifies internal schisms within the Bank, but these schisms 
related to the process of engagement with CSOs.  It did not signify a base of support 
within the Bank that could be leveraged through insider-outsider alliances, as I noted 
previously.370  Hall, Cann, and other activists acknowledge that country campaigns 
certainly contributed to dampening both TNCs’ and the Bank’s enthusiasm for PSP.  
Figure 4 ascribes more of the pressure on TNCs to country campaigns than to direct 
actions taken by TANs (shown as having a moderate effect).  International corporate 
campaigns were not a central piece of activist strategies, and the international 
campaign against Suez was only launched towards the middle part of the decade. But 
the effect of negative publicity on the TNCs was not negligible either. AquaFed’s 
                                           
368 Interview with David Hall and Emanuele Lobina, PSIRU. March 9, 2009. London, U.K. 
369 Interview with Belinda Calaguas, Action Aid, March 12, 2009, London, U.K.  
370 This is not to say that individuals within the Bank may not have been sympathetic to concerns 
raised by NGOs, but a critical mass of “insiders” never emerged with which an alliance could be 
forged.     
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President Gerard Payen confirmed this at Water Week 2009: “Private operators were 
used as scapegoats…we suffered attacks.”371  Bakker states that the broad range and 
sustained nature of protests against PSP increased political risks to private operators, 
“which had the effect of raising the cost of PSP, and according to some observers, 
contributed to reduced private sector interest in long term concessions.”372  As Figure 
4 illustrates, I also hold that negative publicity generated through activist gatherings 
at international events has had a moderate influence on the Bank, though this is my 
own estimate of the weight which  attached to these events.  The effect of negative 
publicity against the Bank is likely to have been  strongest at the WWFs, since the 
international press reported oppositional activities fairly prominently. 
 At the end of the decade, some activists may be turning their focus back on 
the Bank, specifically, the IFC.  Corporate Accountability International intends to 
launch a new campaign targeting the IFC, claiming it is the new locus of activity for 
PSP through non-transparent investments in, and loans to, financial intermediaries.373  
This strategy  appears to be leveraging other multi-issue NGOs’ new focus on the 
IFC, just as happened earlier in the decade. It remains to be seen whether this will 
metamorphose into a new phase of campaigning against PSP in WSS within the 
World Bank Group.  
                                           
371 Remarks by Gerard Payen at the World Bank’s Water Week 2009. 
372 Bakker. April 2009.  “Overview Paper: Recent Trends in PSP, Financing, and Regulation in the 
Water Sector.”   
 http://www.waterdialogues.org/downloads/new/TP-Overview-28-April.doc (August 29, 2009), 3. 
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(active first part 
of decade) 
♦ Supports, links, and 
represents consumer 
groups and agencies 
worldwide. 
♦ Membership of  more 
than 250 
organizations in over 
100 countries. 
Governing Board 
elected directly at 
World Congress.  
Over one-third of 
income is from 
membership fees. 
♦ Campaigns and 
programs in many 
areas.    
♦ Water was theme for 
World  Consumer 
Rights Day, 2004. 
♦ Issued Policy Statement 
on Water and Sanitation 
in March 2004 
promoting principles 
adopted by U.N., e.g., 
recognizing access to 
water as a basic right, 
characterizing water as 
a public good which 




level campaigns in 
member countries, e.g. 
Uruguay constitutional 
reform campaign. 
♦ Former Senior Advisor 
















(active first part 
of decade) 
♦ World’s largest 
grassroots 
environmental 
network, with member 
groups in 68 countries 
plus 15 affiliates, with 
approx.1 million 
members. Annual 




♦ Members fully 
independent, prioritize 
their own country 
campaigns, but agree 
on set of common 
ground rules. Largely 
rely on self-funding. 
Exec. Committee with 
chair and members 
♦ Water became a new 
campaign in 2003. 
Overlapped with  FOE-
I’s Trade, Corporates, 
and IFIs campaigns. 
FOE-I published 
“Water Justice for All” 
for release at World 
Water Forum in Kyoto 
in 2003, with 14 case 
studies of FOE groups 
working on campaigns.  
♦ During 2003-2004, took 
the position that water 
as a resource should 
never be privatized, but 
allows for many models 
of water delivery, 
including some private 
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♦ As of 2003, 10 
priority campaign 




IFIs, and water. 
systems, and 
collective/communally-
run systems.  
♦ Update 2010: FOE-I 
groups “campaign for 
innovative public-
public partnerships for 
water management, 
water reduction and 
reuse, and restoring 
rivers and wetlands to 
more natural states.  
FOE does not currently 
have an international 
water program in place, 
but cites to “many 
groups working on a 












♦ Global union 
federation that 
represents public 
sector workers, with 
about 20 million 
members, and over 
650 affiliated unions 
in 148 countries. Four 
regional and 20 sub-
regional offices. 
Recognized NGO for 
the public sector in the 
ILO. 
♦ Governed by 
quintennial congress, 
made up of delegates 




of action and 
programs which are 
basis of next five-year 
focus. 
♦ PSI and affiliated 
research unit, PSIRU, 
have been consistently 
♦ Represents unionized 
water utility workers in 
developed and 
developing countries, 
often in the forefront of 
campaigns against WSS 
privatization.  
♦ Campaign on “quality 
public services” 
includes keeping water 
utilities in the public 
sector. 
♦ Affiliates have been 
active in anti-
privatization campaigns 
in Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, Uruguay, South 
Africa, U.K., the U.S., 
and Canada, among 
other countries. 
♦ PSI’s Research Unit 
(PSIRU), affiliated with 
University. of 
Greenwich/U.K., has 
produced an extensive 
library of publications, 
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active in all TANs 
against water 




public sector workers.  
critiques of water utility 
privatizations, TNCs in 
the WSS sector, 
analysis of DFI 
policies, and 














Network for  
Vigilance on 
the Defense of 




♦ La Red Vigilancia 
Interamericana para 
la Defensa y Derecho 
al Agua (Red VIDA) 
was formed in San 
Salvador, El Salvador 
in August 2003 when  
54 organizations 
from 16 countries 
joined together to 
launch a hemispheric 
network and 
campaign “in defense 
of water as a public 
good and a 
fundamental right. “ 












17 countries in North, 
Central and South 
America.  
♦ Active presence in 
water justice TANs 
and at international 
conferences. 
♦ San Salvador 
Declaration for the 
Defense and Right to 
Water affirmed 11 
principles, including: 
water as a public good 





exclusion of water 
from trade 
negotiations; 
recognition of gender 
inequality in access 
and rights; 
strengthening  public 
utilities and autonomy 
of communal and rural 
water systems. 
♦ Initial program of 
Network in 2004 was 
launching continental 
campaign: “No to 
Privatization of Water. 
Yes to Public 
Management with 
Social Participation.”  
♦ In second half of 
decade, work has 
focused on building 
new models of social 
organization such as 
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♦ Has “waged s 
campaigns to 
challenge corporate 
abuse for more than 
30 years.” 









♦ “Think Outside the 
Bottle campaign” 
targets major bottlers 
for “manufacturing 
demand for the bottled 
water market by 
eroding confidence in 
public tap water.” 
♦ Works with other 
NGOs and CSOs on 
formalizing right to 
water in the U.N. 
♦ Launching new 
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PRIVATIZATION 
in “the world's first 
corporate 
accountability treaty -





World Bank Group) 
for promotion of PSP 
through equity 
investments in water 
TNCs, posing a 
conflict of interest,  
and other non-
transparent support for 















Water For All 
Campaign 
 














♦ Non-profit research, 
lobbying and 





♦  “Water for All” 
Campaign “worked 
with citizens’ groups 





♦   In U.S., monitors 
state and federal 
legislation, opposes 
bulk water 
exportation, and sales 




water utilities. See 
next box on the 
International 
Campaign. 
♦ FWW now more 
focused on U.S. 
campaigns; also 
active in right to 
water advocacy in the 
U.N., in tandem with 




research and “built 
international networks 
of solidarity with 
citizens’ groups that 
oppose water 
privatization efforts” 
of the water TNCs, 
IFIs, regional MDBs 
and WTO. 
♦ Worked with 
grassroots coalitions in 
many countries to 
ensure broad, bottom-
up participation in 
international meetings 
and forums. 
♦ Publication “Defend 
the Global Commons” 
provided detailed 
reports on CSO 
activism around the 
world.   
♦ Public Citizen-Water 
For All and FWW 
were/are the most 
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outreach and global 
networking.  Engaged 
in global networks 

















watchdog org., with 
100,000 members 
and 70 chapters 
across the country. 
Lobbies MPs, 
conducts research, 
and runs national 
campaigns.  Current 
campaigns include 
biotechnology, 
Health, Trade, Water 
and the Blue Planet 
Project. 
♦ Funded by member 
support and grants. 
♦ In early 1999, the 
Council launched the 
Water Campaign to 
ban the bulk export 
of Canadian water 
and prevent “the 
gradual 
commodification and 
privatization of this 
priceless public 
resource.” Works to 
protect Canadian 
lakes, rivers, and 
aquifers from 
appropriation by 
private investors.   
♦ Blue Planet Project is 
an international effort 
launched by the 
Council “to protect the 
world’s fresh water 
from growing threats 





“Blue Gold,” popular 
book cited by activists 
orgs. that warns 
against global water 
exploitation by the 
“water barons.” 
♦ Council instrumental 
in forming “Water is 
Life” coalition with 
other activist CSOs 
prior to Third World 
Water Forum in Kyoto 
(2003).  Vision 
Statement signed by 
300 CSOs.  Active in 
international forums 
(such as WSF, Red 
VIDA), and provides 
solidarity  support to 
country campaigns 
(e.g., water campaign 
in Uruguay). 








♦ FAN was launched at  
second WWF in 
2000.  It is a 
consortium of five 
 
♦ Engages in capacity-
building activities “to 
create a strong and 





Major Civil Society Organizations and Networks Active in Transnational  





NAME DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED 
ORGANIZATION TO WATER 
PRIVATIZATION 
regional networks 
with over  900 
member 
organizations in 89 
countries – each 
working on their own 
regional strategies as 
well as collaborating 
globally through the 
global network. 
 
♦ Describes its 
members as mostly 
grassroots CSOs  
working in 
challenging 
situations, such as 
urban slums and 
degraded 
environments, with 
weak governance and 
inadequate legal  or 
regulatory 
frameworks. Goal is 




♦ Hosted by WaterAid, 
no independent legal 
structure. 
♦ The network 
coordinates local 
inputs into a diverse 
range of high level 
forums including the 
WWF and Stockholm 
Water Week. 
Monitors processes 
such as tracking 
progress on the 
MDGs, U.N. climate 
change negotiations 
and the rights to 
water and sanitation. 
 
that can hold 
governments and other 
powerful institutions to 
account.” Examples 
include  “training of 
trainers” for advocacy 
work. 
♦ Main emphasis is on 
building the capacity 
of CSOs in regional 
networks to engage 
with policymakers at 
all levels.  
♦ Four thematic focus 
areas identified for 







boundary waters; and 
the rights to water and 
sanitation  
♦ Much less emphasis on 
PSP as an issue than 
other networks or 
CSOs; regional 
network in South Asia 
(FANSA) is the main 
network to express a 
concern with 
“commercialization” 
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♦ Founded in 1981, it is 
the U.K.’s  major 
charity dedicated 
exclusively to the 
provision of domestic 
water, sanitation, and 
hygiene education to 




set up low-cost 
sustainable projects 
using appropriate 
technology. States that 
it is “one of the 
leading international 
NGOs in the global 
drinking water 
sector.” 
♦ Unlike the other CSOs 
and networks listed in 
this table, WaterAid 
was established by the 
UK water industry, 
and has received up to 
25 percent its income 
from privatized UK 
water companies, 




funding from the U.K. 
government, the EU, 
as well as from trusts, 
individuals, and public 
campaigns.  
♦ Seeks to influence 
national governments, 
donors, and IFIs. Has 
called on U.K. 
Government to spend 
more on water aid to 
poor.   
 
 
♦ Has programs in 15 
countries throughout 
Africa and Asia, where 
there are the largest 
number of poor people 
without access to safe 
water.  
♦ Local partners identify 
projects and programs 
which are assessed by 
WaterAid in-country 
representatives to 
ensure that projects 
integrate water supply, 
sanitation, and hygiene. 
Communities involved 





partner organizations.  
Estimates that 
completed projects have 
helped over  eight 
million people gain 
access to  improved 
water supplies.  
♦ Sees role for small-
scale domestic private 
sector. Has been critical 
of PSP, especially in 
view of  insufficient 
regulatory capacity, 
lack of community 
participation, and lack 
of institutions in 
developing countries. 
♦ Has been a member of 
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♦ WDM is an anti-
poverty organization 
founded in 1970 
which advocates for 
“the right of poor 
communities to 
determine their own 
path out of poverty, 
and an end to harmful 
policies which put 
profit before people 
and the 
environment.” 
♦ 15,000 supporters 
and a network of 60 






research (does not 
provide aid or 
support for projects). 
♦ “Only U.K.-based 
anti-poverty 
campaigning 
organisation with a 
network of groups 
taking collective 
action at a local 
level.” 
♦ Has had high profile in 
the water justice 




2005-2008 focused on 
removing PSP 
conditionality from 
DFID’s bilateral WSS 
aid to client countries. 
Claims the following 
successes as a result of 
the water campaign:   
♦ In 2009, the EU 
announced it would 
commit 40 million 
Euros to support 
progressive public 
water schemes in 
developing countries.  
♦ In March 2007, 




support for the public 
water sector in 
developing countries, 
marking a shift away 
from DFID’s previous 
approach. 
♦ Campaign successfully 
pressured U.K. water 
TNC Severn Trent to 
withdraw from bidding 
on PSP contract in 
Nepal (2007). 
Campaign in Ghana in 
2005 similarly 
convinced TNC 
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♦ The Transnational 
Institute (TNI) was 
established in 1974 as 
an international 
network of activist  
researchers (“scholar  
activists”) committed 
to critical analyses of  
global problems. “It 
aims to provide 
intellectual support to 
movements 




♦ Sources of funding 
come from a variety 
of progressive NGOs 
and foundations as 
well as the Danish, 
Dutch, Finnish and 
German  
governments and the 
European Union. 
♦ Corporate Europe 
Observatory (CEO) 
describes itself as a 
research and 
campaign group 
“working to expose 
and challenge the 
privileged access and 
influence enjoyed by 
corporations and their 
lobby groups in EU 
policy making.”  It is 
located in the same 
office building as 
TNI in Amsterdam. 
 
♦ Jointly runs the “Water 
Justice 
Project,”descibed as 
“engaged in the work 
of building viable 
alternatives to water 
privatisation, focused 
on how to reform 
public utilities in order 
to make the human 
right to water a reality 
for everyone.” 
♦ Acts as the facilitating 
hub of the Reclaim 
Public Water network; 
advocates for  public-
public partnerships 
(PUPs); facilitates 
global, regional and 
local collective 
learning processes. 
“TNI plays a critical 
role in linking up 
campaigners from civil 
society movements 
across the world with 
resource people from 
the network.”  
♦  Campaigns and 
lobbies donor 
governments, IFIs, and 
actors like the EU 
Commission to “end 
their bias towards 
funding private sector 
solutions” and support 
effective public water 
service provision. 
♦ Represents civil 
society's voice in the 







Major Civil Society Organizations and Networks Active in Transnational  





NAME DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES RELATED 













♦ Established as 
alternative to World 
Economic Forum, to 
represent voices of 
civil society opposed 
to “neoliberal 
globalization.”. 
♦  WSF is “not an 
organisation, not a 
united front platform, 
but "…an open 
meeting place for 
reflective thinking, 
democratic debate of 
ideas…by groups and 
movements of civil 
society that are 
opposed to neo- 
liberalism…and are 
committed to 
building a society 
centered on the 
human person". 
(WSF Charter of 
Principles).    
♦ WSF 2004 in 
Mumbai, India drew 
around 100,000 
participants from 
over 100 countries, 
with goal of greater 
representation of 
poor than at past 
events.   
 
♦ Meetings in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil  and 
Mumbai, India during 
the first half of the 
decade and  in Nairobi, 
Kenya in 2007 have 
attracted many water 
activists. Various loose 
networks of water 
activists coordinated 
16 water-related events 
at the fourth WSF in 
Mumbai, where the 
Reclaiming Public 
Water network was 
formed. Eleven of 






♦ A two-day “People’s 
World Water Forum” 
(PWWF), held in New 
Delhi  prior to the start 
of the WSF IV, crafted 
Declaration of 
Peoples’ World Water 
Movement committing 
to action plan against 
water TNCs, World 










♦ The Water Dialogues 






and how the private 
sector can contribute 
to the delivery of 
affordable and 
sustainable WSS 
♦ Key principle was that 
dialogue should take 
place between those 
directly engaged in 
national and local 
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services, especially to  
poor communities. 
Lasted from 2002 
through 2009. 
♦ Traced its origins to 
the 2001 Bonn 
Freshwater 
Conference where the 




expressed support for 
a “stakeholder 
dialogue” to review 
issues surrounding 
PSP. 





participants at a 
Conference in Berlin 
mandated the 
Working Group – the 
Brazilian Association 
of Municipal Water 






(South Africa), Public 
Service International, 
RWE Thames Water 




WaterAid(UK) – to 
advance a project 
linking national 
dialogues under an 
international 
umbrella. 
dialogue. Both styles 
generated  some 
transformation in 
views in each group, 
underscoring the value 
of the process.     
♦ Scoping study 
identified five major 
PSP themes for 
national working 
groups (NWGs) to 
tackle: Financing water 
and sanitation services; 





and efficiently; and 
safeguarding public 
interests.  
♦ Evidence from primary  
case studies served as 
the basis for dialogue 
and trust-building in 
several countries.  
♦ Final report noted that: 
“Some participants in 
the international debate 
now offer a more 
nuanced understanding 
of the broad range of 
private actors – both 
formal and informal, 
profit and not-for-
profit – participating in 
the water supply 
sector…[t]he issue of 
the relative merits of 
the public and private 
sector as water service 
providers has been 
joined (and to some 
extent supplanted) by 
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♦  National Dialogues 
were established in 
five countries – 
Brazil, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, South 
Africa and Uganda – 





♦ Consensus that 
concessions are no 
longer a widely-
applicable model and 
there is a need to find 
alternative sources of 
financing. 
♦ Broad agreement 
(although not full 
consensus) on the need 
for a strong regulatory 
framework for public 





Chapter 6:  The Successful Campaign to Reform Uruguay’s 
Constitution to Prohibit Private Sector Participation in WSS 
 
Una gota con ser poco, con otras se hace un aguacero 
One drop is too small, but with others becomes a downpour 
 
    -Daniel Viglietti 
    Milonga de andar lejos, 1984374  
 
On October 31 we are all Uruguayans.  
     
    - Maude Barlow375 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
 
These lyrics from folk singer Daniel Viglietti’s internationally beloved song 
were adopted as the motto of Uruguay’s Comisión Nacional en Defensa del Agua y de 
la Vida (CNDAV, the National Commission in Defense of Water and Life) in its 
successful constitutional reform campaign to prohibit the private provision of  water 
and sanitation services. Viglietti, who was imprisoned and then forced into a twelve 
year exile during the brutal Uruguayan military dictatorship (1973-85), wrote this 
song about overcoming poverty, oppression, and exile through transnational 
solidarity.  He sang it again to an adoring crowd which had gathered in the Plaza 
Primer de Mayo across from the Legislative Assembly building in Montevideo on 
October 23, 2004.  The crowd of about 200 people, in which I was an observer, 
rallied to support the upcoming plebiscite vote during the five-year general election 
scheduled for October 31, 2004.  In that historic election the left-wing coalition, 
Frente Amplio-Encuentro Progresista (Broad Front-Progressive Encounter, FA-
                                           
374 Daniel Viglietti, 1984. Recorded on Canciones de mi America. 
375 Author of Blue Gold: The Battle Against Corporate Theft of the World’s Water (with Tony Clarke), 
2002; and Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the Fight for the Right to Water. McClelland 
& Stewart, Toronto, 2007. 
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EP),376 wrested the Presidency from the two traditional parties, the Colorados and 
Blancos, for the first time in the country’s 176-year history.   
 The plebiscite which was the focus of CNDAV’s campaign won with 64.6 
percent of the vote, garnering almost 15 percent more of the popular vote than was 
won by FA-EP President Tabaré Vasquez in his historic victory (Vasquez won with 
50.4 percent of the vote).  The plebiscite won in 16 out of 19 Departments,377 
compared to FA-EP victories in seven of 19 Departments.378  The  plebiscite 
amended the Constitution to codify the following principles: 
                                          
 Access to water and sanitation are fundamental human rights 
 Social considerations take priority over economic considerations in 
water policies 
 WSS will be provided directly and exclusively by the public sector 
 WSS will be managed according to principles of environmental 
sustainability and solidarity with future generations. 
 Civil society will participate in all aspects of planning, management, 
and control of water; and 
 Compensation for existing private concessions will only be for non-
amortized physical investments, not for lost future profits. 
 
The successful constitutional reform (CR) of 2004 thus changed the legal framework 
of WSS provision in Uruguay.  The two private concessionaires and 14 small private 
sector operators that existed before the plebiscite were subsequently either terminated 
or re-absorbed by the state-owned water and sewerage utility, the Administración de 
las Obrus Sanitarias del Estado (OSE, see Box 1).  All WSS services are now 
 
376 During the 2004 elections the Frente Amplio coalition was actually made of up three political forces 
which in turn subsumed different “factions” or “fractions” (see further discussion of this terminology 
in the Chapter).  These were the Frente Amplio (Broad Front), Encuentra Progresista (Progressive 
Encounter), and Nueva Mayoria (New Majority).  I use FA-EP as a shorthand, referring to the two 
largest political forces in the coalition. 
377 Departments are administrative/geographical units. 
378 Government of Uruguay, Electoral Courrt (Corte Electoral de Uruguay).  : 
http://elecciones.corteelectoral.gub.uy/20041031/SSPConsulta.asp?TipoCons=A&Acto=20041031&Or
g. (November 26, 2004) 
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provided either by OSE, the Municipality of Montevideo (for sanitation), or by an 
OSE subsidiary, in the case of the former private Maldonado concessions.379   
 The constitutional amendment set an international precedent for the 
transnational movement against water privatization by making the private provision 
of WSS illegal.  Uruguayan activist-researcher Carlos Santos claims that the reform 
was also one of the first instances where the requirement for environmentally- 
sustainable provision was incorporated in a constitution.  The CR strategy was also 
used to publicize the perceived risks of the loss of national sovereignty under bilateral 
investment treaties and closed-door dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the 
World Bank’s ICSID.  The Uruguayan case was a real and symbolic victory for the 
movement: it gave impetus to and had a demonstration effect on organizing efforts 
around the world to engage in constitutional engineering.  Activists in Colombia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Nigeria, and Mexico began to organize around the 
constitutional protection of water, galvanized by the Uruguayan victory.  In 
Colombia, for example, the National Committee in Defense of Water and Life 
delivered over two million signatures in September 2008 to the National Registrar of 
Elections in support of a constitutional referendum.  The referendum sought to make 
water a fundamental human right; require the Colombian government to guarantee a 
free basic minimum to its citizens; require that water services be administered only by 
the State and/or with community participation; and require that the State protect water 
basins.  The Colombian campaign, headed up by the environmental NGO Ecofondo 
                                           
379 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document (PAD), Second Phase of the OSE Modernization and 
Systems Rehabilitation Project, May 31, 2007.  http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/06/12/000020953_20070612
144947/Rendered/PDF/39864.pdf  (December 9, 2007).  
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with the participation of over sixty other organizations, was strongly supported by 
CNDAV and modeled after the Uruguayan constitutional reform.  CNDAV leaders 
Alberto Villareal (Friends of the Earth-Uruguay) and Adriana Marquisio (Vice-
President of the water workers’ union) sailed down the Amazon River in November 
and December 2007 with Colombian and other Latin American activists to promote 
the referendum.  However, the referendum was significantly weakened by the lower 
chamber of the Colombian Congress in May 2010, and CSOs withdrew their 
support.380    
 The Uruguayan campaign victory on October 31 was further memorialized in 
the water justice TANs’ designation of that month as “Blue October,” an international 
“month of action to challenge corporate control of water and to protect water as a 
shared natural resource available to all.”  Blue October was launched at the 
alternative activist forum (IFDW) during the fourth WWF in March 2006.  It 
functioned as a political space to coordinate commemorative activities for three years, 
but has waned since 2009.  CNDAV members have continued to play a prominent 
role in the international water movement, especially in Latin America, through La 
Red VIDA.  The water utility union’s vice-president, Adriana Marquisio, delivered 
the opening remarks at the August 2008 Red VIDA gathering in Cochabamba, which 
had representation from about 50 civil society organizations.  The 2008 Declaration 
of Cochabamba committed to continued support, in Latin America and around the 
world, for “constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms that promote the 
reversal of privatization and commodification of water.”  Organizers of the 
                                           
380 Martinez, Helda. May 20, 2010.  “Initiative for Water as a Human Right Sinking in Congress.” Inter 
Press Service, Bogota, Colombia.  http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51523 (January 11, 2011) 
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Uruguayan referendum have said that the success of their initiative has had a greater 
impact internationally than nationally.381  But they add that constitutional engineering 
was never meant to be a “silver bullet;” mobilization was a means to encourage 
citizen participation and hold governments accountable. 
 Methodologically, the Uruguay case study has intrinsic value because it is a 
unique example of a successful water activist campaign centered around a strategy of 
constitutional engineering.  The particularities of Uruguay as a small, educated, upper 
middle-income developing country favored social and political mobilization, 
rendering it an atypical or “extreme” case.  In this respect it is a weak test for 
generalizing the effects of activist mobilization on agenda change in the Bank.  But as 
an extreme case, it is a strong test of what we can learn about the behavior and 
influence of TANs and activist domestic coalitions under optimal conditions for 
political mobilization, and through a successful campaign which had a strong 
demonstration effect on the water justice movement.  The case has instrumental value 
for understanding the challenges facing water justice activists after a successful 
campaign.  It is likewise a strong test of the Bank’s ex post reaction to a blanket 
prohibition on PSP in a country where it had been pushing this strategy through loan 
conditionalities. 
 This chapter is divided into three parts. Part One (sections 6.2 through 6.4) 
discusses the precipitants of the CR campaign, its development and protagonists, and 
the trajectory of the campaign up to the October 2004 victory.  Section 6.2 focuses on 
the underpinnings of the CR strategy in Uruguayans’ increasingly frequent 
                                           
381 Bart Beeson, “New Wave of Water Movements in Latin America,” NACLA Online News, March 
31, 2008. http://nacla.org/node/4560 (April 8, 2008) 
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deployment of direct democracy mechanisms to engineer social change.  Section 6.3 
briefly discusses the introduction of PSP into the WSS sector in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, and the coalescence of a cross-section of CSOs into the formation of the 
CNDAV.  Section 6.4 analyzes the characteristics of the domestic CNDAV coalition, 
transnational support, and the strategic development of the campaign between 2002 
and 2004.  Part Two (section 6.5) returns to the discussion of neoliberal policies in 
WSS provision between 1992-2004, closely analyzing key World Bank and IDB loan 
documents, including structural adjustment loans made during the severe economic 
downturn of 2002-2003.  The analysis exposes contradictions in the Bank’s 
evaluation of OSE’s  performance and the rationale for pushing PSP loan 
conditionality.  Part Three (sections 6.6 and 6.7) examines developments in the post-
CR period between 2005 and 2009.  Section 6.6.1 looks at fissures on the left, first 
between CNDAV and the new FA-EP government, and then within CNDAV over 
how to realize the social goals in the CR, and whether to do so by “participation from 
above or below.”  Section 6.6.2 looks at the World Bank’s and IDB’s reactions to 
operating in the new WSS sector environment where PSP is now prohibited.  I 
conduct a close analysis of Bank documents which again reveal a number of startling 
contradictions and “truth-stretching” in the Bank’s hindsight evaluation of its WSS 
lending policies, and inadequacies in the Bank’s technical assessments.  The Uruguay 
case confirms the tensions laid out in the internal descriptive model of the Bank that I 
presented in Chapter Four.  Pro-PSP ideology and loan conditions prior to the CR are 
shown to be at odds with the relatively good performance of OSE as a public sector 
utility; after the CR, the Bank continues to lend very willingly to the sector.  
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Moreover, the strongest impetus for reforming regulation comes from the new left-
wing government on its own initiative; neither from previous neoliberal governments, 
nor from Bank-imposed conditions (though the Bank falsely attempts to take credit).  
Section 6.7 concludes by looking at the unresolved tensions between CNDAV’s goals 






An Overview of Water Resources and Service Provision In Uruguay 
 
▪ Along with neighboring countries, Uruguay has one of the largest reserves of fresh 
water in the world: almost half of its 187,000 square kilometer area is situated above 
usable aquifer sources.  The largest, the Guaraní aquifer, is one of the biggest 
subterranean freshwater reservoirs in the world; it occupies 58,000 square kilometers 
of Uruguayan territory, and extends into Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.382   
 
▪ The World Bank characterizes Uruguay as “an upper-middle income country 
characterized by a high coverage and quality of public services and infrastructure 
relative to other Latin American or middle income countries…the provision of potable 
water is practically universal in the entire country, as is the provision of adequate 
sanitation services.”    However, Uruguay’s sanitation coverage level drops to 56.5 
percent when coverage is measured as the  percentage of the population with 
household connections to the sewerage network, and to 27.4 percent when 
measurement is restricted to the population in the urban interior served by OSE, the 
national water and sewerage utility. 383     
 
OSE provides water and sanitation services for the entire country, except for Montevideo, 
where sanitation services are provided by the municipality. OSE was a private British-owned 
utility until 1952 when it became a public enterprise through the 1952 Sector Law (No. 
11.907).  It was one of the first Latin American utilities to introduce wastewater treatment not 
only to the capital city, but also to regional capitals.384  OSE reports to the Ministry of 
Housing, Land Management and Environment (MVOTMA), which submits OSE’s proposed 
budgets to the Executive’s Office of Planning and Budget (Oficina de Planeamiento y 
Presupuesto, OPP).  OPP in turns clears the proposals before the President approves them on 
behalf of the national government.385  As noted elsewhere in this chapter, OSE has typically 
been self-sustaining, but unlike other Uruguayan state-owned enterprises has not been a net 
contributor to the state treasury.
                                           
382 Rabuffetti, Mauricio. 2006. “When Water Becomes a Political Challenge: Uruguay Moves for a 
Constitutional Amendment Declaring Water to Be a Public Right,” Women’s International Peace and 
Freedom League, (original from portal.unesco.org). http://www.wilpf.org/water_political_challenge 
(December 9, 2007). 
383 World Bank 2007.  Project Appraisal Document (PAD), Second Phase of the OSE Modernization 
and Systems Rehabilitation Project, May 31, 2007.  http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/06/12/000020953_20070612
144947/Rendered/PDF/39864.pdf  (December 9, 2007). Adequate sanitation services here refers to 
access to some type of improved sanitation facility, including connection to septic systems and simple 
or improved pit latrines. 
384 World Bank 2000.  Project Appraisal Document (PAD), OSE Modernization and Systems 
Rehabilitation Project, May 1, 2000, 25. 





6.2.  Statism and Direct Democracy Mechanisms: Historical Factors 
Underpinning the Constitutional Reform Campaign  
 
 
The origins and success of the CR campaign, as a specific strategy to prohibit 
the private provision of WSS in Uruguay, are rooted in a number of historical factors.  
The template for the campaign’s success was forged by a pluralistic political system 
with strong party competition and civic participation, strong support for state 
institutions and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the ability to constitutionally 
engineer social and political change through two mechanisms of direct democracy, 
referendums and plebiscites.  Referendums and plebiscites have played an important 
role in effecting social and political change, as I discuss below.   
With the exception of the period 1973-85 under military dictatorship, Uruguay 
has been the most enduring democracy in Latin America, with the continent’s oldest 
multiparty political system.386  Until the breakdown of democracy in 1968 and the 
subsequent military coup d’etat, Uruguay had enjoyed the moniker of  the 
“Switzerland of South America” due to historically high levels of economic 
development, sophisticated representative institutions, and a comprehensive welfare 
state.387  Its electoral and party system, modeled early in the twentieth century after 
the Swiss collegial executive system, has nurtured pluralism and a highly-
participatory democracy through, among other features, electoral rules which have 
                                           
386 Uruguay achieved independence in 1828 and had its first constitution in 1830. As noted below, the 
party system was bipartisan until the growth of a leftist opposition in the 1960s and with Frente 
Amplio’s entry in the 1971 elections.   
387 Council on Hemispheric Affairs. May 2005, 3; Weinstein 1988, Chapter 3.  
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institutionalized stable party factions (under the Ley de Lemas).388   Uruguay’s 
political party system was effectively bipartisan for the first two-thirds of the 
twentieth century, dominated by the two traditional parties, the Partido Colorado and 
Partido Nacional (or Blancos).389  The onset of stagflation in the late 1950s and the 
1960s and the exhaustion of the import-substituting industrialization model led to the 
weakening of the traditional parties and the growth of a left-wing opposition, the 
Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA).  Although the Frente Amplio was outlawed during 
the dictatorship, it grew substantially in the years after the return to civilian rule in 
1985.  The FA garnered the largest share of the popular vote in the 1999 general 
elections (40  percent), winning the most seats in the General Assembly.  Tabaré 
Vasquez, the FA candidate who won the presidency in 2004, would have won in 1999 
were it not for a 1996 constitutional amendment which instituted a run-off system for 
the presidential election.  This amendment had the desired outcome of changing 
                                           
388 The Ley de Lemas is the Spanish name for the double simultaneous voting system, which tallies 
votes for political parties or coalitions (lemas) on the basis of votes cast for lists of candidates 
submitted by party fractions (sublemas).  This system allows many candidates for the legislative 
branch to run within the same party, allows a voter to cast her vote according to ideological preference 
or in accordance with a sublema’s platform, and is intended to make intra-party alliances more 
transparent.  Four features characterized the Uruguayan electoral system between 1942-1994: the 
double-simultaneous voting system, wherein a political party and one of its lists (put forth by party 
fractions) are voted simultaneously, election of the Executive through plural voting; election of the 
legislative chambers through proportional representation and  concurrent elections for the Executive 
and Legislature.  New electoral rules which came into force in 1999 modified three of these four 
features, including replacing the plurality system for the election of President with a two-ballot 
majority system, which requires a run-off election in the event no party receives a majority in the first-
round of voting.  This reform was an attempt by the Colorados and Blancos to head off a victory by the 
burgeoning  Frente Amplio. The multiple-simultaneous voting system was also changed, so that now 
each party could only run one presidential candidate across all of its fractions, or sublemas.  Bergara et 
al. 2004, 49-50; de Brito 1997, 35; Weinstein 1988. 
389 The Colorados (reds) and Blancos (whites), were so named for the headbands they wore as warring 
factions in the decades following independence. The Colorados were traditionally associated with 
liberalism, secularism and urban business and worker interests, in line with the legacy of their 
renowned leader, José Battle y Ordóñez who built the foundations of the modern welfare state in the 
early 20th centry. The Blancos were historically conservative, defending the interests of landowners 
and the Catholic Church.  The distinctions between the parties blurred in later decades of the twentieth 
century. Weinstein 1988. 
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electoral rules to the benefit of the traditional parties.390   Today, the FA comprises a 
broad spectrum of political fractions (sub-lemas)391 from the center to the left, and as 
a coalition, represents the social-democratic policy space in Uruguayan society.  
Uruguay was one of the earliest welfare states in Latin America, developed 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century through the programs initiated 
by Colorado Party leader President José Battle y Ordóñez.392  Battle promoted social 
welfare legislation that consolidated his support among the urban, immigrant working 
class, but the centerpiece of his ideology, “Battlismo,” was the creation of entes 
autónomos, state enterprises, to provide essential services, or to own and operate key 
commercial or industrial sectors.393   Reforms introduced in the 1960s reduced 
clientelism and patronage in these SOEs and Uruguayans have consistently supported 
the maintenance and operation of essential service utilities in the public sector.  The 
provision of utility services by public enterprises is enshrined in the Constitution; 
management of SOEs is somewhat independent, though the President has the power 
to appoint Board members and approve tariffs in the monopoly segments.394  
 One of Uruguay’s leading historians, Benjamín Nahum, notes that the 
overwhelming majority of Uruguayans, without distinction of political party, see state 
institutions as serving a social function, first and foremost.395  In a poll conducted in 
the year 2000, roughly 80 percent of Uruguayans expressed the view that the State 
                                           
390 Frente Amplio won the plurality of votes—40 percent of the popular vote in a four-party race—in 
the 1999 elections, thus constituting the largest legislative bloc. U.S. Department of State 2002. 
Human Rights Report and Background Note: Uruguay, October 2006.    
391 Several scholars of Uruguay’s political system prefer the term “fraction,” to faction, as the sublemas 
are institutionalized political groupings. Altman 2002, 620; Juan Pablo Luna 2007.  
392 Weinstein 1988, 23.   
393 Weinstein 1988, 23-24. 
394 Bergara et al. 2004.  
395 Nahum 2002, 385. 
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should control most public companies, an opinion shared by 90 percent of those who 
identified themselves as left-wing, 82 percent of centrists, and 71 percent who 
considered themselves as on the right-wing side of the political spectrum.396  The 
public’s endorsement of a free market economy was the lowest in Latin America in a 
survey taken in 2003, even though Uruguay ranked high on various measures of 
economic openness and governance.397   Only Argentina had a more negative view of 
privatization.398  Mario Bergara, whom I interviewed and who currently serves as 
President of the Central Bank of Uruguay,399 has written that the lack of political 
consensus for privatization has been a function of the fact that many public sector 
monopolies, especially in electricity, telecommunications and petroleum refining, 
have historically run surpluses which contributed to the state Treasury and helped to 
promote efficiency improvements.400  The water and sanitation utility, OSE, is an 
exception, though it has still generally operated at the break-even point.401  
In addition to strong public support for maintaining network utilities under 
state ownership and control, Uruguayans have had at their disposal two constitutional 
devices for engineering political and social change: referendums and plebiscites.  
Bergara et. al. maintain that these two mechanisms of direct democracy “are the key 
institutional ingredients for understanding the moderation of liberal reforms in 
                                           
396 Bergara et al. 2004, 4.   
397 Global Competitiveness Report, 2003. Cited in Bergara et al., 3-8. 
398 Global Competitiveness Report, 2003. Cited in Bergara et al., 3-8. 
399 Bergara was vice-minister of Economy and Finance from 2005-2008. 
400 Bergara et al. 2004, 12.  During the mid to late 1990s, the electricity and in part, 
telecommunications monopolies were opened up to moderate market-oriented reforms, though 
implementation has been uneven.  The authors do not indicate that liberalization in these sectors 
altered revenue flows to the Treasury.  
401 Interview with Marcel Achkar and Ana Dominguez, October 29, 2004. 
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Uruguay from 1990 onwards.”402  Both plebiscites and referendums have been in use 
in Uruguay for most of the twentieth century, though their use and purpose has 
changed in frequency and in substance with changes in the country’s legal and 
governance structure.  Although the terms “plebiscite” and “referendum” were used 
interchangeably for over the first half of the twentieth century, since 1967 
referendums have been constitutionally defined as mechanisms to repeal existing 
laws.403  The signatures of  25  percent of registered voters must be collected within a 
year of the law’s passage to be put on the ballot as a referendum.  Plebiscites, in 
contrast, are a legal means of directly amending the Constitution, require the 
signatures of at least ten percent of registered voters to be placed on the ballot, and 
can only be put to a vote at the same time as Presidential elections, once every five 
years.  These two constitutional devices act as veto mechanisms on Uruguay’s strong 
executive branch, obliging presidents to be cautious about legislation that can be 
subsequently overturned by disaffected groups which could mobilize popular 
initiatives.404 
 Lissidini delineates three epochs in Uruguayan political history associated 
with the differential use of these mechanisms of  direct democracy.405  In the first 
epoch, 1917-1971, the two dominant political parties, the Colorados and Blancos, 
originated legislative initiatives to create majorities based on prior inter-party or inter-
factional accords, with the goal of displacing some other political faction.  These 
referendums did not arise from popular initiatives, and although were viewed as a 
                                           
402 Bergara et al. 2004, 35. 
403 Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay, Article 79.  Laws dealing with taxes or where the 
Executive has exclusive powers cannot be repealed under referendums. 
404 Bergara et al. 2004, 35. 
405 Lissidini, in Mallo and Serna 2001. 
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legitimate means of resolving crises in the political sphere, were frequently more 
autocratic than democratic, and had the effect of consolidating the stronghold of the 
two dominant parties.406  The second phase Lissidini cites is under the military 
dictatorship. In November 1980, the armed forces submitted to a plebiscite its project 
to reform the constitution, with the goal of return to “limited democracy.”   The 
proposed new constitution would have continued to authorize the armed forces to take 
“all measures needed for national security,” legalized military control over the two 
traditional parties, outlawed the leftist parties, given the armed forces veto power over 
all future government action, and effectively ratified all the illegal acts of the de facto 
regime.407  The military expected to win the plebiscite: it was instead rejected by a 57 
to 43 percent margin, with a 64 to 36 percent margin in Montevideo.  This mistaken 
strategy of resorting to a plebiscite “was the beginning of the end for the military” 
and opened the road toward re-democratization in Uruguay.  A wave of detentions 
followed the constitutional plebiscite, and most of the disappearances that occurred 
under Uruguay’s military regime occurred in this period.408  A further indication of 
the regime’s humiliation was the 1981 ban on the word “plebiscite” or any reference 
to that event.409   
The third phase in the use of referendums and plebiscites began in 1989 and 
has continued up to the present time.  Four years after the return to civilian 
government in 1985 the Uruguayan people put to the ballot a referendum to repeal the 
                                           
406 Lissidini 2001, 1-7. 
407 Weinstein 1988, 74-75; Lissidini 2001, 8-9.  
408 de Brito 1997, 48. 
409 Weinstein 1988, 72. 
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controversial and divisive law, the Ley de Caducidad,410 which granted amnesty to 
military officers accused of human rights violations.  After an intense campaign 
accompanied by threats and intimidation by the military and “dirty tricks” by the 
Electoral Court (which was accused of invalidating legitimate signatures), the 
referendum to repeal the amnesty law was defeated, with 44  percent voting in favor 
of repeal.411   Nevertheless, the referendum on the amnesty law was a turning point in 
the use of direct democracy mechanisms in Uruguay.  It ushered in a new era where 
direct democracy mechanisms would be employed frequently by civil society groups 
for explicitly contestational or oppositional purposes.  Since 1989, referendums and 
plebiscites have been used once a year in Uruguay compared to only 17 instances 
during 1917-80.412   They have become critical tools in the arsenal of activists, 
organized interest groups, and opposition parties to repeal legislation, block economic 
reforms, and/or promote political goals.  The use of direct democracy mechanisms 
has been the primary vehicle for opposing privatization of SOEs and the neoliberal 
reforms introduced in the 1990s. 
 
Blocking Privatization through Referendums: 1992  
 
In December 1992, a successful referendum backed by Frente Amplio, 
fractions of both the Colorados and Blancos, and the national trade union federation 
(PIT-CNT), partially repealed the Ley de Empresas Publicas, the Public Enterprises 
                                           
410 Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado, roughly translated as Law for the 
Annulment of the State’s Punitive Capacity.  This law was passed in December 1986 after bitter debate 
in both houses of parliament, fistfights between legislators, and violent street demonstrations.  In 
February 1987, a campaign was launched to gather the requisite 520,000 signatures (25 percent of 
registered voters) to put the referendum on the ballot.  
411 Lissidini 2001, 13. 
412 Valdomir 2002. 
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Law.413  The Public Enterprises Law would have permitted the executive branch, 
without legislative approval, to privatize or “demonopolize” any public enterprise or 
service, and opened the door to the partial sale of the surplus-generating 
telecommunications utility (ANTEL) and to some commercial associations for the 
electrical energy utility (UTE).414   The law also contemplated the full sale or closure 
of the national airline, PLUMA, and the state-owned fur seal and fisheries enterprise.  
The law was passed under the National Party (Partido Nacional, PN) presidency of 
Luis Alberto Lacalle, who was committed to a vision of economic restructuring 
which included an emphasis on the roles of the private sector and the market, and 
reform of the public sector through demonopolization and privatization.415  Lacalle 
assumed the presidency in 1990 with real GDP per capita roughly stagnant for the 
prior five years, inflation approaching 130 percent, and a fiscal deficit over 3.0 
percent of GDP, the highest it had been in five years.416  In an example of Peter 
Gourevitch’s “second image reversed,” political scientist James Vreeland argues that 
Lacalle actively sought an IMF Stand-by credit in 1990 to impose conditionalities that 
would reduce the fiscal deficit and the size of the public sector—policies that 
Lacalle’s administration could not alone impose, given their unpopularity with 
                                           
413 Articles 1, 2, 3, 10 and 31 of the Public Enterprises Law (Ley No. 16.211) were repealed with 71.6 
percent of the popular vote. 
414 Bergara et al. note that the union of ANTEL employees initiated the referendum, while Lissidini 
suggests that the move to preempt parliamentary consideration generated broad-based and multiparty 
support.  Bergara et.al. 2004, 57. Lissidini 2001, 11. 
415 Jennifer McCoy, with Jeff Davis and Paul Foote, “Reluctant Reformers:Explaining Privatization in 
Venezuela and Uruguay,” Department of Political Science, Georgia State University.  Draft copy, 
Prepared for presentation at the Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, 1998. 
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/McCoy-Davis-Foote.pdf  (January 13, 2009. 
416 World Resources Institute, Earth Trends, Country Profiles: Uruguay, 2003. 
http://earthtrends.wri.org/pdf_library/country_profiles/eco_cou_858.pdf  (January 15, 2009); U.S. 
Department of State February 1994. “Uruguay: Economic Policy And Trade Practices.”  
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/economics/trade_reports/1993/Uruguay.html (January 15, 2009). 
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fractions of all three political parties. (Though Lacalle’s National Party won 37 
percent of the vote, he and his political “fraction,” Herrerismo, won only 22 percent 
of the vote, only one  percent higher than Frente Amplio, which won populous 
Montevideo and took control of its local government).417  To bolster his economic 
reform program and counteract the lack of domestic support, Lacalle went so far as to 
announce that his administration had signed a letter of intent (LOI) for a $150 million 
Stand-by Arrangement six months before the LOI was actually signed.  When the 
Stand-by Arrangement went into effect in December 1990, the IMF made no mention 
of Uruguay’s foreign reserve position (because, as Vreeland points out, it was 
“conspicuously strong”).  It instead attributed Uruguay’s economic problems to a 
rising budget deficit, and called for linking public-sector wages to the projected 
decline in inflation and deregulating and privatizing public enterprises.418  
 Despite Lacalle’s strategic engagement of IMF support through loan 
conditionalities, the President was dealt a severe setback when 72 percent of the 
population voted by referendum for a partial repeal of the Public Enterprises Law.  
Lissidini states that the idea for repealing the Public Enterprises law germinated even 
before it passed.  She attributes this to the demonstration effect of the two 1989 
referendums which emboldened organized social and political groups to challenge the 
results of representative democracy with the tools of direct democracy.  Public sector 
employees constituted almost one-fourth of the employed workforce, and the 
downsizing of the State threatened a loss of patronage and political influence for both 
                                           
417 James Vreeland 2003. “Why Do Governments and the IMF Enter into Agreements? Statistically 
Selected Cases,” International Political Science Review 24 (3), 321–343.  
418 Vreeland 2003. 
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the Colorados and Blancos.419  Argentina’s negative experience with privatization of 
its state-owned telecommunications enterprise, ENTEL (during which rates went up 
and service declined), made Uruguayans even more leery of opening up their 
generally well-regarded SOEs to market forces.420  It should be noted, however, that 
the Public Enterprises Law was only partially repealed because a full repeal did not 
have the support of even the Frente Amplio.  There were two ballots associated with 
the referendum: the “white ballot” (papeleta blanca) called for repealing those 
articles of the law which would have permitted the sale of private shares in ANTEL; 
this won overwhelmingly, with 72 percent of the vote.  However, the papeleta rosada 
or “pink ballot,” which would have also prohibited the sale of the state-owned airline 
PLUNA and the state-owned seal and fishing enterprise, ILPE, lost.  Though 
supported by the respective unions of these SOEs and the left-wing faction of Frente 
Amplio, the majority of the party recognized that PLUNA and ILPE were not 
economically viable, and did not close ranks to support the pink ballot.421 
  In the decade following the successful rollback of the Public Enterprises Law 
and prior to the 2004 water plebiscite, there were several more popular initiatives 
introduced to defeat proposed liberalizations of state-owned enterprises.  The 1998 
initiative to oppose deregulation of the electricity SOE, UTE,  failed to collect the 
required signatures (25  percent) for a referendum.422  In another instance, the 
Uruguayan Parliament preemptively repealed a law to partially privatize the state-
                                           
419 Lissidini 2001, 11. 
420 L. Luxner, “Uruguay Voters Kill Privatization,” Telephony, January 4, 1993. 
421 Raul Legnani. January 18, 2007. “Plebiscito de 1992: el FA no cerró filas por Pluna estatal.” La 
Republica online. http://www.larepublica.com.uy/larepublica/2007/01/18/politica/241953/plebiscito-
de-1992-el-fa-no-cerro-filas-por-pluna-estatal/ (November 20, 2007).  
422 Bergara et al. 2004, 19. 
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owned mobile telephone company, anticipating that a referendum drive was imminent 
and would have succeeded.  In December 2003, over 62 percent of Uruguayans voted 
to approve a referendum to block a law which would have allowed the state-run fuel 
company, ANCAP, to associate with private firms.423  Unlike in the subsequent case 
of water privatization, the Frente Amplio party played a pivotal role throughout, 
along with ANCAP’s trade union, in supporting the referendum campaign to repeal 
the privatization of ANCAP.424    
In summary, mechanisms of direct democracy such as referendums and 
plebiscites were a key tool in preventing the “retreat of the state” in strategic areas.  
Even advocates of market reforms in the liberalization of Uruguayan public 
monopolies have conceded that these tools have been a transparent form of veto 
mechanism in the policymaking arena.425  However, in contrast to the 
telecommunications, electricity, and fuel sectors, where referendums sought to 
overturn existing laws, the plebiscite campaign against water privatization caught 
analysts and proponents of market reforms off-guard.426  The WSS concessions to 
private operators in Uruguay were localized and had been awarded through 
administrative channels which did not require legal approval (hence there were no 
specific sectoral laws to overturn via a referendum campaign).  Moreover, a complete 
privatization of the state-owned utility, OSE, had never been on the agenda for 
political reasons.  Yet in spite of the different circumstances affecting OSE and 
                                           
423 ANCAP is the National Administration of Fuels, Alcohol and Portland (cement).  Resource Center 
of the Americas, “Oil Privatization Voted Down,” http://www.americas.org/item_8637 (November 26, 
2004). 
424 Bergara et al. 2004, 58.   
425 Bergara, et al. 2004. 
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predictions to the contrary, it became the center of a plebiscite campaign which 
galvanized more attention than any of the prior anti-privatization campaigns and an 
international symbol of success in beating back the privatization of public services. 
 
6.3. From Concessions to the Constitution: Prelude to the CNDAV  
 
 The first private concession of public water provision in Uruguay began 
“paradoxically”-- as leading chroniclers of the anti-privatization campaign put it-- 
two days prior to the 1992 referendum against  privatization of public enterprises.427   
Recognizing that public sentiment was heavily against privatization, on December 11, 
1992 the Directors of OSE granted a 15 year concession to a private company, Aguas 
de la Costa, to supply WSS to 3000 households in the eastern part of the Department 
of  Maldonado.  Maldonado is the wealthiest Department in Uruguay, famous for its 
luxurious beach resorts in Punta del Este.428  The concession was awarded through 
administrative channels, and did not require legal approval at the time of  award.429  
One year later, the General Assembly ratified the concession.430  In December 1997, 
the French multinational water company, then Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, bought up 
60 percent of the shares of Aguas de la Costa through its ownership share in the 
Spanish company, Aguas de Barcelona.   
 In 1996 both the Government of Uruguay (GOU) and the World Bank began 
stepping up activities to increase private sector participation in the provision of WSS.  
                                           
427  Santos and Valdomir 2006.   
428 The concession area at that point in time did not include the destination beach resorts such as Punta 
del Este and Piriapolis which were concessioned in 2000 to a different provider.   
429 Bergara et al. 2004, 58. 
430 Law No. 16.361. Only a single deputry, Helios Sarthou of Frente Amplio, voted against allowing 
the concession to stand.  El Correo de la Diaspora Argentine, July 30, 2004. 
http://www.elcorreo.eu.org/esp/article.php3?id_article=3916 (December 6, 2007). 
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In January of that year, President Sanguinetti  (of the Colorado Party) submitted a 
budget to the General Assembly authorizing OSE, with prior approval of the 
Executive, to grant concessions for WSS in the interior of the country.431  The World 
Bank began, in its own words, to “expand its dialogue” on public service reform, 
sending a mission from its Infrastructure Department to Uruguay in September 1996.  
In June 1997 the Bank published a sector report, Uruguay: Towards a New Role for 
the State in Uruguay’s Utilities, which stated that its main purpose was to maximize 
public-private joint ventures in the utilities sector.432   The report acknowledged that 
OSE’s service coverage and quality, especially for water, were high in comparison to 
regional indicators, but it cited a number of problems.  Among these were: poor labor 
productivity and restricted flexibility in staffing and contracting; inadequate 
separation between (self-) regulation, operations, and policy; and the conflict between 
OSE’s dual roles as public provider and grantor of private concessions.433   The report 
noted that OSE recognized these problems and had committed to addressing them 
through increasing private participation via concessions and outsourcing, and by 
decentralizing operations.  
 During this same year, and probably stemming from knowledge of OSE’s 
commitment to the Bank to accelerate privatization activities, members of the water 
utility’s trade union, the Federación Functionarios de las Obras Sanitarias del 
Estado (FFOSE), joined with neighborhood organizations in the Department of 
                                           
431 Ley No. 16736, January 5, 1996.  FFOSE 2002, 19. 
432 The World Bank. June 16, 1997. Uruguay: Towards a New Role for the State in Uruguay’s 
Utilities, Infrastructure Division, Country Department I, Latin America and the Carribean Region, 
Report No. 16154-UY.  
433 World Bank. June 1997, 4-5. 
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Canelones434 to address problems in WSS provision.  Residents of Ciudad de la 
Costa, a coastal area of Canelones which was experiencing rapid population growth 
that outpaced the expansion of WSS, joined with local FFOSE members in a pilot 
project to organize a cooperative to install water supply facilities with OSE’s help.435   
Several years later this community-trade union alliance would form the basis of the 
Comisión de Defensa del Agua de Ciudad de la Costa y Pando, a diverse local 
coalition that would germinate in the creation of the CNDAV.  One of the founders of 
this organization, Octavio Silvera, made a point of telling me that the impetus for 
forming the CNDAV came from this local neighborhood association, and was not 
instigated by the FFOSE trade union.436 
 Between 1997 and 2000,  the World Bank continued its analytical and 
advisory work on reform of the water sector, culminating in a major loan to OSE in 
June 2000 to expand and upgrade WSS.  This was accompanied by a smaller 
technical assistance loan to the Government’s Office of Planning and Budget.437  The 
OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation Project (OSE MSRP) was structured 
as a ten-year, $100 million  adaptable program loan (APL),438 with four phases and 
                                           
434 After Montevideo, Canelones has the second-largest population in the country; it grew 22 percent 
between the censuses of 1985 and 1996. Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, Gobierno de 
Uruguay. http://www.ine.gub.uy/banco percent20de percent20datos/soc_pobhogyviv/Censos_T4.xls 
(December 7, 2007).  
435  Santos and Iglesias 2006. 
436 Interview with Octavio Silvera, Montevideo, Uruguay, October 19, 2004. 
437 IBRD 2000.  Project Appraisal Document, OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation Project, 
Report No.: 20343-UR. May 1.   
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?menuPK=51447259&pagePK=51351007&piPK=646
75967&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=51351213&theSitePK=40941&entit
yID=000094946_00052705302843&searchMenuPK=51351213&theSitePK=40941  (December 14, 
2005).   
438 Adaptable Program Loans are a type of investment (as opposed to adjustment) lending instrument 
used by the World Bank Group.  The “programmatic” component refers to the loan’s structure, which 
incorporates “a series of operations that are sequentially related over time…normally linked to the 
country’s annual policy and budget cycle… with clear triggers/benchmarks for moving from one 
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disbursement tranches.  Phase 1 of the APL, which was projected to be implemented 
between July 2000 and July 2004, committed the Bank to disburse $27 million in a 
loan to OSE, with OSE contributing $21 million.  The Bank describes the program 
loan as “designed to foster gradual reform and increase private sector participation” 
over its life, “in line with the Government’s vision…in which a more efficient and 
effective public utility (OSE) provides services alongside private providers.”  This 
was consistent with the sector goals laid out in the Bank’s Country Assistance 
Strategy (CAS).439   Key “performance indicators” listed for the program included:  
 increased efficiency and effectiveness, in part through reduction of OSE 
employees per thousand connections (from 5.6 in 1999 to 4.4 in 2008)  
 separation of operations from regulatory and control functions, including a 
system of internal benchmarking and moves toward decentralization, 
accompanied by the GOU’s explicit commitment to planning for an 
independent and transparent regulatory body, and  
 an increase in private sector participation (PSP), with a goal of 67,000 
households reached by private operators by 2009.440 
With respect to PSP, the Bank highlighted that WSS in the Department of Maldonado 
was about to be transferred to a private concessionaire, the Basque multinational 
corporation, Aguas de Bilbao.  In January 2000, Aguas de Bilbao bid $150 million 
and was awarded a thirty year concession to supply water to Maldonado’s 260,000 
                                                                                                                        
operation in the series to the next.”  See: “World Bank Programmatic Lending: Some Questions and 
Answers.”  http://www.worldbank.org/urban/forum2002/docs/programmatic_qa.pdf   (January 2, 
2009). 
439 World Bank 2000, 3 and 33. 
440 World Bank 2000, 3-8, 25, 33. 
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inhabitants.441  Aguas de Bilbao began operating under the name URAGUA in 
October of that year. 
The project appraisal document (PAD) for this program loan reveals that the 
Bank recognized in May 2000 that “sector-wide privatization is not a strategy 
supported by the GOU, and is considered unfeasible given the existence of important 
political and legal constraints, including the powerful opposition of organized labor.”  
Seven years later, in the September 2007 Implementation and Completion Results 
Report (ICR) for this project, the Bank acknowledges that “PSP in the water and 
sanitation sector notoriously failed to gain backing from politicians and the general 
public,” but exonerates itself by stating that it correctly identified this risk as 
significant at the time of project design.442  (See Part Two of this chapter for further 
discussion).  Quite revealingly, and with the benefit of hindsight, the Bank 
retrospectively acknowledges in the ICR that the project approval stage was: 
deliberately and effectively timed with a new presidential election [in 1999] in a 
bid to secure greater commitment to the project.  The design team was fully 
aware that Presidential elections would be held at a critical time within the 
APL-1 preparation cycle. Since the incumbent party was expected to win, it was 
felt that the timing would enable the new administration to have a full run of 
project implementation. Although the incumbent party was indeed reelected, the 
weakness of the new governing coalition led to congressional delays in 
appointing a new OSE Board.443 
 
By the time the Bank approved the OSE Modernization Loan in June 2000 the 
opposition train was building up a head of steam and preparing to leave the station.  
The Maldonado concession no doubt provided the impetus for the water utility 
workers’ trade union, FFOSE, to step up organizing around what it now perceived as 
                                           
441 A consortium composed of Aguas de Bilbao, Iberdrola and the bank BBK made the bid.  PSIRU 
Company Profile-Aguas de Bilbao, personal copy. 
442 World Bank. September 2007. 
443  World Bank. September 2007, 8-9. 
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complicity between the GOU and the World Bank to extend privatization to other 
Departments in the country.  On October 19, 2000, local FFOSE members and 
neighborhood allies in the rapidly growing city of Costa de Oro y Pando in Canelones 
convened a plenary of regional social organizations to form the Comisión de Defensa 
de Agua y Saneamiento de Costa de Oro y Pando (CDASCOP).  CDASCOP would 
become the forerunner and nucleus of the CNDAV, coming to comprise about 40 
organizations in the following two years.444   FFOSE claimed that the instigation for 
the organization of CDASCOP was the Government’s announcement that it intended 
to privatize WSS services in the cities of Ciudad de la Costa (Canelones Department), 
San José, and Colonía.445   Though there is no mention of these cities as concession 
candidates in the World Bank’s OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation loan, 
that loan did establish that two more concession contracts would be required of the 
GOU for the second and third tranches to be disbursed.  
In January 2001, members of CDASCOP and Friends of the Earth-Uruguay 
(Red de Ecología Social-Amigos de la Tierra/ REDES-AT) participated in the first 
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil.  Adriana Marquisio, the President of 
FFOSE and one of the founders of CDASCOP and later the CNDAV, described her 
attendance at the WSF as a milestone in her life.  She claims the Forum was 
instrumental in educating her about the issue of water privatization on a global scale, 
the role of multinational corporations, and the link to the FTAA and the WTO; she 
brought this information back to Uruguay, and at the next union Congress, FFOSE set 
                                           
444 Santos and Iglesias, 2006; Rel-UITA interview with Adriana Marquisio, November 2004. 
445 FFOSE 2002. 
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up a Secretariat in Defense of Water.446   In October 2001, CDASCOP put forth an 
alternative proposal for sanitation in Ciudad de la Costa y Pando, and joined with 
FFOSE and other neighborhood organizations in the Departments of Colonía and 
Maldonado to oppose further privatization. 
 During 2001 and 2002,  FFOSE and CDASCOP were aided in their efforts to 
foment public opposition to WSS privatization by several major mishaps that 
occurred under URAGUA’s new management in the Department of Maldonado.  In 
January 2001, a principal water main ruptured in Piriápolis, the second largest beach 
resort in Uruguay, leaving the city without potable water for four days.447  The public 
utility, OSE, had to bring in water tanker trucks to supply the city.  In February 2001, 
URAGUA overcharged residents of Maldonado from between 50 to 300 percent on 
their bills, and was warned by the Comptroller of Concessions to take action to refund 
the overcharges.448  In January 2002, in the height of the summer tourist season, a 
sewer main ruptured in the luxurious beach resort of Punta del Este, contaminating 
potable water for weeks, and leading to a public health advisory to boil all water.  
This incident led to embarrassing friction within the ruling Colorado Party, as the 
Minister of Tourism publicly repudiated the health advisory issued by OSE (whose 
Director is also a political appointee of the ruling party), and proclaimed the water 
                                           
446 Regional Latinoamericana de la Union de Trabajadores de la Alimentación, Agrícolas, Hoteles, 
Restaurantes, Tabaco y Afines (Rel-UITA) [Latin America Regional office of the International Union 
of Food, etc., Workers].  Interview with the Director of FFOSE, Adriana Marquisio, “Lo Esencial es 
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safe to drink.449  In a Parliamentary hearing held in February 2002 on the debacle, 
OSE supported the charges leveled by the trade union and the left-wing political 
party, Encuentra Progresista (EP), in which the latter blamed URAGUA for using 
sewage treatment “bypass” (dumping partially-treated sewage) into the port at Punta 
del Este, triggering elevated levels of fecal coliform bacteria in the water supply.450    
The beginning of  2002 also heralded the worst economic crisis Uruguay had 
suffered in decades, capping a three-year downturn that had started in 1999.  After 
averaging growth of 5 percent annually during 1996-98, in 1999-2002 the economy 
suffered a major downturn, stemming largely from economic problems in Argentina 
and Brazil, which together account for roughly half of Uruguay’s exports. 451  There 
is a well-known Uruguayan aphorism: “When Argentina sneezes, Uruguay catches a 
cold.”  Argentina’s economic and financial meltdown in 2001-2002 had disastrous 
effects on Uruguay; during that period Argentines made massive withdrawals of 
dollars deposited in Uruguayan banks, leading to a plunge in the Uruguayan peso and 
a run on the banks in the summer of 2002.  The official unemployment rate rose to 
almost 20 percent in 2002, inflation surged, and external indebtedness doubled.452  In 
response to the deepening crisis, the IMF approved a two-year “Stand-by Credit”453 
                                           
449 La Republica (Uruguay). February 7, 2002.    
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451 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 2003. The World Factbook 2003: Uruguay.  
http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/print/uy.html (February 3, 2004).  
452 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2003. 
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to Uruguay in March 2002 for $781 million, increased this by $1.5 billion in June 
2002, and again by $500 million in August 2002.454   
                                          
As is standard procedure, in order to qualify for an increase in the reserves it 
may draw on, a country must submit a “Letter of Intent” (LOI) to the IMF 
accompanied by a Memorandum of Economic Policies (MEP) laying out the 
strategies it intends to pursue in accordance with IMF lending  conditionalities—
namely, stabilization policies and structural reforms.  As it turned out, the Letter of 
Intent submitted by the GOU on June 18, 2002 requesting an augmentation of $1.5 
billion under its Stand-by Arrangement, became an important raison d’etre and 
rallying point for the formation of the CNDAV two months later, and the launch of 
the signature campaign to place the CR on the ballot in October 2002.  In the LOI and 
accompanying MEP, the GOU committed to opening all public utilities to private 
sector involvement, to introducing new regulatory frameworks for all the public 
services, and to taking the following actions in the WSS sector by the dates 
specified:455 
1. Introduce a new regulatory framework for the sector, with a  proposal to be 
submitted to the General Assembly in September 2002.   
2. Introduce new quality standards and controls to facilitate private investment, 
with the issuance of an Executive Decree in December 2002. 
3. Invite bids to improve services in Montevideo (reduce “unaccounted for water” 
leakages) by December 2002. 
4. Invite bids for PSP in sewage treatment plants by March 2003. 
 
 
454 International Monetary Fund. 2002. “ IMF Increases Stand-By Credit to Uruguay by US$1.5 
Billion,” News Brief No. 02/54, June 25. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2002/nb0254.htm. 
(December 13, 2005);  “IMF Completes First Review and Approves New Increase on Uruguay Stand-
By” August 8, 2002. News Brief No. 02/87. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/2002/nb0287.htm  
(December 31, 2007). 
455 International Monetary Fund 2002. “Uruguay-Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic Policies, 
and Technical Memorandum of Understanding.” Montevideo, Uruguay.  June 18. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2002/ury/02/index.htm (December 13, 2005). 
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  In literature disseminated during the campaign and in retrospective analyses, 
leaders of the CNDAV pointed to these commitments as evidence of GOU 
capitulation to IMF conditions, negotiated with no transparency or public 
consultation.  In reality, it does not appear that these commitments reached the 
threshold of IMF conditionality at all.  None of the commitments  above were listed 
as “prior actions,” “performance criteria,” or “structural benchmarks,” the three 
principal instruments the IMF uses to verify that a country is adhering to 
commitments before it disburses successive installments of a loan.456   Reforms in the 
telecommunications and state-owned oil sectors were listed as “structural 
benchmarks”-- which do not even technically qualify as IMF conditions-- but 
nowhere in the LOI or MEP does reform in the WSS sector rise even to that level.457   
But apart from the claim that these commitments by the GOU would have wrested 
WSS from public management and control, the CNDAV leveled a much more 
explosive charge: it alleged that the IMF demanded that Uruguay’s mineral reserves, 
including its aquifers, be used to securitize the GOU’s debt repayment to the IMF, 
and that the GOU, consciously or unwittingly, agreed to these terms.458  The 
                                           
456 Prior Actions are measures a country agrees to take before the Fund’s Executive Board approves a 
loan or completes a review; Performance Criteria are specific conditions that have to be met for the 
agreed amount of credit to be disbursed; and Structural Benchmarks are used for measures that cannot 
be monitored through objective measures such as quantitative indicators, and would not alone be 
sufficient to warrant an interruption in Fund financing. International Monetary Fund. September 2005. 
“ IMF Conditionality.”  Factsheet.  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm, accessed 
December 23, 2005. 
457 International Monetary Fund.  June 18, 2002. As noted in the preceding footnote, even if the WSS 
sector had been listed as a structural benchmark, failure to reach it would have had no effect on IMF 
loan disbursements. 
458 REDES-Amigos de la Tierra Uruguay, “La Campaña Nacional en Defensa del Agua: Una Reforma 
Constitucional que Protege el Recurso Vital de Todos los Uruguayos.” http://www.redes.org.uy (July 
30, 2003).     
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Declaration of the Social Forum of Uruguay in November 2002 echoed the 
CNDAV’s charge: 
In Uruguay, the irresponsibility of the Government has led it to promote a 
public auctioning of the surface water and the mineral deposits of the country, 
that, among other things, includes the groundwater (aquifers). In short, this 
means the privatization of potable water and sanitation, as well as our water 
resources.  This leads to a loss in the range of liberties in Uruguayan society 
that includes the management of water resources and the preservation of life 
and national sovereignty.459 
 
Later on, in the final two months of the campaign in 2004,  the Montevideo daily 
periodical, La Republica, repeated CNDAV’s allegations about the IMF’s loan, 
adding that the Government did not realize it had signed on to pledging the country’s 
mineral reserves-- including the famed Guaraní aquifer-- as collateral.460  A day later, 
the IMF counter-attacked, sending a letter to La Republica which the newspaper 
reprised in an article on September 5, 2004.  In it the IMF denied that financial aid 
provided to Uruguay was subject to “any guarantee to ensure payment.”   However, 
La Republica maintained that its own review of the contents of the June 2002 LOI 
showed that water reserves and aquifers were among the guarantees cited for payment 
of external debt, contradicting the IMF’s affirmation to the contrary.461   I could find 
no mention of such a guarantee in the June 2002 Letter of Intent, nor in the preceding 
March 2002 Memorandum of Economic Policy which accompanied the first, smaller 
IMF disbursement, and where reform of the water sector is not mentioned at all.  A 
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CNDAV communication distributed through an e-mail list-serve on September 7, 
2004, entitled “IMF Questions Uruguayan Movement in Defense of Water,” dropped 
any reference to the alleged demand by the IMF for the use of the country’s mineral 
reserves as collateral.462   
 Although it is very unlikely that this particular accusation leveled at the IMF 
was true, the notion that Uruguay’s natural resources and patrimony could be 
transferred to a multilateral creditor undoubtedly helped strengthen the movement 
against water privatization that was coalescing during 2002, attracting support from 
increasingly broad social sectors.  Though falling short of formal conditionality, the 
agreement between the IMF and the GOU constituted a commitment by the 
Government to effectuate policy and legal changes without prior public notification 
and consultation.  This was especially true of the promise to issue an Executive 
Decree in December 2002 to facilitate private investment.    
 By mid-2002, the debate over a CR began to take place formally within the 
FA-EP, where divisions emerged—though not along clear ideological lines. The 
largest political fraction in the FA-EP, the former Tupamaro-backed Movimiento por 
Participación Popular (MPP),  joined with the more moderate, social democratic 
political fraction, Progressive Alliance (Alianza Progresista) to sponsor a CR 
initiative.  However, the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) expressed reservations, 
saying that it needed to study the proposal, especially because it had doubts that the 
measure could be applied retroactively if approved in the 2004 elections.  Even more 
pointedly, the General Secretary of the Socialist Party expressed concerns that a 
                                           
462 REDES-AT, “IMF Questions Uruguayan Movement in Defense of  Water,” September 7, 2004. 




reform measure to brake privatizations could negatively impact foreign direct 
investment, given the uncertainty investors would face about future contract 
revisions.463  The social-democratic political fraction Vertiente Artiguista, from 
which the then-mayor of Montevideo hailed, came out in direct opposition to a CR, 
citing the unfavorable political and economic climate and the undesirability of addin
yet another element into the 2004 electoral campaign.
g 
4   
                                          
46
In summary, a combination of factors in 2002 drove the growth of  the 
movement against water privatization.  Activists were increasingly exposed to, and 
influenced by, events in the international arena.  By the time of the second World 
Social Forum in January 2002, Uruguayan representation from anti-privatization 
groups expanded significantly to include members of  CDASCOP, FFOSE, and 
Friends of the Earth-Uruguay.  On the domestic front, the IMF’s Letter of Intent,  
problems with the URAGUA concession in the Department of Maldonado, and 
President Batlle’s public declarations in favor of increased privatizations, contributed 
to building popular and organized political support.   In August 2002, the Canelones 
community and labor-backed CDASCOP joined with FFOSE, Friends of the Earth-
Uruguay, Sustainable Uruguay, and the Neighborhood League of Manantiales (the 
beach resort area east of Punta del Este, where Aguas de la Costa operated a smaller 
concession) to form a committee to plan a CR campaign.465  Two months later, the 
Comisión Nacional en Defensa del Agua y la Vida, CNDAV, was launched, its name 
a tribute to the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida in Cochabamba, 
 
463 La Republica (Uruguay). July 8, 2002. “Reforma Constitucional para impeder privatizaciones: FA, 
opiniones divididas.” http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/85290-reforma-constitucional-para-
impedir-privatizaciones-fa-opiniones-divididas. (May 15, 2007) 
464 La Republica (Uruguay). July 8, 2002. 
465 Liga de Fomento de Manantiales. 
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Bolivia, and a testament to the influence of transnational networking.  Faculty and 
student organizations added their organizational backing to the coalition, along with 
factions of Frente Amplio.   A growing awareness of an international movement 
against water privatization had combined with national-level forces to galvanize the 
formation of what would become one of the strongest multi-sectoral coalitions against 
water privatization in Latin America and perhaps, internationally.   
 
6.4  CNDAV and the National Campaign in Defense of Water and Life, 2002-
2004 
 
A.  The Constitutional Amendment: Basic Needs and the Environment Before Profits  
 
On October 18, 2002, CNDAV formally launched a signature-collection 
campaign at the University of the Republic to place a plebiscite on the ballot in the 
October 2004 national elections.  Article 331 of the Uruguayan Constitution permits 
citizens to offer amendments to the Constitution with the signatures of at least ten  
percent of registered voters, or at the time, about  245,000 people.  The Campaña 
Nacional En Defensa del Agua y de la Vida, the “National Campaign in Defense of 
Water and Life,”  described its goals as: 
[aiming] to preserve water from the economistic conception promoted by the 
IFIs and the Executive Power.  The constitutional reform aims to set up a 
sustainable system for water management, defending national sovereignty in 
the management of a vital resource, protecting the public interest, and 
ensuring that potable water continues to reach even those social sectors that 
cannot pay for service.466 
 
                                           
466 Translation from the Spanish.  REDES-Amigos de la Tierra Uruguay, “La Campaña Nacional en 
Defensa del Agua: Una Reforma Constitucional que Protege el Recurso Vital de Todos los 
Uruguayos.” http://www.redes.org.uy. (July 20, 2003).  
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The reform campaign proposed amending Articles 47 and 188 of the Constitution to 
incorporate several key principles of the CNDAV: that access to water and sanitation 
are fundamental human rights, that these services must be delivered exclusively and 
directly by the State, and that water must be managed sustainably and through 
participatory planning and control. The text of the amendments is as follows:467  
Article 47 
 
To be added:   
 
 Water is a natural resource essential for life. 
 Access to water and sanitation are fundamental human rights. 
1)  National water and sanitation policy will be based on: 
a) land use planning, conservation, environmental protection, and the 
restoration of nature; 
b) the sustainable joint management of water resources with future generations, 
and the preservation of the water cycle as a matter of collective interests; 
c) the prioritization of water use by regions, basins, or sub-parts thereof, with 
the first priority being the supply of drinking water to the population; and  
d) the principle that the provision of water supply and sanitation must prioritize 
social needs before economic requirements.  Every authorization, concession or 
permit which violates this principle shall be rendered null and void.    
  
2)  With the exception of rainwater, surface water and sub-surface water, being 
integrated in the water cycle, constitute a collective resource, subordinated to the 
collective interest and form part of the public state domain, as the public water 
domain.  
 
3) Water and sanitation services will be provided exclusively and directly by the 
State. 
 
4) By three-fifths vote of each legislative chamber, water may be provided to 




                                           
467 FFOSE Legislación: Reforma Constitucional, 
http://www.ffosustse.org.uy/aguayvida/legislacion.htm (October 15, 2004) and Santos and Villareal 
2006, 6.  Author’s translation from the Spanish..  
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The transitory and special provisions added to this article (referring to public-
private economic associations), are not applicable to the essential services of 
potable water and sanitation:  
 
To be added: 
 
(Indent “Z”) Any claims for compensation that correspond to the entry into force 
of this reform may indemnify only for non-amortized investments, but not for 
loss of future earnings. 
 
Carlos Santos and Sebastian Valdomir, participant-observers in the campaign, 
point out that  the CR set an important international precedent in being one of the first 
instances where an environmental right, sustainability, was included in the 
Constitution, along with the requirement for participatory management of water 
resources.468   The rationale for Article 188 was to head off any challenges that might 
be brought under BITs by foreign investors claiming that the CR measures constituted 
expropriation.  The CNDAV had investors’ reaction to the anti-privatization 
movement in Bolivia as an object lesson in this regard.  As I discussed in Chapter 5, 
Bechtel and its co-investors filed a $50 million claim against the Bolivian government 
with the World Bank’s ICSID; this claim sought not only recovery for sunk 
investments, but also for estimated lost future profits.  Leaders of the CNDAV were 
aware that both major private concessionaires in the country, Aguas de la Costa and 
URAGUA, could seek remedies under the 1992 BIT between Spain and Uruguay, 
which provided that disputes could be remanded to ICSID.469   As the CNDAV’s 
Alberto Villareal told me, the insertion of Article 188 in the Constitution was an 
                                           
468 Santos and Valdomir 2006. 
469 Santos and Valdomir 2005. 
257 
 
attempt to inoculate the CR against this potential scenario.470  As participant-
observers within CNDAV put it:  
The threat of popular sovereignty being ceded to international tribunals is a new 
factor that has to be taken into account when formulating water policies; MNCs 
shelter themselves in BITs, which can take on more force than the Constitution. 
A strong international campaign is needed to expose and defeat the undemocratic 
character of the international arbitration panels that the water corporations have 
threatened to use to impose their will over the Uruguayan people…[the insertion 
of Special Disposition “Z” in Article 188] is in direct conflict with normal 
practice in BITs and FTAs…and puts the local struggle against water 
privatization in the international arena.”471   
 
 In contrast, Mario Bergara (who became the Undersecretary for Economics 
and Finance under President Vasquez, and is currently Central Bank president) told 
me he viewed Article 188’s “Indent Z” as an “awful signal to the investment 
community.”472  (Though a member of FA-EP, Bergara was associated with the more 
centrist political fraction Asamblea Uruguay, from which Vasquez would later choose 
his Minister of Economics, the market-friendly Danilo Astori).  
The inclusion of environmental and social/human rights in Article 47 reflected 
the conjoint emphasis placed on these rights by the CSOs which formed the nucleus 
of the CNDAV. The inclusion of Article 188, Indent “Z,” reflected the leadership’s 
integration into activist transnational networks fighting not only water privatization, 
but also neoliberal trade and investment regimes and IFI policies. 
 
B.  Characteristics of the CNDAV 
 
                                           
470 Conversation with Alberto Villareal, CNDAV, October 2004.   
471 Santos and Villareal 2005, 178-179; Santos and Valdomir 2005, 2. 
472 Interview with Mario Bergara, Montevideo, Uruguay,  October 27, 2004. 
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During the campaign period of 2002-2004, the CNDAV evolved into a broad-
based  popular alliance of  trade unions, environmental NGOs, grassroots urban 
movements, neighborhood associations, students and faculty organizations, and 
fractions of the two biggest political parties, FA and the National Party.  As discussed 
previously, the water workers’ trade union FFOSE, Friends of the Earth-Uruguay, and 
two neighborhood civic organizations in Canelones and eastern Maldonado 
provinces, CDASCOP and the Manantiales Promotion League, formed the early 
nucleus of the Comisión.   Table 3 lists the member organizations of the CNDAV and 
highlights the most active organizations in the coalition.  Verónica Iglesias, a 
participant-observer of the water campaign associated with the social-cultural 
institute Casa Bertolt Brecht in Montevideo notes that there were two important 
characteristics of CNDAV which differentiated it from predecessor coalitions which 
had organized to promote referendums or plebiscites.  These were its strong 
connection to international networks, and its heterogeneous composition across social 
groups.473   During the campaign’s run-up to the 2004 election, the CNDAV set up 
various local commissions across the country, taking advantage of FFOSE’s affiliates 
in the interior Departments.  Iglesias characterizes this on-the-ground organizing as 
“participation from below,” one of the CNDAV’s strengths in the pre-election period. 
Iglesias and Santos maintain that while CNDAV benefited from the history of direct 
democracy strategies that were employed in the 1990s with great success, it had 
                                           
473 Iglesias, Verónica. July 2008. “Desde arriba y desde abajo: La participación ciudadana en la 
implementación de la reforma del agua en Uruguay,” in Participación y proyecto político 
emancipador, eds. Rosana Abella y Javier Taks, 49.  
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several characteristics of new social movements.474  They cite the coalition’s use of 
“strategic rationality”-- the integration of a multiplicity of actors from diverse 
backgrounds, something which had not characterized previous popular or direct 
democracy initiatives in Uruguay.  CNDAV also employed new organizational forms, 
such as the adoption of general plenaries as a mechanism for horizontal decision-
making and decision-making by consensus. Javier Taks, a  participant-observer 
affiliated with Casa Bertolt Brecht and the University of the Republic of Uruguay 
(UDELAR), cites this decision-making structure as another factor which 
differentiated CNDAV from previous popular coalitions that promoted referendums 
against the privatization of social services.475  For example, although employment 
protection for public sector workers was a key motivation for the campaign, Taks 
states that this agenda was not “hegemonic.”  Environmental considerations and the 
concept of water as a common good were equally, if not more, important.  The CR 
campaign coordinator for REDES-AT, Maria Selva Ortiz, told me that REDES had 
not always collaborated well with trade unions on environmental issues, unlike in the 
CNDAV.476   She described FFOSE as having progressive environmental politics, 
often articulated by FFOSE’s Vice-President and a prominent trade union leader, 
Adriana Marquisio.477  
                                           
474 Santos and Iglesias.  2006. “Movimientos Sociales en la Defensa del Agua: el Caso de Uruguay,” in 
Anuario, Antropología Social y Cultural en Uruguay, 2006. Office of UNESCO, Montevideo, 
Uruguay. http://www.unesco.org.uy/shs/areas-de-trabajo/ciencias-
sociales/publicaciones/antropologia.html (October 14, 2007).  
475 Taks, Javier. 2008. “El Agua es de Todos/Water for All: Water Resources and Development in 
Uruguay.” Development 51(March):17-22. http://www.palgrave-
journals.com:80/development/journal/v51/n1/full/1100464a.html (July 31, 2008) 
476 Telephone interview with Selva Ortiz, December 22, 2003. 




CNDAV Member Organizations 
 
Organization Description 
Asociación de Remitentes  Pensioners’ Association 
Casa Bertolt Brecht * Progressive institute promoting German 
culture and language; provides institutional 
and financial support to  Uruguayan causes  
Centro de Viticultores de Uruguay  Winegrowers’ Association 
Comisión Barrial Zona Oeste  Neighborhood Commission, eastern 
Maldonado 
Comisión de Defensa del Agua y 
Saneamiento de Costa de Oro y Pando 
(CDASCOP)*  
Neighborhood organization in fast-growing 
province of Canelones; precursor to CNDAV 
Comisión Nacionalista en Defensa del 
Agua  
 
Conosur   
Convergencia Socialista   
Coordinadora del Barrio Sur y 
Adyacencias  
 
Consumidores del Uruguay Asociados Uruguay affiliate of Consumers International 
Docentes de la Facultad de Ciencias y 
Facultad de Ingeniería*  
Faculty of Science and Engineering, 
University of the Republic of Uruguay 
ECOS  Foundation promoting sustainable 
development located in Maldonado 
Federación de ANCAP  Trade union of the state energy enterprise 
(fuels and combustibles) 
Frente Amplio - Encuentro Progresista 
- Nueva Mayoría*  
Broad Front-Progressive Encounter-New 
Majority.  Left-of-center ruling political party 
in Uruguay. 
FENAPES  National Federation of Secondary School 
Teachers 
FEUU*  Federation of University Students 
FFOSE*  Federation of OSE Public Employees. WSS 
utility trade union 
FUCVAM*  Federation of Mutual Aid Housing 
Cooperatives. One of the largest and most 
influential urban social organizations and 
movement in Uruguay. 
Liga de Fomento de Manantiales*  Manantiales Promotion League.  Civic 
organization in eastern Maldonado province, 
served by Aguas de la Costa. 
MADUR  Uruguayan Movement of Agricultural 
Cultivators 
Movimiento por la Utopía   
Partido Nacional - Todo por el Pueblo National Party-- fraction 
Partido por la Seguridad Social  Social Security Party 
Partido Verde Ecologista  Green-Ecology Party 




CNDAV Member Organizations 
 
Organization Description 
Proyecto Solidario Cultural Sayago - 
SODEC  
 
REDES - Amigos de la Tierra*  Social Ecology Network-Friends of the Earth, 
Uruguay.   
UITA* International Federation of Food, Tobacco, 
and allied workers—Latin American Regional 
Division 
Unión de Mujeres del Uruguay  Women’s  Union of Uruguay 
Uruguay Sustentable* Sustainable Uruguay, environmental research 
organization working with REDES-AT and 
faculty of the University of the Republic 
 
* Denotes  Key Member.  Source: FFOSE, available at: http://www.ffose.org.uy/aguayvida/ 




The Trade Union Axis 
 
During the campaign, FFOSE represented about 4000 workers in the Obras 
Sanitarias del Estado, or about 75 percent of OSE’s workforce.  It is affiliated with 
the national trade union central organization in Uruguay, PIT-CNT, and with the 
international confederation of public sector workers, Public Services International 
(PSI).  The respect accorded FFOSE by environmental NGOs in the CNDAV was 
rooted in the trade union’s emphasis on environmental issues and its support for a  
“social-ecological” vision.   In July 2002,  FFOSE’s Executive Secretariat issued a 
document laying out the platform which later constituted the central discourse and 
strategic orientation of the National Campaign in Defense of Water and Life.478   This 
discourse centered on the ecological dimension, the importance of social 
participation, public management, and water as a “fundamental human right.”479  A 
31 page booklet that FFOSE published during the same year included a detailed 
discussion of water resources and basins; the importance of integrated management of 
water resources; and the recognition of transboundary effects.  FFOSE pointed to 
fragmented authority among the several Ministries responsible for managing water, 
and recommended that one governing law for water be adopted under the control of  a 
single institution which would regulate water, such as the Ministry for the 
Environment.480  
Marquisio credited REDES-AT and Friends of the Earth-International with 
educating the union about institutions which were promoting market liberalization of 
                                           
478 Santos and Iglesias 2006. 
479 Santos and Iglesias 2006. 
480 FFOSE 2002.  
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water services.  FFOSE’s literature throughout the campaign echoed the themes that 
potable water and sanitation must be kept outside of trade agreements and 
institutions, including the WTO and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), and the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA).  FFOSE also 
credited REDES for putting it in touch with many transnational groups grappling with 
the water “problematic,” such as the Council of Canadians and the Polaris Institute in 
Canada, which became strong supporters of the campaign.  
FFOSE played a vital role during the campaign in providing financial support 
to CNDAV,  as well as in providing foot soldiers for the signature collection 
campaign which put the referendum on the ballot.   FFOSE launched a sophisticated 
website, which remained online for several years after the constitutional victory.481  
Marquisio appeared in two televised debates prior to the election, facing off against 
OSE’s then vice-president, Hugo Granucci (who subsequently was sentenced and 
imprisoned for various counts of fraud committed during his tenure at OSE.)482  
FFOSE  received some public relations support during the campaign from Public 
Services International,483 the international federation for public sector trade unions 
with which it is affiliated, but did not receive financial support.  Cameron Duncan, 
then the Regional PSI Director for the Inter-Americas, told me that financial support 
to affiliated unions is given only in limited instances, and that PSI often provides 
direct help when the conflict is focused specifically on a corporation—less the case in 
                                           
481 See http://www.ffose.org.uy/aguayvida/ (October 12, 2004; August 18, 2008) 
482 La Republica (Uruguay), online. 2007.”Granucci y Rodríguez Landoni, a la cárcel por 
irregularidades en OSE.” April 26. http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/255550-granucci-y-
rodriguez-landoni-a-la-carcel-por-irregularidades-en-ose   
483 PSI has 650 affiliated trade unions in approximately 150 countries, which represent on the order of 





Uruguay.484   PSI issued a strong statement of support for the Campaña Nacional at 
its 2002 World Congress, where it also launched its “Global Campaign for Quality 
Public Services.”  This campaign was launched to burnish the reputation of publicly 
provided services in response to the “serious policy failures in some high-profile 
privatization and public sector reform programs.”485   More direct international trade 
union support was provided to FFOSE by the Latin American regional secretariat of 
the International Union of Food, Agricultural, and Allied Workers (IUF), 
headquartered in Montevideo. Rel-UITA, as it is known by its Spanish acronym, (for 
Union Internacional de Trabajadores Agrepecuarios, Secretaría Regional 
Latinoamericana), was a member of the CNDAV, and provided public relations 
support to the campaign through extensive print, internet, and radio publicity.486    
 
The Environmental Axis 
 
REDES-AT, the Uruguayan affiliate of  Friends of the Earth-International 
(FOEI), was the other organizational pole of the water campaign, complementing 
FFOSE’s financial support with academic research, strong transnational linkages, and 
agility in disseminating campaign communications through various media.  REDES 
was founded in 1988 and joined FOEI that same year.  It describes its orientation as 
“social-ecological” as opposed to “environmental,” with the former term connoting a 
perspective which approaches environmental problems from a socioeconomic, 
                                           
484 Interview with Cameron Duncan. Regional Director for the Inter-Americas, Public Services 
International, January 7, 2004, Washington, D.C.  Duncan also noted that due to internal conflicts 
within FFOSE, it was in arrears in dues payments to the federation. 
485 Resolution No. 12, PSI Programme of Action 2002-2007, PSI 27th World Congress, Ottawa, 
Canada, September 2-6, 2002. 
486 Radio Rel, for example, hosted a radio show, Todos por el Agua, with a mock conversation between 
a barber and his client on the importance of a vote in favor of the CR.  
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political, and cultural standpoint.  The social-ecological perspective “understands that 
the current environmental crisis derives in large measure from the processes of 
resource concentration, and from profit-seeking corporate actors.”487  Its activities 
include campaigning, information sharing, research, environmental education, and 
lobbying; during the campaign period of 2002-2004, it had six local groups and a 
youth branch.  Its programs were organized into four areas: “Sustainable Uruguay” 
(an affiliate of  the regional “Program for a Sustainable Southern Cone”); 
biodiversity; participation and land-use planning; and trade and the environment.488   
REDES linked all these programmatic themes to the water campaign in its literature 
and activism.  For example, the Sustainable Uruguay program drew on faculty from 
UDELAR to formulate a proposal for improved territorial water governance through 
the creation of autonomous basin authorities to act as intermediaries between national 
and Departmental-level authorities.489  During the campaign period REDES served as 
the Latin American regional coordinator for two of FOEI’s global campaigns on 
Trade, the Environment and Sustainability; and Genetically-Modified Organisms.490  
REDES leader Alberto Villareal was the coordinator of these FOEI campaigns, and 
played a key role as a social entrepreneur in the CNDAV in forging transnational 
linkages, and disseminating information about the CR campaign at international 
meetings and forums.491   Villareal was one of the main activist spokespeople on 
agricultural and water issues in FTAA meetings, and REDES staff played an 
                                           
487 REDES-AT website. http://www.redes.org.uy/redes,html. (December 5, 2003). 
488 REDES-AT website. 
489 Marcel Achkar. August 2002.Propuesta para una Gestión Sustentable de los Recursos Hídricos, 
Programa Uruguay Sustentable. http://www.redes.org.uy/redes,html (July 28, 2003).  
490 See  http://www.foei.org/groups/members/uruguay.html  (December 2, 2003 and September 8, 
2008). 
491 Interviews with Sara Grusky, various dates. 
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important role in the 2004 WTO meetings in Cancun, Mexico.  In 2003, “Water 
Justice for All” became the tenth recognized global campaign for FOEI, linking to 
three other campaigns on resisting corporate domination, international trade, and the 
IFIs.492   However, REDES-AT did not obtain any direct funding from FOEI for the 
water campaign, and as Selva Ortiz told me, FOEI only contributed in-kind resources, 
such as the use of office space in Montevideo and “solidaristic” support.493  Carol 
Welch, Director of International Programs at Friends of the Earth-U.S., told me that 
campaigns such as Uruguay’s have normally been decentralized both in decision-
making and in funding.  Although water had by 2003 become a campaign issue for 
FOEI, it was a lower priority than other campaigns, and as Welch noted, it was “the 
Trade and IFIs campaigns driving water.”494  Welch indicated that REDES-AT had 
received support from various foundations in the U.S. and Europe. 
In addition to deploying member volunteers and staff to work on the water 
reform campaign, REDES’ full-time coordinator, Maria Selva Ortiz, represented 
CNDAV at the Third World Water Forum in Japan.  REDES played a critical role 
throughout the campaign publicizing and disseminating information through its 
website, webcasts on its online radio station, Radio Mundo Real, and through active 
engagement in a number of transnational activist listservs and electronic mailing lists, 
such as “Water Warriors,” Public Citizens’ FTAA-International listserv, and  FOEI’s 
                                           
492 Pocket Brochure, Friends of the Earth International Secretariat. September 2003.  Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands.  
493 Telephone interview with Selva Ortiz. December 22, 2003.  
494 Interview with Carol Welch. Director-International Programs, Friends of the Earth-U.S., December 
8, 2003, Washington, D.C.  . 
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Latin America and Caribbean regional listserv.495  REDES’ integration into 
international activist networks was reflected in the campaign literature posted on its 
website, which made explicit links between the water situation in Uruguay, 
globalization, and the role of the IFIs and a complicit Uruguayan state in promoting 
PSP.  For example, two main CNDAV publications emphasized that: 
The campaign aims to preserve water from the economistic conception 
promoted by the IFIs and the Executive Branch….The World Bank, IMF, and 
the IDB are proposing management of water that cedes control to the private 
sector through commercialization, privatization, and large-scale development-
- transforming water into a commodity.  Since 1992, but especially since 
2001, there’s been a thrust towards privatizing water and sanitation services in 
Uruguay, with the department of Maldonado being the test case.  The decision 
to privatize services in Maldonado was taken by the top management of OSE 
and the municipal government of Maldonado, but in accordance with the 
policies of the Executive Branch, which is responding to pressure from the 
IFIs, in particular the IMF’s Letter of Intent….No public consultation was 
undertaken to solicit the public’s view…496 
 
Several years after the reform, REDES continues to be CNDAV’s nexus to the 
transnational water movement. 
 
The Role of Political Parties 
 
As discussed previously, initial FA support for the CR was mixed, with strong 
support from the leftist MPP fraction and the social-democratic Progressive Alliance 
fraction, a non-committal stance on the part of the Socialist Party, and opposition 
from another social-democratic fraction, Vertiente Artiguista.  However, the CNDAV 
had to court the support of the FA in 2002-2003, since it needed its support in 
                                           
495 Various electronic mail communications; see also http://www.redes.org.uy/ (July 30, 2003 and 
various); http://www.redes.org.uy/category/agua/ (November 10, 2008); and 
http://www.radiomundoreal.fm/rmr/ (November 10, 2008).  
496 REDES/ Amigos de la Tierra Uruguay, “Porqué No Podemos Vender el Agua,” and  “La Campaña 
Nacional en Defensa del Agua: Una Reforma Constitucional que Protege el Recurso Vital de Todos los 
Uruguayos.” http://www.redes.org.uy. (July 30, 2003). 
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Parliament to garner two-fifths of the chambers’ votes for a proposed CR to go 
forward.497  By 2004, Frente Amplio had a designated representative to CNDAV, 
Carlos Coitiño, who joined Adriana Marquisio in public debates against leaders of the 
other political parties which opposed the reform measure.498   Nevertheless, other 
CNDAV members characterized the FA’s commitment to the campaign as “mixed,” 
and as taking a secondary place in the Party’s political agenda and media campaigns. 
Marquisio’s view was that those who really committed to doing the work were the 
rank and file members and not the leadership of FA.   She complained that CNDAV 
was “kept on the sidelines of the internal debate within FA over the water plebiscite, 
and that the FA did not conduct a thoroughgoing analysis of what adherence to the 
reform would entail.499   In the months prior to the October 31 election, tensions grew 
between the CNDAV and FA.  This followed on a trip by Tabaré Vázquez and Danilo 
Astori500 to Spain, during which the two FA leaders assured Spanish business leaders 
and investors that concession contracts “would be respected, and the rules made clear 
and permanent.”501  CNDAV claimed that this contradicted its own clearly articulated 
position on the water concessions, which is that they would be terminated after the 
reform took effect.  The “mixed” signals from FA prior to the election were 
transformed into direct confrontation after the election, when, as discussed below, 
                                           
497 Constitution of the Republic of Uruguay, Article 331(B). 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/constituciones/const004.htm  (November 22, 2008). 
498  Espectador.com. November 26, 2004. “Sí o no a la Reforma del Agua.”      
http://www.espectador.com/1v4_contenido.php?id=26743&sts=1  (November 26, 2004). 
499 La Republica (Uruguay). November 24, 2004. “Promotores de la reforma dijeron que el FA apoyó 
la iniciativa con ‘ligereza.’"   http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/160692-promotores-de-la-
reforma-dijeron-que-el-fa-apoyo-la-iniciativa-conligereza (November 26, 2004) 
500 Astori, from the moderate social-democratic fraction Asamblea Uruguay, was then presumed the 
likely candidate for Minister of the Economy, the position he was later awarded.  Astori was well-liked 
by the business community in the U.S.  
501 La Republica (Uruguay). November 24, 2004. 
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questions of how to deal with the concessions moved squarely into the foreground.  
Notwithstanding some political fractions’ lukewarm support for the plebiscite, every 
political fraction of the FA inserted the “Yes” ballot (papeleta por Sí) in their 
respective candidates’ lists before the elections and at the polls, for deposit into the 
ballot boxes (urnas).  This physical endorsement of the reform measure was key to its 
success.  
  In addition to FA’s endorsement of the water plebiscite, Alianza Nacional, the 
fraction of the National Party (PN) headed by Jorge Larrañaga, also supported the 
water reform, and likewise inserted the Sí ballots in its electoral lists. Hitherto a minor 
fraction in the National Party, Alianza Nacional scored an upset two-to-one victory in 
2004 over the historically-dominant “Herrerismo” fraction, from which former 
President Lacalle hailed. The Herrerismo fraction of the PN did not support the water 
initiative.  In a study on the relationship between popular initiatives in Uruguay and 
party loyalties, David Altman found a highly significant correlation between the 
amount of votes received by any referendum or plebiscite and the amount of votes 
received by those political fractions that supported it.502  The water plebiscite won 
64.6 percent of the vote in Uruguay, while FA-EP garnered 50.4 percent, and the PN, 
34.3 percent of the vote (Alianza Nacional, which supported the reform, won 66 
percent of the total PN vote).503  It is clear that support for the CR was deeper and 
wider than support for Frente Amplio alone, crossing party lines. This is not 
                                           
502 David Altman. 2002. “Popular Initiatives in Uruguay: Confidence Votes on Government or Political 
Loyalties?” Electoral Studies 21: 617-630.  He reported a correlation coefficient of 0.9. 
503 Universidad de la Republica, Area Política y Relaciones Internacionales del Banco de Datos, 
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. 




surprising for several reasons.  In 2004, the Uruguayan electorate continued to be the 
most skeptical in Latin America of the market’s ability to promote development, 
rating the state’s responsibility for citizen’s welfare higher than the regional 
average.504  Although the National Party had been historically identified as a center-
right party, Larrañaga framed his campaign discourse in such a way as to attract the 
center-left votes that the Colorado Party was losing.505  But crucially, without the 
CNDAV’s pressure and campaign, neither the FA or the PN would have supported 
the reform to the extent they did.   Moreover, the CR was relegated to secondary 
status in the parties’ electoral campaigns.506  
    
Other Key Actors in the Coalition 
 
 Several other CNDAV member organizations played active roles in the 
campaign.  Noteworthy among these was the Uruguayan Federation of Mutual Aid 
Housing Cooperatives (Federacion Uruguaya de Cooperativas de Vivienda por 
Ayuda Mutua, FUCVAM), a strong urban social movement in Uruguay which 
consolidated grassroots mutual aid cooperatives into a social force.  FUCVAM was in 
the forefront of protests against the authoritarian government in the early 1970s, 
played an important role in the process of re-democratization in the early 1980s, and 
has sought, through direct action and/or support for state and community intervention, 
solutions to social problems such as the provision of basic services, health care, 
                                           
504 Luna, Juan Pablo. 2007. “Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social Democratic Alternative in 
Uruguay.” Latin American Politics & Society  49 (Winter): 1-30. 
505 Altman and Castiglioni. 2006. “The 2004 Uruguayan elections: A political earthquake foretold.” 
Electoral Studies 25 (March): 147-154. 
506 Espectador.com.“El plebiscito sobre el agua.” Interview with Oscar A. Bottinelli, Director of 
Uruguayan polling firm, FACTUM, October 27, 2004. 
http://www.espectador.com/1v4_contenido.php?id=29440&sts=1  (November 28, 2004). 
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education, and community-managed food programs.  An active member of FUCVAM 
explained to me the reasons why his organization supported the water plebiscite: 
“Cooperatives incorporate direct democracy.  FUCVAM has always supported such 
measures to defend the Uruguayan state.”507  I observed the contribution FUCVAM 
made to the mobilization efforts in the run-up to the October 31 election.  Its offices 
in Montevideo became transformed into a staging area for large groups of  volunteers 
preparing and coordinating activities in support of the CR.  This included dropping 
off ballots and voter instruction manuals at polling stations across the capital.508  
 Casa Bertolt Brecht, founded in 1964 in Montevideo to promote cultural 
exchange between Uruguay and Germany, and as a progressive “space” for political 
formation and activities, has been an important source of financial and organizational 
support to CNDAV.   It established a “Project in Defense of Water and Life” in 
collaboration with CNDAV which built support for the CR through international 
conferences, national-level seminars to popularize the water issue, demonstrations, 
and numerous publications on the water problematic. Two weeks before the October 
election, Casa Bertolt Brecht helped to organize a panel discussion at Montevideo’s 
municipal auditorium entitled “Blue Gold: Multinational Corporations and Organized 
Water Theft All Over the World,” which featured Canadian activist Maude Barlow.  I 
attended this panel discussion, and noted that it drew a diverse audience of several 
hundred people on a weeknight.  At the event, Casa Bertolt Brecht unveiled a 140 
page edited volume called “The Open Taps of Latin America: Latin American and 
Global Resistance to the Private Appropriation of Water.”   The title in Spanish is a 
                                           
507 Interview with Sebastian Oliveira, FUCVAM office in Montevideo,October 28, 2004. 
508 Author’s observations, FUCVAM offices, Montevideo, October 28, 2004. 
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play on words: it is a permutation of the title of the renowned book, The Open Veins 
of Latin America, by acclaimed Uruguayan author Eduardo Galeano.509   That book’s 
leitmotif concerned centuries of resource exploitation in Latin America. (Galeano was 
a strong supporter of the CR and CNDAV campaign.)  The “Open Taps” volume, 
which was being sold as a fundraiser for the campaign, contained contributions from 
the international network of water activists and a dedication from the water 
movement in Bolivia.  Casa Bertolt Brecht has since published a second edition of 
this volume, which has become one of several primary reference documents for the 
international water movement.  Financial support for its water project and pre- and 
post-reform activities has come from the Heinrich Böll foundation in Germany, Bread 
for the World, and other German foundations and organizations such as Umverteilen! 
(“Redistribution”) and World Economy, Ecology, and Development (WEED).510  
 University students and faculty were also active participants in CNDAV, in 
particular, the union of university students, FEUU, and faculty from the sciences and 
engineering department, several of whom did active research through their connection 
to REDES’ Sustainable Uruguay program. 
 
C. Transnational Support, Opposition, and Victory: 2003-2004 
 
 As Iglesias notes, the other distinguishing characteristic of CNDAV was its 
integration into international activist networks.  CNDAV drew early strength from 
solidaristic networking with other transnational water and IFI-focused activists; as 
previously noted, the majority of founding organizations participated actively in the 
                                           
509 Grosse, Thimmel and Taks. October 2004. Galeano’s book is  Las Venas Abiertas de América 
Latina, The Open Veins of Latin America.    
510 Casa Bertolt Brecht, Defensa del Agua y de la Vida.  
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WSF II  in Porto Alegre.  Table 4 lists the most engaged international NGOs and 
activist water networks which provided support to CNDAV during the course of the 
campaign.  Support included information and media dissemination, signature 
campaigns, publicity tours, solidaristic networking, and financial assistance.  Of these 
organizations, the Council of Canadians, La RED VIDA, and Public Citizen were 
three of the most prominent and visible supporters, helping to publicize the campaign 
and garner international support, including financial help.  Foundations such as the 
German Heinrich Böll and the U.S. Panta Rhea Foundation, also provided support. 
TABLE 4 
Transnational CSO and NGO Support for CNDAV 
Consumers International, Office for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Coordinadora en Defensa del Agua y la Vida (Bolivia) 
Council of Canadians 
Friends of the Earth-International 
International Union of Food, Agriculture, Hotel, Restaurant, Tobacco, and Allied 
Trades—Latin America Regional Secretariat (Rel-UITA) 
 
Polaris Institute (Canada) 
Public Citizen, Water for All Campaign (U.S.) 
Public Services International 
RED VIDA 
 
 During the second phase of the campaign to gather the legally-required 
minimum number of signatures to place the CR on the October 2004 ballot, 
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transnational networking began to increase bi-directionally, with CNDAV 
participating visibly in international water events, and transnational activists in turn, 
highlighting the importance of the CR.  Several key networking events transpired 
during 2003: 
 In January 2003 leaders of the Council of Canadians, the Polaris Institute, Public 
Citizen , and the Cochabamba Coalition for Defense of Water and Life 
participated in a “Solidarity Tour” to Argentina and Uruguay.  In Uruguay, the 
group held several open forums and met with government officials and the 
press.511  Directly following this tour, members of the CNDAV attended the third 
World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil.  FFOSE members stated that the 
WSF helped it establish networks of communication with other labor groups and 
“compañeros from countries that had survived privatization who…offered their 
solidarity through e-mail chains, calling and pressuring the Executive Branch, the 
Directors of OSE and the relevant Cabinet Ministers.” 
 
 In  March 2003, REDES-AT’s Maria Selva Ortiz made a public statement at the 
third World Water Forum in Kyoto, where she denounced the World Water 
Council’s (WWC) World Water Action report, which presented the privatization 
of Uruguay’s water as an example of “actions taken around the world to improve 
the way water is managed.” Selva-Ortiz maintained that the WWC made little or 
no effort to consult with those affected by privatizations, and ignored successful 
community-based models of service delivery such as those in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil and Santa Cruz, Bolivia.512 
 
 In August 2003, CNDAV participated in the founding of the Inter-american 
Network for the Defense of and Right to Water (Red Vigilancia Interamericana 
para la Defensa y Derecho al Agua, Red VIDA) in El Salvador, during an 
international conference on “Citizens’ Movements Confronting Water 
Privatization.” (Red VIDA is discussed in Chapter 5.)  Organizations from 16 
Latin American and Caribbean countries participated, and agreed to support the 
CR signature collection campaign through a call for letters of solidarity.  
 
 
                                           
511 Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy and Environment Program. N.D. “Solidarity Tour- Uruguay 
and Argentina.”   
http://www.publiccitizen.org/cmep/Water/cmep_Water/reports/argentina/articles.cfm?ID=8839 (July 
30, 2003).  
512 Olivier Hoedeman. 2003. “World Water Forum Organiser Promotes Water Privatization.” March 
16. Japan Independent Media Center. http://japan.indymedia.org./feature/display/119/index.php 
(August 13, 2003). 
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 On October 31, 2003, CNDAV achieved its first momentous victory with the 
delivery of  over 280,000 signatures to the President of the General Assembly-- 
25,000 more signatures than the minimum requirement of ten  percent of registered 
voters. The signatures were delivered by what CNDAV described as a “human river” 
of hundreds of marchers, starting at the headquarters of FFOSE in Montevideo, and 
terminating at the Legislative Palace.513  Daniel Viglietti addressed the assembled 
crowd and read from a proclamation of the Commission:    
We call today on the Uruguayan people to join in that titanic struggle which 
confronts the  modern-day Goliaths with weak people who want to defend 
their existence and their viability on the earth, so as to guarantee to their 
children and grandchildren a country which still maintains the green color of 
hope. 
 
During the rally, the campaign received letters of support from numerous 
international campaigns in support of water rights, including from La Coordinadora 
in Bolivia. 
 The delivery of signatures to Parliament marked the beginning of the third 
phase of the campaign: mobilization and preparation for the 2004 elections.  A little 
over a month later on December 7, 2003, the water campaign was given a boost as 
more than 60 percent of Uruguayans voted by referendum to repeal a law that would 
have led to the partial privatization of the state oil company, ANCAP (la 
Administración Nacional de Combustibles, Alcoholes y Portland). Repeal of the law 
followed a period of intense debate in the country and was supported by social and 
political organizations, including ANCAP’s trade union, Frente Amplio, and the 
                                           
513 El Pais Digital. 2003. “Entregaron firmas para plebiscito sobre el agua.” October 31.  
http://www.elpais.com.uy/Paginas/ImprimirNota2.asp?I=65064 (December 8, 2003).  CNDAV sought 
a margin of safety of 15 percent of registered voters, based on the discard rate of previous ballots by 
the Electoral Court.  
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CNDAV.514  For the CNDAV, the referendum outcome, including majority support 
from cities in the country’s traditionally more conservative interior, signaled a defeat 
for President Battle’s neoliberal agenda, and inspired hope that the water plebiscite 
was headed for a similarly positive fate.  During that same month CNDAV and 
REDES helped organize the  “First Social Forum on Water,” which drew several 
hundred participants from Argentina and Uruguay.  The Forum focused on support 
for the CR and rejection of water privatization generally, but also on other water-
related environmental issues such as opposition to the proposed World Bank-backed 
cellulose plant in Fray Bentos, Uruguay, and on how to create legal instruments for 
the sustainable management of the Guaraní aquifer.515 
 As outlined in Table 5, the months preceding the October 2004 election 
witnessed both a consolidation of domestic and international support for the 
campaign, and the gelling of some political opposition around an alternative CR 
proposal, put forth by the small Independent Party (Partido Independiente, PI.).  On 
June 3, 2004, seven months after the delivery of signatures to Parliament, Uruguay’s 
Election Board finally certified that CNDAV had met the requisite threshold to put 
the plebiscite measure to a vote.  The following month, on July 20, 2004, 
Representative Pablo Mieres of the PI reached an accord with the Colorado Party and 
some members of the National Party to present an alternative CR proposal on 
                                           
514 REDES Amigos de la Tierra. 2003. “URUGUAY: Consulta Popular deroga privatización de 
empresa de combustibles.” Email comunicación to listserv for Friends of the Earth-Latin America and 
the Caribbean. December 7.  
515 The aquifer is shared among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. REDES- Amigos de la 
Tierra  Comunicación, Foro Social del Agua   
http://www.elistas.net/lista/inforedes/archivo/indice/441/msg/442/ (December 24, 2003). 
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water.516  The alternative proposal had commonalities with CNDAV’s proposal 
insofar as it declared water to be a human right, assigned social needs priority over 
economic interests, and required that water resource planning be environmentally 
sustainable.  The key differences related to retaining the legal rights of the existing 
concessionaires and not foreclosing the option of future public-private partnerships.  
Mieres argued that prohibiting private financing of sanitation would relegate the 50 
percent of the population in the interior which lacked access to sewerage to a 
continuation of that fate.  He described a meeting with the CNDAV as cordial, but 
maintained that the group did not understand the difference between privatization 
and concessions. The newspaper La Republica claimed that private sector Uruguayan 
firms involved in the sale of water mounted a strong lobbying campaign in 
conjunction with bottlers and the logging sector, backing the PI’s proposal.517  
However, the PI’s proposal foundered because of a lack of wide support, and because 
on two occasions in July, it could not assemble the necessary quorum of members to 
convene a session of Parliament.  Frente Amplio and members of Larrañaga’s 
National Party fraction refused to enter the chambers of the General Assembly, 
denying the alternative measure’s supporters the opportunity to vote before the end-
of-month deadline for submitting the alternative proposal.518  Adriana Marquisio 
believed that had the PI’s proposal been approved, it would have spelled the death of 
CNDAV’s reform measure. 
                                           
516  Espectador.com. July 21, 2004. “Comisión promotora de plebiscito sobre el agua lanza el último 
tramo de su campaña.”  http://www.espectador.com/nota.php?idNota=22404 (December 3, 2007). 
517 La Republica (Uruguay) online. August 29, 2004. “Claves de la reforma constitucional en defense 
del agua y la vida.”   
http://www.larepublica.com.uy/lr3/larepublica/2004/08/29/politica/152224/claves-de-la-ref  (May 15, 
2007) 
518 El Espectador. July 28, 2004. “Se frustró el proyecto alternativo de reforma sobre el agua.” 
http://www.cncs.com.uy/softis/0/nv/1774 (October 27, 2004)  
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 As previously described, in September 2004 the CNDAV and the IMF got 
into a public spat over whether or not the GOU had been forced, as a condition of the 
IMF’s 2002 crisis-related loans, to pledge the country’s mineral reserves and Guaraní 
aquifer as collateral.519  The IMF counter-attacked in a letter to La Republica in 
which it denied that loans to the Uruguayan government were subject to “any 
guarantee to ensure payment.”520  I could find no evidence supporting CNDAV’s 
claim in publicly-available documents of the IMF, including the associated loan 
LOIs.  CNDAV’s literature on the LOI did not corroborate its own allegation.521   In 
the several weeks before the campaign, the PI was quoted in several newspapers as 
saying that the IDB’s President, Enrique Iglesias (a Uruguayan national) stated that if 
the CR won, “half the country [those currently without sanitation] would be left 
using cesspits.”  On September 22, 2004, the IDB met with officials from the 
Municipality of Montevideo (which provides sanitation to the city’s residents), the 
Government’s Office of Planning and Budget, and OSE, following which it issued a 
report stating that if the CR passed, Uruguay would not be able to fulfill the WSS 
goals it agreed to in 2000.522  Those goals included the provision of over 750,000 
new users with networked sanitation service by 2015, and 350,000 new users with 
potable water supply.523   The IDB warned that passage of the CR would jeopardize 
the country’s ability to achieve the MDB goals for sanitation, since OSE would not 
                                           
519La Republica (Uruguay). August 29, 2004.  “Claves de la Reforma Constitucional: en Defensa del 
Agua y la Vida.”  http://www.larepublica.com.uy/larepublica/2004/08/29/politica/152224/claves-de-la-
ref.  (May 15, 2007)  
520 La Republica. September 5, 2004.  “Polemica entre FMI y Comisión de Defensa del Agua.”  
521 REDES-AT. September 7, 2004.  “IMF questions Uruguayan Movement in Defense of Water.”   
522 REDES-AT, online archives, citing an article in the weekly news magazine Búsqueda on September 
30, 2004. 
523 REDES-AT.  September 30, 2004. “IDB warns Uruguay about ‘the failure to comply with water 
and sanitation goals.” Personal copy. 
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be able to finance expansion through debt capital.524    In terms of private sector 
opposition, CNDAV alleged that large landowning interests such as rice and 
eucalyptus tree cultivators, along with water bottlers, developed a “strong lobby 
against the proposed reform.”525  However, I observed little concerted opposition to 
the reform either in the media, on billboards, or at the many tables and booths 
distributing political literature in Montevideo during the two weeks prior to the 
election.  (This was in contrast to visible scare tactics in the form of propaganda 
leveled against FA-EP and its largest political fraction, the former Tupamaros).526  
FFOSE and CNDAV members that I interviewed at the Socialist Party headquarters 
agreed that there was no visible opposition to the “vote Yes” (vota por Sí)  CR 
campaign.527  
 Nevertheless, CNDAV’s ramped-up mobilization between July 2004 and the 
October election bore fruit in terms of the number of Uruguayans who became 
cognizant of the plebiscite and inclined to support it.  When the first national opinion 
poll on the CR was conducted in late July 2004, the leading national polling 
organization, FACTUM, found that half of registered voters had no knowledge of the 
water plebiscite.528   In a second national opinion poll conducted on October 17, 
2004, the  percentage of voters aware of the CR had risen to 69  percent, with 65  
percent expressing support for the measure.  During the critical last two months, the 
CR campaign focused on the interior of the country and soliciting transnational 
                                           
524 Alfano, P. October, 22, 2004. “Sofismas con olor a pozo negro.” Brecha Montevideo, Uruguay. 
525 Santos and Villareal, July 2006. “Uruguay: Direct Democracy in Defence of the Right to Water.” In 
Reclaiming Public Water, Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory, revised. 
http://www.tni.org/books/wateruruguayrev.pdf? (November 19, 2007). 
526 Author’s observations; field work conducted October 18- November 1, 2004. 
527 Interviews at Montevideo headquarters of Partido Socialista, October 21, 2004. 
528 FACTUM, Opción 2004, “Plebiscito sobre el Agua,” poll conducted July 26, 2004. 
http://www.factum.edu.uy/ (February 24, 2005) 
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support.  In September, an “International conference in Defense of Water,” part of 
the Uruguay Social Forum, included participation from activists in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay.529  Twelve days before the election Council of 
Canadians president and author Maude Barlow declared to an audience of several 
hundred in the Montevideo municipal auditorium: “On October 31 we are all 
Uruguayans.”530  On Saturday October 23, 2004, the CNDAV officially closed its 
campaign with a symbolic public rally which drew perhaps 200 people to the plaza 
across from the Legislative Palace.  The event featured speakers, music and a 
procession of jinetes (horsemen) rallied by FFOSE, who had traveled from different 
parts of the interior of the country to the event.  Six days before the election, 
CNDAV received  an “international declaration of solidarity” from over 100 
organizations and hundreds of individuals from 36 countries. The declaration stated 
that the CR “sets a fundamental precedent in the defense of water through its 
inclusion in a country’s constitution by means of direct democracy.”531 
 On October 31, 2004, Uruguay’s Left made history, displacing the two 
traditional parties from the Presidency for the first time in the country’s 176-year 
history.  The FA-EP won 50.5 percent of the vote, with voter participation at 89.6 
percent.532  A half-million people—one sixth of the country’s population-- filled the 
streets of the capital on election night in a sea of jubilation.  October 31st also made 
history in another way: by making Uruguay the first country to constitutionally 
enshrine the provision of water and sanitation as the exclusive province of the public 
                                           
529 The event was co-sponsored with Casa Bertolt Brecht and Sustainable Uruguay. 
530 The author was in attendance.  
531 REDES-AT. October 26, 2004. “Water Referendum in Uruugay supported by more than 100 
organizations from all over the world.” Personal copy. 
532 Altman and Castiglioni 2006, 147-191. 
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sphere.  By a margin of almost two to one, 64.6 percent of Uruguayans voted for the 
“Yes” ballot to amend the Constitution.533  The plebiscite won a majority of votes in 
16 out of 19 Departments in the country, 11 of which won with 60 percent or more of 
the popular vote, and eight of which won with close to 70 percent or more of the 
vote.  In the days and weeks to follow, the water activist listservs positively pulsed 
with the news of CNDAV’s momentous victory.  Indeed, on October 31st, as Maude 
Barlow had proclaimed, the activists “were all Uruguayans.”  
                                           
533 Corte Electoral de Uruguay, Elecciones 2004, Plebiscito por Agua, Resultados por departmento. 
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♦ Public Enterprises Law, 
permitting privatization or partial 
privatization of various SOEs, 
goes into effect.   
♦ First private concession in 
Maldonado, Aguas de la Costa, 
subsidiary of Aguas de Barcelona 
(Suez). 
♦ Public Enterprises 
Law is partially 
repealed in December 
by an overwhelming 
majority, handing 
defeat to incumbent 
President Lacalle and 





♦ IDB loan of $45 million for 
National Sanitation Program I.  
Includes support for 
decentralization of OSE 




♦ World Bank conducts analytical 
and advisory activities, and 
publishes two sector  reports 
promoting reform and PSP in 
Uruguay’s utilities. 
♦ IDB approves $153 million loan 
for sanitation in Montevideo and 
environs. Seeks to achieve full 
cost recovery via tariffs. 
Coordinates with World Bank 
work on sector restructuring. 
♦ Local residents join 
with FFOSE members 
in fast-growing 
Ciudad de la Costa in 
a pilot project to 
supply water to 
neighborhoods 
lacking service.   
 
2000 
♦ GOU awards 30 year concession 
contract for Maldonado 
Department to Basque company, 
Aguas de Bilbao, in January.  
Assumes control from OSE in 
June. 
♦ World Bank approves $27million 
loan to OSE; first tranche of 10 
year, $100 million loan. Includes 
PSP conditions, contemplating 
extension beyond Maldonado. 
♦ With impetus from 
the water utility trade 
union FFOSE, 
Commission in 
Defense of Water and 
Sanitation in Costa de 
Oro y Pando 
(CDASCOP) formed 
in October. Claims 
eventual membership 
of 40 local 
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Anti-Privatization International/ 
Activities in Transnational  
Uruguay Activities 
2001 
♦ World Bank approves a $ 6 
million utility services 
modernization and technical 
assistance loan to establish and 
strengthen regulatory structures 
and foster PSP.  In the WSS 
sector, loan will support the 
preparation of medium-sized 
concessions. 
♦ CDASCOP joins with 
FFOSE and other 
neighborhood 
organizations in the 
Colonía and 
Maldonado 
Departments  to 
oppose the 
privatization of OSE.  
In August, FFOSE 
launches its campaign 
for the defense of 
water at Aguas 
Corrientes, site of the 
principal treatment 
plant for Montevideo.   
♦ Members of  
CDASCOP and 
Friends of the 
Earth-Uruguay  
participate in the 
first World Social 
Forum in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil.  






of the global 
dimension to PSP. 
2002 
♦ IMF approves increase of  $1.5 
billion in Stand-By credit to 
Uruguay in wake of Argentine 
financial crisis.  
♦  GOU signs “Letter of Intent” 
with IMF in June committing to 
new regulatory framework for 
water; new quality standards and 
controls to facilitate private 
investment; and tenders for bids 
for PSP in sewage treatment. 
♦ First independent regulator for 
energy and WSS, URSEA, 
created in December, in 
accordance with IFIs’ loan 
stipulations.    
♦ CDASCOP, FFOSE, 
REDES-AT (Friends 
of the Earth, 
Uruguay), Sustainable 
Uruguay, and the 
neighborhood 
organization of  
Manantiales form a 




♦ National Commission 
in Defense of Water 
and Life (CNDAV) 
launched in October. 
Begins collection of 
signatures to put the 
reform on the 2004 








Forum in Brazil. 










launch of  PSI’s 
“Global Campaign 
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  ♦ Solidarity Tour 
with Public 





♦ CNDAV at WSF 









♦ World Bank approves 
$151.5 million Public 
Services Structural 
Adjustment Loan (SAL) in 
wake of 2002 financial 
crisis. In WSS sector, key 
goal is to strengthen the 
framework for PSP through 
new sector law and 
management contract for 
Montevideo water supply. 
 ♦ Press release by 
CNDAV/REDES-
AT at Third World 
Water Forum in 
Kyoto, Japan, 
denouncing World 











♦ URAGUA plagued by 
operational and financial 
problems; GOU 
Comptroller of Concessions 
accuses it of breach of 
contract, Minister of 
Economy and Finance 
Atchugarry requests 
“orderly exit from the 
country.” URAGUA 
announces it may abandon 
the concession.  
 ♦ Red VIDA 
(Vigilancía 
Interamerica por 
Derecho al Agua) 
founded in San 
Salvador.  Call for 











 ♦ CNDAV and a 
“human chain” of  
hundreds march to 
Parliament to deliver 
282,000 signatures 
(14 percent more than 
required) to put the 
constitutional reform 
measure on the 2004 
ballot 





numerous letters of 
international 
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wins with 62 percent 
of the vote, garnering 
a majority even in the 
conservative cities of 
the country’s  interior. 
♦ Uruguay and 
Argentina hold the 
first Joint Social 














































♦ The Independent Party (PI) 
launches an alternative 
constitutional reform 
proposal which would 
declare water a human 
right, but continue to allow 
for PSP in the form of 
concessions.  Argues that 
private financing crucial for 
closing the country’s 
sanitation gap.  FA-EP and 
National Party factions 
block ability of  PI and 
supporters to gain a quorum 
in the National Assembly 
♦ Election Board 
confirms in June  that 
CNDAV submitted 
sufficient signatures 
to put the plebiscite to 
a vote concurrent with 
national elections in 
October. 
♦ CNDAV launches 
final phase of 
campaign in July; 
plans workshops and 
rallies throughout the 
country.  
♦ The leading national 
polling organization, 
FACTUM, conducts 
its first national 
opinion poll on the 
constitutional reform; 
finds that 50 percent 
have no knowledge of 
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♦ The IMF publicly 
challenges the CNDAV’s 
campaign and arguments.  
It denies CNDAV’s charge 
that debt repayment would 
be subject to a guarantee by 
the GOU that  would pledge 
water (aquifers) and 
mineral resources  as 
collateral for IMF loans. 
♦ The IDB warns that passage 
of the Constitutional 
Reform will jeopardize 
Uruguay’s ability to 
achieve the MDG goals for 
sanitation, since OSE can’t 
finance expansion through 
debt capital. 
♦ Solidarity tour in 
support of the “Yes” 
vote on the 
referendum held in 
various Departments 
in the interior. 
♦ International 
Conference in the 
Defense of Water 
takes place within  














♦ Opposition steps up 
lobbying in last throes of 
campaign, warning that a 
vote in favor will condemn 






♦ In second national 
opinion poll on the 
water plebiscite 
conducted Oct. 17, 
FACTUM finds that 
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 6.5. Neoliberal Policies and WSS Provision in Uruguay, 1992-2004 
 
 
Even Well-Performing Public Utilities (Apparently) Need PSP: The IFIs Push, the 
Citizens Push Back, and the State Minds the Treasury 
  
 As I discussed in Section 6.2, Uruguayan voters dealt a resounding blow in 
1992 to President Lacalle’s neoliberal reform program by partially repealing the 
Public Enterprises Law.  If it had been enacted, that law would have constituted a 
radical departure from the history of statism that Uruguayans had embraced 
throughout the 20th century.  The rejection also implicated the IMF, which was 
persuaded by Lacalle to enter into a Stand-by Arrangement for over $150 million 
with conditions requiring Uruguay to begin privatizing its public sector.  Although 
OSE was not one of the six public enterprises slated for de-monopolization or 
privatization in the 1992 law, two days before the vote on the referendum, the 
directors of OSE began to conceive of a role for PSP in water management.  On 
December 11, 1992 they initiated a process which one year later, culminated in the 
first private concession in Maldonado province, Aguas de la Costa.534  Bergara, et. al. 
point out that this concession did not require legal approval and was awarded through 
administrative channels.    
 World Bank projects involving private participation in infrastructure in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region increased annually between 1991 to 1997, with 
                                           




one project in 1991 and 22 projects in 1997.535  Projects with PSP continued strong 
until the Argentine financial crisis of 2002.  This change was reflected in the WSS 
loan portfolios of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
in Uruguay, and in the conditions of IMF Stand-by Arrangements. Both the World 
Bank and the IDB were significant lenders to the Uruguayan WSS sector between 
1993-2004, but the push to open WSS services to PSP was reflected and articulated 
more explicitly in the form of conditions in World Bank project and policy (i.e., 
structural adjustment) loans.  Table 5 outlines the major lending operations during 
this period.  The section below describes key government and IFI initiatives to reform 
the WSS sector, and the reactions of civil society organizations that formed the 
organizational base of CNDAV.   
 
A. The Push for Private Sector Participation Begins: 1996-2000 
  
 In January 1996 President Sanguinetti (of the Colorado Party) submitted a 
budget authorizing OSE, with prior approval of the Executive, to grant concessions 
for WSS in the interior of the country.536  During this same year the World Bank sent 
a mission to Uruguay to “open a dialogue” with the GOU on public service reform, 
followed in the ensuing years by analytical and advisory work. That work culminated 
in the preparation of a report entitled Uruguay: Towards a New Role for the State in 
Uruguay’s Utilities, whose main purpose was to maximize public-private joint 
                                           
535 World Bank. 2009. Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, Regional Snapshot: Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
536 Law No. 16736 of January 5, 1996. 
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ventures in utilities.537  The report argued that Uruguay’s public utilities were not as 
cost-effective as they should be compared with best international practice; were 
hobbled by poor performance incentives, complex and costly cross-subsidy schemes, 
and legal restrictions on contracting and staffing; and were constrained by the role 
they played as an important source of revenue for the Treasury.  With respect to this 
last point the Bank notes that Uruguayan utilities made a net contribution to public 
sector revenue of about two percent of GDP, rendering them an important instrument 
of fiscal policy.  This has contributed to resistance to privatization across political 
lines, and as Antonio Estache remarked, raises a serious question of whether such 
utilities should be candidates for privatization.  In a footnote to the report, the Bank 
acknowledges that it is appropriate for governments to require a return on investment 
on public enterprises and to impose taxation on public as well as private companies, 
but “it is not clear that this approach is the best” with respect to Uruguay’s utilities. 
Yet the Bank fails to say  why, and what approach might replace it.  Regarding OSE, 
the report notes that its service coverage and quality were good when compared to the 
region, but that labor productivity was poor, and OSE’s multiple conflicting roles as 
regulator, operator, and grantor of private concessions “thwarted competition by 
discriminating in favor of its own operations when allocating constrained public 
resources.”538   But the Bank characterized OSE as (now) recognizing the need to 
separate regulation, policy, and operation; and cited its intention to foster greater 
efficiency through decentralizing operations to four regional business units and 
                                           
537 World Bank. June 16, 1997. Uruguay: Towards a New Role for the State in Uruguay’s Utilities, 
Infrastructure Division, Country Department I, Latin America and the Carribean Region, Report No. 
16154-UY.  
538 World Bank. June 16, 1997, 10. 
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increasing PSP through new concessions and outsourcing.  The Bank emphasized that 
the natural monopoly characteristics of WSS would preclude competition “in the 
market” (as between rival firms competing directly to supply consumers), but that 
OSE could foster competition “for the market,” by awarding concessions through a 
competitive bidding process.  This process would putatively engage “firms offering 
the most advantageous terms to consumers,” who would be subject to a re-bid process 
at the end of the franchise period.  At the same time, the Bank’s report acknowledged 
that the Aguas de la Costa concession bidding process in 1993 was “flawed,” 
characterized by weakness and arbitrariness in the ratings of both the technical and 
economic proposals.539 
 In 1995, a year before the World Bank’s report on reforming Uruguay’s 
utilities, the IDB Group unveiled its grand strategy in support of private infrastructure 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.540  That report highlighted the need to focus on 
new sources of private financing, such as the development of domestic financial 
markets, loan guarantees, and political risk insurance. In a follow-on report in 1996 
reprising its activities in support of PSP in infrastructure, the IDB noted that since its 
founding in 1959, infrastructure has been the largest component of its loan portfolio, 
traditionally focused on the public sector. With the creation of the Inter-American 
Investment Corporation in 1989, the Multilateral Investment Fund in 1993, and the 
Private Sector Department in 1994, the focus had shifted to operations designed to 
encourage PSP.  At the same time, the IDB acknowledged that the private sector was 
                                           
539 World Bank. June 16, 1997, Annex E, p.38. 
540 Inter-American Development Bank. April 2006. Private Infrastructure: Support from the Inter-
American Development Bank Group 1990-2005, Sustainable Development Department, Infrastructure 
and Financial Markets Division, p.2.    
291 
 
not “a universal solution,” and that “different countries and sectors may require 
different solutions at different points in time.”541  
 During this same period, the IDB made two substantial WSS sector loans to 
Uruguay: a $45 million loan in 1993 for the first phase of a National Potable Water 
and Sewerage Program, and in 1996, a $153 million loan to the municipality of 
Montevideo for sanitation.  Compared to subsequent World Bank loans, these loans 
were “soft” in their approach to integrating PSP.  The 1993 loan to OSE did not have 
a PSP component, but provided support for the decentralization of the administration 
and operations of OSE—often viewed as a precursor to PSP.   The 1996 loan to the 
municipality of Montevideo (Intendencia Municipal de Montevideo, IMM), which 
focused on construction, rehabilitation and expansion of sewer and storm drainage 
systems, had no direct requirement for PSP conditionality, but stated more 
equivocally that “where shown to be warranted,” the municipality should outsource 
the operation and maintenance of the sewer systems included in the 
program…including contracting out to private firms and cooperatives.”542  It also 
required the municipality to set up a business cost accounting system with the goal of 
reaching full-cost recovery in sanitation tariffs.  Nevertheless, as current Central Bank 
president Mario Bergara told me in a 2004 interview (when he was then director of 
URSEC, the telecommunications regulatory agency), sanitation services were, and 
always had been, deficit-generating, and would need to be cross-subsidized.543  
                                           
541 Inter-American Development Bank. April 2006, 2. 
542 Inter-American Development Bank  Metropolitan Montevideo Sanitation Program, Stage III, UR-
0089, Executive Summary, p.8. 
543 Interview with Mario Bergara, Montevideo, Uruguay, October 27, 2004. 
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Two interesting facts should be noted with respect to the IDB loan to the 
IMM.  First, this loan was made to the leftist Frente Amplio municipal government 
which won local elections in Montevideo in 1989 and again in 1994-- with a plurality 
of 44 percent of the votes.  Second, the left-wing municipal government put forth a 
program described as “radically democratic,” a centerpiece of which was 
administrative, social, and political decentralization to participatory neighborhood 
councils.544  Ironically, and in contrast to the IFI’s push for decentralizing state 
enterprises like OSE, decentralization of governance in Montevideo was a specific 
leftist response to the neoliberal programs of the Lacalle and Sanguinetti regimes at 
the national level.  As discussed in Section 6.6.1, the period since the passage of the 
CR has exposed differences within CNDAV regarding whether or not 
decentralization of OSE operations represents a progressive or desirable move.   
CNDAV activists point to 1999 as the year when the World Bank began to 
apply pressure on OSE in loan negotiations to incorporate PSP in WSS provision, and 
the Bank’s OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation Project (MSRP) loan, 
approved in June 2000, underscored the priority now given to PSP in line with 
Uruguay’s five-year Country Assistance Strategy (CAS): 
“The new [CAS] presented to the Bank with this project has identified reform 
of public enterprises as one of the main development themes in Uruguay over 
the next few years…The Program is in line with the Government’s vision for 
reform in the sector. Over the medium and long-term this includes an 
increasingly open and competitive water sector....Beginning with the 
Maldonado concession, and continuing with other areas in which outside 
financing is critical to meeting sector investment needs, new private operators 
will be brought in over the short and medium term.”545 
 
                                           
544 Chavez, Daniel. “Decentralization and Participatory Urban Management in Montevideo.” 
http://www.ucm.es/info/femp/red/articulos/montevideo.doc (January 22, 2009).  
545 World Bank. June 2000, 3-5.   
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Given the “political constraints to full-fledged privatization,”  the project loan was 
instead focused on a “re-definition of public sector roles in infrastructure services, 
and the goal of state reform.”546  Two broad goals spelled out in the PAD for the 
project were for OSE to undertake demand-driven investments in sewerage and to 
deepen decentralization. The PAD comments that decentralization was at the time 
politically infeasible because of GOU reluctance, a shortage of technical capacity in 
the regions, and a lack of transparency in the allocation of costs and subsidies.  It is 
very likely that some of the resistance to decentralization from the ruling parties had 
to do with a reliance on patronage positions in the national OSE office. Bergara 
points out that representation on the Boards of public service enterprises has 
historically been political, with co-participation between the Colorados and Blancos, 
each of which had rewarded political loyalty with patronage.547  When I visited 
OSE’s headquarters in Montevideo, members of the trade union FFOSE told me that 
at least one-fourth of the management of OSE was appointed through patronage—
most with no prior experience in water or sanitation.548  The President of URSEA, the 
newly-created regulatory agency for the energy and water sector utilities (discussed 
below), told me that there were 24 positions requiring specialized management 
expertise in OSE, yet there were 72 managers.549  A World Bank official confirmed 
to me that among public service utilities, OSE has historically been more closely tied 
to patronage.550  
                                           
546 World Bank. June 2000,  9-11. 
547 Bergara et al., 27. 
548 Interviews with Lourdes Martinez and other FFOSE members, October 21, 2004. 
549 Interview with Carlos Costa, President of URSEA, October 29, 2004. 
550 Interview 1. 
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 The analysis contained in the OSE MSRP points to contradictions in the 
World Bank’s own internal assessment of OSE and the WSS sector. The Bank’s 
analysis of OSE’s tariff structure for water and sanitation provides an example of this, 
leading the reader to wonder how strong a rationale really existed for requiring the 
introduction of  PSP into the sector. While consistently criticizing OSE’s average 
WSS tariffs as among the “highest in Latin America… and the world,” the PAD 
simultaneously praised OSE for its “well-intentioned efforts to achieve full cost 
recovery” and noted that: 
Despite major inefficiencies in the collection and use of funds, these tariffs 
are high enough to cover operation and maintenance costs, to ensure medium-
term profitability, and to generate the revenues required to support 
commercial borrowing for an ambitious investment program [my emphasis]… 
If cost reduction improvements are achieved, OSE’s expected profitability 
would improve to the point where the company could even support a tariff 
reduction…[OSE] has made steady performance improvements over the past 
15 years…overall levels of  water and sanitation service coverage are still 
high by regional standards…Though improvements have occurred slowly in 
the public utility, OSE did increase annual investment ten-fold from 1987 to 
1997 while increasing labor productivity from 12.7 employees per 1000 
connections to 7.9 employees per 1000 connections over the same period [my 
emphasis].551 
 
The Bank acknowledges that most Uruguayans are happy with OSE’s services, and 
that the public accepts OSE’s “relatively high tariffs more a result of an emphasis on 
social equality than a consequence of OSE’s inefficient monopoly operation.”  It 
makes recommendations for rationalizing the tariff structure, but these are more on 
the order of streamlining rather than calling for a fundamental overhaul.  Notably, 
while the Bank castigates OSE for its high tariffs, it concomitantly lauds the utility 
for tariffs high enough to recover full costs and support investment, exactly the 
                                           
551 World Bank. June 2000, 23-29. 
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prescription the Bank promotes in its global policies to reform the WSS sector!  In 
short, the OSE MSRP loan leaves the impression that OSE, as a public utility, had 
already traveled a good part of the of the distance towards achieving the World 
Bank’s vision of a WSS service provider, albeit one with room for efficiency 
improvements and especially, improved sanitation coverage in the interior provinces 
outside of Montevideo. This was and is certainly the area where OSE and Uruguay 
has lagged significantly, and a gap which the World Bank and IDB loans were 
seeking to close.  But the contradictions in the MSRP project appraisal highlight the 
tensions described in Chapter 4 in respect of the Bank’s internal organizational 
culture.  OSE, it turns out, was actually a well performing public utility before the 
MDBs stepped in with prescriptions to introduce PSP.   
 
B. Stepped-up Pressure During the Economic Crisis: 2002-2003   
 
 
 As discussed in Section 6.3, the economic and financial crisis that crippled 
Uruguay in 2002 led the IMF to extend almost three billion dollars in stand-by credits 
(loans) to the country during that year.  By August 2002, the total package extended 
by the IMF, IDB, and World Bank reached $3.9 billion, in what the World Bank 
describes as “one of the largest [multilateral rescue] efforts as a  percentage of GDP 
ever carried out.”552  The combined assistance package was tied to “deep structural 
reforms, including drastic expenditure restraint and fiscal adjustment.”553   In April 
                                           
552 World Bank. May 2005. Country Assistance Strategy for the Oriental Republic of Uruguay 2005-
2010.. 
553 World Bank. March 25, 2003. Program Document for a Proposed Public Services and Social 
Sectors Structural Adjustment Loan in the amount of U.S. $151.52 million and Special SAL in the 
amount of US$ 102.02 million to the Oriental Republic of Uruguay.” Finance, Private Sector, and 
Infrastructure, Latin America and the Caribbean Region.  Report No. 25012-UR, 3. 
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2003, after several months of preparation, the World Bank approved two structural 
adjustment loans (SALs) to Uruguay for a total of $250 million. The larger of these 
SALs, the $150 million Public Services and Social Sectors Structural Adjustment 
Loan, was intended to improve Uruguay’s pallid economic health by increasing the 
efficiency of the public sector and creating a “more market-friendly environment.”  
The Bank explained that the loan met the criteria for an SAL through its focus on 
structural reform of the public sector: 
“the monopoly service provision by the public utilities and weak regulatory 
frameworks have historically contributed to service lags and high costs, 
adversely affecting competitiveness, and bringing additional inflexibility to 
the economy. The loans support the Government’s efforts to open areas 
currently dominated by the State to the private sector, reducing pressures on 
public expenditures and facilitating a private-sector led economic recovery.” 
554 
 
Together, the IMF’s June 2002 stand-by credit and the 2003 World Bank SAL 
constituted the strongest conditions to that date placed on the GOU to open up the 
WSS sector to PSP.  The key reforms required of the GOU in each loan document, 
which were coordinated in concertation among the IFIs,555 called for changing the 
legal and regulatory frameworks for WSS to facilitate PSP; restructuring and 
reducing OSE’s scope of authority through creating an independent multi-sector 
regulator; and passing a new sector law for WSS. 
.  The commitment documents signed by the GOU in exchange for the IMF 
loans (the Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic Policies, and Technical 
Memorandum of Understanding) committed the Government to submit a new 
regulatory framework for WSS to the legislative branch in September 2002; to issue a 
                                           
554 World Bank. March 2003, 39. 
555 World Bank. March 2003. 
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Presidential Decree by December 2002 to facilitate private investment; and to invite 
bids for PSP in Montevideo for service improvements and sewage treatment.556   
Although these were not tantamount to “hard” conditionality imposed by the IMF, 
they did represent “upping the ante,” especially in terms of consolidating a legal and 
regulatory framework for PSP.  This was evidenced by the creation of the multi-
sector regulatory agency for electricity, gas, fuel, and water and sanitation, URSEA 
(Unidad Reguladora de Servicios de Energía y Agua), in December 2002, in 
accordance with the timeline specified in the IMF LOI.  In addition to its stated 
objectives to protect consumers’ and users’ rights through “quality assurance and 
reasonable prices” for public services, the law creating URSEA explicitly included 
the “promotion of free competition in service provision,” “free choice for consumers 
among diverse providers,” and the “application of tariffs which reflect economic 
costs.”557  
 The World Bank’s SAL made explicit reference to “altering the balance of 
power in Uruguay’s water sector” through two pieces of legislation: the creation of 
URSEA and the passage of a new Water and Sanitation Sector Law, which would 
give the central government title over WSS services and limit the ability of OSE to 
control new entrants.  The SAL set two other conditions in the loan: (1) the Office of 
Planning and Budget under the Executive Branch would set uniform accounting 
standards for the water sector, and (2) the GOU would look into letting a contract in 
Montevideo to reduce unaccounted-for-water (UFW).  Incremental billings from 
                                           
556 International Monetary Fund.  June 18, 2002, 6-8. 
557 Republic of Uruguay, Legislative Chamber, Law No. 17.598. December 24, 2002, Article 2.  
http://www.ursea.gub.uy/carga.php?l=11&p=http://www.ursea.gub.uy:8080/web/mnormativo.nsf/Leye
s_WebI?OpenView  (January 5, 2009) 
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UFW would finance sewerage expansions in the interior (note that the Bank here 
implicit agrees to the necessity of  cross-subsidization of sewerage investment).558  
As in the previous OSE MSRP loan, the World Bank stressed that price, not coverage 
or quality (except for sanitation), was the main problem with Uruguay’s utilities.  Th
Bank makes scant reference in the SAL to the then-extant private concessions, 
especially the larger URAGUA, which was serving the lucrative, tourism-based 
Department of Maldonado.  In 2004 Bergara wrote that  “regulatory design has been 
notably deficient in the water sector… and this became evident during the opaque 
process of renegotiation of the concession contracts after the crisis in early 2002.”
e 
559  
Bergara told me in an interview that both URAGUA and Aguas de la Costa were 
“bad contracts, bad concessions—inconsistent and not well done. The contracts have 
been renegotiated every two to three years.”560   In the program document for the 
Public Services SAL, the Bank parenthetically states that neither OSE nor the private 
WSS providers had been required to “report customer service indicators in a 
standardized format, so that consumers have been left in the dark” about the relative 
performance of the private and public operators.  It acknowledges that greater 
accountability in operational and financial performance is needed for both OSE and 
the private operators.    
 FFOSE and CNDAV were opposed to the creation of URSEA for several 
reasons, not the least of which was that they viewed it as being primarily charged 
with rationalizing and deregulating the state, and preparing bid tenders for PSP 
                                           
558 World Bank. March 2003, 33. 
559 Bergara, Mario. October 2004. “Efficiency, Equity and Affordability in Infrastructure.” Personal 
copy from the author, then Director of URSEC, the regulatory agency for telecommunications. 
560 Interview with Mario Bergara, October 27, 2004. 
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concessions.  FFOSE Vice-President Adriana Marquisio told me that URSEA’s 
placement in the Office of Planning and Budget under the executive branch was a 
calculated move to shield the regulatory agency from any control by the legislative 
branch.561  In stark contrast, the World Bank’s Public Services SAL lamented the fact 
that URSEA  “can only recommend tariff changes, while the ultimate say on tariffs 
remains with the executive branch, as established in the Constitution.”562  Moreover, 
Carlos Costa, the first appointed president of URSEA, told me in a 2004 interview 
that the agency’s powers were diluted from the time of its creation.  It had 
overlapping competencies and competing legal jurisdiction with other public entities, 
such as OSE and the Ministry of Housing, Land Management, and Environment 
(MVOTMA, in Spanish).563  In the case of WSS, OSE retained the role of de facto 
regulator of URAGUA through its own Commission for Comptroller of Concessions 
(Comisión de Contralor de Concesiones), and was responsible for ensuring that 
URAGUA fulfilled the conditions of its contract with the public utility, which 
awarded the concession.  The World Bank’s SAL envisioned that this regulatory 
responsibility would shift to URSEA, but that had not transpired in the year and a half 
following the April 2003 loan.  Bergara attributes this to a reluctance on the part of 
the executive branch to cede power to independent regulatory authorities, especially 
since tariff-setting was an important means of regulating transfers to the GOU’s fiscal 
coffers.  However, OSE was the one public utility that did not make net positive 
transfers to the treasury (it generally only broke even).564  In short, URSEA never 
                                           
561 Interview with Adriana Marquisio, Montevideo, Uruguay. October 28, 2004. 
562 World Bank. March 2003, 14. 
563 Interview with Carlos Costa, President of URSEA, October 29, 2004. 
564 Bergara. October 2004. 
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acquired the mandate to become the PSP broker that the activists feared, seemingly 
because the ruling neoliberal government in 2003-2004 was unwilling to cede control 
over an important source of fiscal revenue to an autonomous entity.  With respect to 
regulation on behalf of consumers and users, it is not clear how much of URSEA’s 
failure to do this in its first two years of operation was attributable to its lack of 
authority, and how much to a failure in implementing its mandate.  Ana Dominguez 
and Marcel Achkar, two members of the UDELAR faculty who were also activists in 
CNDAV, pointed out to me that they were unaware of any complaint procedures that 
the public could avail themselves of under URSEA.  In my  conversation with 
URSEA President Carlos Costa, it did not appear clear that a mechanism for lodging 
complaints had yet been put in place.565   URSEA’s lack of authority to regulate the 
private concessions meant that it was OSE and the Minister of the Economy which 
found URAGUA in breach of contract in 2003.  They found that it had failed to invest 
in sanitation infrastructure improvements in Maldonado in accordance with an agreed 
timetable, and was in arrears on payment of its monthly taxes to the State.566  Achkar 
and Dominguez told me that OSE had to step in when URAGUA was unable to live 
up to its contractual obligations, such as when a water main burst in 2001, which 
caused OSE $30 million in losses it would otherwise have not incurred.567   
 Beyond the debate over what kind of regulator URSEA was or could be, 
several weeks after CNDAV’s victory in the constitutional reform campaign FFOSE 
                                           
565 Interview with Ana Dominguez and Marcel Achkar, Faculty of Sciences and Engineering, 
University of the Republic, October 29, 2004.; Interview with Carlos Costa, President of URSEA, 
October 29, 2004.  
566 El País-Uruguay online. July 30, 2003. “El gobierno decidió ponerle fin a la concesión de la 
empresa Uragua.”  http://www.elpais.com.uy/03/07/30/pnacio_51659.asp  (January 13, 2008).  
567 Interview with Ana Dominguez and Marcel Achkar, Faculty of Sciences and Engineering, 
University of the Republic, October 29, 2004 
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Vice-President Adriana Marquisio leveled a somewhat surprising and more 
fundamental critique at regulation.  In a press interview with an international trade 
union federation in Montevideo Marquisio stated: 
 
We [FFOSE trade unionists] are very skeptical of regulatory frameworks, 
while acknowledging that in certain cases they can function very well.  We 
believe that the best control and guaranty of an efficient, transparent, and 
financially accountable state is the citizenry itself.  When given the 
opportunity to participate, civil society knows how to regulate the expenditure 
of its own [public] funds.568 
 
 
This view probably sprang more from Marquisio’s role as a leader of a public sector 
union and concern over how a regulator might infringe on OSE’s autonomy, than 
reflected a consensus position of CNDAV about regulation. Yet it was a statement 
that foreshadowed one of the major challenges CNDAV has faced in the post-reform 
period: whether CNDAV could begin to operationalize its own vision of grassroots 
involvement in the day-to-day decisions affecting WSS provision.  Even in a country 
as small, homogeneous, and relatively well-off as Uruguay, would proponents of 
“deep participation” in decision-making about WSS provision be able to demonstrate 
this was feasible and sustainable?  The years since the passage of the Constitutional 
Reform have revealed this to be a challenge more difficult to effectuate in practice 
than in rhetoric, and a source of angst for the future direction of the smaller, but still 
functioning, CNDAV.  
                                           
568 Interview with Adriana Marquisio by Rubén Yizmeyián, Rel-UITA. “The Most Essential Element 
is the Involvment of the People.” (“Lo esencial es que la gente se involucre”) Author’s translation from 
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6.6.  Challenges in the Post-Reform Period, 2004-2009  
 
6.6.1.  Fissures on the Left 
 
A. CNDAV versus Frente Amplio   
 
One of the first major challenges confronting the CNDAV occurred several 
weeks after the October 31st  victory.  In a move not wholly unanticipated by the 
leadership of the Comisión, but that was still considered a setback, the victorious FA-
EP dropped out of the CNDAV.  At issue was whether or not the constitutional 
amendment should be interpreted as having retroactive effect, a position that the 
Government-elect was against, calling instead for allowing the existing concessions 
to remain in operation until the expiration of their contracts.  Not surprisingly, this 
position was strenuously opposed by the other members of the CNDAV.  The 
motivation for Frente Amplio’s stance was first of all pecuniary, out of concern that 
the incoming Government might be liable to the two main private concessions for 
expropriation. This could saddle it with compensation that could run into the tens of 
millions of dollars.  REDES’ Alberto Villareal  told me that FA-EP was really 
worried that Aguas de la Costa might take Uruguay to an international tribunal like 
the ICSID under the bilateral BIT between France and Uruguay (Aguas de la Costa 
was a subsidiary of the French MNC Suez).569  Unlike in the case of URAGUA 
where the GOU had a basis for arguing that the company had breached its contract, 
                                           
569 Phone conversation with Alberto Villareal in Uruguay, November 28, 2004. 
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there was far less confidence that the Government could prevail in an international 
arbitral proceeding with Aguas de la Costa.  
                                          
Second, FA-EP’s position reflected the concern that the new constitutional 
amendment would send the wrong signal to investors.  The more centrist fractions of 
the political coalition, including the one to which the incoming Minister of Economy 
and Finance, Danilo Astori, belonged (Asemblea Uruguay), had a strong aversion in 
particular to “Special Disposition Z” which prohibited compensation to the 
expropriated concessions for the present value of lost future earnings.  In the months 
before the general election Tabaré Vasquez and Astori had traveled to Spain with a 
delegation of Uruguayan business representatives to assure investors that “contracts 
would be respected and that [investment] rules would be clear and permanent.”570  
Astori was well liked by Wall Street, and his appointment was taken as a reassuring 
signal by foreign investors and governments who otherwise might have felt jumpy 
about Uruguay’s new left-wing government.  
When the new FA-EP Government came into power in March 2005, there 
were signals that it would move to oust URAGUA for breach of contract with OSE 
re-assuming the provision of WSS in the Department of Maldonado.  The 
Undersecretary of  MVOTMA, under which OSE was subsumed, said that URAGUA 
was using the CR as a pretext, and that it had in fact wanted to get out of its contract 
since the 2002 financial crisis.571  Nevertheless, on May 20, 2005 the FA-EP 
government issued a presidential decree declaring that the CR could not legally be 
 
570 La Republica (Uruguay) online. “November 24, 2004. Promotores de la Reforma dijeron que el FA 
apoyó la iniciativa con ‘ligereza’.”    http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/160692-promotores-de-
la-reforma-dijeron-que-el-fa-apoyo-la-iniciativa-conligereza  (November 26, 2004). 
571 Espectador.com, online., March 10, 2005.  http://www.espectador.com/nota.php?idNota=38108  
(March 11, 2005).  
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interpreted as having retroactive effect, and that doing so would damage Uruguay’s 
legal framework for the respect of contracts.  The Decree was signed by all the new 
Cabinet Ministers, including the popular José Mujica, leader of the Movimiento de 
Participación Popular, the former Tupamaro-aligned fraction of the FA-EP (which 
garnered the largest bloc of votes in the 2004 national elections).  On the very next 
day, leaders of the CNDAV met in a plenary session in Maldonado and issued a 
declaration declaring that they rejected the Government’s Decree and would appeal it 
in the courts.572  Since the GOU had already commenced actions against URAGUA, 
the concern centered around Aguas de la Costa, with CNDAV arguing that this 
Decree would consolidate the presence of Aguas de la Costa until 2018.  Under the 
banner of several slogans-- “The popular will shall not be interpreted, it shall be 
fulfilled,” “With the Constitution Everything, Without It Nothing,” and “Water 
Belongs to All”-- CNDAV promised to mobilize nationally and demanded “strict 
adherence to the Constitution.”  It continued to invoke the same arguments against 
Aguas de la Costa that it had raised during the campaign: that hundreds of families 
were still excluded from access to water through their inability to pay connection 
costs and tariffs that were many multiples higher than those of OSE’s, that communal 
standpipes (canillas populares) had been dismantled, and that the company wreaked 
environmental damage through dessicating the Laguna Blanca, from which it drew 
water in the 1990s.573    One month later, on June 22, 2005, President Tabaré 
Vázquez met with the Directors of the Uruguayan National Union Federation, the 
                                           
572La Red VIDA. May 22, 2005.  Noticias, “La CNDAV rechaza decreto del Presidente Vázquez.”         
http://www.laredvida.org/noticiasdestacados.php?tipo_noticia=Noticia&cod_noticia=65 (January 23, 
2009).  




PIT-CNT, which FFOSE is affiliated.  Following that meeting, Adriana Marquisio 
held a press conference and announced that the FA-EP government had explained its 
rationale for the decree in terms of avoiding future claims from the two private 
concessions, whether through judicial action at the national level, or in internationa
tribunals.  Appearing mollified, Marquisio quoted the President as indicating that that
the GOU wanted to “completely comply with the CR,” and was looking into the 
possibility of taking back Aguas
l 
 
 de la Costa. 
                                          
Transnational activist networking next played a role in helping to speed this 
process along.  A global campaign against Suez was launched at its annual 
shareholders’ meeting in Paris in May 2005, hosted by French foundations and 
NGOs, including Friends of the Earth-France, Association for a Global Water 
Contract, and Frances Libertés, a foundation started by Danielle Mitterand, widow of 
the former French President.  Boston Common Assets, a Suez shareholder, used its 
proxy at Suez’s annual meeting to present a declaration of grievances from civil 
society groups in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the Philippines, and Uruguay.574  In 
September 2005, France Libertés organized a delegation to tour Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Uruguay to “promote the concept of water as a public good and to speak 
out against the privatization of water and sanitation countries.”575  The delegation, 
which included Mitterand, and the General Director of Aguas de Paris, among others, 
went to Uruguay to “urge the Uruguayan Government to  enforce the Constitutional 
reform… and expel Suez from the country.”  Ms. Mitterand stated that “a model born 
 
574 Pambazuka News-online. June 13, 2005. “Stop Suez Campaign Update,” 
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/advocacy/28546/print (January 30, 2009). 
575 Pierri, Raúl. September 23, 2005. “South America: Blocking the Wave of Privatisation of Water.” 
InterPress Service News Agency, Montevideo, Uruguay.   
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30402 (September 28, 2005). 
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in France has proved to be ineffective and unfair; it only benefits those who can 
afford to pay.”576 The delegation met with Uruguayan Vice President Nin Novoa and 
the Mayor of Montevideo, and in a meeting with OSE, the latter announced that it 
was analyzing the possibility of  renegotiating the contract with Aguas de la Costa. 
Less than two weeks later, on October 8, 2005, OSE and URAGUA officially signed 
the agreement transferring the Maldonado utility back to the State.  Members of 
CNDAV departed by caravan from Montevideo to Maldonado where they staged a 
jubilant celebration as part of the signing ceremony.    
 On February 20, 2006, the GOU announced that it would buy 60 percent of 
the shares in Aguas de la Costa from Aguas de Barcelona, the controlling Suez 
subsidiary, for $3.4 million.  The remaining 40 percent of shares would be retained by 
Uruguayan shareholders in Suez, who refused to sell.  CNDAV was displeased with 
this outcome, arguing that this public-private partnership was unconstitutional.577  
Nevertheless, they did not prevail. 
 
B. Participation from Above or Below? 
 
 
 As described above, CNDAV often found itself in an antagonistic relationship 
to the new FA-EP Government during its first year in office.  This was transformed 
into a more complex relationship after the Government created the National Water 
and Sanitation Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Aguas y Saneamiento, DINASA ) 
                                           
576 REDES-AT Comunicación. September 28, 2005. “French Municipal Authorities ask Uruguayan 
Government to Expel Suez,”  “Water-Warriors” listserv communication. 
577 Santos and Villareal. July 2006, 4. 
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in December 2005.578  Situated under MVOTMA, DINASA was created to 
implement the CR through a National Plan of Water Resources Management, a 
National Potable Water and Sanitation Policy, and a new water sector law intended to 
rationalize and streamline the multiple government agencies which had jurisdiction 
over WSS.579   DINASA was charged with formulating policies for the administration 
and protection of water resources, including ensuring universal access, and 
establishing criteria to prioritize WSS improvements, services, finance, and 
investments.  Article 331 of the law establishing DINASA further created a 
multistakeholder consultative body for civil society participation, the Advisory 
Commission on Water and Sanitation (Comisión Asesora de Agua y Saneamiento, 
COASAS).  The law specifies that COASAS should “incorporate the vision of distinct 
societal actors in the formulation of sectoral policies.”  It prescribes that  members be 
drawn from CSOs and consumer groups from the public and private spheres, as well 
as from the executive branch, the National Congress of Mayors, and the management 
of OSE, URSEA, and the University of the Republic (UDELARR).  As of 2009, 
COASAS had created four working groups (Water Resources, Water and Sanitation 
Services, Participation, and Norms/Regulations) that were meeting approximately 
five times a year, in addition to an annual plenary session.  It describes its governance 
structure as decision-making through consensus, when possible, and otherwise, by 
majority vote.  In an attempt to decentralize participation, COASAS has held 
occasional working group meetings in the interior cities of Treinta y Tres and Salto, 
                                           
578 DINASA was creaated under Law No. 17.930 of the National Budget for the period 2005-2009, 
December 19, 2005.  
http://www.mvotma.gub.uy/dinasa/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=96&Itemid=60  
(February 2, 2009). 
579 Taks 2008,17-22. 
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with the expectation that these might also provide guidance on how to institutionalize 
civil society participation at the water basin level—an objective explicitly articulated 
in the amendment to Article 47 of the Constitution (“Users and civil society should 
participate in all instances of planning, management and control of water resources, 
with water basins constituting the basic unit for [such].”580  It bears mention that the 
World Bank TTL I interviewed was not aware of the creation of COASAS in the new 
law.581  
 The CNDAV has been an active participant in COASAS, albeit with deeply 
conflicting feelings which have emerged in an internal debate about the identity of the 
post-reform Comisión.  CNDAV members Javier Taks and Verónica Iglesias of Casa 
Bertolt Brecht describe this debate as centering on whether CNDAV should 
participate in an “institutionalized space…from above,” such as COASAS, or regain 
its identity as an “autonomous organization” which fosters participation from below.  
The danger of engaging in what Iglesias calls “democratic participation” from above, 
as in COASAS, is that this “runs the risk of focusing on a networking model proposed 
by the Government…where decision-making depends on political will and the 
position of other actors.”582   She compares this kind of participation to the World 
Bank’s use of multistakeholder platforms, which she sees as being coopted by 
transnational corporations and multilateral lending institutions.   
 At the same time, Iglesias and Taks acknowledge that CNDAV has lost its 
identity as a grassroots movement in the post-reform period, with the result that 
“autonomous participation” from below has languished. Taks points out that while it 
                                           
580 Constitución de La República, Article 47. Author’s translation.  
581 Interview 1. 
582 Iglesias. July 2008. 
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still may be said that a “water social movement” exists in Uruguay, after the 2004 
victory many of the CNDAV member organizations withdrew from the coalition, 
leaving a core of activists focused on activities in Montevideo, while grassroots 
committees in other parts of the country disappeared.583  Iglesias argues that CNDAV 
has focused “much effort and time on international meetings and international 
coordination,” at the expense of building a participatory grassroots movement at 
home.584  There have been efforts to renew participation at the local level, especially 
around discussions of water resources, such as the Guaraní aquifer, but Iglesias writes 
that these efforts have been perceived by local actors as not much more than 
information dissemination. 
 Taks points out that the debate within CNDAV is also a product of mixed 
directions within the FA-EP center-left Government.  He credits DINASA for 
showing “clear intentions to follow the principles defended by the water movement,” 
but accuses the Ministry of Economy and Finance, headed by Astori, of promoting 
market-friendly policies such as outsourcing in the water sector, and accuses him of 
leaving water services open to negotiation in bilateral FTAs.   FFOSE’s Marquisio is 
particularly adamant in laying the blame for slow progress in implementing the CR at 
the doorstep of the FA-EP.  She states that the CNDAV is actually in a worse position 
in the post-Reform period because it’s confronting a government that’s not only 
maintaining the neoliberal model, but has in certain respects deepened it, through 
approval of environmentally-controversial “mega-projects” such as the Botnia 
                                           
583 Taks 2008, 21. 
584 Iglesias. July 2008, 55. 
310 
 
cellulose pulp mill on the Uruguay River, and by approving the U.S.-Uruguay BIT.585   
In Marquisio’s view the “progressive Government has actually demobilized the social 
movement, because mobilization is interpreted as an attack on [trade union and social 
movement] leaders in the Government.”586  Marquisio says almost nothing, however, 
about what FFOSE is doing to increase citizen participation in WSS delivery in 
accordance with the constitutional amendment, either through the CNDAV or through 
its seat on COASAS (where it represents the national trade union federation, PIT-
CNT).  Despite her espoused view that regulation should not equate to “further 
bureaucratization of the state, but the opening for social control and citizen 
participation in the planning, management and control of national water and 
sanitation policies,” none of the extensive publications by various members of 
CNDAV, including  FFOSE and REDES, have included any specific, concrete 
proposals for how this might be carried out in practice.  
 
6.6.2.  Multinationals Leave, Multilaterals Stay: The IFIs Adapt to a Post-PSP 
Environment 
 
 The successful CR and the attendant departure of the two multinational 
private operators in WSS produced no “Humpty Dumpty” effect with respect to 
continual lending by the IFIs.  On the contrary, the IFIs showed maximum flexibility 
in adjusting loan agreements and conditions to meet the new constraints of having to 
work exclusively with the public sector.  Within two months of assuming power, the 
new FA-EP Government cancelled one of the two 2003 World Bank SALs.  As a 
                                           
585 Marquisio 2006, 122-123. 
586 Bacchetta, Victor.  February 8, 2008. Interview with Adriana Marquisio. “Water, Development, and 
National Sovereignty.” Originally published in Brecha, 
http://www.guayubira.org.uy/english/Marquisio.html (August 7, 2008). 
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Bank Task Manager told me, the GOU was able to do so because economic 
conditions had improved since 2003, and one of the SALs had “tough conditionality” 
and financing terms that the GOU did not like or now need.587   The cancelled SAL 
was cross-linked, in terms of conditionality, with the Public Services and Social 
Sectors SAL which required PSP-related reforms in the WSS sector. To address the 
reality of the constitutional reform, the new Government requested a restructuring of 
the Public Services SAL.  It submitted a “Revised Letter of Development Policy” 
(which sets out the objectives, policies and measures it commits to) as part of the 
World Bank’s amended loan agreement for release of the second tranche.  The second 
tranche disbursement was reduced from $50 million to $40 million, and the third 
tranche of this SAL was cancelled.  In the amended loan agreement the Bank states: 
 
The amendments place those [original SAL] objectives within a new external 
and domestic environment in which the current government has to address 
public services and infrastructure investment requirements, particularly, 
legislative restrictions on private sector participation and a strong consensus of 
public opinion in favor of a greater role for the public sector.  As a 




Nonetheless, the Bank credits the GOU with having already made significant progress 
towards implementing the goals of the original 2003 SAL.  It cites URSEA’s work 
preparing for the implementation of regulatory accounting in the WSS sector, and 
regular publication by OSE and URSEA of performance indicators and data on water 
and service quality.  The amended loan removed prior conditions related to 
promulgating a law establishing a new legal and regulatory framework for WSS 
                                           
587 Interview 1. The cancelled SAL was the so-named  “Special SAL,” which was targeted at 
improving efficiency in the health and education sectors. 
588 World Bank. December 15, 2006.   
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which was to shift authority from OSE to the executive branch. The new FA-EP 
Government was instead committing to develop a new WSS regulatory framework as 
a medium-term objective in consultation with civil society through COASAS, and to 
“prepare in a participatory manner” a National Plan for Potable Water and Sanitation.  
The amended loan also cancelled the condition related to OSE awarding a 
performance-based contract to a private operator for management of the UFW 
program in Montevideo, since the CR rendered this type of arrangement illegal.  
Instead, OSE committed to developing and implementing new strategies for reducing 
UFW and increasing revenues through a new unit established under the OSE MSRP 
(APL-1), and to further other forms of “institutional renewal” to be supported by a 
new APL- 2 from the Bank.589   The World Bank task manager for the country whom 
I interviewed was in fact quite impressed with the new Government’s commitment to 
the WSS sector, as I note below.590  
 In late 2007, the Bank prepared two reports known as “Implementation 
Completion and Results Reports” (ICRs) for respectively, the closing of the first 
phase of the $27 million OSE MSRP loan (APL-1), and the closing of the amended 
Public Services SAL discussed above.591  These ICRs, which together assess 
outcomes for most of the same targeted reforms in the WSS sector, provide startlingly 
candid insights into the World Bank’s reaction to the constitutional reform and the 
manner in which it affected these Bank operations.  It is worth quoting extensively 
from these documents.  In the September 2007 ICR for the OSE MSRP, the Bank 
places the CR in the context of a “global paradigm shift” against PSP:   
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PSP in the water and sanitation sector notoriously failed to gain backing from 
politicians and the general public…Although a second concession was 
successfully awarded in August 2000 in Maldonado, a powerful anti-
privatization backlash had started sweeping the globe.  Given the magnitude of 
the global paradigm shift, it is unlikely any measures implemented by the 
project could have prevented the backlash against PSP and the subsequent 
2004 Constitutional Amendment, (emphasis mine) particularly in Uruguay 
where public utilities enjoy extensive support based on a satisfactory record of 
delivering services…On the other hand…Project design should be commended 
for not relying solely on high-risk PSP as a means for achieving institutional 
change…[it] included a range of alternative strategies such as sector unbundling 
and regulation, decentralization, and internal and external benchmarking, which 
together proved an effective contingency plan once PSP was made 
unconstitutional.592 
 
Although the Bank here states that there was little it could have done to prevent the 
backlash against PSP in Uruguay, and congratulates itself on a loan which included a 
diversified menu of options for reforming the WSS sector, a more nuanced picture 
emerges elsewhere in this same ICR and in the December 2007 ICR for the Public 
Services SAL.  In the ICR for the OSE MSRP  the Bank states: 
 
The World Bank’s push for increasing competitiveness in the WSS sector 
through private sector participation—under both the APL-1 and the Public 
Services and Social Sector Structural Adjustment Loan—may have provided 
an unintended impetus for the national backlash against private sector 
participation in the sector.  The granting of a management contract for the 
Montevideo water supply system to reduce UFW, which was specifically 
promoted via the SAL, but also supported by the APL-1, was deeply contested 
by OSE’s trade unions.  The trade union’s opposition proved one of the 
original catalysts of the 2004 national public referendum...593 
 
While FFOSE was indeed one of the original catalysts of the CR campaign, the IMF 
and SAL conditions associated with contracting out for reducing UFW in Montevideo 
could hardly be described as the key motivating factor behind the campaign, nor, as I 
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have argued, was FFOSE the dominant agent which catalyzed the campaign.  But 
with respect to the larger point—whether or not the Bank was implicated in the 
unraveling of the central PSP axis of its loans, the ICR for the Public Services SAL 
(whose outcome was rated  “moderately unsatisfactory”) was even more self-
reflectively critical: 
 
The design of the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) raises a fundamental 
question about whether far-reaching structural reforms can best be achieved at 
a time of deep crisis when conditionality can easily be perceived as an attempt 
to use external financing as a way to force through policy reforms without 
popular support.  This may be particularly true in consensus driven countries 
like Uruguay.  Sector reforms should be based on a realistic assessment of the 
political and economic context and the willingness of the people and the 
government to accept the reform…Discussions with officials of the current 
and previous administrations during program implementation showed that a 
program involving policy changes with many different objectives…involves 
regulatory rules and an institutional framework that can only work with 
popular support.  The Bank should understand and acknowledge cultural 
realities and, if needed, accept slowing down some reforms and relaxing some 
measures and controls.594  
 
 
There are further contradictions to be found in the Bank’s description of the 
“alternative strategies” and risk mitigation measures which it claims vindicated the 
original design of the OSE MSRP loan.  With respect to “unbundling,” for example, a 
term the Bank often uses to denote measures which increase competition “for the 
market,” such as the creation of an independent regulator, the Bank claims that its 
loans sparked not only the creation of the regulator URSEA, but also the creation of 
the policymaking body DINASA, which occurred under the new FA-EP Government.  
The creation of DINASA, it implies, comported with Bank recommendations to 
separate out the policymaking function which was formerly subsumed under OSE.  
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However, the record does not support the Bank’s view about the provenance of 
DINASA, even though the new Government no doubt concurred that OSE’s various 
conflicting roles should be divested to other independent agencies.  As discussed in 
the previous section, the creation of DINASA and COASAS followed from the new 
provisions of the amended Article 47 of the Constitution, which laid out specific 
social and environmental requirements for a national water and sanitation policy.595  
Underscoring the CR’s impetus in its creation, when the new Director of DINASA 
assumed his post on January 31, 2006, he cited compliance with Article 47 of the 
Constitution as the principal responsibility that the new agency had to undertake.  
Second to this was establishing coordination between the executive and legislative 
branches—hardly what the World Bank had in mind for the sector reform law that it 
advocated in the Public Services SAL and the OSE MSRP loans.596  In an amusing 
twist, the Bank was now even claiming credit for DINASA’s  role in “providing a 
space for policy dialogue, particularly with the emerging new sector actors, and 
increasing transparency and information sharing.”597  Further, CNDAV activists had 
for the several years of their campaign, been calling for the rationalization of the 
multiplicity of state entities that had overlapping jurisdiction over WSS and the 
management of water resources.  This was a central goal of the law creating 
DINASA, along with the mandate for public participation through COASAS.   
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Another centerpiece of the OSE MSRP loan pushed by the Bank was the 
“demand-driven” strategy for increasing connections to sewerage networks in 
Uruguay’s urban interior, a strategy the Bank was promoting as based on market 
principles (determined by “willingness-to-pay”), complementary to PSP, and full-cost 
recovery.  This strategy turned out rather differently than the Bank expected, with 
connection rates of only 44 percent at the close of APL-1, versus the original 80 
percent target.  The Bank had identified the risk of non-connection by the beneficiary 
population as negligible.  The Bank comments that the lower than-expected 
connection rate has also been observed in other countries, “for reasons not entirely 
clear.”  However, the Bank did discover an important reason for this phenomenon in 
Uruguay: it had failed to factor in the additional, and it turns out, preponderant costs 
of installing internal plumbing that would be borne by individuals--who otherwise 
demonstrated a great desire to connect to the network.  Moreover, the drawbacks of 
the Bank’s demand-driven sewerage approach had what the Bank describes as an 
“unintended impact,” which induced the new FA-EP Government to:  
 
…take the lead in the Region, and among middle income countries, to review 
appropriate sanitation standards. This was partially based on the APL-1’s 
experience of delivering demand-driven sewerage, which highlighted some of 
the common drawbacks of this approach (high per capita costs, low 
demand/ability of households to connect). The administration is overtly 
questioning the validity of the ‘universal sewerage’ model of highly 
developed countries, acknowledging that alternative sanitation options (such 
as cheaper private septic tanks) may be appropriate in some cases, particularly 
for small urban or low-density populations, where the per-capita public 
expenditure required for public sewerage systems and treatment plants is often 
prohibitively high.598 
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This provides a telling illustration of the Government rebuffing the Bank on the 
grounds that it preferred a more cost-effective solution than the Bank was advocating!  
It further illustrates that the Bank’s vaunted “demand driven” approach was hardly 
well thought out by Bank WSS experts, who failed to understand the real connection 
costs that households would bear.  
Yet another surprise which emerges in the ICR for the OSE MSRP is the fact 
that it was the neoliberal Batlle Government, with whom the Bank negotiated the 
loan, which “had limited ownership of the project and lacked commitment to 
institutional change,” despite the fact that the “Project approval stage was deliberately 
and effectively timed with a new Presidential election (in 2000) in a bid to secure a 
greater commitment to the project.” 599   In another droll twist, it was the left-wing 
FA-EP administration that the Bank credits with the commitment to institutional 
reform which finally aligned the project goals with OSE management and a new 
sector vision.  A World Bank Task Manager affirmed this to me in an interview, 
praising MVOTMA and DINASA for tackling all the non-PSP regulatory conditions 
that were included in the Public Services SAL, and for the “very competent” people 
selected to head up DINASA and URSEA.  “The FA-EP has a great opportunity to do 
things in this sector,” he said, “and are taking it very seriously…José Mujica (the ex-
Tupamaro), included.  He wants to improve the country.”600 
In conclusion, neither the World Bank nor the IDB have been deterred by the 
passage of the 2004 Constitutional Reform.  In fact, the Bank praised OSE for 
fulfilling several conditions in the APL-1 which improved operational and financial 
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efficiency, such as internal and external benchmarking (including publishing 
performance indicators), new programs for UFW reduction, and institutionally and 
physically decentralizing the Maldonado unit it re-absorbed from URAGUA.  
Notably, the Bank concludes from this that: 
These initial experiences suggest that there exist a broad range of external and 
internal incentives to promote efficiency gains and enhanced competition, 
which can be used to complement, or instead of, PSP. 601 (my emphasis) 
 
In Uruguay, at least, the Multilateral Development Banks have proved to be very 
adaptable partners—possibly out of self-interest in continued lending relationships.  
In June 2007, the World Bank approved $50 million in new lending for the Second 
Phase of the OSE Modernization and Systems Rehabilitation Program (APL-2).  The 
loan will support OSE’s strategy for continued improvement in client responsiveness 
and efficiency, will test a series of innovative initiatives to reduce UFW, and will 
complete sewerage expansion works in at least five interior cities.602  In December 
2008, the IDB announced an $80 million credit to OSE for improving sanitation and 




 The success of Uruguayan water activists in changing the country’s 
constitution has functioned as a real and symbolic victory for the transnational “water 
justice movement.”  It has had a demonstration effect on, and gave impetus to, other 
organizing efforts around the world to engage in constitutional engineering-- most 
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prominently in Colombia, but also in Mexico, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, and 
Nigeria, to greater or lesser degrees. “Blue October” memorializes the Uruguayan 
victory through an annual call to global water activists to generate,   publicize, and 
share local activities against privatization with transnational networks during that 
month.  In its press release for the third commemoration of Blue October in Uruguay 
in 2008, CNDAV characterized the constitutional reform as having  “transformed the 
country into an international referent…[where] currently, more than 40 countries are 
engaged in activities to change legislation along the same lines as the Uruguay 
experience.”604  While the number of countries may be exaggerated, there is little 
doubt that this small state generated a global ripple effect.     
 The Uruguayan case encapsulates the bi-directional transmission of  learning 
from domestic to international movements and back. CNDAV drew early strength 
from solidaristic networking with other transnational water and IFI-focused activists, 
such as through the World Social Forums in Brazil, and through domestic linkages 
with international networks (e.g., Friends of the Earth) opposing FTAs and BITs.  
One of the motivating factors behind the plebiscite campaign was concern over the 
risks faced by sovereign states under BITs, something the Uruguayan activists 
became aware of by engagement in regional and international “spaces.”  CNDAV 
participated in the founding of Red VIDA, and has continued to play a prominent role 
in that organization.  Southern CSO and NGO solidarity with CNDAV was manifest 
in the Uruguayan Social Forum in 2004, with the participation of organizations from 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay.  Northern NGOs and foundations, 
                                           
604 CNDAV and REDES-AT. October 28, 2008. “En un nuevo Octubre Azul:El cumplimiento total de 
la reforma es imprescindible.” Prensa.  http://www.redes.org.uy/2008/10/28/en-un-nuevo-octubre-
azul-el-cumplimiento-total-de-la-reforma-es-imprescindible/ (November 19, 2008). 
320 
 
including Public Citizen, the Council of Canadians, and Heinrich Böll, provided 
financial and public relations support, and greased the wheels of international 
solidarity towards the campaign.  Before the elections in 2004, more than 100 
organizations from 36 countries signed a declaration of support.  In the period since 
the CR victory, CNDAV has played an active role in the 2006 alternative water forum 
in Mexico City; has been active in the regional Inter-american Platform on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Development;  and has participated in international meetings 
in Europe and Central America, and in the creation of the African Water Network in 
2007. 
 As one observer notes however, “Despite Uruguay’s status as a beacon for the 
movement, many groups say that making water a constitutional human right is not 
enough… and  none of the campaign organizers believe a constitutional amendment 
is a silver bullet for their country’s water woes.”605  The real value, he adds, is in 
encouraging citizen participation and holding governments accountable.  And therein 
lies the double-edged sword for CNDAV and the long-term success of the 
Constitutional amendment.  The cultivation of its bright, international profile appears 
to have exacted a price on CNDAV’s own raison d’etre and the stated objectives of 
the CR.  Organizers of the CR have admitted that the success of their initiative has 
had a greater impact internationally than nationally.606  Grassroots participation has 
withered and the Comisión has so far not devised a successful program to reinvigorate 
it.  Nor has it put forth (at least in the public realm) any concrete proposals for 
“operationalizing” the mandate of the reform measure: integrating citizen input and 
                                           
605 Beeson, Bart. March 31, 2008. “New Wave of Water Movements in Latin America.” NACLA 
Online News.  http://nacla.org/node/4560 (April 8, 2008) 
606 Beeson.  March 31, 2008. 
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participation into “planning, management and control” of WSS provision and the 
protection and conservation of water resources.  The CNDAV is engaged in an 
internal debate over a variety of issues, including the desirability/efficacy of 
participating in the “institutionalized space” of COASAS, and what posture to adopt 
towards decentralization and regulation.  The positions that FFOSE has articulated 
against decentralization and regulation lend the appearance of the trade union taking a 
self-interested, protectionist stance, rather than a stand which takes the broader public 
interest into account.  Although there are reasons to be chary of the Bank’s 
indiscriminate push for decentralization when packaged with PSP (because as critics 
have argued, this may be a thinly-veiled strategy for pushing fiscally-strapped 
municipalities into the arms of private providers), this is unlikely to be a concern in a 
country where PSP is now illegal.  Javier Taks alludes to the fact that there is 
disagreement within CNDAV about this issue, pointing out that the decentralization 
of OSE’s management in Maldonado through a “public-public partnership” (between 
the utility and the municipality), may be the most effective way to increase 
transparency and accountability, and reduce UFW and costs.  Most prominently, there 
appears to be virtually no discussion in CNDAV literature of  how to address 
longstanding and continued problems in the WSS sector, e.g., lack of sewerage 
connections for a large  percentage of the interior’s population, leaks and UFW which 
raise costs, and utility tariffs that are among the highest in Latin America.  And while 
criticism has been leveled against the “multistakeholder” attributes of COASAS—
where CNDAV runs the risk of its proposals being rejected or diluted, this would not 
seem to preclude the Comisión from at least floating its own set of ideas.  In point of 
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fact, there has been more discussion of specific options for public participation in the 
Social Evaluation component of the World Bank’s MSRP loan to OSE, which 
discussed the strengths and weaknesses of some of the existing partnership 
arrangements between OSE, municipal governments, and community organizations 
throughout the country—especially in the urban interior.  None of CNDAV’s 
literature has referenced these types of arrangements, actual or potential. 
 In a strange irony, it appears to be the World Bank and IDB which have been 
more responsive to the constitutional reform than the activists.  Whether reluctantly 
or not, they have moved rather rapidly to adapt their program lending to the new 
reality of working exclusively with the public sector.  On the flip side, neither the 
CNDAV or FFOSE has complained about their continued operations in the country, 
which in actuality are likely a critical source of finance for improvements in WSS 
provision.  Its small size, relatively high income, political culture, and highly-
educated population, make Uruguay an ideal laboratory for a program and/or strategy 
that seeks to implement the provisions of the constitutional amendment.  The 
CNDAV could help to bolster the credibility of the water justice movement by 
turning its attention to this task.   
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 
 
 This dissertation has analyzed the uneven and contradictory process of agenda 
transformation in the World Bank with respect to PSP in urban water and sanitation in 
developing countries.  It has focused in particular on the role of transnational activist 
networks in influencing agenda change and the ways in which that change has in turn 
transformed TANs and domestic activist coalitions.  I examine these processes at the 
international levels of Bank policymaking and activist networking, and through the 
case study of Uruguay. 
 The Bank’s turn to PSP in the 1990s reflected its larger neoliberal 
development agenda, an extension of the principles and policies underlying the so-
called “Washington Consensus.”  Several intellectual trends and policy initiatives in 
the 1980s and 1990s supported arguments advanced by proponents of water sector 
privatization.  The 1992 “Dublin Statement” was a turning point in affirming water as 
an economic good as well as a social/merit good.  The “new public management” 
school of thought provided theoretical and ideological support for advocates of 
privatization, and underpinned the Bank’s conceptual arguments for PSP in a natural 
monopoly sector. Changes in the global political economy, such as trade and financial 
liberalization, the push toward privatization, and deregulation enabled TNCs’ 
investments in infrastructure sectors during the 1990s.  
 But turbulence in global markets and inherent tensions in the globalization 
process constrained PSP in the 2000s, as financial destabilization buffeted numerous 
developing countries. TNCs’ interest in the sector dwindled due to a realization that 
profit-making opportunities were lower than expected and risks were significantly 
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higher.  Disaffected publics felt deceived by infrastructure privatizations, which 
became associated with higher utility rates, higher profits for foreign companies, and 
corruption.  Neoliberal politicians and governments fell victim to this disaffection and 
market reform fatigue, especially in Latin America (the recipient of a major share of 
PSP in infrastructure), where a wave of center-left governments swept into office 
during the 2000s.  Client states that had suffered politically from the uptick in loans 
with PSP conditionality reduced their demand for such loans.   
  Popular disillusionment with the negative effects of market liberalization and 
globalization.  bolstered social movement mobilization by TANs and domestic 
activist coalitions.  Activists and TANs which had criticized structural adjustment 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s migrated to anti-privatization and water justice 
networks in the 2000s.  As I discussed in Chapter Five, TANs deployed frames 
against water privatization that combined the themes of human rights and access to 
essential services with criticisms of the IFIs’ neoliberal policies.  Activist 
mobilization increased the risk profile of investments for TNCs and put pressure on 
politicians and governments to resist PSP loan conditions.  TANs put the Bank in an 
uncomfortable global spotlight, forced it to recalibrate the weights assigned to water 
as a public versus economic good, empowered both civil society and client states 
disaffected with PSP, and compelled the Bank to reevaluate PSP’s effects on poverty 
reduction.    
 The Bank has produced research that reflected experiential learning and that 
has overturned at least one previous generation of thinking about PSP.  Knowledge 
cumulation and discrete learning by the Bank has been a product of unmet 
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expectations from private sector investors, failures in project performance and 
development outcomes, and political resistance to PSP.  The flight of WSS service 
TNCs forced the Bank back to the drawing board to consider alternative sources of 
investment finance, which pulled it back into the domain of  public finance.  
Experiential learning occurred because of a combination of external and internal 
influences impossible to segregate or assign specific weights.  One of the 
contributions I make in this dissertation is to show, however, that the Bank’s learning 
in this issue area has been only partial and contradictory.  This is a result of 
unresolved, and perhaps irresolvable, tensions between the Bank’s structural and 
functional imperatives as a development bank and knowledge broker, and its 
intellectual culture, which reinforces the dominant discourse of mainstream 
economics and neoliberalism. Organizational power asymmetries (e.g., the 
differential bureaucratic influence of experts versus task team leaders and country 
directors) have also militated against sustained learning. 
 Tensions between knowledge production and ideology were evident in my 
analysis of Bank literature and confirmed by interviews with Bank staff.  These 
revealed discordance between the content of key Bank documents and knowledge 
outputs, and policy recommendations which followed thereon.  Conclusions and 
policy recommendations reproduce the dominant neoliberal paradigm, confirming 
that the Bank engages in “paradigm maintenance.”  Despite the intellectual 
recognition that both private-sector and public-sector utilities’ performance is 
dependent on well-functioning enabling institutions, the Bank continues to revert to 
ideological recalcitrance in favoring the private sector.  It has refused to put into 
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practice the agnosticism that it has rhetorically professed for the last six years.  At the 
same time, as was demonstrated by the case study of Uruguay, the Bank’s profit-
making imperative can trump ideology in situations where the Bank won’t be left 
with “egg on its face.”  This pragmatism is consonant with the disbursement and 
approval culture, and reflects the bureaucratic influence wielded by the operations 
and lending side of the Bank. 
 One of the strengths of TANs in this issue area has been their horizontal and 
democratic engagement with domestic campaigns, which have driven agenda change 
internationally and nationally.  As TANs lost a framing target when TNCs retreated 
and the IFIs’ WSS project lending declined, TANs began to reorient their activities 
and frames toward articulating alternatives to PSP.  However, the focus on attaining 
an ideal-type of democratic participation, present in Uruguay’s CNDAV and in some 
international TANs, has diverted attention away from the fundamental issues of 
improving access and services for the poor.  As a result, alternatives to PSP that are 
deemed acceptable are at times narrowed to a degree that suggests continued 
ideological rigidity.  This leads to the impression that the “search for the perfect may 
be enemy of the good.”  
 
7.1. Implications of the Dissertation’s Findings for Research and Policy  
 
Implications for Scholarship 
 
 
 The case of PSP in water presented in this dissertation validates Weaver’s and 
Miller-Adam’s theoretical framework for analyzing the Bank not only through the 
traditional international relations lens of principal-agent dynamics, but also through 
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the lens of its internal bureaucratic culture.  With respect to external influences on the 
Bank, scholarly literature has often rightly emphasized the disproportionate influence 
of the Bank’s largest donors (in particular, the United States) on Bank ideology and 
agenda-setting.  However, this study showed that client countries and private actors, 
both TNCs and TANs, were more influential than donor states in transforming the 
Bank’s PSP agenda during the 2000s.  Accelerated changes in the global political 
economy altered the balance of power between these actors and the Bank.  Agenda 
setting and agenda transformation at the Bank cannot therefore be viewed as 
reflecting “hegemonic” donor preferences; a constellation of external actors and 
forces can undercut those preferences. 
 Analogously, with respect to the Bank’s internal organizational culture, this 
study confirms that the Bank cannot be viewed as a bureaucratic monolith.  The 
operations side of the Bank can be in conflict with the knowledge production side of 
the Bank, as other scholars have pointed out, but the knowledge production side of 
the Bank can also be in conflict with itself.  Knowledge production runs headlong 
into ideology and vice versa.  The case of agenda change in PSP confirms that the 
Bank engages in “paradigm maintenance,” but it also points to a learning process 
within the Bank, around, for example, articles of faith such as full-cost recovery and a 
general disdain for  subsidies.  The acquisition of experiential knowledge, and the 
belated acknowledgement that the effects of PSP on the poor could not be quantified, 
contributed to the Bank’s retreat from its original orthodoxy.  Learning thus “pushed 
back” at the dominant paradigm, albeit only up to a certain point.  Future research 
might explore the issues and conditions which create space between ideology and 
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learning (both internal and external), how much space can be created, and how that 
space is navigated within the Bank.   
 With respect to the literature on TANs, this study has affirmed the centrality 
of domestic politics and mobilization to TANs’ influence and efficacy. “Trans-
mestic” activism is a good typological moniker for describing the water justice 
movement.607  The dissertation demonstrated that domestic activist coalitions, with 
the support of TANs, can influence core neoliberal tenets of Bank policy.  These 
neoliberal tenets, or elements of structural adjustment policies, were previously 
considered to be unconducive to mobilization because of a long and complex causal 
chain.  Mobilization was in this case facilitated by strategic framing, linking the core 
neoliberal tenet of privatization to a basic need with great symbolic resonance.  
Typical modalities of NGO influence on the Bank, such as insider-outsider alliances 
and donor pressure, were respectively, nonexistent or minimal.  The Uruguay case 
illustrates how TANs are reinvigorated and energized by the demonstration effect of a 
successful domestic campaign, and seek to replicate that success elsewhere.  Future 
research might focus on what TANs learn from “trans-mestic” political alliances 
based on strong domestic political coalitions, and how trans-mestic activism alters 
political opportunity structures and targeting.  
 
Implications for Bank Policy 
 
 Two of the critical unmet challenges facing the Bank in water supply and 
sanitation are building regulatory capacity in developing countries, and ensuring that 
                                           
607 I thank Jim Riker for introducing me to this phrase.  
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improvements in WSS benefit the poor.  I have noted throughout the dissertation 
contradictions between the Bank’s acknowledgement of the critical role of institutions 
and regulation, and its practice in this area.  In the wake of the private sector’s 
unwillingness to invest in WSS, the Bank’s prescribed ratio of government versus 
private sector roles in expanding WSS services to the poor has effectively reverted 
back to the pre-PSP era.  The public sector again has the lion’s share of responsibility 
for being financier, regulator, and redistributor in the WSS sector.  Yet all the 
literature confirms that neither public nor private WSS providers can meet efficiency 
or equity goals without effective institutional and regulatory infrastructure in place.  
The Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group has stated that “support for institutional 
reform and capacity building has had limited success in the sector.”608  The Bank has 
funded these activities frequently, but the IEG notes they have been “less than fully 
effective and weak institutions have often been responsible for project 
shortcomings.”609  Economist and privatization expert Gerard Roland offered a 
pessimistic assessment of the prospects for institution building in poorer developing 
countries (see Chapter Two).  He noted that privatization or PSP becomes 
“increasingly complex in more monopolistic environments where good regulation is 
easier said than done…Calling for better regulation might be illusory because it 
would require a major institutional overhaul that is not in the cards in the immediate 
future.”610  As noted, regulation is necessary for both public and private utilities, 
though the challenges are greater for utilities with PSP, since these involve 
                                           
608 Independent Evaluation Group 2010, xiv. 
609 Independent Evaluation Group 2010, xiv. 
610 Roland 2008, 17-18. 
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informational asymmetries between often weak states and experienced private 
operators.   
 This case raises the question of how regulatory capacity building can be better 
supported by the Bank and other development finance institutions.  If there a 
structural contradiction between the profit-making role of the Bank and the patient 
capital needed for building regulatory/institutional capacity, how might this be 
addressed?  To what extent does corruption impede the development of this capacity?  
The IEG’s evaluation does not elaborate on the reasons for weak performance in the 
WSS-related institution-building activities that the Bank has supported; this is an area 
that needs to be fully and transparently explored.  The Bank often focuses on a 
circumscribed definition of regulation—one that is primarily focused on investors’ 
concerns and secondarily on users’ concerns.  Absent is a focus on truly pro-poor 
regulation, i.e., regulation that addresses equity and distributional issues as much as 
the protection of property and contract rights.  If the Bank is serious about improving 
WSS delivery to the poor, it must incorporate equity and distributional criteria in its 
policy and project lending.  It must also produce measurable and independently 
verifiable results of improvements in WSS service delivery to the poor, something it 
has yet to do. 
 
Implications for TANs and Water Justice Activists 
  
 A Bank official I quoted earlier stated to me that “advocacy is cheaper than 
building toilets.”  An internationally prominent water activist in the U.K. analogously 
expressed the view that the water justice movement’s credibility and influence would 
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have been greater (and would have had an earlier impact on the DFID) had it offered 
concrete alternatives to PSP.  Just as with the pro-privatization obsession of the Bank, 
the anti-privatization obsession of some activists has deflected attention and energy 
from the real concern: getting water and sanitation to poor people.  This is not to say 
that water activists should have tempered their critique of privatization and PSP.  
Rather, that critique should have been accompanied earlier on by proposed 
alternatives.  As I discuss in Chapter Five, some water justice activists did turn their 
focus to this in the middle of the last decade.  TANs have linked with water 
professionals in the public sector of developing countries as they have championed 
public-public partnerships and alternative forms of service delivery.  TANs could 
further bolster their effectiveness and credibility by linking, where feasible, to experts 
who can provide technical support for improving WSS services and designing 
alternative supply models. 
 The Bank official who commented on activists and toilets also acknowledged 
that the Bank needs to pay more attention to improving the performance of public 
utilities. The Bank has no choice now but to revisit the public utility model of WSS 
delivery.  Further, both the Marin and Gassner studies explicitly acknowledge that 
labor force reductions in utilities with PSP (and presumably also public utilities that 
wish to rationalize their labor force) must address displacement of redundant workers 
and their attendant loss of public sector employment benefits.  These realities provide 
openings for activists with bona fides and concrete suggestions to influence the future 
direction of the Bank’s work with public utilities.  
 





1. Comparison of Water and Sanitation to the Electricity Sector.  Have the limitations 
and challenges the Bank has confronted in the WSS sector emerged as issues in other 
infrastructure sectors, particularly those which are also, at least in part, natural 
monopolies?  The electricity/power sector would be a useful case to look at in this 
regard.  It shares some, but not all, of the characteristics of water supply and 
sanitation. Although electricity does not have the same human rights characteristics or 
“essential” attributes as WSS with respect to effects on mortality and morbidity, it is a 
clear marker of development linked to improvement in livelihoods and living 
conditions. As with WSS, affordability and tariff structures are key social and 
political concerns. Electricity generation and distribution, but not transmission, have 
typically been identified as the components of the sector most amenable to 
privatization.  Unlike in WSS, most of the PSP that has occurred in electricity 
distribution has involved partial or full divestiture.611  Nevertheless, even with the 
concomitant responsibility for private investment that attends divestiture, the World 
Bank found low levels of total investment by the private sector, analogous to water.  
Further, the Bank acknowledges that electricity’s unique economic and technical 
characteristics make the sector highly vulnerable to the exercise of market power, and 
regulatory oversight is thus essential.  But it also acknowledges that this oversight is 
hard to come by even in developed countries, as was demonstrated by the crisis in 
California in 2000 and 2001.  The deeper level of private sector involvement in the 
sector, and the Bank’s very explicit acknowledgement that PSP is vulnerable to 
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monopolistic abuse by private actors, make the electricity sector an interesting 
comparative case.  To the extent that political opposition to electricity privatization 
has occurred, has it differed because of these characteristics?  Specifically, the sector 
itself might have less symbolic and tactical resonance than water in terms of 
transnational organizing, but could potentially generate more traction locally if this 
more-fully privatized sector fails to perform to expectations or engages in visible 
abuse of monopoly power.   
 
2. Analysis of the Water Dialogues Multistakeholder Process.  In Chapter Five I 
touched on the  Water Dialogues multistakeholder process that terminated in 2009.  
An in-depth analysis of this process would be useful and interesting, particularly with 
an eye to analyzing the differential impacts of the country-focused dialogues, the role 
of TANs and domestic civil society organizations in the process, the extent to which 
tensions around PSP were mitigated between proponents and opponents—and the 
reasons for this, and any impacts on the development finance institutions.  The 
authors of the final report on the Dialogues noted two opposing tendencies among 
participants at the conclusion of the process.  On the one hand, some participants 
gained a more “nuanced” understanding of  PSP as they recognized that the private 
sector encompassed a range of actors, including small-scale, community-based 
providers.  Concerns over the challenges of finance and regulation supplanted a more 
“black and white” oppositional stance.  For other participants, the key issues, such as 
water as an economic good versus human right, were still as sharp and polarized as at 
the outset of the process.  What factors accounted for these differences among 
participants?  Did these correlate with the differences in consensus versus 
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confrontational process styles among the countries?  Did the Water Dialogues process 
deepen critics’ willingness and/or ability to formulate specific alternatives to PSP, or 
predispose them toward engagement with the opposing side (be it governments or the 
MDBs)?  Follow-up studies in the participant countries would of course be a useful 
sequel for understanding the longer-term significance of multistakeholder processes. 
 
 3. The Role of Public Utilities Going Forward.  As I discussed above, the Bank has 
perforce returned to looking at the role of public utilities in the WSS sector, which 
again are the main recipients of its lending.  How is it approaching this process in the 
wake of the failure of its PSP agenda?  How is this reflected in its project lending and 
country and sector work?  In the research studies I have discussed in this dissertation, 
the Bank invariably identifies shortcomings in its own work and in expected results—
e.g., the lack of data on the poverty impacts of PSP.  Going forward, and especially as 
the MDG target date of 2015 approaches, it would be elucidating to track the extent to 
which the Bank takes up the challenges it has laid out over the last decade for 
improving WSS delivery to the poor, and whether/how this alters the balance between 








Common Types of PSP Contracts 612 
 
Subcontracting arrangement/service contract:  the private party performs specific, 
time-bound tasks, such as supplying inputs, taking care of planning studies, 
computing and payroll services or public relations, construction, maintaining assets, 
installing meters or billing customers, usually in exchange for a fixed fee. In this 
situation, the private sector bears very little risk and there is very little uncertainty 
around the expected outputs. In recent years, more and more activities have been 
outsourced that way to the private sector, including the task of reducing non-revenue 
water. 
 
Management Contract: a private firm is appointed by the government to provide 
managerial services, often for a fixed fee. The contract typically requires the private 
party to manage a utility and provide services to the public for a given period of time. 
The remuneration of the private operator may be fixed at the outset, in which case the 
commercial risks of the operation are borne entirely by the public sector, or it may be 
linked to the performance of the utility, in which case the private operator bears some 
commercial risk. More and more countries resort to this type of contractual 
arrangement to facilitate transfer of know-how and to develop greater understanding 
of the implications of involving the private sector as part of a gradual approach to the 
private sector participation.  
 
Lease:  a written agreement under which a property owner allows a tenant to use the 
property for a specified period of time and a specified rent. The private-sector 
operator is responsible for providing the service at its own risk, including operating 
and maintaining the infrastructure for a given period of time. The operator is not 
responsible, however, for financing investment such as the replacement of major 
assets or expansion of the network. If payments from users cover more than the 
operator’s remuneration, the operator is generally supposed to return the difference to 
the public authorities in order to cover the cost of the investments under the latter’s 
responsibility. 
 
Affermage: only differs from a lease in terms of revenue for the private sector. In 
both cases, the private operator collects the tariffs and pays, on top of the operation 
and maintenance costs, a fee to the public sector. But while this fee is fixed in the first 
case, it is proportional to the volume of water sold in the second case. An affermage 
contract is currently underway for the provision of urban water in Senegal. A lease 
was signed in Yerevan, Armenia, in 2006. 
 
Concession: the private operator is also responsible for asset replacement and 
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SectorParticipation in Water Infrastructure: OECD Checklist for Public Action Box 1.2, p. 19. 
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network expansion. The level of risk transferred to private sector is therefore higher 
and compounded by the nature of remuneration of the operator, mainly based on user 
charges. Concessions were the predominant contractual arrangement adopted in Latin 
America in the 1990s. 
 
Public limited company:  a commercial company is formed but owned by local, 
provincial and national government. The Dutch Water Supply Act spread the 
methodology in the water sector of the Netherlands.  
 
Water co-operatives, customers are members of the board, but they are uncommon 
in large cities. They constitute a common form of rural water provision in Chile. 
 
Full or partial Divestiture: ownership of the existing assets and responsibility for 
future upkeep and expansion are transferred to the private sector. Very few countries 
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